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Abstract 
The thesis explores cooperative security efforts between the United States and 
Russia in the framework of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Programme and 
other non-proliferation programmes, which were established in the aftermath of the 
Soviet collapse as a response to nuclear proliferation threats in the former Soviet 
Union. One of the main objectives of CTR is to reduce nuclear dangers associated with 
vast nuclear arsenals, which first and foremost, means reductions in nuclear weapons.  
This work presents an overview of different proliferation threats ranging from 
proliferation of nuclear material to potential “brain-drain” from the former Soviet 
nuclear complex, explains their technical and socio-economic aspects and assesses the 
effectiveness of the U.S.-Russian programmes, which deal with these threats. The CTR 
process has encountered some major obstacles on its way. The research suggests that 
some important problems in the implementation of CTR programmes are of 
bureaucratic nature. However, bureaucratic factors are aggravated by the political 
factors stemming from the fact that the national security policies of the U.S. and Russia 
are still in part based on concepts and strategies adopted during the Cold War. This is 
especially evident with regard to the role assigned to nuclear weapons by both 
countries. Therefore, the CTR process is used as a laboratory study of the U.S.-Russian 
strategic relations in the post-Cold War era. 
The study demonstrates that the processes happening in the international security 
system below the surface and which might not be so obvious at a glance can be 
absolutely important for the future of the international system. The CTR process 
represents a mechanism, which can be used to build a new international system, where 
the role of the nuclear weapons becomes more and more obsolete. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction1
 
1.1. Topic of Research  
1.1.1 U.S.-Russian Relations after the Cold War: Confronting the Nuclear 
Threat 
The strategic nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet 
Union was one of the defining features of the bipolar international system during the Cold 
War when the two superpowers accumulated immense nuclear arsenals. It would have been 
expected that the transformation of the security relationship between the United States and 
Russia would necessarily involve a fundamental shift in its military dimension. While this 
was true for the deployment of military forces in Europe, the strategic nuclear relationship 
did not change in line with the changes in the global security environment. Two seemingly 
contradictory and yet related phenomena could be observed: The structure of the nuclear 
relationship in terms of force and alert postures remained essentially the same, albeit at 
lower levels. At the same time, a major cooperative programme was launched to provide 
for the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the safety and security of 
nuclear materials and other elements of the nuclear weapons complex in the former Soviet 
Union. This Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) process significantly transcended the 
previous relationship based on insecurity and mistrust and constituted a genuine effort at 
cooperation that defied the assumptions of the international order during the Cold War 
period.  
The current work looks in depth at cooperative security efforts between the United 
States and Russia – this includes Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR Programme) and 
several other programmes, which were established by the different U.S. Departments and 
represent the cooperative threat reduction process. The CTR process is used as a 
laboratory study of the U.S.-Russian strategic relations in the post-Cold war era. It 
demonstrates both the achievements and limitations of the evolving new framework for 
interaction between the U.S. and Russia.  In this respect, from a scholarly point of view, it 
                                                 
1 The U.S. spelling is preserved in the direct quotations and the names of the private organisations 
2 
is interesting to put the CTR process into a larger picture of U.S.-Russian relations, as it can 
also help to identify whether some problems of implementation of CTR programmes are 
influenced by political factors. 
In this work, “cooperative threat reduction” refers to all the major U.S.-funded 
programmes designed to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation in Russia. This includes 
the original Department of Defence’s CTR Programme, and other programmes 
administered by the Departments of Energy, and State. The current work focuses on 
‘nuclear’ dimension of cooperative threat reduction and does not cover issues of biological 
and chemical weapons proliferation, although concerns about these threats are addressed in 
the U.S.-Russian CTR cooperation. 
The immediate concern that motivated the Cooperative Threat Reduction process 
was the risk of the loss of control of nuclear weapons, materials and expertise in the wake 
of the disintegration of the USSR and the social and economic dislocation in the former 
Soviet space. It became a more integral part of the evolving U.S.-Russian nuclear 
relationship as the reductions in the arsenals and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from 
Eastern Europe and various parts of the former Soviet Union necessitated a substantial 
programme of warhead dismantlement and nuclear materials disposition in Russia. The 
dismantlement process entails many difficulties of technical and socio-political nature. First 
of all, the process of denuclearisation raises a lot of questions for the safety and security of 
nuclear weapons and materials. Thus, for example, a weapon to be dismantled in Russia 
should be first delivered to the assembly/disassembly plant. In a situation of political and 
economic instability, transportation of nuclear weapons becomes very dangerous. There is 
a problem of the technical safety of weapons to be transported in special rail trains. 
Moreover, there is a concern that during transportation these weapons can be stolen and 
used by unauthorised parties (dissident military leaders, those seeking financial profit from 
selling them to terrorist groups and organisations, or terrorist groups themselves). Even 
more dangerous is the amount of nuclear materials generated by the process of 
dismantlement. Fissile material from dismantled weapons can be re-used, and therefore, is 
attractive to threshold/rogue states, terrorists, or those looking for a quick profit from 
selling illicitly acquired goods.  
There are also serious problems relating to the storage of nuclear weapons and 
materials. Currently, Russian storage facilities are overloaded with the nuclear warheads 
removed from the non-Russian republics as a result of their adherence to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear states. 
3 
The denuclearisation process in Russia also means that thousands of people are 
being deprived of their work, privileged position in society and the simple means of 
existence. It is not only a matter of state responsibility to provide former employees of the 
nuclear complex with jobs. These people possess unique knowledge which could 
significantly decrease the time for rogue states willing to pay for their services to obtain 
nuclear capability. The increase in the number of nuclear states can undermine the global 
system of non-proliferation, and will greatly increase instability in the world. The CTR 
Programme was designed to confront these problems.  With time several other non-
proliferation assistance programmes were established to address specific problems.   
The CTR Programme defies conventional thinking about strategic relations as well 
as public policy. This is because it involves close technical collaboration on the most secret 
and closely guarded elements of the military-industrial complex that provides the backbone 
of the means to guarantee national security. It goes against the grain of political and 
military culture, and involves a degree of cooperation and altruism that marks a very radical 
departure from U.S.-Russian relations in the past. Moreover, it requires the political leaders 
to overcome considerable resistance among their political elites to confront a threat that 
may or may not be imminent and the overall dimensions of which are disputed and hard to 
estimate. It therefore requires an explanation of how CTR could come into existence, 
assess its achievements, the extent to which its objectives were accomplished and explain 
the constraints that caused it to fail to achieve its full potential or fully deal with the threat 
that it was designed to meet. 
1.2 Conceptual Framework  
The first research question identified for this thesis, which aims at placing the CTR 
process in the context of the U.S.-Russian post-Cold War strategic relations, can be 
answered with the help of the conceptual framework described in the following section. 
The first part of my work (Chapter 2) discusses the issues of the U.S.-Russian 
strategic relations with regards to the changing role of the nuclear weapons in the new 
international security system in order to provide basis for testing problems of 
implementation for each individual programme (Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7) on being 
dependent on political factors in U.S.-Russian strategic relations. An attempt is made to 
demonstrate the correlation between the significance of nuclear weapons assigned to them 
by Russia and the U.S. and various scenarios for bilateral relations. In order to fulfil this 
task the following conceptual framework (Table 1) is developed and main schools of 
thoughts on the role of nuclear weapons are presented. 
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Table 1 Possible Scenarios in U.S.-Russian Strategic Relations 
Scenarios Characteristics  Associated Problems 
Scenario 1 
Complete Disarmament 
No nuclear arsenals retained by 
Russia and the U.S.;  
Problem of rogue/threshold states
Scenario 2 
Cooperative 
Denuclearisation 
Very low level of nuclear 
arsenals, not on alert 
Denuclearisation creates additional 
pressure on extending cooperative 
threat reduction 
Scenario 3 
Strategic Arms 
Reductions 
Reductions within START2 
framework; significant nuclear 
arsenals on both sides 
“Strategic Paradox” resulting from 
too many weapons for the post—
Cold War era 
Scenario 4  
Strategic Confrontation 
Retention of large nuclear 
arsenals 
Instability of the international 
security system 
 
The above scheme defines four major scenarios for the U.S.-Russian strategic 
interaction in relation to the role of nuclear weapons.  
The first possible scenario would represent a complete disarmament. A total 
elimination of the nuclear arsenals possessed by Russia and America can be perceived as a 
final goal of the nuclear disarmament. In the ideal circumstances, such outcome would 
mean a disappearance of the threat of an all-wage nuclear war and increased stability in the 
world. However, this idealistic picture is far from being realisable, at least, for several 
decades to come. Even if other nuclear powers (member states of the NPT) would follow 
the unprecedented move of Russia and the U.S. for complete disarmament, a world will 
still face a number of so called rogue/threshold states and self-declared nuclear states. 
Taking into consideration the motives of the countries engaged in unauthorised nuclear 
production, it seems a much harder task to persuade them to give up with their nuclear 
intentions. These countries most always see the development of nuclear programme 
(covert or open) as a primary matter of their national security. Being deprived from other 
means of guarding their state security and being weak in other aspects (bad economy, low 
                                                 
2 START refers to Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties. START-limited systems are warheads and 
delivery vehicles, which fall under START requirements for dismantlement. 
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levels of conventional forces) they are out of direct influence or control of the NPT 
members (even in case of their own disarmament). 
The second scenario is characterised by the emphasis being shifted away from the 
nuclear weapons. In other words, the role of the nuclear weapons in the world politics is 
changing dramatically. In this scenario, Russia and the U.S. would posses a very small 
amount of the nuclear arsenals, ‘off alert’. The notion of cooperative denuclearisation is the 
most viable option for the current state of international security system.  
The main feature of the third scenario is strategic arms reductions, which is 
represented by the START process. In today’s circumstances, START is an important part 
of the U.S.-Russian strategic relations and is praised for reducing the numbers of weapons 
on both sides. But at the same time this process created a phenomenon of ‘strategic 
paradox’: both countries are reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons, but this reduction 
in absolute terms fails to make a difference. After meeting the START levels the U.S. and 
Russia will still remain with excessive numbers of the nuclear weapons. This fact creates a 
‘strategic paradox’ when two countries are no longer enemies, but  have a capability of 
destroying each other (as well as the rest of the world). 
The need for the nuclear deterrence is driven by the presence of hostility between 
the states. If this is removed, the preservation of nuclear relations becomes absurd. Just 
after the end of the Cold War the problem of safety and security was clear cut for both the 
U.S. and the Russian governments. Attention was attracted to the elimination or at least 
reduction of nuclear threats and dangers from a disintegrating Soviet state. Safety was and 
still is at the core of U.S.-Russian cooperation, but not the question of nuclear relations per 
se.  
The most negative scenario would be the retention of large arsenals on both sides. 
In other words, Russia and the U.S. would engage in a strategic confrontation similar to the 
Cold War period. Such outcome would mean a growing instability in the world. 
The distinction between these four scenarios is not clear-cut.  There can be a 
mixture of features of more than a one defined scenario. The U.S.-Russian cooperation 
within the CTR framework can be a part of scenarios 2 & 3. The goal is to test the 
assumption that the future of cooperative threat reduction is determined by the state of the 
U.S.-Russian strategic relations, and in particular, by the role the countries will assign to 
nuclear arsenals in their strategic policies. 
One of the main hypotheses of this thesis is that the CTR process is influenced by 
unique conditions of a post-Cold war international security environment, in other words, 
that political factors are no less important than bureaucratic factors, and occasionally, there 
is no clear separation between the factors of political and bureaucratic nature. 
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The post-Cold War international security system calls for a re-evaluation of nuclear 
strategies of the U.S. and Russia and demands re-examination of the U.S.-Russian strategic 
relations currently still based on the dominant role of nuclear weapons.  The role of nuclear 
arsenals has to be re-considered since their justification as a means of deterrence and war-
fighting has been considerably reduced due to the changed nature of conflicts and new 
security requirements since the end of the Cold War. (See the discussion on the role of 
nuclear weapons in Chapter 2) 
The response of the two large nuclear powers and former adversaries to the 
changed nature of their relationship and the international system more generally has been 
contradictory. On the one hand, one can say that the U.S. and Russia have failed so far to 
adjust their strategic relations to the new security environment.  Their nuclear postures are 
still more appropriate for the Cold War period. Despite the positive rhetoric, U.S.-Russian 
relations are still far from demonstrating a true partnership.  A decade since the end of the 
Cold War many aspects of the bilateral relations are influenced by lingering Cold War 
thinking, lack of trust and cultural differences. 
On the other hand, despite the above caveats, the START process and the 
cooperative threat reduction process as well as U.S.-Russian interaction in the various non-
proliferation fora exhibit a level of cooperation and a sense of joint responsibility for the 
future of nuclear weapons arsenals that is more in line with a strategic partnership. The 
CTR Programme not only took off the ground but has led to development of the 
cooperative threat reduction process, which now incorporates an array of programmes 
managed by different state agencies and aimed at addressing specific proliferation concerns. 
Many obstacles including the culture of secrecy and suspicion, conflicting interests of the 
key players, general confusion in the post-Cold War international relations and not fully 
articulated foreign policy objectives were overcome, if not fully, than to a considerable 
extent. The fact that cooperative threat reduction programmes are fighting their way 
through the bureaucratic and political jungle deserves appraisal. It demonstrates that new 
political thinking and shift from the Cold War practices is gradually developing in the 
United States and Russia even though obstacles exist on both sides. 
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1.3. U.S.-Russian Relations in the Contemporary International System: 
In Search of a Theoretical Framework  
1.3.1. Choosing “Conceptual Lenses”    
Finding an appropriate theoretical framework for this study serves two major 
purposes. First, it provides a necessary structure for conducting research (i.e. gives us 
“conceptual lenses”), and second, it helps to place current research into wider discourse 
about international relations (IR) theories and the nature of the international system after 
the Cold War. 
The weight of the “political” factor is to be examined based on an analysis of the 
U.S.-Russia strategic relations in the post-Cold War era. To structure this analysis the study 
identifies four possible scenarios of the bilateral strategic relations with a focus on the role 
of nuclear weapons (Chapter 2). An examination of U.S.-Russian relations after the end of 
the Cold War calls for questioning the factors that motivate foreign policy, perceptions of 
security threats, and views on cooperative security held by the Russia and the United States. 
Such an examination is expected to yield insights on the validity of some major IR 
theories in explaining the behaviour of states during and after the Cold War (for example, 
realism, neo-realism). The experience of the CTR process during the last decade questions 
some of the main assumptions of realism about the nature of the international system. 
Realism, in its newest manifestation  of ‘offensive realism’ outlined by John Mearsheimer 
reaffirms the anarchical nature of the international system after the Cold War and asserts 
that the structure of the international system forces states to act aggressively toward each 
other in their pursuit of ‘security’.3   
Even if we assume that realism was a useful approach to study the international 
system in the Cold War period, it appears inappropriate for the contemporary era. The 
assumption that the international system is anarchical does not seem to be borne out by 
empirical observation. Quite the opposite is the case, states generally accept very substantial 
normative constraints in their relations, especially in relation to the use of force. The 
prevalence of inter-state conflict in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse has not been 
realised. Armed conflict in the post-Cold War world is almost exclusively sub-state, 
                                                 
3 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2001, 
p. 3 
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involving ethnic rivalry or other non-state actors (e.g. terrorism). With the exception of 
some specific, confined regional problems, states generally do not fear external aggression 
from other states. Especially in Europe and the Americas, states generally do not 
experience a ‘security dilemma’ and consequently military expenditure in most countries 
(with the United States, Israel and South Korea being notable exceptions) has declined 
precipitously and the notion of a ‘national defence’ policy has been all but abandoned by 
many countries. 
During the time period under consideration, the United States and Russia sought to 
develop a relationship that would be part of a different international order based on 
international norms, cooperation and cooperative security. This involved the adoption of 
policies designed to eliminate the legacy of the Cold War and create a new foundation for 
the mutual security relationship. CTR was to be one important element, designed to deal 
with the dangers of the Cold War nuclear inheritance and develop a cooperative approach 
to nuclear safety and security. The intellectual foundation of this approach is explicitly 
contrary to the assumptions and notions of realism. 
The nature of current security threats, especially in terms of potential conflicts, is 
important because it sheds light on the role for nuclear weapons in the post-Cold war 
international security system. The fact that the main security threats states confront in our 
age are either internal  (economic instability, instability of governing regime, environmental 
dangers, etc.) or are coming from sub-state actors (the threat of terrorism) calls for a 
revised role for nuclear weapons in the security policies of the states. Nuclear weapons can 
neither deter nor be used as war-fighting tool in the sub-strategic type of conflicts more 
common in the post-Cold war era (see Chapter 2).   
It is evident that the attitudes in the U.S. and Russia with regard to the future role 
of their arsenals and their nuclear relationship is characterised by ambiguity and 
uncertainty. In this respect, a conceptual framework of four possible scenarios of the U.S.-
Russian strategic relations is presented to aid the analysis of the nature of their relations 
and the role they assign to nuclear weapons. 
The evidence for the changes in the structure of international security and the U.S.-
Russian relationship specifically confronts us with a strategic paradox. The structure of the 
strategic nuclear relationship has remained intact in terms of the force deployments, even 
though the erstwhile political rationale no longer applies. As far as CTR is concerned, the 
priority and commitment given to the programmes does not match the urgency of the 
threat as portrayed by its promoters in the U.S. administration or the Russian government. 
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It seems therefore that systemic explanations are not adequate to explain the phenomena 
under consideration. 
 Consequently this study aims to develop an explanatory model that accounts for the 
development of the CTR Programme and its consecutive growth into several independent 
non-proliferation programmes in the context of the post-Cold War international system, 
the failure to address what has been recognised as one of the most serious threats to 
international security effectively, and the conditions that would allow the CTR process to 
succeed. In this respect, particular emphasis is placed on the theoretical frameworks that 
relate domestic politics (bureaucratic politics) to the definition of the national interest and 
international behaviour.  
Graham Allison’s work in Essence of Decision4  is considered one of the most 
substantial contributions in the development of the bureaucratic decision-making model; 
however, it was also criticised for the several shortcomings of a theoretical and 
methodological nature. Possible limitations of the Bureaucratic Politics Model when 
applied to the CTR process are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.    
One of the main hypotheses of this study is that bureaucratic politics plays a major 
role in the way the CTR process evolved (the extent of this influence and dependence of 
bureaucratic politics on broader political factors are examined throughout Chapters 4, 5, 6, 
and 7). The main assumption of the Bureaucratic Politics Model is accepted with a view 
that different organisations and individual bureaucrats with their varying organisational 
interests and values influence the implementation track of major non-proliferation 
programmes.    
The definition of bureaucratic politics is given at length by I. M. Dester: 
«Bureaucratic politics is the process by which people inside government 
bargain with one another on complex public policy questions. Its existence 
does not connote impropriety, though such may be present. Nor is it caused 
by political parties and elections, though both influence the process in 
important ways. Rather, bureaucratic politics arises from two inescapable 
conditions. One is that no single official possesses either the power, or the 
wisdom, or the time to decide all important executive branch policy issues 
                                                 
4 Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 
1971 
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himself. The second is that officials who have influence inevitably differ in 
how they would like these issues to be resolved...»5
This work attempts to grasp a complicated and intertwining net of key players in 
both countries. By defining vested organisational interests and values it is possible to 
understand the mechanisms both stimulating and constraining the implementation of non-
proliferation programmes.  
The argument of this work is that confusion or sometimes even rejection of 
important aspects of the programmes of cooperative threat reduction by different 
government agencies and departments demonstrates the confusion in the post-Cold war 
relations between Russia and the U.S. and is a result of varying organisational interests and 
values of key political actors involved. 
The key players in CTR decision-making are often large influential organisations, 
such as the U.S. Department of Defence (DOD), State Department, Department of 
Energy (DOE), the U.S. Congress and the Russian Duma, Russia’s Ministry of Atomic 
Energy (MINATOM), and the Russian Ministry of Defence (MOD).                                                       
There is a complex system of interrelations and interdependencies between the 
different structures of the state power. Different organisations pursue different and 
sometimes conflicting interests.  There is also a serious lack of coordination between the 
different agencies responsible for different programmes.  The way the bureaucratic system 
operates in the U.S. and Russia prevents a smooth and straightforward implementation of 
CTR projects. 
The emphasis on Bureaucratic Politics is not taken to imply that other factors, and 
in particular the political objectives pursued by the political leadership are not also an 
important part of the explanation for the evolution of the CTR process. Quite the reverse, 
the political priorities set form an essential part of the story of Cooperative Threat 
Reduction. 
Bureaucratic Politics Theory was used to test the second main assumption of this 
thesis (that is that bureaucratic factors have an important role to play in how the CTR 
process was established and why it encountered particular problems of implementation). 
The discussion in Chapter 3 explains why this model was chosen as a principal analytical 
tool for case studies of major CTR programmes, particularly with a view to understanding 
                                                 
5 I. M. Destler, ‘Organisation and Bureaucratic Politics’ in Michael Smith, Richard Little, and 
Michael Shackleton, eds., Perspectives on World Politics, The Open University Press, 1981, p. 158 
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the constraints that affected them. Applying the Bureaucratic Politics Model to CTR a 
coherent account of the CTR process can be given that would otherwise not be possible. 
Although, successful in explaining some major trends in the CTR process and important in 
terms of providing structure for the case studies (i.e. programmes assessed at the level of 
the implementing agencies), it is not assumed that the Bureaucratic Politics approach will 
provide a full explanation for CTR due to some apparent limitations. 
Those limitations are not connected with the model itself but with the scope of its 
applicability. Thus, some particular trends in the CTR process, such as the role of non-state 
actors in some of the programmes (example of Lab-to-Lab part of the Material Protection, 
Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Programme assessed in Chapter 5), fall outside the 
boundaries of the Bureaucratic Politics Model. The empirical evidence of the behaviour of 
the scientific community and non-governmental organisations (a section on role of NGOs 
in Chapter 3) calls for the utilisation of another theory, e.g. the theory of transnational 
movements, which assigns epistemic communities an important role in moving inter-state 
cooperation forward and in influencing policy decisions on important state-level issues. 
Several scholars (Thomas Risse-Kappen, Matthew Evangelista) have developed interesting 
ideas of how the arms control process was influenced by transnational relations, defined by 
Risse-Kappen, as “regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is 
a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an 
intergovernmental organization”.6
The example of U.S.-Russian cooperation on the level of nuclear labs, which 
involved nuclear scientists and was successful in avoiding bureaucratic hurdles, 
demonstrated the ability of epistemic communities to act beyond the immediate Cold War 
reflexes (typical for large state organisations). The important role played by non-
governmental policy ‘think-tanks’ can be also looked at from the angle of the theory of 
transnational movements. Independent non-proliferation scholars tend to be more liberal 
in their views of cooperation between the U.S. and Russia and are putting pressure on the 
governments to further engage in cooperative threat reduction.   
 
                                                 
6 Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic 
Structures, and International Institutions’ in Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing Transnational 
Relations Back In, Cambridge University Press, quoted by Matthew Evangelista, ‘The Paradox 
of State Strength: Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in Russia 
and the Soviet Union’, International Organization, 49, 1, Winter 1995, pp. 1-38 
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1.3.2. Finding a Place in the Existing Literature and Wider IR Theories 
Discourse   
The novelty of this research should be seen in the fact that it is the first attempt to 
use the CTR process as a case study for the U.S.-Russian strategic relations in the post-
Cold war international security system. By attempting to answer questions, such as why this 
process is prone to some persistent problems of implementation and why it was possible in 
the first place, may yield some conclusions regarding the nature of U.S.-Russian relations, 
the achievements and limitations in the bilateral relationship since the end of the Cold War. 
Only a very limited amount of academic work has been published on the subject of 
the CTR process. The existing works provide important insights on different aspects of 
CTR.  The first major text devoted to this issue was published in 1997. 7 Dismantling Cold 
War remains the most comprehensive work, which covers perspectives of the U.S. and NIS 
countries on the CTR programmes and defines key players. Another substantial work was 
carried out by Jason Ellis from the National Defence University who published Defense by 
Other Means: The Politics of U.S.-NIS Threat Reduction and Nuclear Security Cooperation8 in 2001.  
His work provides an invaluable and very detailed account of U.S. decision-making and the 
interagency process connected with the development of the CTR process. More recent 
work published by Michael Krepon Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense, and the Nuclear 
Future9 looks at cooperative threat reduction from the point of the U.S. foreign policy, 
specifically in the area of nuclear policy. 
This study looks at the CTR process from a different perspective by linking it to 
constraints in the U.S.-Russian relationship and by assessing specific problems in the CTR 
process, such as problem of fissile material disposition in terms of larger arms control 
process (dismantlement versus disposition). 
It is a well-established principle in the literature of strategic arms control that the 
objective of arms control is not only to regulate technical aspects of the strategic 
                                                 
7 Shields and Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. and NIS Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 
England, 1997 
8 Jason Ellis, Defense by Other Means: The Politics of U.S.-NIS Threat Reduction and Nuclear Security 
Cooperation, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 2001 
9 Michael Krepon, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense, and the Nuclear Future, Palgrave, 
Macmillan, 2003 
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relationship, but more importantly to develop political relations. Indeed, some have argued 
that during the Cold War this was the principal purpose of strategic arms control.10 The 
technical negotiations become a vector of larger political settlements. In view of the radical 
nature of the CTR programmes and the stated intentions of its proponents, the thesis 
assumes that this general principle also applies to CTR. Thus, although this thesis is 
focused on some specific technical programmes, there is an obvious link between their 
implementation and larger issues in the U.S.-Russian strategic relations in the post-Cold 
war, which this study attempts to demonstrate. An evaluation of U.S.-Russian relations 
since the end of the Cold War provides insights on the validity of different perspectives on 
the contemporary world order. On the face of it, the U.S.-Russian partnership in the 
framework of CTR programmes goes against realist notion of ‘aggressive pursuit of power’; 
it appears to be a manifestation of a major shift in the international system as former 
antagonist powers search for a new form of interaction.   The fact that the United States 
and Russia are willing to cooperate appears to go against realist argument that ‘international 
anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to 
cooperate even when they share common interests’.11 The behaviour of different U.S. 
administrations (Clinton and Bush) assessed in this work can be looked at from the angle 
of opposing schools of theory. The way the Clinton administration was constructing its 
policies towards Russia reflect ideas promoted by republican liberalism, which links 
democracy with peace.12 Thus, for example, the democratic peace theory13 assigns 
democracy an important role in decreasing the likelihood of war. The experience of the 
early and mid-1990s showed that the Clinton administration was pursuing a policy of 
‘democratising’ Russia; President Clinton saw engaging Russia and supporting democratic 
processes in the country as crucial to the international security of the post-Cold war era. 
Events in Russia during the same period of time also showed signs of certain political 
                                                 
10 Christoph Bluth, Soviet Strategic Arms Policy Before SALT, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1992; Robin Ranger, Arms & Politics 1958-1978: Arms Control in a Changing Political Context, 
Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1979 
11 As defined by Joseph M. Grieco, ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of 
the Newest Liberal Institutionalism’ in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The 
Contemporary Debate, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, p. 116 
12 David A. Baldwin, ‘Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics’, in Baldwin, ed., Neorealism 
and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, op. cit., p. 4 
13 Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1993 
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forces adopting values of liberalism. Chapter 2 describes the divide in Russia during the 
early years of Yeltsin cabinet between liberals promoting Russia’s engagement with the 
world economy, integration into the international community with adopting Western 
democratic values and traditionalists, who were seeing the world from the realist position 
and were not ready to embrace a changing world order. 
The current Bush administration seems to be more inclined to adopt ideas from 
realism by rejecting values of institutionalism and moving towards pursuing unilateral 
policies in search of security. The problem with such policies is that the post-Cold war 
world order seems to be developing under conditions, which do not fit with the realist 
explanations: due to nature of majority of security threats states are facing (threat from sub-
state actors, environmental dangers, internal domestic problems) cannot be deterred by 
trying to weaken the other states. Cooperation between states, adherence to institutionalist 
values (respect for international mechanisms) is needed to confront most of the security 
threats. As George Perkovich has argued, by adopting an inappropriate nuclear policy and 
neglecting the international regimes of non-proliferation while demanding compliance of 
others, the Bush administration loses much of the soft power instruments that would 
render its policies of nuclear non-proliferation and counterproliferation much more 
effective.14 The thesis will discuss the effects of the shift in U.S. nuclear policy on the CTR 
process in particular. 
In sum, it appears that the post-Cold war world order, which is in the process of 
transition, cannot be explained on the basis of simply realist or liberalist schools of 
thought. There are conflicting trends in the policies of the countries (in this case, example 
of Russia and the United States). This study will consider the effectiveness of policies to 
deal with certain security threats (e.g. nuclear proliferation, illegal smuggling and terrorist 
use of WMD) based on cooperation as opposed to the unilateral projection of power.   The 
technical issues raised in this thesis (such as the danger of accidental nuclear war or the 
unauthorised use of nuclear weapons – Chapter 2) are related to the arguments for a 
reduction of nuclear arsenals on both sides. A dramatic reduction of arsenals is more likely 
if the U.S. and Russia would see their own security in having fewer weapons than having 
more (i.e. a move away from balance of power towards an understanding of common 
security). The dissertation will examine the role that CTR might play both in provoking and 
facilitating such a shift. 
                                                 
14 George Perkovich, ‘Bush’s Nuclear Follies’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.82, No.2, March/April 2003, 
pp. 2-8 
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The case studies of different proliferation threats connected with nuclear weapons 
and materials as presented in chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 can contribute to the debate on the 
role of nuclear weapons (presented in Chapter 2), whether more nuclear weapons in the 
world means more or less security. The empirical evidence collected on risks associated 
with large nuclear arsenals suggest that their presence does not entail more security, 
especially in the light of the end of the Cold War superpower stand-off (the ‘deterrent’ 
value has diminished), the rise of international terrorism (threat of illegal use), and the 
changing nature of conflict in the world (a shift towards sub-strategic conflicts, in which 
nuclear weapons play no role).   
This study can also provide some additional insights into validity of the 
Bureaucratic Politics Theory. The application of this theory to the study of the CTR 
process is expected to show its general validity, deal with some of the criticism (e.g. the 
alleged non-applicability to countries other than the United States) and demonstrate its 
limitations (not all decision-making in foreign policy analysis can be based on simple 
application of the Bureaucratic Politics Model; other factors also play a role).   
Some new material can be found for the discourse on the theory of transnational 
movements (treated as a part of sociological liberalism, which links transnational 
interactions with international integration).15 It is a hypothesis of this study that the success 
of certain projects and trends in the CTR process can be attributed to transnational 
movements (e.g. interaction between the nuclear scientists, which is capable of overcoming 
bureaucratic obstacles and influencing the state-level decision-making (“bottom-up” 
approach)). 
The current study can, therefore, contribute to the existing literature a new 
dimension of looking at the CTR process. Moreover, it makes a contribution to the debate 
of the nature of the contemporary international system from the perspective of 
international relations theory. 
1.4 Objectives and Hypothesis 
The theme of this thesis is the construction of the security relationship between the 
United States and Russia in the emerging post-Cold War international order. Its particular 
focus is the strategic nuclear relationship; the sub-theme is the issue of nuclear safety and 
                                                 
15 Baldwin, ‘Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics’, in Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and 
Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, op. cit., p. 4 
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security in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The assumption is that CTR can 
serve as case study that reveals the substantial features of the evolving bilateral security 
relationship.   
The hypothesis of this thesis is as follows: The U.S. and Russia are in the process 
of adjusting to the changed post-Cold War environment. The main features of the 
contemporary international system of states include the absence of a systemic great power 
conflict, the obsolescence of Marxism-Leninism as an alternative to capitalism and liberal 
democracy, and the increasing acceptance of international norms by most states, with 
conflicts largely involving sub-state actors. In this New World Order, the United States and 
Russia are partners, rather than adversaries, in a cooperative rather than competitive 
security relationship. However, the process of adaptation to the new international 
environment remains incomplete. Aspects of foreign and security policy, especially nuclear, 
policy, are still informed by attitudes and ideas that stem from the time when the United 
States and the Soviet Union were bitter adversaries. The example of cooperative threat 
reduction as a case study of the U.S.-Russian strategic relations shows that although 
considerable achievements have been reached and cooperation such as in CTR framework 
became possible, this cooperation has been limited and constrained by factors of 
bureaucratic and political nature. At the political level, the attempt by political leaders to 
reconstruct the security relationship has to some extent been impeded by the failure of 
political elites to fully come to terms with the realities of the contemporary international 
order. At the same time bureaucratic politics has impeded change at the level of 
implementation. The CTR process reflects both the attempts to engage in a very radical 
reconstruction of U.S.-Russian security relations and the constraints imposed upon it by 
political recalcitrance and bureaucratic politics. 
The following are the main objectives of the research:  
1.  An analysis of the post-Cold War U.S.-Russian strategic relationship with an 
emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons in their strategic policies, an evaluation of 
political environment of the post-Cold War international security system in order to 
identify how the CTR process fits into broader bilateral relations and to test the 
assumption that political factors influence the CTR process at the level of 
implementation.  Such analysis is also necessary for establishing a link between the role 
of nuclear weapons in U.S.-Russian relations and the future of the CTR process. 
2.  An integrated and comprehensive account of the major non-proliferation 
programmes: the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme (CTR Programme), the 
Material Protection, Control and Accounting Programme (MPC&A), the Nuclear Cities 
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Initiative (NCI), the International Technology and Science Centre (ISTC), the Initiatives 
for Proliferation Prevention (IPP), the Highly Enriched Uranium Agreement (HEU 
Deal), and the Plutonium Disposition Programme; an assessment of perceived 
proliferation threats and effectiveness of the programmes in terms of confronting stated 
threats, the future prospects of the programmes and the extent to which the non-
proliferation goals of the states have been  achieved; the development of an explanatory  
model that accounts for the development of the CTR process in the context of the post-
Cold War international system, problems of implementation, and the conditions that 
will allow CTR to succeed. (the identification of the nature of problems of 
implementation is crucial to explaining why the CTR process has been limited in its 
scope and what will allow it to move beyond the current constraints) 
 
1.5 Research Methods and Methodological Issues  
1.5.1. Qualitative Methods  
One of the main resources for the study is primary and secondary documents. 
According to Marcus Ethridge, “content analysis of official documents is much more 
manageable” since “documents are plentiful and relatively easy to access”.16
There is extensive documentation from the U.S. government agencies, such as the 
Department of Energy and Department of Defence, U.S. Congress, State Department, 
National Security Council (NSC).   
The research uses documents from non-governmental agencies in the United 
States, such as the National Resources Council (NRC), Carnegie Endowment for Peace 
(CEIP), Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), the Center for Science and International Affairs 
(CSIA) at Harvard University, Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council 
(RANSAC), and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute 
for International Studies. The CNS maintains comprehensive databases of open-source 
information concerning the spread of nuclear weapons and missiles. These databases 
represent a unique collection of materials collected from more than 300 sources (many in 
foreign languages), including trade journals, government documents, newspapers, net sites, 
books, and conference proceedings.  
                                                 
16 Marcus E. Ethridge, The Political Research Experience: Readings and Analysis, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, 
New York, 1990, p. 169 
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There is also a wealth of documentation from Russian language sources, such as the 
journal Yadernyi Control (Nuclear Control) and other publications produced by PIR-Center in 
Moscow (Centre for Policy Research), and publications from research institutes, such as 
Russian Institute of World Economy and International Relations. 
In the case of this study the documents from these sources are the evidence, or they 
straightforwardly reflect evidence - or in a more interpretative sense - for example they 
need to be read and interpreted for evidence.17 The particular subject matter requires the 
analysis of the legislation that brought CTR into being, and track government policies from 
that point.  The data include specific information about nuclear weapons deployments, as 
contained in the START memoranda and other official documents, and the various 
elements of the CTR programmes as reported to Congress. They also include a detailed 
survey of all elements of the nuclear weapons complex in Russia, as revealed in a range of 
official and non-governmental publications. While the raw data of official publications are 
considered reliable (unless shown otherwise), as regards their interpretation it is important 
to take into consideration the sensitive nature of the topic under consideration one should 
be aware of biased viewpoints. 
The study of the political decision-making processes requires research beyond 
official documents and non-governmental publications. Another important qualitative 
method used for this research is elite interviewing. Interviewing typically generates a richer 
body of data than that produced by other survey methods. Because of this, it is a 
particularly useful way to gather information from relatively small groups of politically 
influential individuals (political elites).18  
I have conducted interviews with the current and former U.S. officials (from 
Department of Defence, Department of Energy, State Department, National Security 
Council) and with the representatives of the leading policy non-governmental 
organisations, such as Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Carnegie Endowment for Peace 
(CEIP), Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), Center for 
Strategic Studies and International Studies (CSIS), the Monterey Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies (CNS).  I also interviewed members of Congress and 
Congressional Research Service.  The above mentioned interviews were conducted in 
Washington D.C. during March-April of 2003. 
                                                 
17 Mason, Qualitative Researching, op. cit., p.73 
18 Ethridge, The Political Research Experience: Reading and Analysis, op. cit., p. 9 
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Another set of interviews was conducted in Moscow (Russia) during the period of 
May-June of 2003. In Moscow I interviewed former senior Russian military officials, 
representatives of non-governmental PIR-Centre, Carnegie Endowment for Peace (CEIP), 
physicists (Moscow Institute of Physical Engineering – MIFI), as well as U.S. 
representatives of the Moscow-based offices of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and the 
International Science and Technology Center (ISTC).  
The interviews were mostly one hour long, conducted face-to-face, apart from 
three telephone interviews with the experts residing outside of the Washington D.C. area. 
The interviews were qualitative, with ‘qualitative interviewing’ referring to in-depth, semi-
structured or loosely structured forms of interviewing.19 The interviews were conducted 
during the final year of research. The idea was to have an understanding of the situation 
surrounding the issues of CTR implementation prior to interviewing. The whole process of 
denuclearisation in Russia with the use of American funds is very controversial and 
extremely sensitive for both sides.  
I experienced high cooperation from the side of non-governmental organisations 
(especially from those individuals, who were instrumental in developing CTR ideas), as well 
as from the side of the government officials. One organisation hosting my field work in the 
U.S. – the Monterey Center for Nonproliferation Studies – played a crucial role in 
facilitating the process of arranging the interviews.  
In Russia PIR-Center provided a wealth of Russian sources for the research in the 
form of policy papers and journals published by it.   
The spectrum of views was often predetermined by the position occupied by the 
interviewee. Thus, current officials were usually presenting a more formal view with a 
limited acknowledgement of the problems of implementation in the cooperative threat 
reduction programmes, while non-government sector representatives were more outspoken 
on the problems of such cooperation. 
The reliability of the information given was another important issue of processing 
the data obtained through interviewing. In order to get an objective picture it was useful to 
cross-check information obtained from interviews (by asking the same question several 
unconnected interviewees). The other method I used was mixing different survey methods 
in relation to one and the same problem.  
                                                 
19 Mason, Qualitative Researching, op. cit., p. 38 
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The interviews are not generally considered a complete research method by itself20, 
nonetheless as a part of a survey they constitute a unique opportunity to enhance the 
information available from other sources and were a main source of unpublished ‘raw’ data. 
Due to sensitivity of the topic some of the information received during the interviews 
could not be incorporated into the final work, however, it helped to form assumptions and 
define the ideas central to main lines of arguments in this thesis. 
 
1.5.2. Quantitative Methods   
Data analysis (aggregate data) is an important tool for reaching certain 
conclusions in this study. The work with numerical data helps to analyse levels of nuclear 
arsenals in Russia and the U.S. throughout the last decade. Some important questions in 
this research require careful consideration of numerical interrelations. One of them is 
whether Russia needs START agreements. In the current economic circumstances Russia is 
no longer capable of modernising its nuclear forces, let alone maintain the Cold War levels 
of nuclear weapons.  
The analysis of the current composition of Russian nuclear force, life cycles of 
nuclear weapons (how long they can be maintained before retirement) and current level of 
production can provide assumptions on what will be the ‘natural’ (economically driven) 
requirement in Russia to reduce its arsenal. The ‘natural’ obsolescence of Russian nuclear 
weapons and Russian obligations under START have a direct impact on the cooperative 
threat reduction process, since CTR programmes provide for the dismantlement of 
weapons (the CTR Programme), the disposition of fissile material from dismantled 
warheads (HEU Deal and Plutonium Disposition Programme) and will follow the trend of 
minimising nuclear production. 
The performance of practically all programmes studied can be measured in 
numerical terms: how many warheads were dismantled, what is the percentage of fissile 
material secured, and the percentage of nuclear material, which has been accounted for 
adequately.  In this respect, the analysis of data is important. 
Another utilisation of data analysis is the work with budgets allocated to 
programmes budgets. Fluctuating budget levels provide important information on the 
scope of programmes at different stages, they also reflect political developments, e.g. 
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additional funding appropriated in the aftermath of the financial crisis in Russia in August 
1998 or after events of 9/11, when a threat of WMD proliferation was reiterated.   
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The study begins with setting out the theoretical framework for the research in 
Chapters 2 and 3.  
Chapter 2 addresses the larger questions like the changing nature of U.S.-Russian 
relations, the new evolving international security system, the post-9/11 non-proliferation 
agenda, and the role of nuclear weapons in this new system. It tests the conceptual 
framework designed to define the main scenarios for U.S.-Russian strategic relations, 
especially in relation to the role of nuclear weapons in the bilateral relations. This chapter 
puts cooperative threat reduction into a broader framework of U.S.-Russian relations in the 
post-Cold war era. By identifying political conditions and especially by demonstrating that 
nuclear weapons still remain central to the U.S.-Russian strategic relations, it is possible to 
assess the influence of these factors on the problems of implementation of CTR 
programmes discussed in the consecutive chapters. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the Bureaucratic Politics Model, which is used 
as a framework for explaining individual programmes and identifying problems in their 
implementation. The Bureaucratic Politics Model serves two purposes: it determines the 
structure of the case studies (i.e. the programmes are evaluated with a focus placed on the 
implementing agencies) and it is used to test the assumption that bureaucratic politics can 
be seen as a source of some of the problems of CTR implementation. 
Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 give an overview of particular proliferation threats that exist 
in Russia and present case studies of the individual programmes dealing with different 
aspects of the threats identified.   
Chapter 4 has two goals: to present an analysis of the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction (CTR) Programme and the evolution of this particular programme into a 
cooperative threat reduction process.   
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the threat of fissile material proliferation and three major 
programmes designed to address this threat: the Material Protection, Control and 
Accounting (MPC&A) Programme, the Plutonium Disposition Programme, and the Highly 
Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement. 
Chapter 7 addresses the potential threat of a “brain-drain” of former Soviet nuclear 
scientists and engineers (i.e. proliferation of nuclear expertise) and provides an overview of 
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the three different programmes to counter it: the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI), Initiatives 
for Proliferation Prevention (IPP), and the International Science and Technology Center 
(ISTC) Programme. 
Throughout chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 the problems of implementation are identified 
in order to evaluate their underlying reasons – how bureaucratic and political factors 
contribute to them. 
The Conclusion (Chapter 8) summarises the results of the research and the 
conclusions with regard to the assumptions and hypotheses stated at the outset of the 
study, and discusses the implications for the interpretation of U.S.-Russian strategic 
relations in the contemporary international system.  
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Chapter 2 
U.S.-Russian Strategic Relations: The Role of Nuclear Weapons 
2.1. Introduction  
Cooperative threat reduction is at the heart of the U.S.-Russian strategic relations.  
It is closely interlinked with the role of nuclear weapons in the bilateral relations, and 
should, therefore, reflect the changing nature of the U.S.-Russian relationship.    
The CTR process can be looked at as a laboratory study of U.S.-Russian relations.  
It demonstrates both the achievements and limitations of the evolving new framework for 
interaction between the U.S. and Russia. Putting the CTR process into a larger picture of 
U.S.-Russian relations can help to identify whether some problems of implementation of 
CTR programmes are influenced by political factors. Since one of the research arguments 
of this thesis is that certain problems in implementation of CTR programmes is linked to 
political factors in bilateral relations, it is necessary to assess what is the nature of this 
relationship in the post-Cold war international security system. 
The main body of the chapter focuses on contemporary U.S.-Russian strategic 
relations and looks closely at what should be a changing role of nuclear weapons in the 
post-Cold War period. An assessment of the U.S. nuclear posture, Russian military doctrine 
and data on numbers and state of alert of existing nuclear arsenals demonstrates a serious 
mismatch between the nuclear postures and the nature of bilateral relations – a 
phenomenon of a so called “strategic paradox”.  
The final part of the current chapter assesses the role of the cooperative threat 
reduction process in U.S.-Russian relations and serves as an introduction to the chapters to 
follow on the actual programmes of cooperative threat reduction. It provides a background 
of political environment, in which these programmes operate and provides information for 
analysis on whether limitations in the CTR process can be explained by limitations in the 
U.S.-Russian strategic relations. 
2.2. The Role of Nuclear Weapons in U.S.-Soviet Relations During the 
Cold War   
U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War played a central role in shaping of the 
international system after the World War II. The superpower competition for economic, 
24 
political, and ideological influence in different parts of the world was a dominant feature of 
the Cold War period.  
Nuclear weapons were the key factor in defining the superpower status of the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union. The overwhelming numbers of nuclear weapons were seen as 
destabilising and stabilising at the same time. Some scholars saw the presence of vast 
nuclear arsenals on both sides as a source of instability due to many factors, not least, due 
to the danger of accidental war (Scott Sagan).21 Others considered the ‘overkill’ nuclear 
capabilities as a source of self-restraint (or self-deterrence) for the superpowers. It was 
considered that the prospect of mutually assured destruction in the event of a nuclear 
exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union had a war-preventing effect (Kenneth 
Waltz, John Lewis Gaddis).22  
There are varying theories on what was, is and will be the role played by nuclear 
capabilities in the states’ hierarchy of power. 
Thus, for example, Kenneth Waltz and some other neo-realists believed that nuclear 
arsenals possessed by the super powers had a stabilising effect. Waltz argued that: 
«...Nuclear weapons produced an underlying stillness at the center of 
international politics...»23
The cost of using nuclear weapons against the other country was so unbelievably 
high that their use was becoming irrelevant and illogical. Waltz argued that the war 
remained possible, but the victory in war was too dangerous to fight for.24
The period of the Cold War was christened as «Long Peace» by John Lewis Gaddis 
to emphasise the lack of major wars during that period. The presence of massive nuclear 
                                                 
21 Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton University, 1993 
22 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better’, Adelphi Paper 
No.171, London: IISS 1981, John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold 
War, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, 1987 
23 Kenneth Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’ in International Security, Vol. 
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24 Kenneth Waltz, ‘More May Be Better’ in Scott D. Sagan & Kenneth H. Waltz, eds., The Spread 
of Nuclear Weapons: a Debate, W.W. Norton & Company, New York/London, 1995, p. 5 
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capabilities on both sides was a very effective deterrent for both of them, despite (or 
because of) the continued expansion and refinement of the strategic arsenals.25  
The evidence (including the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) process and 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty) suggests that the logic of nuclear deterrence and 
mutual assured destruction was accepted by both sides. The nuclear weapons were acquired 
for the sake of better stability with a clear idea that their use would bring a disaster.  
During the Cold War the world escaped a major nuclear war. However, the 
possibility of such a war was always present, especially as the two main nuclear powers 
moved towards the adoption of a policy of launch-on-warning. It can be argued that during 
the major nuclear crises (such as the Cuban missile crisis and the 1983 crisis) the avoidance 
of nuclear war was by no means inevitable.26 Given the intense rivalry between the 
superpowers and the hair-trigger alert postures of their nuclear arsenals, the risk of 
catastrophic miscalculations was a clear danger to international security. 
The world population can consider itself lucky to have escaped an all-destroying 
war. Even though there is no longer the same adversarial relationship between the main 
nuclear powers, the persistence of the arsenals means that a tangible threat of a catastrophic 
war remains.  
Another IR theorist, John J. Mearsheimer even supported a «well-managed» 
proliferation: 
«... Peace in Europe during the Cold War has resulted from bipolarity, the 
approximate military balance between the superpowers, and the presence of 
large numbers of nuclear weapons on both sides...»27
                                                 
25 John Lewis Gaddis,  The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War, op.cit. 
26 Cuban Missile Crisis refers to a 13-day stand-off between the Soviet Union and the U.S. when 
the U.S. discovered that Soviets had placed strategic offensive missiles in Cuba and the U.S. 
responded with a naval quarantine of Soviet shipments to Cuba.  The 1983 crisis refers to an 
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took as an indication of a preparation for a surprise nuclear attack.  Sources: Allison, Essence of 
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, op. cit. and Peter Vincent Pry, War Scare: Russia and 
America on the Nuclear Brink, Praeger, Westport, 1999 
27 John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War’ in 
International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1990, p. 13 
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Some other scholars believe that the stability of the bipolar world was, to a large 
extent, overestimated.28 The conflicts at the periphery (Vietnam, Cuba) were an indication 
that a larger war could not be excluded. 
The controversial argument that the immense nuclear capabilities of the 
superpowers had a stabilising effect may be accepted with some reservations for the period 
of the Cold War. However, the role of nuclear weapons in a post-Cold War world has 
changed completely.   
Taking into consideration a scholarly discourse on the stability/instability effect of 
nuclear weapons, the following assumption can be made. The nuclear arsenals of the 
United States and the Soviet Union did have a mixed effect on the international security. A 
deliberate use of nuclear weapons by either of the parties was unlikely (though not entirely 
impossible) due to the deterrence factor. In that sense, the central role of nuclear weapons 
in military parity of two superpowers played a stabilising role. Nuclear deterrence, by 
definition, assumes an adversarial relationship. In the post-Cold war era, this function of 
nuclear weapons is rendered unimportant if the relationship between the main nuclear 
powers becomes one of partnership, of shared values and goals. It was therefore important 
for Russia and the United States to develop a new understanding of the purpose of their 
nuclear arsenals in the context of their emerging new relationship. 
  
2.3. U.S.-Russian Relations in the Post-Cold War Period  
The end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union brought 
a completely new set of conditions to the international security scene. In a short period of 
time the bi-polar world lost one of its poles, and the whole structure of international 
relations changed in accordance with that new development. The international system is still 
in transition. 
There was a qualitative shift in U.S.-Russian relations after the end of the Cold War.  
However, the real extent of how different these relations are still remains vague. The present 
state of U.S.-Russian relations best of all can be described as a “constrained partnership” – a 
relationship characterised by a mixture of unprecedented level of cooperation and a 
remaining lack of trust. 
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The early years of new post-Soviet Russia were met with euphoria in the West.   In 
the early 1990s President Yeltsin’s regime was seen as a determining factor for a fast and 
successful transition of modern Russia to a full-pledged democracy. The foreign policy of 
Russia during that period had a more or less pro-Western trend in it, led by the Foreign 
Minister Andrei Kozyrev. It was a time of expectations that Russia would fully integrate into 
the international system. The rhetoric pledged Russia’s willingness to move towards a 
democratic society. However, Russia was not ready for a full-scale democracy. People in the 
Russian bureaucracy were not all for democracy, and the political system was not able to 
absorb political changes of the post-Cold war era. 
Society was split between those who wanted Russia to be a modern Western 
country, and those, who still adhered to old values. Many of the former group were part of 
the new political establishment.   
President Yeltsin proved to be a somewhat ‘controversial’ democrat. He had to 
manoeuvre between the demands of the West and the expectations of the world community 
of Russia becoming a democratic country on the one hand, and the demands of Russia’s 
domestic politics on the other. Politics at the domestic front required Yeltsin to show 
resistance to Western pressure for Russia to accept Westernised democracy values. Yeltsin’s 
opponents at home used every opportunity to accuse him of being ‘submissive’ to Western 
demands on how Russia should develop.   
In some ways, Yeltsin felt compelled to use methods typical for a Communist 
system. He sometimes used his authority to impose unilateral policy decisions on the 
political system (one of the examples was the parliament crisis in October 1993, when 
Yeltsin forcibly dissolved the Parliament after a bitter conflict between the President and the 
legislative branch). 
Overall, Yeltsin’s policies had a dual character: he tried to appear anti-Western at 
home, while in his foreign policy, he was pushing arms control forward and was interested 
in engaging in cooperative denuclearisation with the U.S.29  
The Russian political establishment in early 1990s was divided between ‘reformists’, 
who were supporting values of economic liberalisation, free market, and Russia’s 
integration into world economy and political system (Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, 
Yeltsin’s advisor on economic affairs Yegor Gaidar – famous for leading radical economic 
reforms dubbed “shock therapy”). The other group held more traditional views and the 
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rapid intensification of U.S.-Russian relations in that period was seen as a dangerous trend 
of Russia losing its national identity. They advocated a ‘Eurasianist’ approach to foreign 
policy predicated on putting Russia’s national interest first, treating the other newly 
independent states (the ‘near abroad’) as Russia’s sphere of influence and maintaining links 
with some of the allies of the former Soviet Union.30 The political forces behind the 
second group were anti-Western and suspicious of U.S. motives on many aspects in 
bilateral relations, and it was especially noticeable in the case of cooperative threat 
reduction. Some representatives of Russian parliament were openly accusing the U.S. of 
trying to undermine Russia’s national security by denuclearising Russia and spying on 
‘nuclear’ secrets. 
The U.S. failed to commit enough resources to support Russia. The U.S. was 
reluctant to commit financial resources to the Russian economy, which was very unstable 
and corrupted and it was unclear whether Russia could absorb financial aid in a way to 
decisively aid economic growth. However, even for symbolic reasons the U.S. should have 
done more, since it would have demonstrated Western support for Russia’s economic 
recovery.    
The initial “honeymoon” in U.S.-Russian relations was short-lived and to a certain 
degree expectations both countries had about each other were ungrounded. The West 
expected Russia to move rapidly towards becoming a full-fledged democracy, while Russia 
expected Western assistance in economic sphere, even though it was not ready to fully 
embrace Western democratic values and to integrate into the world political and economic 
community. 
The decade following the end of the Cold War has demonstrated that the legacy of 
antagonism between the two countries persisted on many levels – it is also deeply embedded 
into the organisational culture of the U.S. and Russia. 
The U.S. and Russia have faced a number of complicated international policy-related 
issues, which had a substantial impact on the overall state of bilateral relations. The main 
issues of that nature included: disagreements over NATO enlargement, wars in Kosovo and 
Chechnya, the U.S. military presence in Central Asia during the operation in Afghanistan 
and beyond, the U.S. position on several key non-proliferation agreements, Russia’s nuclear 
cooperation with Iran. 
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These issues are a reflection of the transitional character of U.S.-Russian relations as 
the two countries seek to develop and define their strategic partnership. Despite the 
commitment at the top to develop their political and strategic relations on a partnership 
basis, the political elite in Russia have been slow to absorb and internalise the conceptual 
framework of international relations based on shared norms, principles and common 
security. Communist ideas have been replaced not just by Western ideals, but by a melee of 
notions including visions of Russia as a Great Power, nationalism and Slavic solidarity. 
Moreover, there remains an echo in many people’s minds of the old adversarial, zero-sum 
relationship between the two countries that makes them reluctant to fully embrace a 
strategic partnership. The recurring tensions between the United States and Russia, which 
seems to defy an analysis of their common interest, can be explained as a consequence of 
the inability of people and institutions to keep up with the very rapid changes in the 
international system.  
U.S.-Russian disagreements surrounding NATO enlargement are a good example of 
the contradictions that arise as both states are trying to adjust to new realities.31 Having been 
created as a collective defence organisation to counter the Soviet threat, NATO’s role in the 
contemporary international system without the Warsaw Pact has to be re-defined. U.S. 
lobbying for NATO enlargement became a matter of serious annoyance in Moscow by 
1994.   There was a broad consensus in the political elite in Russia to oppose the expansion 
of NATO on the basis that it constituted a threat to its national security. The deployment of 
NATO forces close to Russian borders (in case of expansion) was seen as a direct threat to 
Russian national security. However, that perceived threat was based on presumption of a 
possible armed conflict between Russian and the West at the time when there was no 
political ground for such a conflict.32
Russia’s perception of threat from NATO’s enlargement was questioned by 
observers, as were the justifications for the Western decision to proceed with the 
enlargement.33 If NATO enlargement was justified as contributing to stability in Europe, it 
would be hard to define in what ways it actually would achieve it considering the internal 
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nature of instability within the Eastern and Central European countries. If the enlargement 
was to confront external threats to European security, then Russia’s concerns that it was 
designed against itself would be not ungrounded.  By the time of the summit in Helsinki in 
May 1997, it became clear that NATO expansion would proceed with or without Russia’s 
consent. Yeltsin had to accept that enlargement was becoming a reality and was forced to go 
along with the process, which was underway. On May 27, 1997 – NATO and Russia signed 
the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and 
Russian Federation”.    
The mid-1990s brought several developments, which had a negative impact on U.S.-
Russian relations. By 1995 legislative branches in both countries became more hostile and 
aggressive with regard to bilateral issues, partly due to Communists and hard-liners gaining 
the majority in the Russian parliament (State Duma) and more traditional Republicans 
having greater influence in the U.S. Congress.   
At the same time, the war in Chechnya broke out, which the U.S. government had 
disapproved of to a varying degree over the years. Even though the U.S. leadership was not 
officially denouncing Russia’s role in the Chechen conflict, the voices within the U.S. 
expressed their negative view of Moscow’s policy towards Chechnya and its inability to stop 
the bloodshed. The U.S. government had proved to be cautious in voicing its concern over 
Moscow’s policies in a break-away republic. The Clinton administration preferred to engage 
Russia in all important international policy issues, rather than disengage from them 
completely as a punishment for Russia’s treatment of Chechen problem.   
Yeltsin’s victory in Russian presidential elections in 1996 resulted in a temporary 
improvement in U.S.-Russian relations as the United States considered the alternatives (eg. 
the election of Communist leader Zyuganov) unacceptable. 
In 1997 Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed on outlines of the new arms reduction 
treaty (START III) at a summit in Helsinki – the reductions were projected at a level of 
2,000-2,500 of warheads to remain on each side. 34 The idea was for Russia to go down to 
2,000 warheads due to the economic pressures to downsize, and the U.S. would maintain 
2,500 warheads.  
By 1998 an escalation of conflict in Kosovo severely undermined Russia-U.S. 
relations. President Yeltsin adamantly opposed a Western intervention in Kosovo. Although 
no friend of Milosevic regime, Yeltsin had to play in the hands of strong opponents of U.S. 
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intervention in Kosovo (1999), which was perceived by many in Russia as an attack on the 
‘Slavic brothers’ in Serbia. There was outrage at U.S. actions in Kosovo in the Russian 
parliament and the military, and Yeltsin had to demonstrate his ability to express Russia’s 
opposition to the U.S. on that issue.35  
Overall, the Clinton Administration saw Russia as a key to international security and 
was ready to compromise (e.g. with the issue of Chechen war) in order to keep a 
cooperation with Russia flowing notwithstanding several major crises in the early and mid-
1990s. The Clinton Administration had many reasons to see Russia as a vital player on the 
international security scene: Russia was still the only nuclear power capable of destroying the 
U.S.; the fact that Russia possessed a large nuclear arsenal also meant that cooperation such 
as in the framework of CTR had to be in place in order to avoid nuclear anarchy. It was 
unclear how the whole region would develop (Central European States, former Soviet 
republics) and Russia was a linchpin to all this. Clinton Administration believed that the U.S. 
had to somehow ‘manage’ Russia’s transition in order to avoid major international security 
problems.  
Throughout the 1990s the personal relationship between Yeltsin and Clinton played 
a major role in U.S.-Russian relations – the two presidents shared a very strong bond. First 
of all, Russia was always high on the U.S. foreign policy agenda, because Clinton had a 
number of dedicated people in his team, who saw Russia and former Soviet Union as very 
important for the international security system. Secondly, on several crucial occasions 
Clinton expressed his loyalty to Yeltsin and reiterated his personal trust in Yeltsin and his 
policies. Yeltsin saw his relationship with Clinton as very important to the bilateral 
relationships and saw both of them as capable of solving any problems, which two countries 
might have had.36  
The years 2000 and 2001 brought new leaders in Russia and the U.S. respectively, 
who are characterised as pragmatic and realistic. The advent of the Bush administration 
resulted in some major changes in American non-proliferation policies, which do not have a 
wholly positive effect on the international non-proliferation regime. The Bush-Putin 
relationship is qualitatively different from that between Yeltsin and Clinton. President Putin 
is a different kind of leader for Russia. He exercises a tighter grip on the affairs in his cabinet 
and has a more constructive relationship with the Russian parliament. President Putin had to 
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offer Bush administration several concessions, most importantly, with the U.S. withdrawal 
from the ABM Treaty and the War on Terror (when U.S. military forces were stationed in 
Central Asia – a region of Russia’s traditional national security interests). The Bush 
administration was less willing to offer Russia anything in return for those concessions apart 
from agreeing to lock recent agreements on further arms reductions into a bilateral treaty 
(SORT), which initially the U.S. did not want to sign. The main difference between Clinton’s 
and Bush’s policies towards Russia is the level of priority given to Russia in U.S. foreign 
policy.  Since Bush Administration came into power, Russia has been moved backward from 
the foreign policy agenda.    
Russian expert Mikhail Delyagin characterised U.S.-Russian relations since the 
change of administrations in the U.S. in the following way: 
“A negative attitude of the new U.S. leadership towards Russia is, from a 
fundamental point of view, a natural result of the way American society positions 
itself in the modern world.  The U.S. is united in its aspiration for “universal 
security”, which includes protection not only and not as much from specific 
threats (such as terrorist acts), as from the slightest discomfort, the slightest 
differentiation existing outside of it [security].  Such understanding of security 
dictates Americans a maximally wide expansion of their way of life and values, 
because a society, which orientates itself towards different values, is 
subconsciously perceived as an irritating source of potential threats.”37   
However, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 marked a turning point in 
U.S.-Russian relations. The proclamation of a “strategic partnership” became frequent in 
high-level rhetoric. Russian participation in the War on Terror is crucial to American 
interests for a number of reasons: Russian intelligence on Afghanistan, Russian agreement to 
U.S. forces being deployed in Central Asia (in countries bordering Russia), and the Russian 
role in the U.N. Security Council (although, the role of the U.N. Security Council has been, 
at least, partially diminished after the U.S. government started a military operation in Iraq 
without a further explicit authorisation of the U.N. and against the opposition of most 
Security Council members). 
Russia’s participation in the War on Terror can be explained by several reasons. The 
opinion poll conducted in Russia showed that 44% of Russians believed that the main 
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reason for Putin’s support for the U.S. fight against terrorism was his expectation that the 
West would tone down its criticism on Russia’s campaign in Chechnya.38 Another reason for 
Russia’s willingness to assist the U.S. in the War on Terror could also be connected to the 
problem of Chechnya. In the words of Oksana Antonenko from the Institute for 
International Strategic Studies (IISS), “the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan – by targeting 
training camps, financial flows, and fighters that have been aiding Chechen forces – directly 
helps Russia’s Chechnya campaign.”39 But above all, it is believed, that Putin used the post-
9/11 crisis to demonstrate Russia’s desire and ability to be a serious (and necessary) partner 
of the U.S. and the Europe in shaping the new global security environment.40
The next section provides an evaluation of the role of nuclear weapons in U.S.-
Russian relations against a background of more general trends in the bilateral relations 
since the end of the Cold War described above. 
 
2.3.1. The Role of Nuclear Weapons in U.S.-Russian Strategic Relations  
To a large extent, this new role of nuclear weapons in the U.S.-Russian post-Cold 
War strategic relations has yet to be defined. The two extreme opinions were articulated by 
Waltz and Sagan in their famous dialogue transformed into a book ‘The Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons: a Debate’.41  
The main idea defended by Waltz was: 
“Nuclear weapons restore the clarity and simplicity lost as bipolar situations are 
replaced by multipolar ones”42  
Sagan, in his turn, was more sceptical about the ‘rationality’ of the new proliferators 
by stating that their actual behaviour would be strongly influenced by military organisations 
within those states and that the common biases, rigid routines, and parochial interests of 
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these organisations would lead to deterrence failures and accidental uses of nuclear weapons 
despite national interests to the contrary.43   
In Sagan’s opinion, nuclear weapons should play a much smaller role than they do: 
“The United States and Russia should become more like some of the nascent 
nuclear states, maintaining very small nuclear capabilities, with weapons 
components separated and located apart from the delivery systems, and with 
civilian organizations controlling the warheads.”44
The early years of the post-Cold War era were characterised by euphoria in U.S.-
Russian relations, and that was fully reflected in the fairly ambitious concepts of co-
operative denuclearisation that started to surface in the early 1990s. The liberal nuclear 
strategy thinkers were advocating a new nuclear posture, which would reflect a new 
relationship that the West was building with Russia. 
There was a positive trend during Clinton administration years with regard to the 
gradual down-grading of the role of nuclear weapons. Although, complete denuclearisation 
was never a formal policy of Clinton government, Clinton officials created a very ambitious 
non-proliferation framework, which would constrain existing nuclear postures, if realised in 
practice. The cooperative security agenda was brought into government by individuals, who 
before joining Clinton administration have already being developing a framework for 
cooperative denuclearisation in their scholarly work.45 Among such individuals were Les 
Aspin (appointed as Secretary of Defence), Ash Carter and Graham Allison (who were 
previously at Harvard University, where they developed works on cooperative 
denuclearisation and highlighted nuclear threats in the disintegrating Soviet Union), Laura 
Holgate, William Perry and others, who joined the Department of Defence team as soon as 
Clinton came to office.    
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Jason Ellis of the U.S. National Defence University concluded that: 
“…particularly in the Office of Secretary of Defense, these officials brought to 
bear a well-defined policy agenda, and, during their time in office, endeavoured 
to translate their largely predetermined preferences into policy. They placed 
heavy emphasis on, among other things, the safety and security of the Soviet 
nuclear arsenal, NIS denuclearization, U.S.-Russian military and defense 
relations, and defense conversion.”46
Secretary of Defence Les Aspin supported a reduced role for nuclear weapons, and 
Ash Carter, in particular, was trying to implement ideas on denuclearisation that himself 
and his colleagues developed during their academic career at Harvard. Carter and his 
colleagues from Harvard’s Center for Science and International Affairs were instrumental 
in developing concept of cooperative denuclearisation and cooperative threat reduction. 
The concept of cooperative denuclearisation was first developed in the work of 1993 
‘Cooperative Denuclearization’47, while their earlier study ‘Soviet Nuclear Fission’ played a 
significant part in raising the concerns that led to the establishment of  the Cooperative 
Threat Reduction (CTR) Programme. (The role of academia and of this particular report 
for the CTR process is discussed in Chapter 4).   
There was hope for a radical change in the nuclear posture prior to the Nuclear 
Posture Review of 1994.  It formally began in 1993 and operational responsibility for the 
review was assigned to Ashton Carter and Lieutenant General McCaffrey.48   
The ideas of Ash Carter were a quintessence of the ‘new thinking’ in the post-Cold 
War era.  Carter was thinking about ways to reduce the dangers emanating from the high 
state of alert (‘hair-trigger’) of nuclear forces and from the deteriorating safety and security 
of Russian nuclear weapons. Those dangers could be dealt with by reducing the number of 
nuclear forces on both sides and by eliminating the most destabilising categories of 
weapons (those, which were considered more vulnerable to attack and therefore 
contributing to instability by requiring a high state of alert, such as land-based missiles). 
That particular moment in history could have been a turning point in U.S.-Russian 
strategic relations if Carter and his supporters had received backing from within the U.S. 
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political system and military establishment. It is highly likely that if the U.S. was ready to 
engage in sweeping nuclear reductions and eliminate ‘first-strike’ weapons, such as 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), Russia would have undertaken similar changes 
in its nuclear posture. However, Carter ran into bureaucratic difficulties and resistance 
from the side of the military, who were not willing to see the role of nuclear weapons 
diminish.   
 The practice of the last decade has demonstrated resistance on both sides (in the 
U.S. and in Russia) to move away from the Cold War postures (nuclear postures and 
command and control systems are discussed in detail in the subsequent sections). Such 
resistance is especially apparent within the more traditional state establishments, such as 
military and security structures. A greater unwillingness of these agencies to change the 
Cold War practices is explained by the organisational interests and culture, which determine 
their organisational behaviour (as discussed in Chapter 3, in which the bureaucratic politics 
model is tested on all the major organisations involved in the CTR process).  
If during Clinton administration there were, at least, attempts to change the nuclear 
policies, de-alert its forces, give up launch-under-attack postures, and downgrade the role 
of nuclear weapons, the Bush administration set the process in reverse. While the Clinton 
administration supported multilateral non-proliferation regimes, such as the NPT, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, the Bush 
administration has developed a very different approach to international security and 
international non-proliferation regimes that is at odds with the dominant international 
consensus.  
The Bush administration has voiced its general scepticism that non-proliferation 
regimes work, and this creates an enormous contradiction in its policies. The U.S. is heavily 
involved in pressuring countries to adhere to non-proliferation obligations (a war in Iraq; 
diplomatic efforts in North Korea, Libya); at the same time, the U.S. government has 
neglected some of its own obligations with respect to non-proliferation. The U.S. 
unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, which for more than 
30 years, was one of the main pillars of the U.S.-Soviet/Russian arms control.  It has stalled 
the process of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) coming into force by refusing 
to sign a Convention Protocol outlining verification mechanisms. The U.S. officials quote 
their obligation to protect commercial interests of bio-technology, pharmaceutical 
companies, which would have to be checked for compliance with the BWC obligations. 
More recently, the U.S. has decided to modernise its nuclear testing sites, which makes it 
possible that it will resume nuclear testing in the future and thus undermine the 
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Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Although not ratified by the U.S., it has been 
observed so far. The Bush administration also started research and development of new 
nuclear weapons (low-yield, so called “small nukes”) and lowered the threshold of using 
nuclear weapons – these developments can send a wrong signal to the international 
community and create incentives for third countries to acquire nuclear capability.   
On the one hand, the current U.S. administration demonstrates its willingness to 
reduce levels of nuclear arsenals, on the other, the role of nuclear weapons in sub-strategic 
conflicts has been upgraded. During the Cold War a general consensus emerged that the 
role of nuclear weapons was that of a tool of deterrence in strategic conflicts. The changed 
nature of conflicts (from strategic to sub-strategic) challenges the relevance of nuclear 
weapons, since deterrence does not work in sub-strategic conflicts. Although, conflicts 
between states still arise, contemporary wars primarily involve sub-state actors. For political 
as well as military reasons, it is not plausible to use nuclear weapons against non-state 
actors, and therefore, they cannot deter conflict, they have no role in the war-fighting itself, 
or in peace-enforcement missions. The conflict in Bosnia involved four nuclear states but 
this fact had no impact on the conflict or its resolution. The military campaign in 
Afghanistan and the war in Iraq have demonstrated that nuclear weapons have no role to 
play in the most important conflicts in the new century. 
The level of sophistication reached by American conventional forces has also an 
important role to play in the discourse on the future role of nuclear weapons. The U.S. has 
such a capacity to project power on a global basis that it can be regarded as a conventional 
weapons superpower at a time when the existing or potential conflicts require the use of 
conventional weapons. In other words, nuclear weapons are not needed for the military 
contingencies the United States has to contend with.  
Russian policies related to its nuclear posture also do not seem rational from the 
standpoint of international security. From the point of national security, Russia’s nuclear 
weapons provide it with ‘existential’ guarantee – i.e. that in case of a nuclear attack on 
Russia, it will be able to retaliate. However, in terms of the current international security 
environment, a threat of nuclear attack on Russia hardly exists. At the same time, there are 
other threats to Russian national security – such as disintegration tendencies in parts of 
Russian state, like in Chechnya, or threats coming from the Southern borders of Russian 
Federation, such as threat of Islamic fundamentalism or regional instability in the Southern 
former Soviet Republics, which can spill over to Russia. These threats cannot be deterred 
by the existence or by speculation with regard to the use of nuclear weapons. 
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Both Russia and the U.S. did not use the opportunity presented to them in the 
aftermath of the Cold War. They could have used the momentum to reduce numbers of 
warheads in their respective nuclear arsenals to a minimum, which would send a positive 
message to the non-nuclear weapon states (parties to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 
(NPT)). The NPT initially was a compromise between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon 
states based on the agreement that nuclear states would disarm eventually. The failure of 
the main nuclear custodians – Russia and the U.S. – to implement sweeping reductions 
reflects on the legitimacy of the international non-proliferation regime. Overall, the 
discourse on what the role of nuclear weapons should be for Russia and the U.S. has varied 
from optimistic and ambitious scenarios of complete eventual disarmament to the 
realisation that neither country is prepared to introduce radical changes in its nuclear 
posture. Although, the rhetoric always seems to be positive in both countries, an analysis of 
real value of the arms control agreements reached and an evaluation of the posture and 
state of alert of the nuclear arsenals demonstrate the anachronistic nature of nuclear 
policies. 
If Russia and the United States sincerely intend to form a dramatically new type of 
relationship based on mutual trust, cooperation and sense of shared responsibility, the 
presence of excessive stockpiles of nuclear weapons becomes irrelevant. Up until now, 
both countries have demonstrated good will and persistence in reducing their nuclear 
arsenals by implementing several arms control treaties. However, the case of the CTR 
programmes is one of the examples of how complicated the process of restructuring 
strategic relations can be. 
It is very important for both countries to decide what role they assign to nuclear 
weapons in their military forces. Whether it will be the case of a total denuclearisation or 
just a limited process of reducing the nuclear armaments is not the question which needs 
an immediate answer. Nevertheless, the process of strategic arms control and by 
implication CTR have suffered from the absence of a clear definition of the end goal to be 
achieved in the long term.  
Russia and the United States are not isolated from the rest of the world and have to 
consider the developments in other countries. Regional nuclear proliferation (case of India 
and Pakistan, Israel, Iran, North Korea) has a direct impact on how Russia and America 
define their nuclear strategies. Having said this, it should be noted, that at the moment, the 
nuclear capabilities of Russia and the United States are so overwhelming in comparison 
with the others that it is mainly up to two of them to bear the responsibility for the nuclear 
balance in the world. 
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Russia and the U.S. - as major nuclear powers – are in a position to set trends of 
non-proliferation and denuclearisation and set an example of their own for the others to 
follow. In this respect, the joint efforts in the framework of cooperative threat reduction 
are a unique example of this new trend. In the first place, we should analyse the role of 
strategic arms control, assess how it reflects the changing state of strategic nuclear 
relations, before considering the impact of CTR. 
 
2.3.2. Main Post-Cold War Arms Control Treaties  
Figure 1 The Number of Strategic Warheads in the U.S. and Russia (U.S.S.R): 1990-200349
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There are three main arms control treaties, which were designed to reduce the 
number of nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. Those are: START I (signed in 
1991), START II (signed in 1993 – did not enter into force), and Moscow Treaty (signed in 
2002). The abovementioned bilateral agreements will be assessed here in terms of their 
direct impact on the size and composition of the nuclear forces of the U.S. and Russia. 
(Figure 1 presents the number of strategic warheads in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and 
the United States during the period of 1990 to 2003). 
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START I was signed in the summer of 1991 – a few months before the Soviet 
Union collapsed. The main provisions of START I included reductions in strategic nuclear 
offensive weapons in three stages over a seven-year period. On completion of START I 
reductions, each side was limited to have no more than 1,600 missile delivery vehicles and 
no more than 6,000 warheads.50
The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 meant that all four republics, 
on whose territory the START-accountable nuclear systems were located, became parties 
to the Treaty. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine along with Russia and the U.S. signed the 
Lisbon Protocol, which converted a bilateral U.S.-Soviet START I Treaty to a five-party 
agreement (the process that resulted in non-Russian republics agreeing to be parties to 
START I and join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon 
states is discussed in Chapter 4).  START I was the first bilateral agreement to significantly 
reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads. The Treaty also stipulated 
highly intrusive verification and transparency measures. 
The START II Treaty was negotiated in a very short period of time and signed in 
January 1993. The qualitative changes in U.S.-Russian relations were a main factor that 
enabled a swift move to further reduction beyond START I. The Russian government had 
also decided that it was necessary to move to lower levels of warheads due to the declining 
financial resources available to the government and the need to phase out of service missile 
systems that had been manufactured outside the territory of the Russian Federation. The 
reductions mandated by START II would leave each side with 3,000-3,500 nuclear 
warheads.51 The main achievement of START II was the proposed elimination of the most 
destabilising component of the ICBM force – missiles with multiple warheads (multiple 
independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV-ed ICBMs). 
START II signified a further step in the cooperative reduction of nuclear forces.   
However, the Treaty never formally came into force. The ratification of START II by the 
Russian Duma quickly became a hostage to President’s Yeltsin’s stand-off with the 
Parliament and to several serious problems in U.S.-Russian relations. Critics of START II 
in the Russian Parliament were not satisfied with the perceived imbalances in the Treaty. In 
the first place, the Treaty did not ban MIRVed submarine based missiles (SLBMs). The 
United States had developed the only MIRVed SLBM with a hard target kill capability 
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comparable to that of ICBMs. Due to the technical asymmetries of the two arsenals, this 
provision of the treaty put the United States at a distinct advantage. Secondly, the rules for 
‘downloading’ warheads (i.e. putting single warheads on missiles that previously had re-
entry vehicles with multiple warheads) favoured the United States because the maximum 
permitted number of warheads that could be downloaded was six; that meant that Russia’s 
MIRVed ICBMs (SS-18s, SS-24s – which had 10 warheads each) had to be scrapped52, 
while the United States only had to take 100 Peacekeeper53 out of service and could keep its 
Minuteman II force by replacing the three warhead re-entry vehicle. This had two 
important consequences: by storing the original re-entry vehicles for the Minuteman II, the 
United States would retain the capability to quickly upload warheads in the event it decided 
to break out of the Treaty. The other consequence was that in order reach the START II 
limits Russia had to manufacture new single-warhead missiles, thus considerably increasing 
the cost of arms control. These factors made the Treaty unfavourable to Russia in the view 
of the Russian legislation branch and representatives of the military-industrial complex. 
The U.S. government’s intentions to develop its missile defence capabilities were 
also a matter of serious concern for the State Duma. Disagreements between the two 
countries on what were the technical criteria of the Anti-Ballistic Treaty (ABM) Treaty of 
1972 aggravated in the second half of the 1990s. The ABM Treaty prohibited the 
development of defensive weapons since sophistication of defence of one country meant 
devaluation of other country’s offence capabilities. The United States was keen to develop 
theatre missile defences (TMD), and the two sides were attempting to distinguish between 
strategic and non-strategic defences (TMD demarcation); however, it proved to be a 
serious challenge. 
At Helsinki summit in 1997 Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed on extending the 
START II implementation period by five years (in order to put less pressure on the Russian 
side) and they also came out with a number of clarifications of the ABM Treaty (in an 
attempt to eliminate disagreements on its technical provisions).    
By 1998 even the military-industrial complex in Russia started to realise that due to 
the deteriorating economic situation it was not realistic to cling to the existing posture, and 
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that START II was needed to secure U.S. reductions in the situation when Russia would 
have to implement reductions due to economic reasons.54  
In April 1998 President Yeltsin made another attempt to get START II ratified by 
sending to Duma a package of documents, which included agreements reached on the 
demarcation between ABM and TMD. The State Duma designed additional provisions to 
be attached to START II ratification, which would envisage provisions for future arms 
reduction negotiations.  Ratification was postponed in response to the bombing of Iraq in 
Operation Desert Fox which outraged many in the Russian political elite. The ratification was 
then expected to take place in April 1999, but the vote was cancelled due to the U.S. and its 
NATO allies campaign in Kosovo.55
START II was finally ratified in 2000, after Putin had assumed the presidency and 
START had ceased to become a pawn in the political game between the Duma and the 
President. Putin developed a more constructive working relationship with the Parliament 
and sought to put relations with the West back on a proper footing after the disagreements 
over Kosovo and Chechnya. Two main conditions were attached: U.S. ratification of 
START II protocol extending the implementation framework and U.S. ratification of the 
demarcation agreement, which was signed in 1997.  The conditions were not met, and 
START II technically never came into force. 
The Bush administration came into office with a different approach to nuclear 
strategy and arms control. In particular, it wanted to abrogate the ABM Treaty in order to 
be able to deploy a National Missile Defence (NMD) system. Although Bush was willing to 
reduce the number of strategic warheads deployed, he was against continuing arms control 
treaty regimes. At the same time on the Russian side there was hesitation about START II. 
Given the strategic and economic circumstances, a distinct preference emerged to move 
towards a new agreement based on the discussions between Clinton and Yeltsin about 
START III, bypassing START II and moving to lower levels instead.  
The most recent strategic arms reduction treaty was signed in Moscow in May 
2002. The Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) was negotiated in an extremely 
short period of six months. The final document was very brief and did not include 
extensive verification and counting rules. The officials on both sides claimed that that new 
type of agreement demonstrated a new level of trust between the countries, which did not 
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require the Cold War practice of singling out all the conditions of Treaty’s implementation. 
At the same time, arms control experts in both countries saw other reasons behind the lack 
of details in the SORT, the main one being a failure to work out issues of transparency and 
verification.56
The main provision of SORT consists of proposed reductions to 1,700-2,200 
operationally deployed warheads on each side. The reductions signify a further decrease in 
nuclear strategic arms in the U.S. and Russia. However, the Treaty has some deficiencies, 
according to critics, and some arms control experts in Washington and Moscow think that 
it does not make any difference to the existing trends in Russian and American nuclear 
policies.   
It was mentioned before that the signed document lacks explicit verification and 
transparency mechanisms. Moreover, the numerical reductions envisaged in the Treaty do 
not reflect the real numbers of warheads, which will remain in the U.S.   The United States 
is planning to meet SORT levels by downloading warheads and storing them.  It means 
that at any point the U.S. can upload them back on delivery vehicles.   Therefore, even after 
implementation of announced reductions, the U.S. will have a potential capability of 
approximately 5,000 warheads.57
Russia, in its turn, does not have a capability of maintaining its current delivery 
vehicles for long, therefore, it will not have the option of increasing the number of 
operationally deployed warheads.   In the Russian case, the reductions will be irreversible.  
The current issue with delivery vehicles revolves around the fact some of the production 
lines are located outside of Russia (e.g. in Ukraine). 
The signing of the Moscow Treaty (SORT) was preceded by complex negotiations. 
The Russian side was proposing to implement real reductions of deployed warheads from 
START-I levels of 6,000 to 1,700-2,200, provide for the elimination of strategic delivery 
vehicles by using the most economically rational method, expand on transparency and 
confidence-building measures based on the START I system of control and lock in 
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interdependence of strategic offensive forces reductions with the limitations on defensive 
forces (in connection with the muted U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty).58   
The U.S. demonstrated its lack of interest in developing extensive verification and 
transparency measures and was not interested in signing a bilateral Treaty – the U.S. 
government initially proclaimed that it would reduce the number of its nuclear weapons 
without signing an agreement with Russia.  This position reflects the policy of President 
Bush of unilateral approaches to international security, which may sound positive if 
reductions are proposed, but it does create the potential for unilateral reversals of the 
reductions in nuclear weapons. Moreover, unilateral actions favoured by the Bush 
administration undermine the spirit of cooperative threat reduction. 
With SORT being the most recent nuclear arms reduction agreement, the 
approximate size, posture and composition of the U.S. and Russian nuclear forces can be 
projected. It is evident that SORT does not fundamentally change the posture of the 
nuclear weapons, i.e. the structure of the triad remained the same (nuclear forces consist of 
air-, land-, and sea-based weapons), the balance of Russian and the U.S. forces remained 
approximately the same (at the level of mutual assured destruction), and the level of alert of 
nuclear weapons was not decreased (except for the status of strategic bombers), which 
means (according to some analysts)59 there remains a low but non-negligible danger of an 
accidental nuclear launch.   
The apparent example of arms control ‘in reverse’ is demonstrated by the fact that 
SORT abandons the ban on the most destabilising group of weapons – ICBMs with 
multiple warheads (MIRVed missiles). That in fact represents a step back from the 
provisions of START II, which prohibited MIRVed land-based missiles.  Like START II, 
SORT failed to ban MIRV-ed submarine-launched missiles (Trident-II).  
 
2.3.3. The U.S. Nuclear Posture   
The U.S. nuclear posture review (NPR) conducted towards the end of 2001 
provides some interesting conclusions about the role the current White House 
administration assigns to nuclear weapons.    
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The nuclear posture review proposes a new nuclear posture shifting from a 
traditional nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers to a new triad consisting of:  
x Offensive strike systems (both nuclear and non-nuclear); 
x Defences (both active and passive); and 
x A revitalised defence infrastructure. 60 
However, in reality, the U.S. nuclear posture, in this way, remains the same: it is still 
a triad, since neither of ICBMs, SLBMs, or bombers are eradicated from the nuclear forces.  
What changed is the rhetoric on what the U.S. presents as a threshold for using its nuclear 
weapons. An analysis of implications of NPR demonstrates that what Pentagon attempted 
to present as a policy, which decreases the chances of using nuclear weapons, is actually a 
policy for lowering the threshold for their use. 
The U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld presented the New Triad as one, 
which could both reduce U.S. dependence on nuclear weapons and improve its ability to 
deter attack in the face of proliferating WMD capabilities in two ways: the addition of 
defences (decreasing dependence on offensive strike forces) and the addition of non-
nuclear strike forces (decreasing dependence on nuclear weapons in offensive capability).61 
Rumsfeld emphasised that the new U.S. nuclear posture “puts the Cold War practices 
related to planning for strategic forces behind” and that “the U.S. will no longer plan, size 
or sustain its forces as though Russia presented merely a smaller version of the threat 
posed by the former Soviet Union.” 
A closer analysis of the body of the available excerpt from the NPR questions some 
of these claims. The impact of the U.S. nuclear policies on the international non-
proliferation regime and stability, on the whole, is ambivalent. 
2.3.3.1. The Nuclear Threshold 
  The U.S. administration claims that the NPR makes the use of nuclear weapons less 
likely due to its decreased reliance on them in offensive strikes. The nuclear policy experts, 
however, have a different view on that. The evaluation of the practical implications of 
modifications to the U.S. nuclear posture suggested by the NPR shows that they blur the 
borderline between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. Moreover, for the first time official 
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Washington moved away from the rhetoric of not using nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear states (a commitment under the NPT) to proclaiming the possibility of using 
nuclear weapons against some non-nuclear states. The implications of these two major 
provisions on the potential use of nuclear weapons are assessed below. 
The “New Triad” outlines four main defence policy goals: to assure, dissuade, deter 
and defeat.62 The “defeat” component of the revised defence policy is defined in the 
following way:  
“Composed of both non-nuclear systems and nuclear weapons, the strike 
element of the New Triad can provide greater flexibility in the design and 
conduct of military campaigns to defeat opponents decisively. Non-nuclear 
strike capabilities may be particularly useful to limit collateral damage and 
conflict escalation. Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to 
withstand non-nuclear attack (for example, deep underground bunkers or bio-
weapons facilities).”63
By mixing nuclear and non-nuclear offensive strike systems the U.S. does not 
decrease the role of nuclear weapons (as claimed by Pentagon), but on the opposite, 
increases the number of circumstances, in which use of nuclear weapons is defined as 
appropriate. 
The NPR singles out several countries, as states, which potentially can be engaged 
in immediate, potential and unexpected contingencies and suggests the U.S. sizes its nuclear 
arsenal according to the possible danger coming from them (meaning, the U.S. is prepared 
to use its nuclear weapons against them if it considers it appropriate). Among countries on 
the list are North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Iran, Syria, China and Russia. While China and Russia 
are nuclear states themselves, the rest of the countries are signatories to the NPT as non-
nuclear states (except for North Korea).  Countries that are still formally non-nuclear NPT 
signatories were previously not to be attacked by the U.S. unless they would attack it first in 
concert with a nuclear weapon state (according to the negative security assurances of the 
NPT). 
The 2001 NPR for the first time openly proclaims a possible use of nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear states. Some experts point out that a potential use of nuclear 
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weapons in a pre-emptive strike is not new.64 An option of using nuclear capabilities was 
not ruled by the U.S. sometimes mentioned in relation to the cases if any nation would 
threaten U.S. with the use of chemical weapons or against China (before it acquired nuclear 
capabilities) or North Korea. While it may be the case that the potential use of nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear states by the U.S. was not ruled out before, but the NPR 
elevates such a contingency to the level of formal policy. 
By announcing its readiness to use nuclear weapons against several countries 
mentioned in the NPR, which are signatories of the NPT, the U.S. undermines the 
international non-proliferation regime. A further weakening of the NPT could result in 
increased nuclear proliferation all around the world. Moreover, by threatening to use 
nuclear weapons against any nation considered to be a threat to national security, the U.S. 
government increases the likelihood that the countries would try to acquire nuclear 
weapons fearing a possible nuclear attack from the U.S. 
Former U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara and former Clinton 
administration official Thomas Graham Jr. concluded: 
“…the basic implication of the NPR – that the U.S. reserves the right to target 
any nation with nuclear weapons whenever it chooses to do so – is itself likely to 
increase the risk of the nuclear weapons proliferation. If a country believes it’s 
falling out of favour with Washington, what is the first thing it is likely to do? A 
quote attributed to Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes provides some 
insight: ‘Before one challenges the United States, one must first acquire nuclear 
weapons.’”65
2.3.3.2. Russia – Still a Target 
Although, Rumsfeld’s message accompanying the report on the NPR emphasises 
that Russia is no longer seen as a threat, the report itself appears to contradict this. The 
NPR divides the contingencies for which the U.S. must be prepared in terms of sizing its 
nuclear arsenal. Three defined categories include: immediate, potential and unexpected 
contingencies. While Russia does not figure among Iraq, North Korea, Libya, which are 
seen as potential participants in the immediate contingencies, and potential contingencies 
outlining possible “new, hostile coalition against the U.S. or its allies in which one or more 
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members possesses WMD” do not necessarily hint at Russia, the third group of 
unexpected contingencies quite openly do so. Unexpected contingencies are defined as 
“sudden and unexpected security challenges”, when “contemporary illustrations might 
include a sudden regime change by which an existing nuclear arsenal comes in the hands of 
a new, hostile leadership group”.66 The NPR notes the absence of “ideological sources of 
conflict with Moscow” and claims that “the U.S. seeks a more cooperative relationship 
with Russia and a move-away from the balance-of-terror policy framework.”   
At the same time, it concludes the following:  
“Russia’s nuclear forces and programs, nevertheless, remain a concern.  Russia 
faces many strategic problems around its periphery and its future course cannot 
be charted with certainty.  U.S. planning must take this into account.  In the 
event that U.S. relations with Russia significantly worsen in the future, the U.S. 
may need to revise its nuclear force levels and posture.”67
The U.S. stance on what should be the size of operationally deployed and 
responsive nuclear forces demonstrates that the U.S. military planning does not make any 
distinction between the different potential contingencies. NPR states: “The operationally 
deployed forces are sized to provide the capabilities required to meet the U.S. defense goals 
in the context of immediate and unexpected contingencies”.68 In other words, the U.S. 
chooses to have a size of operationally deployed weapons matching that of Russia’s, as far 
as Russia is present in the unexpected contingencies group. The level of announced 
reductions and the size of the nuclear arsenal the U.S. will keep after the reductions take 
place during the next decade provide an additional demonstration of that. 
According to the NPR, in the next decade the U.S. will reduce the size of its 
‘operationally deployed’ strategic force to the range of between 1,700-2,200 warheads.69
The problem with this number is that it does not reflect the number of warheads 
constituting the ‘responsive force’.  It means that the U.S. can upload warheads existing in 
its responsive force, thereby increasing significantly the nominal number of warheads 
planned to be on operationally deployed forces. This ambiguity was pointed out by several 
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experts.70 Even more importantly, there is no contingency that requires 1,700-2,200 
warheads, except to deter the use of about 1,500 warheads that Russia might keep. 
Consequently, contrary to official statements, the configuration of the U.S. strategic arsenal 
continues to be based on Russian nuclear capabilities. 
Peter Scoblic, an arms control expert and an editor of Arms Control Today claims 
that the real problem with the NPR is that: 
“…it reaffirms the cold-war nuclear status quo.  By calling for a large nuclear 
reserve force, ‘ground-penetrating’ nuclear warheads, and a revitalization of the 
U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure, the Bush administration is institutionalizing 
a strong reliance on nuclear weapons for the indefinite future…”71   
In May 2003 the Bush administration has requested funding for four nuclear 
weapons-related projects. They included: research for developing  the Robust Nuclear 
Earth Penetrators (RNEPs) - the so called “bunker busters”, study of new types of 
weapons, such as low-yield nuclear weapons (“mini-nukes”), the enhancement of the 
nuclear test site readiness, and design and technology development for a new plutonium pit 
production facility, which will allow the manufacture of several hundred weapons per 
year.72 The opponents of the new programmes state that at a minimum the administration 
is taking the first steps toward restarting nuclear testing and rebuilding the capacity to 
produce nuclear weapons.73
In his analysis of the impact of the four proposed nuclear programmes and the split 
in Congress between the opponents and proponents of new initiatives, Charles Ferguson 
points out that some of those opposed to the new nuclear projects link them to Russia: 
“Although the four nuclear weapons programmes on Congress’ plate this year 
do not appear to be directed at Russia, some senators opposed to these 
programs were quick to point out to the administration’s Nuclear Posture 
Review, which included Russia on a list with six other countries (China, Iran, 
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Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria) that ‘could be involved in immediate, 
potential or unexpected contingencies.”74
By late 2003 President Bush approved allocation of funds for the creation of low-
yield weapons and granted funds for modernisation of Nevada nuclear test site for 
underground testing.    
 
2.3.4. Russian Military Doctrine and Nuclear Weapons  
Russian strategic military planning also bears distinctive features of Cold War 
thinking. The difference between Russia and the U.S. is that Russia is constrained 
economically with regard to resources available for the maintenance of its nuclear weapons; 
therefore, the Russian government is interested in bilaterally coordinated reductions of 
nuclear arsenals. The Russian objective is that reductions in the number of its weapons 
should be synchronised with reductions on the American side. The Bush administration 
has demonstrated that it does not believe in arms control and places the focus on unilateral 
reductions. President Bush summed up his position by noting: “we don’t need an arms 
control agreement to convince us to reduce our nuclear weapons down substantially, and 
I’m going to do it”.75 However, it is in the interest of both sides to engage in arms control 
to balance the numbers and bind both sides into a process that preserves strategic stability.  
If an uneven balance of forces emerges, with Russia most probably being the vulnerable 
side, the potential for nuclear escalation can aggravate: Russia might be tempted to launch 
its weapons on a dubious warning, since its forces due to their inferiority in size and the 
level of protection would not survive a first strike from the U.S. (the problem is further 
aggravated by the aging warning systems in Russia as discussed later in this chapter).  
Even though Russian nuclear systems are ageing and Russia is pushed to reduce the 
number of warheads, it does not anticipate drastic reductions in arms. The reason for that 
is that Russia does want to keep its weapons for the foreseeable future. 
Russia views nuclear weapons as an important factor in its superpower status.   
While being deprived economically, technologically and conventionally, Russia remains the 
only power, which has enough nuclear weapons to pose a counterweight to the United 
States. The Russian weakness in conventional forces is an important factor on placing the 
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nuclear weapons in the centre of its offensive strike capabilities. The remaining significant 
nuclear arsenal in the U.S. is seen as a requirement for Russia to maintain matching nuclear 
forces of its own. A growing number of states which potentially can acquire WMD 
capabilities is also seen by Russian decision-makers as one of the reasons for keeping 
nuclear capabilities in Russia for the foreseeable future. 
Those four major reasons for giving nuclear weapons a central role in Russian 
military strategic planning are openly presented by the Russian policy-makers, and there are 
no dubious declarations about shifting emphasis away from the nuclear arsenal (as it is the 
case with the U.S.) – mainly, because Russia’s conventional forces in their sophistication 
and size are no match for U.S. conventional capabilities. 
By the end of 1993, Russian military doctrine had abandoned the Soviet-era pledge 
of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. The military doctrine adopted in 1993 had nuclear 
deterrence as its major component. However, apart from a dramatic shift in rhetoric about 
the possibility of first-use, the doctrine lacked any detailed scenarios as to when and how 
the nuclear weapons could be used.76    
The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, signed into a Decree by 
President Putin in December 1999, does not specify that nuclear weapons would not be 
used in case of a non-nuclear attack; on the contrary the wording suggests that nuclear 
forces can be used in different types of conflicts: 
“The main task of the Russian Federation is to deter aggressions of any scale 
against it and its allies, including with the use of nuclear weapons. The Russian 
Federation must have nuclear forces capable of delivering specified damage to 
any aggressor state or a coalition of states in any situation…”77  
The Concept further stipulates that Russia proceeds from the following principle 
when regarding the possibility of using military force for ensuring its national security: 
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“…the use of all available means and forces, including nuclear weapons, in case 
of the need to repel an armed aggression when all other means of settling the 
crisis situation have been exhausted or proved ineffective.”78
The Russian Military Doctrine of 2000 updated the military doctrine of 1993 and 
vaguely pointed to the scenarios of when the nuclear weapons can be used: 
“The Russian Federation retains for itself the right to use nuclear weapons in 
response to the use of nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction 
against it and its allies, and in response to wide-scale aggression using 
conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian 
Federation and its allies.”79
The above suggests that Russia might decide to use nuclear weapons in response to 
a non-nuclear attack. Moreover, nuclear weapons might be used against a non-nuclear state: 
“The Russian Federation will not employ nuclear weapons against states parties 
to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons that do not possess 
nuclear weapons, except in case of an invasion or any other attack on the 
Russian Federation, its territory, its Armed Forces or other troops, its allies, or 
on a state with which it has a security obligation, carried out or supported by 
such a state that does not possess nuclear weapons, together with or in the 
presence of allied obligations with a state possessing nuclear weapons.”80
The most recent information for the analysis of Russian nuclear policy was 
provided by a report produced by the Ministry of Defence named “Immediate Tasks of 
Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation”.81 The new policy paper 
further develops the Russian Military Doctrine of 2000 and elaborates on the missions for 
nuclear weapons in a detailed way. The document also demonstrates that Russia is 
watching closely the moves of the U.S. government in terms of its intention to develop 
new (low-yield) weapons and U.S. modernisation of testing capabilities. Nikolai Sokov, an 
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expert in Russian strategic forces, in his examination of the Ministry of Defence document 
concludes that: 
“the future shape of the nuclear posture does not seem to hold any surprises.  
One remaining element of uncertainty is related to future U.S. policy on nuclear 
weapons: if the United States proceeds with the development of a new, more 
“usable” nuclear weapon and especially if it resumes nuclear testing as many 
expect, then Russian nuclear policy might begin to change and Russia will strive 
to acquire similar capabilities.”82
 
2.3.4.1. Size of the Russian Nuclear Arsenal 
The current size of the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal consists of 5,436 
operational nuclear warheads distributed among the triad components: 3,072 - inter-
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 1,732 - submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBMs), and 632 - bombers (air-launched cruise missiles – ALCMs).83 The lack of 
financial resources severely constrains Russia’s ability to maintain its nuclear arsenal.  The 
resource constraints and the fact that the existing arsenal is reaching the limits of its 
operational lifetime, the existing strategic nuclear forces can be maintained only till 2005 
even in the absence of arms control.84
Therefore, the size of the nuclear arsenal in Russia will be determined by two major 
factors: Russia’s economic resources and bilateral U.S.-Russian reductions. 
According to some estimates, Russia’s economic resources would allow the county 
to maintain approximately 1,500-2000 warheads.85 Other sources claim that by 2010 Russia 
may be able to deploy no more than 1,100 warheads – this number is calculated taking into 
account changes in production and deployment rates, which were established after the 
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Russian Security Council determined in 1998 the structure of strategic nuclear forces for 
the following 10-15 years. 86   
The most recent agreement between the U.S. and Russia signed in Moscow in May 
2002 (SORT) foresees reductions on each side towards the level of 1,700 – 2,200 warheads 
each, which means that natural retirement of nuclear weapons in Russia would reach that 
level (and may even go lower) any way. It is apparent that in any scenario, Russia will 
maintain a range of 1,100-1,700 warheads due to economic constraints and reductions 
introduced by SORT of 2002. The size of 1,100-1,700 nuclear warheads to be maintained 
by Russia still represents an excessive amount of weapons, and it does not reflect the 
requirements of the post-Cold War security environment unless a confrontation with the 
U.S. is seen as a likely possibility.    
Stephen Blank of the Strategic Studies Institute (U.S. Army of War College) points 
out that: 
“Russian threat assessments and planned procurements remain wedded to the 
threat of a war with the United States and/or its allies as well as to nuclear 
scenarios for that war even as Russia demands equality with the United 
States.”87
The Military Doctrine of 2000 and the “White Paper” of Russian Defence Ministry 
of 2002 confirm that statement. It is noticeable, however, that official statements on 
nuclear weapons bear little relation to Russia’s real security needs or the likely military 
contingencies Russia faces. Nuclear weapons are becoming a less and less important factor 
of a superpower status.  Nuclear capability can hardly help the country to overcome its 
economic difficulties, and moreover, brings an additional burden on the state budget. 
Russia simply cannot afford to maintain the huge stockpiles of nuclear warheads and 
missiles.  
The military modernisation is undermined by the decline in Russia’s economy. 
According to Steven Rosefielde, economics imposes three distinct kinds of restrictions on 
Russia’s military power. It diminishes the nation’s productive potential, the demand for 
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defence services, and efficiency.88 The economic performance is gradually becoming more 
important in terms of the influence the country can exercise in the world affairs. The 
military capabilities, even the nuclear ones, do not have a decisive role anymore.89 It is 
evident that Russian military thought has not yet fully adapted to the realities of the 
contemporary international security environment. 
 
2.3.5. Command and Control in the Post-Cold War Era – the Danger of an 
Accidental Nuclear War  
A particular symbol of the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship has been the targeting 
of nuclear weapons against each other. In May 1994 President Yeltsin and President 
Clinton agreed to stop aiming missiles at one another – a step, which could have sent an 
extremely positive message except for the fact that it fell short of a real change in nuclear 
force and alert postures.    
A well-known U.S. specialist in strategic weapons and currently head of the 
Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI) – Bruce Blair – argues that the 
pledge to re-target missiles in technical terms does not make any substantial difference to 
Cold-War time postures.90 The U.S. missiles were retargeted and were re-programmed to 
fall into the ocean if launched. However, such a trajectory is set to be a default one only if 
no changes are made in the computer orders regulating the launch. Blair points out that the 
original Russian aims for U.S. missiles are still programmed into memory banks and it will 
take only 10 seconds to retarget them to the original settings. 
After Clinton and Yeltsin’s announcement in 1994 to re-target their missiles, the 
Russian intercontinental missiles were set to a “zero flight plan”. However, similar to the 
state of the U.S. missiles, the original targets are still present in missiles’ memory banks and 
can be re-ordered from authorised personnel in Moscow to change targeting – a procedure, 
which will take only 10 seconds (as in the case of the American missiles). 
                                                 
88 Steven Rosefielde, ‘Economic Foundations of Russian Military Modernization: Putin’s 
Dilemma’, Paper prepared for the Conference Volume on The Russian Armed Forces at the Dawn 
of the New Millennium, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 7-9 February 
2000, First Draft, April 2000, p.3  
89 Christoph Bluth, ‘Norms and International Relations: The anachronistic nature of neo-realist 
approaches’, paper to be published at http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis   
90 Interview with Bruce Blair, Washington D.C., September 2003 and Bruce Blair’s article ‘Where 
Would All the Missiles Go?’ in The Washington Post, 15.10.1996, p. A15 
56 
The submarine-launched missiles on both sides will also need just a few minutes to 
restore the original target set. Therefore, the highly publicised pledge that none of the 
missiles are targeted at Russia or the U.S. has merely a rhetoric value and reflects the 
immediate status of their nuclear arsenals, but does not mean that there was a substantial 
change in nuclear postures of two countries. 
The continued maintenance of target sets from previous strategic operational plans 
and the continued maintenance of a high status of alert of the nuclear forces in both 
countries have a detrimental effect on security and stability. Dangers of an accidental 
nuclear war run high due to the technical factors described above and due to the potential 
for false tactical warnings. An unauthorised nuclear launch can trigger retaliation by 
another side. One third of Russian and American strategic arsenals have a status of 
“launch-readiness”.91
A false alarm can be a source of an accidental nuclear exchange as well. 
Misinterpreted attack warnings can set off a launch-on-warning on both sides. In this 
respect, ageing warning systems in Russia are a matter of grave concern. The more 
unreliable warning systems become, the greater the danger is for the attack to be launched 
in what would be perceived as a second strike in retaliation, although in reality it could be a 
first strike to initiate a nuclear war. The unreliability of warning systems also can contribute 
to a negative judgement for the decision-makers at the crisis time – with Russian nuclear 
forces becoming less capable of surviving a first-strike attack, the decision-makers can be 
forced to exaggerate a dubious warning rather than dismiss it.   
Bruce Blair pointed out in late 1990s: 
“…in their present configuration, Russian forces could not ride out an attack.  
Russia today in fact faces far stronger pressures and incentives to ‘use or lose’ its 
strategic nuclear arsenal than at any time since the early 1960s.”92
The political improvements witnessed in the last decade considerably reduce the 
dangers of state-authorised nuclear attacks. However, both U.S. and Russia are in danger of 
an accidental nuclear war, the chances for which are exacerbated by the number of nuclear 
missiles on each side, their status of alert and the targeting information still keyed in the 
databanks. The current status of nuclear strategic arsenals in the U.S. and Russia not only 
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fails to reflect the new international security system, in which two countries are no longer 
enemies, but also has a detrimental effect on strategic stability. 
De-alerting and denuclearisation are processes, which have to be gradually carried 
out in order to improve security and stability in the post-Cold war environment. 
Cooperative threat reduction is an important part of denuclearisation and it has contributed 
significantly to this process. Interestingly, cooperative threat reduction has a two-fold 
meaning, when evaluated within the framework of U.S.-Russian denuclearisation: it has 
both influenced the larger process of denuclearisation but also has been influenced by it 
(the limitations of U.S.-Russian denuclearisation efforts have a direct impact on the 
limitations within the CTR process). 
 
2.3.6. The “Strategic Paradox” 93  
The current trend in the U.S.-Russian strategic relations can be characterised as a 
“strategic paradox” phenomenon. It is evident that nuclear strategies, the size, composition 
and level of alert of nuclear forces in the U.S. and Russia do not reflect what is supposed to 
be a new level of partnership between former enemies. A completely different international 
security setting of post-Cold War era makes deliberate attack of the U.S. on Russia or the 
other way around – an almost inconceivable scenario. There are new security threats 
acknowledged by both countries, and there are high-level declarations of true cooperation 
between them in their fight against new threats (such as joint efforts in the global war on 
terrorism). Nonetheless, in strategic terms, the U.S. and Russia still continue to behave in a 
way more suitable for the Cold War antagonism, which does not reflect current security 
environment realities. 
START and SORT are important nuclear arms reduction treaties, however, their 
successful implementation would not make a substantial difference in the posture and state 
of alert of nuclear arsenals remaining in the U.S. and Russia. Although, reduction in 
numbers of weapons targeting each other does contribute to the arms control process, it 
does not change the military aspects of the bilateral security relationship since the two 
countries continue to possess numbers of warheads that represent an ‘overkill’ capability. 
The size of a minimal nuclear arsenal capable of having a maximum deterrent value would 
be calculated on the basis of understanding that “stability is evidently reversely 
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proportional to the probability of a first strike.”94 In other words, a country would be less 
likely to engage in a first strike if the retaliatory strike from the other side after accepting 
the attack would inflict on it an unacceptable damage.   
The nearest formula for mathematically calculating such a balance was offered in 
the 1960s by the then U.S. Defence Secretary McNamara. The threshold of unacceptable 
damage deduced by him was the destruction of about 70 per cent of the industrial potential 
and 30 per cent of the population. It was calculated that such destruction would require 
approximately 400 nuclear warheads of the megaton class; so “McNamara Index” (or M-
Index) was the aggregate megatonnage divided by the number 400. The McNamara 
threshold was determined on the basis of calculations on how many warheads would be 
required for the ‘efficient’ destruction of industry and population; the calculations showed 
that after certain level of warheads, the law of diminishing return would come into force, 
and having more warheads above that level would make less and less difference to the 
overall capability to destroy.95 If to accept M-Index for calculating required levels of 
warheads for the U.S. and Russia (“McNamara threshold” is the only method based on 
objective and measurable parameters), the levels to be reached in accordance with the last 
arms reduction agreements (SORT) of 1,700-2,200 warheads on each side would be 
significantly more than required for a mutual assured destruction relationship between the 
United States and Russia. 
The more weapons there are in two countries, the higher the chances are that a 
nuclear exchange can be triggered. The danger of an accidental nuclear war – possible due 
to deteriorating early warning systems in Russia and remaining hair-trigger alert of a 
substantial part of nuclear forces - increases in direct correlation with the size of 
operationally deployed forces.    
Experts from the Washington-based “think-tank” Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace note:  
“There are real dangers associated with large, deployed forces.  Missiles with 
multiple warheads are considered high-value targets.  In order to protect these 
assets, military commands in both countries keep such missiles on high alert, 
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ready to launch within minutes.  Given the poor and degrading state of the 
Russian early-warning system, the continued deployment of multiple-warhead 
ICBMs poses a major risk of accidental launch or launch-in-error, even during 
periods of strategic stability.  Such risk could rise exponentially if U.S.-Russian 
relations deteriorate.”96
Apart from the dangers associated with the hair-trigger alert of significant numbers 
of forces, there is also a problem of safety and security of those forces.  The problem of 
physical security is exacerbated by higher numbers of nuclear weapons and materials to 
protect. This problem is undeniably more acute in Russia, but even in the U.S. concerns are 
occasionally voiced about the security of nuclear facilities. With the current arms reduction 
treaties – Russia will be dismantling multiple-warhead missiles but it will be forced to 
produce some new warheads in order to meet the limits of SORT. The new U.S. nuclear 
posture calls for developing new nuclear weapons (e.g. earth-penetrating warheads). In this 
way, both countries will need additional nuclear material in order to produce weapons. 
With more material being stored in both countries, the chances for material diversion also 
increase. In other words, Russia and the U.S. follow policies, which might be undermining 
their own security. In the era, when they do not have to maintain large nuclear arsenals, 
decision to do so, creates a ‘strategic paradox’ characterised by Cold War nuclear postures 
in the post-Cold War era.   
 
2.4. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Process in U.S.-Russian 
Relations 
The evidence presented in this chapter indicates that current U.S.-Russian strategic 
relations can be identified as Scenario 3 (Strategic Arms Reductions with a problem of a 
‘Strategic Paradox’) among four scenarios defined in Table 1 in Chapter 1. The empirical 
facts suggest that there was a temporary shift in the U.S political thinking during the 
Clinton term towards cooperative denuclearisation (identified as Scenario 2 in Table 1, 
Chapter 1), however, it was not further developed due to reluctance of U.S. military and 
the U.S. Congress and a consequent change in the U.S. administration. This ambivalence 
about the strategic nuclear relationship is reflected in the implementation of CTR. 
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The process of cooperative threat reduction is a pioneering effort designed to 
further the transition to the post-Cold War security environment. Since the U.S. and Russia 
are no longer enemies, joining efforts in limiting threats to international security, is a logical 
endeavour. Cooperative threat reduction is a process, which is not limited to the 
implementation of nuclear safety programmes. It is a much more complex process of 
defining the new role for nuclear arsenals in two countries, it is a demonstration of how 
different the relations between former enemies can be, it is a way of overcoming Cold War 
legacies in state and organisational cultures, and a tool of enhancing international security 
and stability. 
It is important to note that while CTR itself impacts on U.S.-Russian relations, it is 
also to some extent dependent on the state of U.S.-Russian relations at any given time. By 
having several CTR programmes running for more than 10 years, Russia and the U.S. 
created an unprecedented example of former enemies joining their efforts in combating 
nuclear and other WMD-related threats. Cooperation in the area of nuclear safety and 
security is even more remarkable, since nuclear arms industries in both countries were 
central to the Cold War. The nuclear complexes in both countries were the most resource-
consuming and secretive industries. It is a unique situation that Cold War adversaries 
consider it possible to cooperate in reducing the threats created by the Cold War arms race. 
The implementation of the CTR programmes in some ways constitutes an endeavour to 
overcome the organisational, bureaucratic and political mechanisms within the countries.  
These programmes are capable of gradually changing the perceptions deeply embedded in 
organisational thinking in the U.S. and Russia. 
The unique programmes, which have evolved out of the original CTR legislation, 
now represent a stable productive part of the U.S.-Russian post-Cold War relationship. At 
the same time, the limitations of CTR implementation clearly demonstrate the limitations 
of the U.S.-Russian partnership itself. Answering the question of why some areas of CTR 
work are successful, while in some others – the cooperation has stalled can lead to 
conclusions relevant to the overall state of U.S.-Russian relations in the post-Cold War era. 
The analysis of CTR programmes with a focus on why they experienced certain problems 
in their implementation is presented in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. The consecutive chapters 
using major CTR programmes demonstrate that the CTR process can be treated as a case 
study of U.S.-Russian strategic relations in the post-Cold war era. The CTR process 
provides a vivid example of the limitations of the new relationship between the U.S. and 
Russia. The study of CTR programmes shows that the boundaries of what can be achieved 
in bilateral cooperation were significantly expanded; however, they were not removed.   
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Chapter 3 
Decision-Making Processes and Cooperative Threat Reduction  
3.1. Introduction  
The introduction proposed the hypothesis that the achievements and limitations in 
the U.S.-Russian cooperative threat reduction reflect the new type of post-Cold War 
security relationship between the two countries, which can be characterised as “constrained 
partnership” and that the problems in implementation of various CTR programmes can be 
explained on two levels: the level of bureaucratic politics and political level. By ‘political 
level’ we mean the broader context of U.S.-Russian relations in which the CTR process is 
embedded and that has been elaborated in the previous chapter. However, even given 
agreement at the highest political level to proceed with the programmes such as CTR, it is a 
central hypothesis of this study that their implementation was significantly influenced by 
bureaucratic politics. This chapter attempts to analyse the complex decision-making and 
implementation structure in the U.S. and Russia applied to cooperative threat reduction 
process. It provides an overview of key political players and serves as a basis for 
explanatory model that accounts for the development of the CTR process in the context of 
post-Cold war context (each programme is assessed in the following chapters). 
The implementation and decision-making network for CTR programmes can be 
explained with the help of Bureaucratic Politics Model posited by Graham Allison. The 
Bureaucratic Politics Model sees governmental decision-making as a process determined by 
the views, interests, and goals of organisations and individual bureaucrats.  In other words, 
foreign policy is not necessarily formed by the determination of the most efficient means to 
achieve well-defined objects on the basis of the national interest, but rather is influenced by 
all the different perspectives and interests of the key political players. The foreign policy 
that emerges from the decision-making process does not necessarily bear any relation to 
the priorities and objectives it is alleged to serve. In case of the U.S.-Russian cooperative 
threat reduction, we observe how conflicting interests of different agencies and bureaucrats 
in the U.S. and Russia, as well as the persistence of a Cold War mentality in some 
organisations, complicates implementation of a unique post-Cold War initiative. 
In this respect, it is important to identify the key players involved in decision-making 
and the implementation of CTR in both countries in order to clarify the role of each of 
them, their interests, and what impact they have on the final outcome. 
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The first part of this chapter presents the theoretical framework, which is applied in 
this study. The main propositions and criticism of Bureaucratic Politics Model are 
explained in order to demonstrate its possible theoretical limitations for the current 
analysis. Although, the Bureaucratic Politics Model can not be treated as the ‘perfect’ 
model to explain problems of implementation in cooperative threat reduction process, it is, 
by far, one of the most suitable. 
The second part of this chapter presents key players (organisations and individuals), 
who play a crucial role in shaping the cooperative threat reduction process. The players are 
presented in terms of their role in non-proliferation programmes, their interests, and views. 
On the U.S. side key players include: Congress, the Department of Energy (DOE), the 
Department of Defence (DOD), the National Security Council (NSC), the State 
Department, the U.S. Industry Coalition (USIC), the U.S. Enrichment Corporation 
(USEC), as well as NGOs and the national nuclear laboratories. In Russia key players in the 
decision-making and implementation of CTR programmes are: the State Duma (Russian 
Parliament), the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM), the Ministry of Defence 
(MOD), the State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation Safety known 
as Gosatomnadzor (GAN), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), various nuclear 
installations (institutes and facilities) and NGOs. 
By identifying key political actors in the U.S.-Russian cooperative threat reduction, 
their organisational interests and relevant bureaucratic process, this chapter provides a basis 
for developing an explanatory model for achievements and failures of CTR programmes, 
assessed individually in consecutive chapters.   
3.2. The Analytical Framework  
3.2.1. The Bureaucratic Politics Model  
The decision-making/implementation mechanism is analysed with the help of the 
Bureaucratic Politics Model. This Model is an integrated version of Model II (Organisation 
Process) and Model III (Government Politics) presented by Graham Allison in his well 
known and widely discussed work Essence of Decision: Understanding the Cuban Missile Crisis. 97
In his work Allison tried to demonstrate how the choice of a theoretical framework 
determines the way foreign policy decisions are explained, and how this choice 
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predetermines the array of questions regarding a certain event. In order to prove his theory, 
Allison presents three conceptual models – Model I (Rational Actor), Model II 
(Organisation Process), and Model III (Government Politics) – and applies each of them to 
the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. 
 
3.2.2. Model I – Rational Actor Model  
The Rational Actor Model is one of the most widely used theories in foreign policy 
analysis. The theory’s main proposition is that it is possible to explain the actions of a state 
on the basis of a very specific set of objectives. According to this theory, foreign policy 
decision-making is determined by the interests of a state and security considerations. In 
schematic terms, the foreign policy of a particular state can be understood as a reflection of 
the state’s rational interests. The state is seen as a unified actor, and the foreign policy goals 
are transcribed into foreign policy actions. Nonetheless, there are limits to what extent we 
can rely on the Rational Actor theory.   
In this respect, Allison notes that: 
“…Although, the Rational Actor Model has proved useful for many purposes, 
there is powerful evidence that it must be supplemented, if not supplanted, by 
frames of reference that focus on the government machine – the organisations 
and political actors involved in the policy process…”98   
Judging by this statement, Allison does not deny the importance of the Rational 
Actor Model, but at the same time he encourages to apply a wider range of models when 
explaining foreign policy decision-making. 
Some limitations of the Rational Actor Model are obvious from the example of the 
U.S. and Russian actions in terms of cooperative threat reduction process. There are certain 
patterns in the behaviour of both countries, which cannot be explained from the point of 
view of the Rational Actor Model, since the actions do not correspond to the set 
objectives. In particular, we will see how the implementation of cooperative threat 
reduction efforts is sometimes hampered from within the countries – as a result of actions 
and views taken by certain branches of state power, agencies, and individual bureaucrats, 
contrary to the stated objectives of policymakers. 
                                                 
98 Allison, Essence of Decision, op. cit., p. 5  
64 
Another argument, which can be added to Allison’s discussion of theoretical 
frameworks, is: not only conceptual framework predetermines the questions asked and the 
answers found in the foreign policy analysis, as Allison argued, but the nature of the 
political problem suggests the choice of a conceptual framework.  In this respect, the 
Rational Actor Model can be appropriate in explaining decision-making process when a 
clear linkage between enunciated goals and policy is discernible and bureaucratic processes 
or vested institutional interests do not constrain the achievements of the stated objectives.  
In case of the cooperative threat reduction, the perceived threat was neither 
immediate nor certain (especially before the events of 9/11).  The CTR process is a process 
that evolves over the long term. The goals set by CTR are still not final, and if complete 
denuclearisation or drastic cooperative reduction in nuclear armaments is chosen as the 
final goal, CTR still has a long way to go. Therefore, the CTR process cannot be treated as 
a foreign policy problem, where decisions are taken and implemented quickly enough to 
provide a direct link between the decision-making and the achieved results. The decade of 
existence of CTR programmes has demonstrated that the process of cooperative threat 
reduction is an evolutionary process, very complex in its nature and embedded into 
bureaucratic politics, inter-agency ‘pushing and pulling’ and entangled in perceptions held 
by the U.S. and Russia about each other. In this light, the Rational Actor Model does not 
seem adequate to analyse the problem of cooperative threat reduction in U.S.-Russian 
relations. 
The CTR process has two main prerequisites: resources (human and material) and 
cooperation on the level of different organisations, particularly, on the level of security 
institutions, which, in their turn, are designed to be suspicious of cooperation in the 
sensitive areas. Moreover, noting that the risk coming from unsecured nuclear weapons 
and materials in Russia was never certain or immediate, CTR had to overcome quite a few 
major institutional obstacles in order to take off the ground.  
Why was it possible to achieve this kind of cooperation at all and why is it successful 
in some areas while less so in the others? How is it possible to provide a sustainable 
appreciation among political actors of the rationality and necessity of cooperative threat 
reduction and why are they reluctant to recognise the dangers and how can the patchy 
outcome of the CTR programmes be explained? These are the questions, which might 
receive answers by looking at the interests and actions of the key political actors involved in 
the CTR process. In order to do that it is necessary to choose a theoretical framework. As 
discussed above, the Rational Actor Model, although an attractive model to establish a 
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clean-cut link between the foreign policy objectives and decision-making, is not suitable for 
the study of the CTR process if used on its own. 
The Bureaucratic Politics Model, which represents a blend of Allison’s initial Model 
II (Organisation Process) and Model III (Government Politics), seems to be the most 
appropriate tool in assessing problems of decision-making and implementation of the U.S.-
Russian CTR initiatives. In order to understand the Bureaucratic Politics Model, we should 
look at the attributes of its two integral parts: Models II and III as presented by Allison. 
 
3.2.3. Model II – Organisation Process  
The Organisation Process Model, as presented by Allison, places a major emphasis 
on the role of organisations that make up the government. The organisations, not the 
states, are seen as the key players determining the state policy. The state policy is, in the 
end, a product of a complex process, involving actions of organisations in defining their 
interests, defending them, promoting ways, which they think are most suitable for them, 
and hampering alternative options, which can be viewed as harmful to their organisational 
interests. 
The following definition is given by Allison: 
“…Government behaviour can therefore be understood […] less as deliberate 
choices and more as outputs of large organizations functioning according to 
standard patterns of behaviour […] each organization attends to a special set of 
problems and acts in quasi-independence on these problems.  But few 
important issues fall exclusively within the domain of a single organization.  
Thus government behaviour relevant to any important problems reflects the 
independent output of several organizations, partially coordinated by 
government leaders.  Government leaders can substantially disturb, but not 
substantially control, the behaviour of these organizations….”99
The Organisation Process Model can be an important tool in evaluating the CTR 
process, if the main provision of the Model is accepted. In case of cooperative threat 
reduction programmes, a whole range of large organisations and government agencies is 
involved. Their organisational interests and immediate goals do not necessarily coincide, 
sometimes they are at conflict, and these factors reflect on their behaviour. Moreover, 
organisational interests predetermine the way organisations and state agencies interact with 
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each other and with their partners in the other countries. An evaluation of CTR key 
decision-making and implementing bodies in the U.S. and Russia demonstrates the 
applicability of this model. 
Key players on the Russian side all have their individual patterns of behaviour 
determined by their organisational interests and perceptions of cooperative threat reduction 
process. As a result, overall Russia’s policy on cooperative threat reduction is often a mix 
of different attitudes, views, and actions of these organisations. There are several 
extraneous factors in organisational behaviour of Russian agencies involved in U.S.-Russian 
non-proliferation programmes: an intra-agency struggle for CTR funding; the interests of 
the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) in preserving the nuclear complex; Ministry 
of Defence (MOD) interest in keeping nuclear capabilities and a Cold War-time legacy in 
attitude towards U.S.-funded CTR initiatives; Federal Security Service (FSB) reservations 
about U.S.-Russian cooperation in the security sphere; the Russian Parliament’s suspicions 
towards U.S. non-proliferation assistance; a clash of interests between MINATOM and the 
nuclear safety regulating agency (GAN), and also the MOD and GAN. 
The interaction of governmental institutions takes place in the context of an 
extraordinary shortage of resources that intensifies the competition for turf, preserving 
existing assets and new sources of financial resources. As a result of the vested interests 
and institutional culture, different organisations in Russia follow their own aims and guard 
their own interests.  
On the U.S. side some problems of an organisational nature are: an overall lack of 
coordination between different agencies involved in non-proliferation assistance 
programmes; conservative attitudes towards Russia of the Department of Defence (DOD); 
concern in the State Department an active engagement of the Department of Energy 
(DOE) in Russia; the DOE’s concern about a too active role of national labs; national labs’ 
interest in receiving CTR-related funding; the reluctance of Congress to support 
cooperative threat reduction; USEC’s commercial interests versus non-proliferation 
objectives in the HEU Purchase Agreement. 100
At least, rhetorically, there is a high-level support towards the CTR process both in 
the U.S. and Russia; however, the overall process is not always satisfactory. One of the 
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main reasons for setbacks is the problem of organisational behaviour in the U.S. and 
Russia, and between American and Russian organisations. 
 
3.2.4. Model III – Government Politics 
The Government Politics Model is another part of what later became known as the 
Bureaucratic Politics Model. Many of its main attributes are similar to that of the 
Organisation Process Model. The defining difference is that the main players, according to 
Government Politics Model, are individual bureaucrats and not the states (as in the 
Rational Actor Model) or organisations (as in the Organisation Process Model).   
The officials and bureaucrats involved in decision-making, policy-making, and policy-
implementing process are treated as representatives of their organisations (which parallels 
with the Organisation Process Model) and as individuals, who participate in this process 
with their own beliefs, set of principles, personal and professional goals. 
Allison defines the Government Politics Model as the one, which: 
“[…] sees no unitary actor but rather many actors as players – players who 
focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national 
problems as well; players who act in terms of no consistent set of strategic 
objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, 
organizational, and personal goals; players who make government decision not 
by a single, rational choice but by the pulling and hauling its politics.…”101
The opinions of various individuals involved in the political process directly and 
indirectly vary substantially, and the struggle between the different views, perceptions, and 
strategies of lobbying their ideas can be a battlefield for the formulation of a state policy.  
In metaphorical terms, this process can be seen as a chess game, where ‘a number of 
distinct players, with distinct objectives but shared power over the pieces, could be 
determining the moves as the resultant of collegial bargaining’. 102
The Bureaucratic Politics Model as presented by Allison assigns individual 
bureaucrats an important role in shaping foreign policy decisions taken by the government.  
It is suggested that not only organisations, as integral entities, but the individuals 
representing them, determine the outcomes of the political decisions taken by the state. 
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In this respect, Allison noted: 
“…Constitutional prescription, political tradition, government practices, and 
democratic theory all converge to accentuate differences among needs and 
interests of individuals in the government, and to divide influence among them.  
Each participant sits in a seat that confers separate responsibilities.  Each man 
is committed to fulfilling his responsibilities as he sees them…”103
In this light, the role of several key individuals who shaped the CTR process is 
assessed.   
Extensive ‘elite’ interviews conducted for this study have demonstrated the validity of 
the main provision of the Government Politics Model. Views and perceptions of more 
than 30 Russian and American officials and experts interviewed vary, as does the 
contribution they bring to the process (positive or negative) defined by a set of numerous 
factors: individual backgrounds, political values, organisational interests. 
A separation of the Government Politics Model from the Organisation Process 
Model is not justified, since Allison, himself, acknowledges that one of the factors of 
‘pulling and hauling’ politics are the organisational interests of individuals. Therefore, 
merging of these two models is logical. 
The Government Politics and the Organisation Process Models are often discussed 
as well as criticised as a combination of two, known as the Bureaucratic Politics 
Model.104 Since the Bureaucratic Politics Model is used as one of two main tools105 in 
evaluating the major hypothesis of this work, a thorough examination of this Model is 
important. Knowledge of limitations of the chosen theoretical model would help to avoid 
its artificial application to the study. The bureaucratic politics perspective first appeared 
before Allison used it to develop his models and explain Cuban missile crisis. However, his 
work remains the most widely discussed work on the Bureaucratic Politics theory and, 
therefore, the limitations of this particular approach will be discussed on the basis of 
criticism received by Allison’s models.  
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3.3. Criticism of Allison’s Models in the Existing Literature  
Allison’s work stirred a hot debate among political theorists on the validity of his 
assumptions, the importance of the proposed model to theoretical frameworks of 
International Relations, and their originality. To present a comprehensive account of the 
debate prompted by Allison is not a goal of this work; however, it is important to evaluate 
major critical comments in order to comprehend the limitations of the chosen model.  One 
of the most articulate criticisms of Allison’s work came from Steve Smith. Smith presented 
his critical evaluation of Allison’s Models in several publications, including the chapter he 
authored for Understanding Foreign Policy. 106
Smith’s criticism of Essence of Decision can be summarised as follows: the alternative 
models are not original, the actual account of the Cuban Missile Crisis is not entirely 
correct; the American political system is misrepresented, responsibility is removed from 
the government, cognitive factors are ignored, there are limitations in the 
applicability of the Bureaucratic Model to other countries. 107
Smith also argued that there were generic problems in Allison’s theory construction. 
In his summary of his own arguments and critical comments of other policy theorists, 
Smith comes up with the following three main points: the three models are inseparable, 
there is a problem in Allison’s definition of ‘logic’ and ‘politics’, models are rather 
analogous than explanatory. It is important to assess the criticism of Allison’s Models and 
his work, but such an assessment is done only in respect to aspects relevant to the choice 
of the Bureaucratic Politics Model for this study.   
 
Responsibility is removed from the government 
There should be an understanding of a distinctive difference between the top 
leadership decision-making on major problems and the process of implementation of these 
decisions. Allison is testing his model on the process of decision-making in a time of crisis 
per se. His account of the Cuban missile crisis seen through the ‘lens’ of the Bureaucratic 
Politics Model does not suggest the removal of responsibility from the government and top 
leadership. It rather demonstrates the extent, to which their decision-making is influenced 
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by the organisations and individual bureaucrats, and on how the policy implementation 
process can be affected by them. This criticism of the Bureaucratic Politics Model is 
therefore not justified; the admonition that political leaders have to take responsibility does 
not invalidate the analytical conclusions about the policy process.  
 
Cognitive factors are ignored 
Smith cites several theorists, who criticise a lack of recognition of cognitive factors 
and Allison’s exaggerated attention to divergent organisational interests. The Bureaucratic 
Politics Model was said to undervalue the ‘influence of generation mind sets’, the presence 
of shared values among the bureaucratic players, and to present ‘any bureaucratic battles as 
reflecting bureaucratic differences per se’ at the time when they demonstrate the differences 
between the fundamental values. 108  
Smith also quotes Jervis on this matter, who noted that:  
“what seems to be a clash of bureaucratic interests and stands can often be 
more fruitfully viewed as a clash among values that are widely held in both 
society and the decision-makers’ own minds…we have no grounds for claiming 
that a different constellation of bureaucratic interests and forces would have 
produced a different result.”109
When applying the Bureaucratic Politics Model to the process of cooperative threat 
reduction, it is necessary to keep in mind the above mentioned criticism. The CTR process 
is a unique phenomenon of the post-Cold War security system. The U.S. and Russia – 
former antagonists - are engaged in cooperation in the extremely sensitive area of 
denuclearisation. The nature of this process is complex and controversial – the two 
countries are joining efforts in dealing with the nuclear threats resulting from the decades 
of an arms race when they were adversaries. The decades of the Cold War are most 
certainly deeply embedded into mentality of many American and Russian people, including 
politicians. Even though the Cold War is over, and the U.S. and Russia are developing a 
partnership, a heritage of antagonism is still present in some circles in both countries. 
Therefore, the factor of “generation” brought up by Smith is valid. The principles, 
stereotypes and values shared by the current generation of bureaucrats in both countries 
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influence the political processes. In other words, apart from organisational and individual 
goals, interests, and perceptions bureaucrats also base themselves upon the ‘generational’ 
values typical for the Cold War period – still present today in both societies.   
 
There are limitations in applicability of the Bureaucratic Model to other 
countries 
Criticism on part of limited applicability of the Bureaucratic Politics Model to other 
countries other than the United States is most important as far as the model is chosen to be 
applied not only to the U.S. but to Russia as well. There are some obvious differences in 
the bureaucratic structure and culture in the U.S. and Russia. This factor complicates the 
simple application of the model to Russian bureaucratic realities. However, Allison’s model 
is valuable as an abstract theoretical framework. It should be seen more than just a case 
study explanatory model and should not be limited to analysis of American policy decision-
making only. 
It is imperative to single out key players in the Russian decision-making. While the 
roles played by similar executive, legislative agencies and the extent of their power and 
influence on the decision-making in the U.S. and Russia can vary substantially, the main 
provision of the Bureaucratic Model Politics remains relevant. The idea of ‘hauling and 
pulling’ by different actors occurring in politics is universal and can be applied to any 
country, including Russia. 
3.4. Russian Decision-Making  
3.4.1. Overview  
The structure of Russian decision-making and policy implementation in the non-
proliferation area is somewhat complex and confusing. There is no formal overseeing body, 
although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regulates the formal aspects of bilateral 
cooperation. There is some tension between the key state agencies in some of the areas of 
cooperative threat reduction – mainly resulting from the desire to be an implementing 
agent for certain CTR-funded projects. 
The organisational behaviour varies even within the single Ministry: i.e. different 
parts of the Ministry of Defence have different records in terms of success of cooperation 
with the U.S. Russian Navy, which is a part of the Defence Ministry, has been praised for 
smooth and effective CTR implementation track, while other parts of the establishment 
remain less cooperative. 
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Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) is one of the key players in the 
decision-making and implementation process of the U.S.-administered non-proliferation 
programmes. As the main overseeing body of the Russian nuclear complex, MINATOM’s 
stance in the process of threat reduction has been exceptionally important for an overall 
Russian policy in this area. MINATOM’s first Minister Mikhailov has been an important 
individual in defining the path for the U.S.-Russian cooperation.  His role is ambiguous and 
deserves special attention. 
The relationship between Russia’s nuclear complex controlling body Gosatomnadzor 
(GAN) and the other two major players – MINATOM and Defence Ministry – is a clear 
example of conflicting organisational interests.     
The Russian Parliament – State Duma – as the main legislative body of the country - 
plays an important role in formulating Russia’s policy on cooperative threat reduction. State 
Duma has the power to decline to ratify international agreements, which provide basis for 
non-proliferation assistance programmes.   
The non-governmental sector is not very developed in Russia, and only few non-
government organisations have a degree of influence on cooperative threat reduction 
decision-making. The major policy “think-tank” specialising in nuclear non-proliferation is 
Moscow-based PIR-Centre (Centre for Political Research). 
The U.S. sees the Russian government as a ‘very cumbersome and very bureaucratic’, 
which is ‘not disposed towards openness’. 110
 
3.4.2. The Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM)  
The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, known as MINATOM, is a unique 
organisation with power and structure not typical for any other Russian Ministry.  
MINATOM includes a vast complex of civilian and military research institutions, 
production and storage facilities. MINATOM’s fields of activity include: fundamental 
research, applied research and development, nuclear weapons and disarmament, mining 
and processing industry, nuclear fuel and reactor materials, reactor engineering, instrument 
making, microelectronics, mechanical engineering, nuclear power plants construction and 
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73 
operation, construction industry, ecology and international cooperation in the areas of its 
expertise. 111
There is no other government organisation in Russia, which would incorporate such 
a wide range of activities. Since the Soviet times, MINATOM was often referred to as a 
“state-inside-a-state” for its autonomous, self-sufficient structure. 
MINATOM’s participation in cooperative threat reduction is an interesting case of 
mixing and balancing organisational and state interests. MINATOM is probably one of the 
most important players in the U.S.-Russian cooperative threat reduction process. To 
comprehend MINATOM’s role and evaluate its participation in this process, we need to 
define its structure, look at the historic background of its development and analyse its 
current motives, interests and abilities in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, in 
general, and in bilateral programmes, in particular. 
The inception of the Soviet nuclear complex goes back to 1937, when the first steps 
were made towards the development of nuclear weapons. In 1937 Soviet scientists carried 
out their first active experimental research on atom nucleus. In 1943 a special physics 
laboratory – Laboratory #2 – was established in Moscow; the lab is currently known as the 
Kurchatov Russian Scientific Centre (Kurchatov Institute). 
In 1945 the Soviet government took a decision to establish an interagency 
governmental organ – the First Main Directorate (‘Pervoe Glavnoe Upravlenie’). The main 
responsibility of the newly established structure was to oversee and coordinate all the 
research and production in the area of nuclear science and technology. In 1949 the Soviet 
nuclear complex had a breakthrough by testing its first nuclear bomb and ending the 
American monopoly on nuclear weapons. Four years later, in 1953, the government 
established the Ministry of Medium Machine Building (‘Ministerstvo srednego 
mashinostroeniya’ – ‘Minsredmash’). In 1989 that Ministry was re-organised into the 
USSR’s Ministry of Nuclear Engineering and Industry. 
President Yeltsin established the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy – 
MINATOM – on the basis of the USSR’s Ministry of Nuclear Engineering and Industry by 
his decree No. 61 of January 29, 1992. MINATOM was designed to carry out the following 
functions: support nuclear and radiation safety of the nuclear complex; organisation and 
realisation of the federal regulation of activity of firms and organisations of the nuclear 
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complex of the Russian Federation; realisation of the federal state technological, 
investment and structural policy in the field of nuclear energy and engineering; support of 
creation and implementation of development of programmes of modernisation, production 
and reduction of nuclear weapons, radioactive waste management, systemic realisation of 
defence conversion of the nuclear complex. 112
MINATOM is one of the main key players in the CTR process. As a government 
entity it represents an extensive network of nuclear plants, research institutions, weapons 
development bureau. The Russian nuclear complex, the interests of which MINATOM 
represents, is one of the most important state industries. It occupies a special place in 
Russian political and economic life.  The contribution of MINATOM to CTR decision-
making and implementation process is hard to overestimate.   
As in the case of any government organisation, but especially in Russian political life, 
the role of the leader is decisive in the overall strategy of the organisation. In case of 
MINATOM, the role of one individual was as important as controversial. Minister Viktor 
Mikhailov was the first head of Russian MINATOM and was leading the organisation 
when the CTR process was at its inception. The other two Ministers – Evgeniy Adamov 
and Rumyantsev – are also discussed but in less detail. 
Viktor Mikhailov was the head of MINATOM from 1992 to 1998.  His role in 
evolution of cooperative threat reduction in Russia is controversial. As a head of 
MINATOM he played an important role mainly due to two reasons: first of all, he was 
leading the Ministry, when the CTR process was at its initial stage, and secondly, he served 
in that position for the longer than anyone else so far. The personality factor was also 
important. In many ways, Mikhailov’s example demonstrates the uneasy adjustment of the 
U.S.-Russian thinking to new world order and new security challenges. 
Mikhailov started his career in the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of 
Experimental Physics and then worked in the Scientific Research Institute of Impulse 
Engineering. He holds a degree of technical sciences. In 1992 Mikhailov became the first 
Minister of the newly created Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation 
(MINATOM).   
Mikhailov found himself in a rather difficult situation, when the cooperative threat 
reduction process was getting underway. As head of the most secretive industry working 
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for the development and production of nuclear weapons, he was reluctant to pursue the 
type of cooperation the CTR programme was offering. At the same time, Mikhailov 
probably rightly appreciated the urgency of receiving non-proliferation assistance from the 
U.S. During the years of 1992-1998 Mikhailov was found criticising the threat reduction 
programmes, while at the same time offering his crucial support when it was needed. 
In December 1992 Russian Duma held hearings on the CTR umbrella agreements. It 
was Mikhailov, who insisted on the importance of the U.S.-Russian cooperation in the 
nuclear field and persuaded Russian parliamentarians to support the Programme. 113  
In his famous memoirs titled I am a Hawk (published in 1993), Mikhailov reiterated 
the necessity of cooperation between the U.S. and Russia and the importance of bilateral 
nuclear reduction agreements by stating the following: 
“….It is communication and more communication that will bring the people of 
our planet together.  In the presence of so many nuclear weapons, peace is as 
fragile as an ice-floe in spring – one careless move and it will shatter.  We all 
applaud the two great powers’ steps to reduce their nuclear arsenals…”114
In an annotation to Mikhailov’s memoirs, the editor calls him a ‘convinced supporter 
of general and complete disarmament’, but adds that ‘he [Mikhailov] at the same time 
emphasises that, at this stage, stable peace of Earth can be guaranteed only by nuclear 
parity, and warns of the possibility [of] tragic consequences of unilateral disarmament by 
our [Russia] country’. 115
In later years (1995), Mikhailov often criticised the idea of CTR and was quoted as 
saying the following:  
“…If I had been asked, not as Minister but as a scientist, whether it was worth 
signing the agreements with the Americans, my response would be ‘no’…”116
Mikhailov’s views on some of the main issues relevant to CTR activities are presented 
in Table 2. 
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Table 2 -  Mikhailov’s Views on Issues of Cooperation in Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Issue Attitude Comment 
General U.S.-
Russian cooperation 
in the elimination of 
nuclear weapons 
Cautious Mikhailov: “Cooperation in this area is 
a delicate matter.  Our specialists 
believe that destruction processes 
should not be subject to verification, 
but the exchange of information about 
these processes is obviously necessary.  
The destruction itself, however, should 
be conducted by each side 
separately”.117
Elimination of 
tactical weapons, 
artillery shells and 
mines, construction 
of fissile material 
facilities 
Welcomed American 
assistance for the 
construction of storage 
facilities 
Mikhailov: “…The problem is that the 
lack of adequate storage space for 
nuclear materials – weapons-grade 
plutonium and uranium – is a 
bottleneck in the elimination of our 
tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear 
artillery shells and mines.  Because of 
our financial difficulties, the 
construction of new storage facilities 
could take up to five years, and this is 
certain to delay the implementation of 
the initiatives for up to 10 years”.118
Lab-to-Lab and 
MPC&A 
Generally pleased, but 
pointed out deficiencies in 
MPC&A area.119 Recognised 
the need to improve 
MPC&A systems and the 
lack of domestic funds for 
those needs, but at the same 
time mentioned Russia 
Mikhailov: “…lots of people come to 
discuss MPC&A, there [is] a lot of 
repetition and clarification [is] 
needed…”121
Mikhailov: “…we would be able to 
improve MPC&A ourselves…I am 
personally satisfied by the 
implementation of only two 
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could deal with it on its 
own.120
implementation of only two 
agreements: on containers and the 
storage facility design. Frankly 
speaking, it is the U.S. side that is 
responsible for these delays…”122
Proliferation of 
missile materials and 
technology and the 
“brain-drain” 
 
Expressed concern over 
non-proliferation of 
“sensitive” materials but was 
rather confident in 
professionalism of the 
former Soviet nuclear 
scientists, who would not, in 
his opinion, “leak” any 
knowledge to dangerous 
parties. 
Mikhailov: “…we have not seen any 
indication of a “brain-drain” from 
enterprises and research centers of the 
nuclear-arms complex to foreign 
countries…”123
Mikhailov (in a capacity of the Head of 
the closed nuclear research centre in 
Sarov): “…Professional secrets of 
nuclear research workers are 
thoroughly protected, and the bearers 
of these secrets are not likely to 
confide them to anyone…none of 
Russian nuclear experts, or the so-
called bearers of top secret information 
about “the bomb”, has gone abroad in 
order to stay there permanently..”124
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Overall, the perception of Mikhailov in the U.S. was summarised by a former U.S. 
DOD official:  
“Because of his stature, he [Mikhailov] was able to move beyond the traditional 
perspectives of the community, to move the community... [But] he did it around 
the government structures not with them; therefore, progress made was not 
durable.” 125
  Evgeniy Adamov served in the post of Minister till 2001 – he succeeded Mikhailov 
in March of 1998. Adamov’s scientific career included work for the Moscow Kurchatov 
Institute of Atomic Energy (IAE), where he started as an engineer and later became the 
Deputy Director; in 1986 he was promoted to the position of the General Designer and 
Director of Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering in Moscow. After 
the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident in 1986 Adamov was directly involved in 
dealing with the consequences of the accident and coordinated the activities of IAE 
experts.126 Adamov was seen as ‘weak’ in the West compared to his predecessor Mikhailov, 
who enjoyed a degree of influence well beyond the boundaries of nuclear complex. 
Alexander Rumyantsev is the current (as of 2004) Head of Russia’s MINATOM.  He 
succeeded Adamov in March 2001. Before his appointment to the ministerial post, he led 
the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow, where he started as an engineer and from 1994 worked 
as a Director. It is believed that Rumyantsev occupies an even weaker position within the 
Russian political establishment than did Adamov, but he receives more favourable accounts 
from the U.S. policy experts. It is perceived as an important factor that MINATOM’s head 
Rumyantsev and U.S. Secretary of Energy Abraham have a good working relationship, a 
better relationship than did Adamov and Richmond.127
 
3.4.3. The State Duma (the Lower Chamber of Russian Parliament)   
State Duma is the main legislative organ of the Russian Federation. It is responsible 
for approving all international agreements, signed by the state, and in this way, has a direct 
influence on the destiny of all CTR-related activities. The role of the State Duma in the 
CTR process sometimes proves to be an example of how a beneficial international 
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cooperation becomes hostage to factors of domestic and international politics and 
bureaucratic processes (this equally applies to the role of the U.S. Congress). Certain 
fractions of the Russian Parliament represent the “old” Cold War thinking, which is 
reflected in their attitude to the U.S.-sponsored non-proliferation assistance programmes. 
The prevailing view in the State Duma saw, from the very beginning, the CTR 
programmes as part and parcel of a larger framework of U.S.-Russian relations.  Over the 
years, the degree of anti-American sentiment in the State Duma has been fluctuating, 
depending on foreign policy developments and problems in Russia’s internal politics. 
Overall, on critical occasions the Duma has supported key agreements regulating U.S.-
Russian cooperative threat reduction. 
The following section brings together political developments in U.S.-Russian 
relations and processes occurring in the Russian State Duma in relation to the CTR 
process. It becomes apparent that the decision-making process in State Duma on CTR 
issues was influenced by its composition (which forces were dominating the legislative 
branch) and political factors of domestic and international politics. 
In December 1992 State Duma held a hearing on the issues of the CTR Programme.  
At that hearing, Duma’s representatives severely criticised the bilateral agreements in the 
area of cooperative threat reduction because they “contradicted the Russian Constitution”, 
as some thought.128 The negative attitude of State Duma’s CTR critics was based on the 
two major negative assumptions that: Americans would use CTR as a tool of undermining 
Russia’s nuclear capabilities (by stimulating Russia’s unilateral denuclearisation); and that 
the required access to nuclear facilities in the process of implementation of CTR activities 
would provide critical information for the U.S. intelligence. 
Although, the initial stage of CTR coming into force was characterised by 
controversial debates within the State Duma, it did vote for the ratification of the CTR 
umbrella agreement. The head of MINATOM, Mikhailov, played an important role in 
confronting the scepticism in the Duma and defended Russia’s interests in cooperative 
threat reduction. It is possible that the denuclearisation of non-Soviet Republics with the 
help of CTR funds was seen by Russian parliamentarians as an important incentive to allow 
the CTR Programme to be taken off the ground. 
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The years 1994-1995 were a period of several foreign policy events, which had a 
negative impact on the state of U.S.-Russian relations. The State Duma was the first place, 
where the deterioration in bilateral relations became apparent. First of all, legislative 
branches in both the U.S. and Russia had experienced a change of power in 1994-1995. 
Communists had gained the majority in the Russian Parliament after the parliamentary 
elections in December 1995, while Republicans won over the U.S Congress. Russian 
communists and Republicans in the U.S. held more traditional views on the relationship 
between former adversaries. The two groups were much more cautious of each other’s 
motives and demonstrated less willingness to support cooperative threat reduction. 
Apart from the internal political changes within the legislative powers, the relations 
were under stress from the developments taking place on international scene: Russia started 
the war in Chechnya at the end of 1994. The U.S. government was accusing Russia in 
continuing research in bio-weapons field and illegal nuclear trade with Iran, while Moscow 
was growing extremely critical of NATO’s plans for expansion.   
In June 1995 the Republican majority in the U.S. Congress voted for an amendment 
to the CTR legislation, which proposed freezing any financial assistance to Russia (quoting 
its underground bio-weapons programme). 129 Although, that amendment was withdrawn 
later, it demonstrated the determination of Congress to use CTR as a tool for punishing 
Russia as a result of problems in bilateral relations. It was not the last time when CTR 
programmes were in danger of being cancelled due to negative developments in U.S.-
Russian relations. 
Shortly after the U.S. Congress almost succeeded in freezing all CTR funding, the 
Russian Duma refused to ratify START II. The negative impact of critical problems in 
U.S.-Russian relations on the CTR process is evident, however, CTR managed to survive 
through the lowest points. This proves that, overall, there is a general understanding on 
both sides that cooperative threat reduction has to continue. 
The current Russian President Putin has a qualitatively different relationship with the 
State Duma, compared with his predecessor. The Russian Parliament is less hostile to the 
executive branch and the Duma is under greater influence from the President, in 
comparison with Yeltsin’s era. The parliamentary elections of 2000 left the Duma with a 
much weaker Communist representation and stronger centrists forces (the composition of 
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State Duma changed even more favourably for the Russian President after the most recent 
Duma elections in December 2003). Those developments had a positive impact on the 
attitude inside the Russian Duma towards U.S.-Russian cooperation. 
The events of 9/11 resulted in what, at least, on the surface, should seem like a shift 
in U.S.-Russian relations. The U.S. was interested in having Russia as its ally in the War on 
Terrorism, and the Russian leadership demonstrated its willingness to assist the U.S. in that 
respect.  At the same time, developments which have followed an initial short-lived 
euphoria undermined what was seen as a newly found strategic partnership. There were 
two major reasons for Russia’s concern for how the American government was handling 
the War on Terror: unilateral approaches in military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
and the U.S. military presence in Central Asia – a region historically considered to be a 
zone of Russian security interests. In other words, the U.S.-Russian relationship under 
Putin remains controversial – with some progress made and some problems remaining, 
which results in a mixed mood within the State Duma.  
 
3.4.4. The Ministry of Defence (MOD)  
The Russian Ministry of Defence (MOD) represents one of the most conservative 
state organs with strong traditional views on the U.S.-Russian relationship.  MOD is a main 
recipient of CTR funding. It oversees the dismantlement of bombers, missile silos, land-
based and sea-based strategic missiles. The MOD’s role in CTR is interesting in several 
ways: first of all, it is one of the main implementing agencies while being an organisation, 
less likely to be supportive of CTR goals (i.e. the reduction of nuclear weapons). Therefore, 
it is useful to examine how the MOD’s organisational interests correlate with CTR 
objectives. Secondly, the MOD’s role in the Russian political establishment and its relations 
with other state actors has a direct impact on CTR implementation (i.e. rivalry for CTR 
funding). 
The Ministry has been undergoing a transformation as all other Soviet government 
bodies as a result of the Soviet break-up. In December 1991 the Soviet Ministry of Defence 
was reorganised into CIS Supreme Command (“Glavkomat”). In April 1992 the functions of 
Glavkomat were transferred to the newly established Ministry of Defence of the Russian 
Federation. Throughout all the transformations the control over nuclear weapons was 
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continuously implemented through the MOD’s 12th Main Directorate (“Glavnoe Upravlenie 
Ministerstva Oborony”), also known as GUMO. 130   
The Main Directorate was first established within the Ministry of Medium Machine 
Building (later – MINATOM) in 1957. Among the Directorate’s main responsibilities were: 
taking receipt of nuclear ammunition from the production facilities, transport of nuclear 
arms to the military forces, training of military specialists in nuclear weapons maintenance, 
as well as the construction and operation of nuclear storage sites. In 1959 the Directorate 
was transferred to the Ministry of Defence and became a part of the Strategic Rocket 
Forces, and only in 1974 the Directorate became an independent subdivision of the MOD 
under the name of the 12th Main Directorate (GUMO). 131   
The Directorate has functions similar to the U.S. Defence Nuclear Agency for 
nuclear weapons security and units in the U.S. military responsible for physical security of 
nuclear weapons assigned to U.S. military units. 132 The Russian 12th GUMO is considered 
to be quite liberal in accepting foreign assistance. 133
In the mid-90s the MOD was seen as having a generally positive attitude towards the 
CTR Programme.  In the words of the U.S. former official Gloria Duffy: 
“…The MOD has always expressed a very positive attitude toward its 
cooperation with the United States in the CTR Program, and has always been a 
practical, positive collaborator with the United States…”134
However, the MOD’s unofficial attitude was not always as positive as it was 
portrayed. Some officials within MOD did not always judge cooperation with the U.S. as 
                                                 
130 ‘12th Main Directorate (Glavnoe Upravlenie Ministerstva Oborony)’, FAS, at 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/agency/12gumo.htm    retrieved on 06.12.02 
131 Dmitriy Litovkin, ‘Cooperation of the MOD’s 12th Main Directorate and the U.S. DOD within 
the CTR Programme’ (‘Sotrudnichestvo 12-go glavnogo upravleniya ministerstva oborony RF 
i ministerstva oborony Soedinennyh Shtatov Ameriki po programme sovmestnogo 
umensheniya ugrozy’), in Ivan Safranchuk, ed.,  Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme: 
Assessing Efficiency and Development Prospects (Programma sovmestnogo umen’sheniya 
ugrozy: otsenka effektivnosti i perspektivy razvitiya), PIR Study Paper #13, 2000, PIR Centre, 
Moscow, p. 13
132 ‘12th Main Directorate (Glavnoe Upravleniye Ministerstvo Oborony’, 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/agency/12gumo.htm   retrieved on 06.12.02 
133 Interview with the former senior MOD official, Moscow, June 2003 
134 Gloria Duffy, ‘Cooperative Threat Reduction in Perspective’ in Shields and Potter, eds., 
Dismantling the Cold War, op. cit., p. 33 
83 
favourable to Russia. Along with the list of common concerns about the CTR objectives 
(like, a lack of trust on the Russian side about American motives – discussed in the section 
on the State Duma), there were several conditions attached to the implementation of the 
CTR Programme, which resulted in cynical views of CTR assistance on the Russian side. 
For example, constraints attached to how CTR-sponsored equipment can be used by 
Russian forces, was a source of resentment on the Russian side. A former senior strategic 
nuclear forces official described dissatisfaction with some particular provisions of CTR 
assistance. Thus, for example, cranes and bulldozers allocated to the Russian military could 
be used only for purposes strictly related to dismantlement of weapons. Such equipment 
was monitored from space in order to track its movements. If equipment was used for any 
other purposes, the American side would express its dissatisfaction. In case any crane or 
bulldozer was in need of repair, it was to be fixed only by Americans. It is obvious that 
some impractical conditions attached to how equipment can be used and a lack of trust on 
the American side were prompting negative emotions among Russian people “on the 
ground” involved in first-hand implementation of CTR projects. 135    
It might be the case that there was always an overall support for CTR projects, 
however, there were the above mentioned concerns embedded in the implementation 
process. If MOD as a single state entity was always officially ready for collaboration with 
the U.S. in the framework of the CTR Programme, there were visible differences in 
performance of the different constituent parts of the Russian military.   
The Russian Navy was praised by the American experts, as the most cooperative 
partner in non-proliferation programmes assistance. Data on MPC&A upgrades 
implemented by U.S. DOE at Russian Navy sites confirm the successful cooperation 
between the U.S. and Navy: by FY 2003 rapid MPC&A upgrades were completed on of the 
estimated 60 tonnes of naval fuel, with only 2 per cent remaining to have comprehensive 
upgrades applied. Rapid upgrades had been completed on sites housing an estimated 99 per 
cent of Russian Navy nuclear warheads.136
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The Russian Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) are involved in the implementation of the 
CTR Programme mainly by participating in the fulfilment of obligations under START.  
The CTR Programme provided the SRF with equipment totalling to $10,2 million (as of 
January 2000) for the project of strategic arms elimination.137 Cooperation between SRF 
and DOD went through qualitative changes. The level of trust has increased significantly in 
large part as a result of joint efforts in implementing CTR projects.   
The SRF’s Lieutenant-General (res.) Vasiliy Lata has noted: 
“…Implementation of the CTR Programme allowed to significantly widen 
contacts between the Russian and the American military.  Even seven years ago 
[as of 2000] it was hard to imagine U.S. rocket forces servicemen visiting sites 
of Russian SRF.  However, today we have a sustainable practice of annual 
delegation exchange between the Russian MOD and U.S. DOD with coverage 
of a wide scope of issues connected with threat reduction…”138
The Russian MOD is an organisation in which Cold War practices and mind-sets are 
very deeply embedded, more so than in any other institutions. For several decades, the 
whole Ministry was geared for an arms race against the American enemy. The high 
echelons of the MOD are still largely staffed by the representatives of older generation, 
whose careers developed during the height of the Cold War. In this sense, the CTR process 
is an unprecedented case of cooperation between the military establishments of Russia and 
the U.S. 
It is evident that cooperation does not always go smoothly, and organisational 
interests and bureaucratic politics are the main factors hampering it. Although, economic 
conditions push Russia towards a smaller nuclear arsenal and international security 
conditions call for a re-consideration of the role of nuclear weapons in Russian military 
doctrine – most of the Russian military still hold the view that nuclear forces need to be 
preserved. Any motivation and incentive on the part of the Russian military to engage itself 
in unilateral denuclearisation can only be present if CTR planners balance American and 
Russian interests. The American interests include helping Russia reduce its arsenal and 
render the remaining weapons and materials safer, while the Russian military is interested in 
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downsizing its nuclear weapons but in a way responsive to its own perceived national 
interests. 
 The implementation of the CTR projects is influenced by internal bureaucratic 
struggles within the Russian political establishment and inter-agency disagreement and 
competition for CTR funds. One of the potential tension zones is between MOD and 
Russia’s Federal Atomic Inspectorate (The State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear 
and Radiation Safety - Gosatomnadzor – GAN) (GAN’s role is discussed in the 
subsequent section).  GAN is a regulating body whose function initially was to oversee 
nuclear safety at all MINATOM and MOD facilities. GAN’s oversight role was defined by 
President Yeltsin in June 1992 and confirmed by a Presidential Decree in September 1994.  
GAN started inspecting MOD facilities in April 1993. 
A Russian expert from Moscow office of Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Alexander 
Pikayev mentioned that the Russian President’s decision to allow GAN inspect MOD 
facilities considerably strained relations between two agencies. There was a case of open 
non-compliance with the Presidential decrees, when the commander of the White Sea naval 
sea base at Severodvinsk refused GAN inspectors admission to the base. As a result, GAN 
had to apply with a formal complaint to the General Prosecutor’s Office.139 In 1995 MOD 
facilities were released from GAN’s inspections. 
Intra-agency fights for funding can be treated as another source of tension between 
these two structures. GAN is among the recipients of CTR funds, and as such is a potential 
rival for MOD and other agencies (i.e. MINATOM).   
 
3.4.5. Gosatomnadzor (GAN)  
The State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation Safety known as 
Gosatomnadzor (GAN) is one of the important CTR players. It has been renamed several 
times since 1991; however, its structure and the main activities remained the same 
throughout. Its main responsibilities include the inspection and licensing of all facilities that 
handle nuclear and other radioactive materials. 
In terms of CTR programmes, GAN plays a dual role: as an implementing agent for 
particular MPC&A projects, and as an inspecting body at other facilities, which receive 
CTR funding designed to help them comply with GAN’s requirements for nuclear safety.  
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GAN is involved in implementation of some MPC&A projects, such as the development 
of a federal MPC&A information system and MPC&A Information Centre. GAN works 
with the U.S. DOE on assessing and upgrading MPC&A systems at six nuclear research 
reactors, and DOE provided MPC&A equipment and training to GAN inspectors.140   
As an inspecting body, GAN was put at odds with several influential state agencies, 
such Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD), which 
are also recipients of CTR funds. Both MINATOM and MOD did not welcome GAN’s 
inspections and MOD was powerful enough to lobby through a Presidential decision to 
exempt the MOD from GAN’s inspections. 
 
3.4.6. The Federal Security Service (FSB)  
The role of Russian security service – FSB – is crucial, but largely clandestine and not 
formally defined. Although the role of FSB as an organisation is not widely discussed in 
open literature, indirect references to this agency can be found in the analysis of existing 
implementation problems in the CTR process. 
The FSB – as a state organ – is responsible for guarding national secrets of the 
Russian Federation and has been concerned with the CTR-related cooperation from the 
outset of those programmes. The implementation of all the non-proliferation assistance 
programmes requires access of American experts to Russian nuclear facilities. The access 
required varies according to the type of project. The most intrusive inspections are required 
by MPC&A projects – since the MPC&A Programme deals with fissile material taken out 
of nuclear warheads – and the isotopic composition of material inside the weapons is the 
most strictly guarded information.  In some cases, not only facilities but the whole cities 
(“closed” nuclear cities) fall into the category of places, where access of foreigners is 
restricted. 
The problem of access is quoted as one of the most serious among implementation 
problems for all CTR programmes. The FSB is responsible for issuing permission to visit 
“closed” cities or nuclear facilities.  On many occasions access has been denied, even to the 
American programme managers. The procedure of applying for access is a long, 
bureaucratically strenuous process. Many of the American officials and experts have 
complained about FSB being too suspicious of the work carried out by the Programmes. 
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A current DOE official mentioned: “It is generally understood that security services 
pay attention to us. Some in Russia believe that the CTR programmes are used to collect 
information, but we only need information to verify”.141 At the same time, considerable 
progress has been made over the years, and there seems to be more understanding on both 
sides on the “rules of the game”. Interestingly enough, it was mentioned that on some 
occasions personal connections of facilities’ managers or mayors of the ‘closed’ cities with 
the local security services play a crucial role of how the U.S. experts are treated by the 
latter. Historically, the FSB is an organisation permeated with Cold War mindsets. It is not 
surprising that it often acts as a barrier to the U.S.-Russian cooperation in the nuclear 
weapons area. 
 
3.4.7. Nuclear Research Institutes, NGOs 
An examination of the role of nuclear research institutes and NGOs in the CTR 
process has revealed that Bureaucratic Politics Model, especially in its Organisational Model 
part, would not be able to explain the observed trends. The nuclear scientists and 
representatives of the non-governmental sector in Russia are the most uninhibited in terms 
of cooperation with the U.S. in the field of nuclear safety and security. This can be 
explained by a lack of complicated standard operating procedures typical for large 
government organisations and also by the values held by those in scientific and research 
communities. In this respect, the transnational movement theory can be the useful tool in 
explaining some of the trends in CTR cooperation when the actors do not represent 
government agencies.  
Russian nuclear scientists and engineers are engaged in the CTR process in various 
ways: in developing, carrying out specific MPC&A projects, in joint scientific endeavours 
through the ISTC and IPP programmes, in providing expertise required for all the different 
aspects of threat reduction. The interviews with the Russian and American experts and 
officials have revealed that cooperation ‘on the ground’ between nuclear scientists, who 
speak ‘the same language of science’ is least affected by the bureaucratic politics and 
organisational cultures. Russian physicists are equally disapproving of FSB practices 
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preventing their American colleagues from coming to Russia and State Department’s 
bureaucratic hurdles complicating their travel.142
The practice of projects run by the ISTC and IPP has demonstrated that both 
Russian and American scientists are very interested in bilateral cooperation in the nuclear 
field. They are excited about the opportunity to work together after decades of limited 
information about what work has been done by the other side. Russian scientists are 
welcoming American achievements in high technology, while American scientists are 
extremely interested in Russian fundamental science expertise. The case of nuclear 
scientists demonstrates that a relative detachment of science from politics in the former 
Soviet Union has contributed to their more liberal views on cooperation with the U.S.  
Although being the “brain” of the arms control race, numerous nuclear installations, 
research institutes and centres find it easier to accommodate to the new reality of post-
Cold war period. Their primary scientific interests might be the decisive factor in 
willingness to engage in mutually beneficial cooperation. 
The non-governmental sector working in the area of nuclear policy expertise, nuclear 
safety and other nuclear-related issues is not very well developed in Russia. There are only 
few NGOs, which are able to influence policies or public opinion in the sphere of nuclear 
non-proliferation and nuclear safety. The major Russian “think-tank” working on policy 
issues of nuclear non-proliferation is Moscow-based Centre for Policy Studies (PIR-
Centre). The PIR-Centre is the leading non-government institution in this field.  It is 
engaged in research, educational and consulting activities, as well as publishing. The PIR-
Centre’s publications were the main source of Russian-language materials for this study. 
The PIR-Centre has associates, who either had direct experience with nuclear 
dismantlement, strategic military planning, or are currently working on CTR-related issues. 
Two other non-governmental organisations working in the area of nuclear non-
proliferation in Russia are representative offices of American “think-tanks” – the Moscow 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) and the Moscow office of the 
Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI).  Both offices are mainly staffed with Russian experts and 
are engaged in nuclear non-proliferation policy analysis and publication of relevant material 
in Russian language. 
There is an obvious lack of well-established non-government organisations involved 
in analysis of nuclear policies and problems of nuclear non-proliferation in Russia. The fact 
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that there are only a small number of “think-tanks” and their limited influence on the 
policy-making is a demonstration of a still transitional stage in Russia’s development 
towards a full democracy. 
3.5. U.S. Decision-Making  
3.5.1. Overview 
The roles of American key political players are considerably better defined than those 
of the Russian ones.  Several state agencies (the Department of Energy (DOE), the 
Department of Defence (DOD), and the State Department) are responsible for the 
management of the non-proliferation assistance programmes, while the U.S. Congress has 
legislative powers and authority to allocate funding. The National Security Council (NSC) 
plays a coordinating role, and two non-governmental entities (USIC and USEC) are directly 
involved in two of the CTR programmes.   
The Department of Energy has responsibility for the HEU Deal, the Plutonium 
Disposition Agreement, the MPC&A Programme, the Initiatives for Proliferation 
Prevention (IPP) and the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI). The Department of Defence 
oversees the CTR Programme. The State Department plays a dual role – as an 
implementing agent for the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) and as a 
state agency formulating the foreign policy and regulating all international cooperation. The 
role of the U.S. Congress is crucial in the cooperative threat reduction process, since it has 
the power to authorise programmes, allocate funding or suspend them. The U.S. Industrial 
Coalition (USIC) is a key organisation for implementing IPP projects, while the U.S. 
Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is an implementing agent for the HEU Deal. 
3.5.2. Congress 
The U.S. Congress is by far the most important political actor in the process of 
cooperative threat reduction. It authorises all the legislation necessary for the 
implementation of the programme, determines the amounts to be spent and judges 
whether the monies were spent appropriately in Russia (through Testimonies of experts, 
officials and GAO reports). The U.S. Congress, the same as its Russian counterpart, the 
Duma, has reflected the mood in U.S.-Russian relations over the past decade.  Table 3 lists 
some key developments on Capitol Hill. 
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Table 3  Key CTR Developments in the U.S. Congress 
Period Political environment Developments on Capitol Hill 
1991-1992 The collapse of the Soviet Union, 
political and economic crisis in Russia.  
The dangers coming from deteriorating 
nuclear complex are recognised by 
American scholars and are voiced by 
U.S. Senators Nunn and Lugar. 
After some struggle Senators Nunn and 
Lugar manage to introduce a piece of 
legislation, which gives a basis for the 
CTR Programme. 
1994-1995 Republicans gain control in the 
Congress, Communists are in a 
majority in Russian State Duma.  
Russia starts war in Chechnya. U.S.-
Russian relations deteriorate. 
Several conditions are attached to CTR 
legislation, while proponents of CTR 
continue to address issues of nuclear 
threats in Russia and stress the necessity 
to continue assistance to Russia and other 
former Soviet republics. 
1998 A financial crisis in Russia.  A danger 
of ‘brain-drain’ as a result of severe 
economic situation becomes even 
more acute.  
U.S. Congress is presented with the idea 
of Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) to 
address potential ‘brain-drain’ problems.  
Reluctantly, Congress approves the 
Programme.  
2000 George Bush becomes U.S. President; 
Republicans take major position in 
Congress and the government. 
Vladimir Putin becomes Russian 
President. 
CTR is under threat of considerable cuts 
in funding and scope. New 
Administration is more reluctant to assist 
Russia with its denuclearisation needs. 
2001  Terrorist attacks on the U.S. U.S. government channels a lot of 
funding into homeland security but fails 
to expand on cooperative threat 
reduction. 
2002-2003 U.S.-led War on Terror, military 
operation in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Agreements for two important non-
proliferation assistance programmes – 
Plutonium Disposition Programme and 
Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) are not 
extended due to disagreements over 
liability issues. 
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The first CTR Programme was a Congress initiative – the idea was brought up by bi-
partisan group led by Republican Richard Lugar and Democrat Sam Nunn (how Senators 
Nunn and Lugar established the CTR Programme is discussed in Chapter 4). 
From its inception, the CTR Programme was having a controversial reception at the 
Capitol Hill due to the same reasons, which were making Russian State Duma 
uncooperative in CTR issues (i.e. lack of trust towards the other side, protection of the 
country’s own interests, and lack of understanding of the magnitude of problem). At the 
beginning CTR proponents led by Senators Nunn and Lugar failed to secure approval from 
their colleagues to authorise the CTR initiative. Although, later approved, the CTR 
Programme has always being struggling to expand the pool of its supporters on Capitol 
Hill. 
The way the CTR programmes developed to a substantial extent, was interrelated 
with the internal politics of Congress. At the very beginning, the ‘buy-American’ clause 
attached to the CTR Programme (all equipment had to be bought in the U.S. and all the 
contractors were American companies) was introduced especially to secure support for the 
Programme on the Capitol Hill. In this way, members of Congress knew that the American 
taxpayers’ money would be boosting American economy, not Russian. The ‘Buy-American’ 
clause caused problems at the initial implementation stage of the CTR Programme. It was 
not practical, since it would have been easier, faster and more rational to buy Russian-made 
equipment. It was a source for growing scepticism towards the Programme on the Russian 
side (later, it was allowed to have Russian subcontractors, while American companies 
remained main contractors). 
Congress also introduced certification process for the U.S. President. That meant that 
before appropriations for every fiscal year, the U.S. President had to certify that Russia 
complies with arms control agreements and does not violate human rights. The 
requirement for certification resulted in a year-long freeze on new funding in 2001-2002.  
By early 2003 President Bush was granted the authority to waive certification requirements. 
The main problem for the CTR programmes is the lack of awareness among U.S. 
Congress representatives and Senators of their value for U.S. and international security. 
According to a Capitol Hill insider, no administration at any time had Congress focused 
enough on the importance of cooperative threat reduction.143
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Senate has proved to be more attuned to the benefits to international security of CTR 
programmes than the House of Representatives. This especially applies to Senators 
representing states, where American nuclear labs are located. Apart from Senator Lugar 
and former Senator Nunn, the largest proponents of CTR on Capitol Hill are Senator Pete 
Domenici (Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico) and Senator Ellen Tauscher 
(Livermore National Laboratory in California). This can be explained by the fact that U.S. 
nuclear labs have managed to underscore the importance of non-proliferation 
cooperation.144 It is considerably harder to persuade House members of the importance of 
nuclear non-proliferation assistance to Russia – they have immediate concerns of their 
constituencies and find it difficult to appreciate how helping Russia with nuclear 
dismantlement would benefit their voters.   
The number of true supporters of CTR programmes on the Capitol Hill is small, but 
those are influential legislators, who proved to be very determined to constantly overcome 
hurdles of Congress bureaucratic machine. There are also some dedicated critics of the 
programmes, such as a Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Senator 
Duncan Hunter.  
After two unsuccessful projects under the CTR Programme145 Senator Hunter called 
the cooperative threat reduction process as being “wasteful” and stated the following:  
“Twelve years and more than $7 billion later, it is worth revisiting the original 
purpose of this program.  Designed as a temporary, focused effort to shrink 
Moscow’s vast strategic arsenal with American funding and know-how, the 
CTR program has, over time, morphed into an open-ended, unfocused and 
sometimes self-defeating venture.”146
Some in Congress prefer to support programmes in rhetoric but then vote against 
them, while claiming to be Russia’s “best friends and her harshest critics.”147
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The way Congress perceives different programmes provides some important 
observations about the interests of Capitol Hill. From the analysis of Congress’ attitude 
towards several key non-proliferation initiatives, the following trend is evident:  projects 
dealing with straightforward dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons, scrapping of 
delivery vehicles and sealing off silos are the ones considered to be most successful.  Their 
value for America’s national security can be easily demonstrated by referring to the 
numbers of weapons, which will never be targeted at America. 
At the same time, the ‘softer’ programmes, which are designed to help Russia with 
the socio-economic consequences of downsizing its nuclear complex, are the least popular.  
A good example for that is the case of the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI).   
The NCI Programme addresses a long-term problem of creating non-weapon work 
for Russian weapons scientists. There have been problems with the programme 
management and the programme has failed to deliver impressive results in terms of the 
number of jobs created. At the same time, it should be remembered that with the 
programmes, like NCI, it is much harder to produce results, which can impress the 
Congress. NCI cannot quote the number of weapons eliminated; it cannot prove how 
many former weapon scientists would have gone to rogue states, if not supported by 
programmes like NCI and others. As a result, NCI is seen as a programme, which simply 
helps Russia with its internal problems of a socio-economic nature. The fact that the U.S. 
Congress has refused to consider assisting Russia with providing housing for former 
weapons scientists and military officers demonstrates that it is interested in programmes, 
which directly promote American interests. 
 
3.5.3. The Department of Defence (DOD) 
The U.S. Department of Defence (DOD) was at the forefront of the cooperative 
threat reduction process, since the initial Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Programme 
was brought under DOD’s budget and supervision. 
The DOD-administered CTR Programme was designed to assist in the 
dismantlement and destruction of Soviet nuclear weapons (falling under START reduction 
requirements); it helped to remove nuclear weapons from all three non-Russian republics 
(Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine). The CTR Programme continues work on dismantling 
and demilitarisation of former Soviet industrial and scientific infrastructure. There are also 
various projects dealing with biological and chemical WMD threats. (However, current 
work focuses only on nuclear aspects of the non-proliferation programmes). 
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The Material Protection, Accounting and Control (MPC&A) and the International 
Science and Technology (ISTC) programmes, in their initial forms, were also under 
auspices of the DOD. However, the MPC&A Programme was later moved to the 
Department of Energy (DOE), because DOE had relevant expertise for the work to be 
implemented. For some time, the expertise for MPC&A was coming from DOE, while 
funding was still coming out of the DOD’s budget.   
The ISTC Programme was also moved out of DOD, and became the responsibility 
of the State Department.    
As a result of a review of all CTR programmes in 2001, it was decided to transfer a 
programme on plutonium reactor shut-down in Russia to the Department of Energy from 
the Department of Defence. That decision was taken as a response to criticism and 
resistance from the Pentagon and lawmakers to support a programme, which apart from 
shutting down Plutonium reactors envisaged the construction of conventional plants to 
substitute them for energy production.148  
It seems possible that DOD as an organisation could not be too enthusiastic about 
certain aspects of cooperation with Russia, at first. For the first two years money for CTR 
activities were to come out of the pre-planned DOD’s budget because the legislation only 
authorised DOD to exercise a ‘transfer’ authority, in other words, DOD did not receive 
any new funds but had to cut out its own expenses to implement the programme.   
Jason Ellis characterised that arrangement in the following way:  
“In practice, this involved a programming trade-off: every dollar spent on the 
CTR Program meant one less for a program or policy priority already identified 
by the Bush [senior] administration.  It is not surprising, then, that Secretary 
Cheney reportedly called it a foolish program, or that the Pentagon was quickly 
criticized for a perceived pattern of “foot-dragging” during its first two 
years.”149
DOD as a military organisation stands separately in the political system of the United 
States. It also has its particular features, most important of them being its stronger 
traditional approaches to international security. The Pentagon, by virtue of its 
organisational interests and values, is logically more interested in building new weapons, 
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enhancing the army and strengthening its military capabilities, rather than assisting another 
country overcome its trouble with nuclear weapons-related problems.   
DOD is also the most ‘closed’ organisation in the U.S. establishment with the 
strictest security regulations, and it can be assumed that these factors contribute to the 
complexities of the bureaucratic processes within the DOD. DOD was the only 
organisation involved in the U.S. on the American side, whose representatives were not 
available to be interviewed on the achievements and failures of the CTR Programme due to 
security clearance problems. 
 
3.5.4. The Department of Energy (DOE)  
Currently, the Department of Energy (DOE) oversees several major non-
proliferation assistance programmes. They include: the MPC&A Programme, the Nuclear 
Cities Initiative (NCI), the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP), the HEU 
Agreement, the Plutonium Disposition Programme and the Plutonium Reactor Shut-
Down. 
As a civilian organisation, DOE proved to be more flexible in many ways in 
implementing its programmes (as opposed to DOD). A civilian status of DOE also helped 
overcome some of the suspicion on the side of the Russian secret services. Most 
importantly, DOE holds technical expertise needed for implementation of the key CTR 
programmes. 
The level of DOE’s determination in moving forward the programmes has varied 
throughout the years – it has been influenced by the DOE’s leadership. Most of DOE’s 
Programmes were boosted during the Clinton administration, when officials at key DOE 
positions were the active proponents of cooperative threat reduction. Key officials, who 
contributed to the CTR process during that period, were Secretary of Energy Hazel 
O’Leary, Rose Gottemoeller, Leonard Spector, and Kenneth Luongo. These individuals are 
not members of the current government, but most of them by working in non-
governmental sector still influence U.S. policies regarding non-proliferation. The profile of 
DOE’s non-proliferation programmes has somehow diminished after Clinton 
administration left; however, they received renewed attention after the events of 9/11.   
DOE constantly comes under scrutiny of the U.S. Government Accounting Office 
(GAO), which produces reports assessing the performance of DOE-managed 
programmes.   
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Proponents of cooperative threat reduction lobby for increases in funding allocated 
to DOE for its non-proliferation programmes, however, DOE officials are quite cautious 
about requesting more money. One of the reasons for it is a concern for the risk that 
money allocated to DOE might not be spent within the time required.150 Although, not 
explicitly spelled out by DOE representative, it might be an indication that there are not 
enough of experts within DOE assigned to work on non-proliferation assistance, and as a 
result, a lack of potential to expand on existing projects.   
 
3.5.5. The National Security Council (NSC)  
The National Security Council (NSC) is somewhat of a ‘shadow’ player in cooperative 
threat reduction. The NSC is responsible for the coordination of all the non-proliferation 
assistance administered by different departments.  The NSC holds inter-agency meetings 
on matters of the macro-management of the programmes, at the same time it does not 
want to be pulled into ‘micro-managing’.151 Such a position might be a response to a widely 
criticised lack of coordination between the U.S. agencies implementing CTR programmes.   
The ‘Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials’ report (2003) indicated that the 
NSC has assigned a very small fraction of its resources to the effort of CTR coordination, 
and has only a limited ability to control directions that the different agencies choose to 
take.152
 
3.5.6. State Department  
The State Department plays a dual role in the cooperative threat reduction process: as 
an implementing agency for several non-proliferation assistance programmes in the FSU, 
and as an overseeing body for all international cooperation between the U.S. government 
and other countries. 
The State Department is responsible for the International Science and Technology 
Centre (ISTC) and for export control assistance programmes designed to assist former 
                                                 
150 Interview with the DOE official, Washington D.C., March 2003 
151 Interview with the NSC official, Washington D.C., March 2003 
152 Matthew Bunn, Anthony Weir, John P. Holdren, ‘Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: 
A Report Card and Action Plan’, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (Harvard 
University), commissioned by NTI, March 2003, p. 50 
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Soviet republics in interdicting illegal smuggling (this study does not cover export control 
programmes). The ISTC Programme (discussed in detail in Chapter 7) has been praised in 
recent years as one of the most successful areas of threat reduction cooperation between 
the U.S. and Russia.   
It is interesting to look at the State Department’s role in the CTR process as that of 
an agency regulating international cooperation on the whole.  It has been noted by some 
key participants of the earlier CTR programmes, that there was some degree of tension 
within the State Department (between different offices) and between the State Department 
and other U.S. agencies in the earlier years of the programmes. 
There was some tension over the locus of authority with regard to the CTR process 
within the State Department, because there were two teams working on issues, which in 
the case of CTR overlapped. One team was responsible for non-proliferation, and it was 
headed by John Bolton. The other team, a so called NIS desk, had a regional focus and 
oversaw cooperation with all the former Soviet republics (the NIS desk’s head was Ann 
Harrington). In the earlier years of the MPC&A Programme, when DOE was trying to 
build a more informal relationship with Russia, there was some tension between the State 
Department (NIS desk) and DOE. Overall, there was a lot of support for the programmes 
coming from the different teams within the State Department, but there was tension over 
day-to-day activities.153
The example of some DOE versus State Department stand-offs is regarding more 
informal approaches to MPC&A programme, which went against State Department views 
of proper procedure, demonstrates that there was a clash between the State Department’s 
organisational culture and some of the approaches, which because of their informality 
could be valuable for the CTR process. The State Department’s main responsibility is to 
ensure that cooperation with Russia takes place within an established framework of overall 
U.S. policy towards Russia and that this cooperation is formalised. The bureaucratic 
mechanisms within the State Department often come under attack from both the U.S. and 
Russian side (mainly from people working ‘on the ground’, directly engaged in 
programmes’ implementation). 
An example of how the formal approach of the State Department can negatively 
affect the implementation of CTR programmes are its rigid rules for issuing visas to 
Russian participants and for the time-consuming and strict procedures for authorising U.S. 
                                                 
153 Interview with a former DOE official, Washington D.C. , March 2003 
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experts to travel to Russia. In recent years the State Department has tightened its rules on 
American specialists travelling to Russia, and according to a State Department official, it 
was more of an administrative measure due to very high numbers of American personnel 
travelling to Russia and a request from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, which is engaged in 
country clearance process (an interagency clearance process takes place prior to a trip of 
U.S. officials or experts to Russia) .154
Some Russian interviewees, who have to travel to the U.S. regularly for training and 
other purposes of the CTR process, have complained that it takes  them a long time (up to 
6 months) to obtain a visa or that some of their colleagues have been denied it altogether. 
Russian experts involved in programmes, such as MPC&A, also raised concern over 
bureaucratised procedures their American colleagues have to go through before being able 
to travel to Russia to implement projects. 
 
3.5.7. U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC) 155  
The privatisation of USEC – an implementing agent for the HEU Deal designated by 
the U.S. to buy HEU from Russia – raised a debate on how appropriate it was to have a 
commercial company being the sole executive agent for a programme of significant non-
proliferation value. It was evident that USEC’s interests as a commercial enterprise did not 
necessarily coincide with the objectives defined by the HEU Agreement in the context of 
CTR.  USEC was simply not interested in buying Russian low-enriched uranium (LEU) at 
low prices – thereby undermining its status at the U.S. uranium market. The non-
proliferation objectives of the programme designed to downblend Russia’s HEU into LEU 
and remove it to safer locations in the U.S. for further sale to commercial enterprises were 
at odds with USEC’s own interests as a uranium producer, which had its own uranium to 
sell on the U.S. market. 
Nonetheless, Russia and the U.S. managed to reach an interim consensus on the 
conditions of the HEU Deal and USEC’s role in is now less controversial. 
                                                 
154 Interview with a State Department official, Washington D.C., March 2003 
155 USEC’s role in the HEU Deal and the politics of the U.S. uranium market is discussed in detail 
in Chapter 6 
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3.5.8 Nuclear Labs, NGOs  
Similar to Russian nuclear scientists, American scientists are the least influenced by 
the dogmas of the Cold War thinking.  The best evidence for that is the success of the lab-
to-lab cooperation between the American labs and Russian nuclear institutions, which was 
carried out as a part of the MPC&A Programme. Its purpose was to overcome the 
bureaucratic hurdles of more formal state-level cooperation, and it proved successful. The 
assessment of the lab-to-lab initiative in Chapter 5 suggests that the transnational 
movement theory is an appropriate framework to explain the success of moving CTR 
cooperation forward below the government-organisational level. It is evident that on the 
‘ground’ level there is almost a bond between the nuclear scientists of two countries.  
The non-governmental sector working in the area of non-proliferation in the U.S. is 
very well-developed and influential. A number of well established ‘think-tanks’ play an 
important role in shaping the policies. Many of them employ former senior Clinton 
administration officials, who were instrumental in establishing CTR programmes and 
developing them into a broad CTR process. 
The Monterey Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) (based in Monterey, 
California) has a reputation of a leading research centre for all aspects of non-proliferation.  
CNS contributes to the process by providing extensive expertise to government and 
government subcontractors working on the programmes. It also represents one of the main 
sources of information with publications on important non-proliferation issues and 
running databases on nuclear smuggling and constantly updated resources on WMD 
threats in the FSU. The head of the CNS office in Washington D.C. is Leonard Spector, 
who worked as an Assistant Deputy Administrator for Arms Control and Non-
proliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE) during the Clinton 
Administration.  Leonard Spector managed the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention 
(IPP) and the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) programmes.  
The Russian-American Nuclear Security Council (RANSAC) is another important 
non-governmental player.  RANSAC’s Executive Director - Kenneth Luongo - served as 
the Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Energy for Non-Proliferation Policy and the 
Director of the Office of Arms Control and Non-proliferation at the U.S. Department of 
Energy during the Clinton Administration. In addition, Luongo was the Director for of the 
Russia and Newly Independent States Nuclear Material Security Task Force. Prior to these 
positions, he served as a Special Assistant for Non-proliferation Issues to Secretary of 
Energy, Hazel R. O'Leary. RANSAC developed the idea for what later became the Nuclear 
Cities Initiative (NCI).  It provides substantial information resources on all aspects of U.S.-
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Russian nuclear cooperation. RANSAC promotes better awareness of the existing 
problems in cooperative threat reduction by organising workshops, including some 
especially designed for members of the U.S. Congress. 
The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) is a non-profit organisation founded by media-
magnate Ted Turner and by one of the two founders of the CTR Programme – former 
Senator Sam Nunn. Apart from being headed by one of CTR’s founders Sam Nunn, NTI 
also has several key individuals as its members, such as Laura Holgate, who managed the 
DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction programme during the previous administration. She 
also served as director of the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition at the U.S. Department 
of Energy. NTI has substantial resources and has been able to sponsor several non-
proliferation assistance projects implemented in different parts of the world from its own 
funds. 
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) – is a non-government 
‘think-tank’, which runs a programme on non-proliferation. CEIP employs Rose 
Gottemoeller, another key former senior official from Clinton administration with direct 
experience in the CTR programmes. Rose Gottemoeller is a former deputy undersecretary 
for defence nuclear non-proliferation in the Department of Energy. Previously, she served 
as the department’s assistant secretary for non-proliferation and national security, with 
responsibility for all non-proliferation cooperation with Russia and the NIS. Rose 
Gottemoeller has been instrumental in establishing the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI). 
The U.S. NGOs involved in policy-relevant research exercise a stronger degree of 
influence on the U.S. policies than similar institutions in Russia.  The experts working in 
the non-government sector often testify before the relevant U.S. Senate Committees, 
publish reports, which provide a thorough assessment of CTR programmes and in this way 
prompt current officials to review some of the government’s practices in the CTR process. 
There are several NGOs, which are concerned with the dangers of ecological and 
social consequences of nuclear production and testing. One of the most active one is 
Initiative for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia – an NGO, which among other 
activities, lobbies for safer nuclear stewardship.   
3.6. Conclusion  
The organisational culture of key political actors predetermined their attitude towards 
the CTR process.  However, attitudes of different organisations were never fixed; they have 
been shifting in different directions under the influence of several important factors, such 
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as the views of key individuals at the top, the prevailing atmosphere in the U.S.-Russian 
relationship, problems of domestic politics and conflicting interests between different 
government bodies, both in Russia and the U.S. More importantly, the nature of each 
individual programme has an important role to play in how it is perceived by the 
governments, implementing agencies and people on the ground. An account of the 
evolution of different programmes, problems in their implementation and role of 
organisations and individuals in this process provide some explanations of why CTR 
programmes have succeeded in some areas while failing in others, what were the reasons 
for setbacks and what factors caused them to advance.  
For example, the MPC&A Programme, which requires most intrusive verification 
mechanisms, has experienced a lot of setbacks due to unwillingness of Russia to grant 
access to its sensitive facilities (due to heightened FSB concerns). At the same time, the 
example of the MPC&A Programme has led to two main observations: 1) moving a 
programme from a more conservative U.S. DOD to a civilian DOE helped to bring the 
cooperation forward; 2) cooperation on the level of labs between Russian and American 
scientists (Lab-to-Lab part of MPC&A Programme) proved to be successful because 
scientists are less influenced by Cold War thinking and their work is less subjected to 
bureaucratised mechanisms of state agencies.   
The more conservative military establishments (i.e. the U.S. DOD and the Russian 
MOD) are still heavily represented by people of the Cold War generation, whose careers 
were shaped and whose beliefs were moulded during the height of antagonism between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union. In this respect, involving these organisations in the process of 
cooperative threat reduction was a groundbreaking development in U.S.-Russian relations.  
Apart from well-deserved praise for implementing the unique and first of its kind CTR 
Programme, the military establishments do occasionally stumble over the Cold War legacy 
and organisational values. Another cause of tension between the two military organisations 
is that their interests differ: while the U.S. DOD (as well as the U.S. government as a 
whole) is interested in dismantling and eliminating as many nuclear weapons, warheads, and 
silos in Russia as possible, thereby reducing the dangers to its own national security, the 
Russian MOD, while recognising a pressing need to downsize its nuclear forces, wants to 
do it on its own terms and implement it according to its perceptions of Russia’s military 
requirements. 
The implementation of all CTR programmes requires cooperation from the side of 
the Russian security services – namely, the FSB. The priority interests of the FSB are to 
ensure that no harm is inflicted to Russia’s national security interests while the bilateral 
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cooperation is underway. Therefore, opposition by the FSB to more intrusive U.S.-funded 
projects and restriction on access of American officials and experts to Russian sensitive 
sites and ‘closed’ cities is directly linked to the FSB’s organisational values. 
The U.S. State Department has to meet its organisational priorities – and that is to 
ensure that cooperation with Russia does not get outside of the formal framework of U.S. 
policies towards Russia. A desire to be ‘in control’ of bilateral cooperation and internal 
bureaucratic processes sometimes contributes to slowing down the pace of the 
programmes. At the same time, as an implementing agent for the ISTC, the State 
Department achieved considerable success, and the ISTC is currently attributed as one the 
most successful CTR projects underway. 
An examination of U.S. and Russian legislative branches and their behaviour in terms 
of the CTR process shows how remarkably similar the attitudes of the U.S. Congress and 
of Russian State Duma are. Being at the forefront of representing the interests of their 
people, members of the U.S. Congress and Russian parliamentarians prove to be very 
vigilant when it comes to cooperation between two countries. Both the Congress and State 
Duma have repeatedly put pressure on the programmes by voicing concern over the 
motives of the other party and by making them hostages to problems in bilateral relations 
and domestic politics.   
The Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) was of necessity a key player in the 
implementation of CTR. While keen to receive CTR funding, its institutional interests (the 
preservation of the Russian military nuclear complex) were not always congruent with the 
objectives of CTR. The analysis of the organisational behaviour of MINATOM therefore is 
crucial to an understanding of the development of CTR as a whole. 
Overall, the following major conclusions can be drawn from the examination of key 
political actors and the developments in the CTR process: the role of individuals was and 
remains to be crucial for the CTR process, especially on the U.S. side, where the funding 
and political will has to be secured; the bureaucratic mechanisms and patterns of operation 
within the organisations slow down the pace of programmes’ implementation; the U.S. and 
Russian organisations have a set of their organisational interests, which they try to guard 
while participating in cooperative threat reduction process; even though on some occasions 
there is a clash between organisational/individual interests and CTR objectives, both the 
U.S. and Russia have preserved the cooperation and continue to move forward with a 
varying degree of commitment and political will.  
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The Bureaucratic Politics Model is used as one of the major analytical tools in 
evaluating programme performance in the CTR process.  Although it fails to cover all 
aspects of cooperation in CTR framework and alternative theoretical approaches should be 
employed, the focus on organisations and individual bureaucrats suggested by the Model is 
imperative. This is due to nature of the CTR process, in which state organisations are 
primary players and the individual members of the government exercise specific influence 
on how CTR programmes are developed and perceived. In order to employ the model the 
following chapters define key political players for each programme and evaluate their role 
in its implementation. An examination of the problems of implementation for major non-
proliferation assistance programmes provides evidence that some (although not all) of 
them can be explained by the organisational values and interests, their standard operating 
procedures, and by the role of individuals engaged in programme decision-making and 
implementation process. The case studies of main CTR programmes demonstrate how 
bureaucratically-based problems of implementation are further negatively supplemented by 
political problems in the U.S.-Russian strategic relations. 
Some problems of implementation in CTR programmes cannot be attributed to 
purely bureaucratic or political factors (e.g. technical problems connected with disposition 
of fissile material). Therefore, the Bureaucratic Politics Model cannot provide explanations 
for all problems defined in the course of examination of CTR programmes, but it provides 
an important structural framework for this research by focusing attention on implementing 
agents, i.e. state organisations. In the following chapters we will consider specific elements 
of CTR, in order to understand the various factors that affected the implementation of the 
programmes and the evolution of CTR as a whole. 
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Chapter 4 
The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Programme and the 
Evolution of the CTR Process 
4.1. Introduction  
This chapter provides a historical background for all the programmes assessed in 
this thesis with an analysis of the political and economic environment in the Soviet 
Union shortly before the collapse. It describes the concerns in the West that called for 
measures to confront potential nuclear threats stemming from the disintegrating Soviet 
Union and the reasons why Russian government accepted the assistance. The chapter 
presents an account of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Programme, which 
provided the foundation for the process of U.S.-Russian cooperative threat reduction, 
and was the first formal U.S. non-proliferation assistance programme to be implemented 
in Russia. It describes the history of the inception and the main objectives of the CTR 
Programme. This is followed by a description of its evolution into several non-
proliferation programmes funded and administered by different U.S. agencies (each of 
these programmes is further discussed in chapters 5, 6, and 7).   
The chapter analyses the problems of the implementation of the CTR 
Programme, which are shown to be endemic to most of the non-proliferation assistance 
programmes (empirical evidence provided in Chapters 5, 6, and 7). Allison’s model of 
bureaucratic politics is tested against the decision-making and implementation track of 
the CTR Programme.  In order to do that, the role and interests of key organisations are 
addressed throughout the chapter. The goal of this chapter is to analyse how some of the 
problems of implementation of bureaucratic nature are influenced by problems on the 
political level, since it is evident from the case studies analysis that the legacy of the Cold 
War thinking is still present in some organisational procedures. Most typically, a lack of 
trust and unresolved issues in the U.S.-Russian post-Cold War strategic relationship have 
an impact on the implementation tracks of the CTR Programme, as well as on other 
major CTR programmes (discussed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7). 
In conclusion, the overall effectiveness of the CTR Programme is assessed based 
on its achievements and limitations. 
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4.2. Historical Background  
4.2.1. The Economic and Political Crisis in the Soviet Union  
The initial major objectives of the CTR Programme included: assistance for the 
denuclearisation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine; the elimination of START-limited 
systems and infrastructure; assistance to Russia for accelerating strategic arms reductions 
to START levels; enhancing military reductions and reforms in FSU recipient 
countries.156 The CTR Programme generated an array of non-proliferation activities, now 
managed by different U.S. agencies, and as such represents an important phenomenon of 
post-Cold War international security cooperation.   
There were several key events that played an important role in establishing the 
CTR Programme in 1992. First and foremost among these was the economic and 
political situation in the former Soviet Union by the end of 1980s.   
Already in 1990 Soviet decision-makers demonstrated their concern about the 
vulnerability of tactical nuclear weapons deployed on Soviet territory, and there were 
discussions underway between Soviet academics and Western specialists regarding the 
control over nuclear weapons in the event the Soviet Union should break up. However, 
no actions were taken to address this problem.157
The failed coup-d’état in August 1991 undertaken to overthrow President 
Gorbachev demonstrated that the Soviet Union was facing a new set of threats. The 
country was going through severe political turbulence, and safety and security of nuclear 
weapons and materials became questionable. Speculation as to whether the Soviet 
President, Mikhail Gorbachev, had lost control of the nuclear arsenal during the 
attempted putsch gave new credence to the fear that nuclear control might be lost and a 
nuclear holocaust might be brought about by accident and as a result of unauthorised 
launch. It never became clear whether control over the huge Soviet nuclear arsenal was 
fully lost, but it is known that Gorbachev was cut off from all communication, including 
the “nuclear briefcase” (the communication device integrating the President and the 
Defence Minister into the nuclear launch authorisation process, also called “football”).   
The Soviet system designed to generate an order for a nuclear attack was called Kazbek 
 
156 The Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme, at http://www.osd.mil/ctr retrieved on 
04.11.02 
157 Bluth, The Nuclear Challenge, op. cit, p. 129 
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and involved at least three authorising parties.  At the time of the August coup, the three 
authorising parties included Mikhail Gorbachev, Minister of Defence General Yazov, and 
Chief of General Staff General Moiseyev. Under the Kazbek system the decision to 
launch nuclear weapons was supposed to be formed jointly by the three parties. In 
peacetime the three authorised persons were supposed to communicate via special 
devices, which would allow them to generate and transmit their part of the electronic 
authorisation codes. The separate codes sent by the country’s president and the Minister 
of Defence would travel to an electronic device with a special algorithm. That device 
[“nuclear briefcase”] was to validate, combine and send off the codes to another device, 
which would have an input from the Chief of General Staff. The composed code would 
then travel to the Commanders in Chief of the strategic forces to authorise the launch.158    
Most probably, Gorbachev did not have control of his “nuclear briefcase” per se. 
It seems as through it was not technically possible anyway for the coup-d-état organisers 
to acquire full command and control over nuclear weapons due to the multi-stage 
authorisation system needed to launch nuclear weapons. However, it is not only such 
extreme situations as a short-lived attempt at a coup-d-état that can represent a real 
nuclear danger to the world. A less extreme and prolonged period of transition to a new 
stable state bears numerous obvious and hidden proliferation challenges. The failed 
attempt to overthrow the legitimate government of the Soviet Union exacerbated 
concern which had already existed in the West.  That concern led to a fundamental 
assessment of threats arising from the possible dissolution of a Soviet nuclear state. 
 
4.2.2. The Harvard Study on the Soviet Nuclear Threats  
Scholars from Harvard’s J. F. Kennedy School of Government carried out a 
study entitled Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet 
Union.159 That report was praised as “a timely study [...] that outlined in an analytical, 
scholarly format the dangers of nuclear command, control, and safety in an unstable 
Soviet Union”.160
 
158 Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, op. cit, p. 72 
159 Campbell, Carter, Miller, and Zraket, eds., Soviet Nuclear Fission, op. cit.  
160 Senator Sam Nunn, ‘Foreword: Changing Threats in the Post-Cold War World’ in Shields and 
Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold War, op. cit., p. xvii 
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The study outlined the following major risks. The break-up of the Soviet Union 
into 15 constituent republics would result in the creation of new nuclear states, including 
four (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan) with strategic nuclear weapons. That 
would raise profound questions about the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) regime, 
which did not envision the creation of new legitimate nuclear powers.  The future destiny 
of the nuclear weapons located on their territory was unknown, especially because the 
nature and stability of the new governments was unknown. In times of political and 
social upheaval, nuclear weapons might fall into the wrong hands. Tactical weapons were 
seen as particularly problematic, given that many of them were deployed in crisis regions 
and were not adequately protected against unauthorised use.161 Storage sites for weapons 
grade nuclear materials had inadequate systems for materials control and accounting and 
were not sufficiently protected. 162
The Soviet Nuclear Fission report was, in other words, a formal and written 
reaffirmation of major concerns and worries of the post-Cold War environment, which 
envisaged the disappearance of a great nuclear power. 
 
4.2.3. The U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar: An Appreciation of 
the Threat  
At the time of publication of the Soviet Nuclear Fission, two U.S. Senators – Sam 
Nunn and Richard Lugar - became active in promoting awareness in the U.S. about the 
great dangers of nuclear proliferation looming as a result of political and economic crisis 
in the Soviet Union. Senator Sam Nunn had a personal communication with Mikhail 
Gorbachev soon after the attempted coup-d’état in August 1991, and Gorbachev 
indicated that “command and control” of the Soviet nuclear arsenal during the coup was 
unclear.  
Senator Nunn later stated: 
“...I concluded that the Soviet Union was in great peril.  In particular, I 
believed that we needed to do everything we could to help the Soviet 
 
161 Soviet tactical nuclear weapons were not universally equipped with permissive action links 
(PALs – electronic devices that require the input of a code before the weapon can be 
activated). 
162 Campbell, Carter, Miller, and Zraket, eds., Soviet Nuclear Fission, op. cit.  
108 
 
                                                
authorities gain control and keep control over their own nuclear 
weapons...”163
Meanwhile, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin 
had proposed a humanitarian aid package for the Soviet Union, which had already 
received defence authorisation and had been included in appropriation bills. Senator 
Nunn and Congressman Les Aspin tried to put the humanitarian aid package and 
concerns about WMD together in a conference initiative. However, their attempt was 
unsuccessful. As on many other occasions in the consequent evolution of CTR, that 
initiative became hostage to internal political battles. 
At that point, Senator Nunn asked for cooperation from another Senator - 
Richard Lugar, who like Senator Nunn himself was a devoted non-proliferation activist. 
Both of them appealed to a small group of experts, including David Hamburg (President 
of the Carnegie Foundation), William Perry (from Stanford University, who later became 
Secretary of Defence), Ashton Carter (from Harvard University, co-author of the Soviet 
Nuclear Fission report) - to present their findings to 15-20 key senators. The group 
succeeded in getting support of some other members of Congress.164    
Initially, there was opposition from some key individuals in Congress and the first 
Bush administration (see the analysis of the role of Congress in the cooperative threat 
reduction process in Chapter 3). Part of the problem was that the money for the CTR 
Programme would be coming out of Department of Defence budget. However, Senators 
Nunn and Lugar realised the urgency of the matter, and offered their legislation to the 
Senate on November 25, 1991. The proposal was called the “Soviet Nuclear Threat 
Reduction Act of 1991”, and the legislation became known as the ‘Nunn-Lugar’ act.    
Just in few weeks after the briefing by the experts called out by Senators Nunn 
and Lugar, the relevant legislation was passed in the Senate and then in the House almost 
without any opposition. The proposal was adopted with a vote of 86-6 by Senate, and 
later approved by the House. On December 12, 1991 President Bush (Sr.) signed the 
Nunn-Lugar proposal and it became a law (Public Law 102-228, 12/12/91).165
 
163 Senator Sam Nunn, ‘Foreword: Changing Threats in the Post-Cold War World’ in Shields and 
Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold War, op. cit, p. xvi   
164 John Felton, ‘The Nunn-Lugar Vision: 1992-2002’, NTI, p. 5  
165 ‘The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program’, NTI, at 
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/nunn_lug/overview.htm  
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The Nunn-Lugar legislation was passed in the form of amendments to an 
unrelated bill.  It provided $400 million for the nuclear control area, which later became 
known as the Nunn-Lugar Programme, and $100 million in humanitarian aid. That was 
the origin of the Nunn-Lugar Programme.  The money was supposed to come from the 
overall budget of the Department of Defence (DOD). That factor was one of the major 
stumbling blocks in popularising the Programme. The critics saw no logic in U.S. defence 
money being spent on addressing nuclear complex problems of another country.  The 
Programme was informally called the Nunn-Lugar Programme until the Clinton 
Administration started referring to it as to Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme 
from 1993.   
Only two weeks after the Nunn-Lugar legislation was signed by the U.S. 
President the Soviet Union collapsed, leaving four nuclear states (Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) instead of one.    
Former Senator Sam Nunn, currently – co-chair of Nuclear Threat Initiative 
(NTI) and Senator Richard Lugar remain the most active proponents of raising 
awareness in the U.S. and the world about the dangers of WMD proliferation.   
 
4.3. The CTR Programme: Implementation  
The CTR Programme provides equipment, services and technical support to 
assist not only Russia, but all other FSU republics in preventing proliferation and 
securing and dismantling weapons of mass destruction, related materials and production 
facilities.166
The denuclearisation of three non-Russian republics is assessed thoroughly since 
that development has a direct relation to the issues of safe transportation, storage, and 
dismantlement in Russia. A brief overview of what has been done by the CTR 
Programme in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine in terms of nuclear safety and security is 
presented as well.  The section covers CTR assistance to these three republics since it was 
 
retrieved on 24.10.02  
166 This cooperation is not limited to nuclear weapons and materials only (it covers areas of 
biological and chemical weapons too). However, the main focus of this research is limited to Russia 
and its nuclear complex only, therefore, attention is paid only to cooperative threat reduction in the 
nuclear field. 
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a case of complete denuclearisation of three states, which, otherwise, might have become 
nuclear.  
The CTR Programme began in 1991, and will continue, at least, until June 2006. 
The protocol to the “Agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States 
of America concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of 
Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation” was signed on June 15-16, 
1999.167
The CTR Programme is a symbiotic array of different projects, addressing 
problems of the whole non-proliferation spectre: reduction of arms, safety and security 
of weapons and materials elimination, storage, and transportation, personnel reliability, 
and general facilitation of U.S.-FSU non-proliferation communication. The CTR 
Programme has given way to several different programmes led by different U.S. agencies, 
which address specific goals of CTR in a more narrowed down, focused way.     
The following section evaluates the achievements of the CTR Programme in each 
of the areas of the stated objectives. 
 
4.3.1. Assistance for the Denuclearisation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine; the Elimination of START-limited Systems and 
Infrastructure  
The appearance of four nuclear states instead of one after the Soviet Union broke 
up in 1991 brought a completely new set of possible threats. Although, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine did not have the formal status of a nuclear power nor had an 
independent comprehensive nuclear infrastructure of their own – they all (to a different 
extent) possessed nuclear weapons, materials, technologies, delivery systems, and 
expertise on their territory.   
The question of whether those three independent states would give up nuclear 
weapons located on their territories was not answered until 2-3 years after the collapse.  
Each national government went through an evaluation of its security, economic, and 
political needs, as well as the pros and cons of adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) as non-nuclear states. The CTR Programme played a substantial role in the final 
 
167 DefenseLINK News: United States and Russia Extend Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Agreement, at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1999/b06241999_bt307-
99.html retrieved on 20.06.03 
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decision of all three states to become non-nuclear parties of NPT. The denuclearisation 
of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine was linked to the START process (refer to START 
agreements discussed in Chapter 2) – and was seen as an instrument of nuclear non-
proliferation. START I was signed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union on July 31, 1991.   
When the Soviet Union collapsed there was a fear that START I would become 
ineffective.   
In January 1992 Russian Federation announced itself the legal successor of all 
international treaties signed by the Soviet Union, and that statement was not challenged 
by any of the newly independent states (NIS). The U.S. did not accept that Russia should 
be the sole successor to the START Agreement, and it insisted that the four republics 
would share that role. A special Protocol was signed in relation to Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Ukraine adhering to START I. In this way, START became a multilateral agreement 
by making all five countries (U.S., Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) parties to 
START I, and committed the non-Russian republics to enter NPT as non-nuclear the 
shortest possible time.168  The Protocol was signed in Lisbon on May 23, 1992. 
All three presidents of the newly independent states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine also had sent letters to the U.S. Government whereby they pledged to remove 
nuclear weapons from their territories within seven years after START I’s entry into 
force.169 The U.S. Senate ratified START I on October 1st, 1992, stipulating that the 
Lisbon Protocol and the letters of the three heads of the state carried the same legal 
obligations as the START I treaty itself.170 Russia was very keen on ratifying START I 
because it was perceived as a mechanism of the denuclearisation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Ukraine.  The Russian Parliament ratified START I on November 4, 1992. 
However, the process of ratification and implementation of Lisbon Protocol in 
non-Russian states was not an easy one; and it fully demonstrated the uncertainties 
present in all three republics about the destiny of nuclear weapons and materials left on 
their territories. The following section describes the process of denuclearisation country 
by country. 
 
168 Protocol to the START I Treaty (Lisbon Protocol), Source: Conference on Disarmament 
document CD/1193, 5 April 1993, available in Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: A Guide to 
Negotiations and Agreements, PRIO, 1996, p. 675 
169 Marco De Anreis and Francesco Calogero ‘The Soviet Nuclear Weapon Legacy’. SIPRI 
Research Report No. 10, SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 11 
170 De Anreis and Calogero, ‘The Soviet Nuclear Weapon Legacy’, op. cit, p. 12 
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Belarus    
Among the three states Belarus was the one where the ratification of the Lisbon 
protocol and joining the NPT as a non-nuclear state was the least controversial. This was 
mainly due to the political considerations of Belarussian government, which always, to a 
large extent, oriented itself to political developments in Russia and was seeking close ties 
with it. Moreover, the new constitution adopted after Belarus had gained independence 
codified the neutral and non-nuclear status of the country. That is why the ratification of 
the NPT and START I did not raise any arguments in Belarussian political circles.  
On February 4, 1993 the Belarussian parliament ratified START I and the Lisbon 
Protocol (which laid down the procedure for the re-deployment of the 81 SS-25 strategic 
nuclear missiles on Belarussian soil to Russia, and thereby committed the country to 
disarmament and eventual non-nuclear status with very little opposition). It also voted 
for Belarus to join NPT as a non-nuclear state.171
Belarus had the lowest number of nuclear weapons on its territory of all the non-
Russian republics. It amounted to 800 weapons (including 100 warheads for the road-
mobile SS-25 ICBMs and 725 tactical nuclear weapons)172, and a smaller number of 
launch sites among three non-Russian republics. The CTR Programme managed to 
return to Russia all 54 SS-25s (the SS-25 is an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) 
with one warhead).173 At some point, some officials in Belarus were hinting that the 
country would retain some of the ICBMs, but notwithstanding such claims by November 
1996 all the ICBMs were removed from the Belarussian territory.   
Belarus also possessed 81 SS-25 launch sites, and the U.S. had allocated CTR 
assistance for their destruction. However, due to a deterioration of the U.S.-Belarussian 
relations all CTR assistance to Belarus ceased in March 1997, and the equipment 
provided by the U.S. for launch sites destruction was withdrawn.174
 
171 Vyachaslau Paznyak, ‘Belarus: in Search of a Security Identity’ in Allison and Bluth, eds., Security 
Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia, op. cit., p. 159  
172 Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2002, p. 319 
173 Nuclear Status Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and Export Controls in the former 
Soviet Union, No. 6, June 2001, The Monterey Institute of International Studies & The 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 53 
174 Ibid 
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Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan was one of the major republics of the Soviet nuclear complex. A 
large number of strategic offensive and tactical nuclear weapons, which compromised as 
much as 7,6% of the total share of Soviet nuclear arsenal was deployed on its territory.175 
That included an estimated 1,400 strategic nuclear warheads, 104 SS-18s, and 47 heavy 
bombers.176 Moreover, Kazakhstan accommodated on its territory a wide range of 
former Soviet missile testing grounds, bombing ranges and so forth, covering some 4% 
of its land surface, which have been the subject of negotiations with Russia. The most 
important Soviet strategic assets on Kazakh territory were the ICBM bases, with 104 SS-
18s, the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, the Baikonur space launch centre and the ABM 
radar site.177 Kazakhstan would have become the fourth largest nuclear weapons state if it 
had decided to consolidate all the nuclear weapons, materials, and related technologies 
present on its territory in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet break-up. 
The decision of the government of Kazakhstan to transfer all nuclear weapons to 
Russia, destroy its nuclear weapons infrastructure and adhere to the NPT as a non-
nuclear weapon state - was not immediate. Concerns of Kazakhstan and Ukraine of 
transferring nuclear weapons from their territories to Russia were not surprising. The 
Soviet nuclear complex was developed at the expense of the vast human and economic 
resources, which were not exclusively Russian. Kazakhstan was subjected to nuclear tests 
on its territory, which irreversibly damaged the environment, and led to serious health 
problems of several generations of people. Moreover, the young ex-Soviet republics were 
facing uncertain security threats, and nuclear weapons could have provided some sort of 
existential deterrence.  
The process of decision-making on the issue of nuclear capabilities left in 
Kazakhstan after the break-up of the Soviet Union fully reflected dilemmas of national 
security concerns and interests of the Republic. For some time, Kazakhstan occupied a 
‘wait-and-see’ position closely watching the developments in Ukraine, which was about to 
 
175 Data of ‘Where the weapons are’ (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists), vol. 47, no. 9 (Nov. 1991), 
pp. 48-49; and Norris, R. S. ‘The Soviet Nuclear Archipelago’, (Arms Control Today), vol. 22, 
no. 1 (Jan./Feb. 1992), pp. 24-31 cited by De Anreis and Calogero ‘The Soviet Nuclear 
Weapons Legacy’, op. cit, p. 5 
176 Nuclear Status Report, op. cit, p. 52 
177 Oumirserik Kassenov, ‘Central Asia: National, Regional and Global Aspects of Security’ in 
Allison and Bluth, eds., Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia, RIIA, 1998, op. cit, p. 193 
114 
 
                                                
make a choice about the nuclear weapons left on its territory. There was a choice 
between keeping nuclear weapons, thus securing some sort of power leverage in the 
region, and giving them up for the sake of a good international image and receiving 
security guarantees from the nuclear powers. (It should be said that Kazakhstan did not 
consider taking control over the weapons, but considered their presence on Kazakh 
territory as forward-based weapons under Russian control.) The opinions within the 
Republic on which path to choose were divided and demonstrated different perceptions 
of threats to national security and ways to protect against them. 
The supporters of keeping nuclear capabilities were concerned about two of 
Kazakhstan’s neighbours – Russia and China – both nuclear weapon states. An extremely 
unstable Russia was considered to be a very likely source of threat to the national security 
of Kazakhstan, especially, because of a potential strengthening of “neo-right” and “neo-
imperialist” power in Russia.  
The proponents of denuclearisation argued from the point of view of national 
security interests as well. However, in their opinion, trying to keep nuclear weapons was 
seen not as a deterrent to possible security threats, but on the contrary, as a source of 
instability. The rationale behind such arguments was obvious: by attempting to force its 
way inside the ‘nuclear club’ Kazakhstan would undermine the existing nonproliferation 
regime, fail to earn any political leverage as a country, and even trigger some 
unpredictable developments in the region. It was also fairly obvious that a young state 
would not be capable of sustaining a required level of infrastructure to support nuclear 
weapons. 
For observers Kazakhstan’s position was almost intentionally dubious. The 
Russian opinion on the nuclear policy of Kazakhstan of early 1990s was expressed by a 
Russian expert Davydov: 
“It looks as Kazakhstan got maximum dividends from its previous ambiguity 
on whether to be a nuclear or a non-nuclear state by securing nuclear 
defence, mainly at the expense of Russia, and by raising its political prestige 
as a state, which supports the regime of nuclear non-proliferation.”178  
In the end, Kazakhstan chose to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, 
because that option to a larger extent than any other, reflected the national interests of 
 
178 Davydov cited by Oumirserik Kassenov, Dastan Eleukenov, Murat Laumulin, Kazakhstan I 
Dogovor o Nerasprostranenii Yadernogo Oruzhiya (Kazakhstan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), 
Kazakh Institute for Strategi
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the Republic. Joining the NPT and ratifying START I were seen in the light of 
strengthening state security by obtaining security guarantees in exchange for nuclear 
weapons it had possessed.  
One of the important factors reinforcing the security of Kazakhstan after its 
Supreme Council ratified the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear 
state in December 1993 was the acceptance of formal security assurances from Russia, 
the Unites States and the United Kingdom. If Kazakhstan becomes a victim of 
aggression or an object of threats to use nuclear weapons, then Russia, the United States 
and the United Kingdom will demand immediate action from the UN Security Council to 
render assistance to Kazakhstan as a non-nuclear member state of the NPT.179
Assistance within the CTR Agreement was important in denuclearisation of 
Kazakhstan. With the help of the CTR Programme, out of 47 heavy bombers – 40 were 
returned to Russia and 7 were destroyed.180 By September 30, 1999 all 147 silos in 
Kazakhstan were dismantled and eliminated.181  All of the 1,400 strategic nuclear 
weapons and 104 SS-18s were returned to Russia. 
On July 29, 2000 the CTR Programme completed the destruction of the world’s 
largest nuclear test site, which was the most important testing ground for the Soviet 
Union. The test site was situated in the tunnels of Degelen Mountain in Kazakhstan and 
comprised of 180 tunnels and 13 vertical boreholes.182
 
Ukraine  
The process of denuclearisation of Ukraine proved to be the most difficult one. 
Ukraine had stronger nuclear ambitions than Belarus and Kazakhstan. The nuclear 
arsenal on its territory comprising of 1,240 warheads on strategic nuclear missiles and 
 
179 Oumirserik Kassenov, ‘Central Asia: National, Regional and Global Aspects of Security’ in 
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180 The Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme, at 
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181 The Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme, at 
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between 2,650 and 4,200 tactical nuclear weapons183 was seen as a lucrative heritage by 
the Ukrainian government.  
Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol in May of 1992 and thereby assumed the 
obligations of the Soviet Union under START I Treaty.  
The subsequent moves of the Ukrainian political elites were a matter of serious 
concern to the international community, and to Russia, in particular (Russia was keen on 
ensuring it was the only nuclear power on the post-Soviet space). The Ukrainian 
leadership was sending mixed signals to whether it would try to retain the weapons on its 
territory or whether it would simply prolong the process of transference in order to use 
them as a bargaining chip in the political and economic trade-off with Russia and the 
West.  
The most important questions of the debate were how safe were the weapons on 
its territory and whether Ukraine could become a nuclear power. Concerns about the 
safety and security of nuclear weapons in Ukraine were an important dimension of the 
Western interest in Ukraine’s denuclearisation. Ukraine had some important assets 
necessary for nuclear weapons industry.  For example, the largest missile factory in the 
world ‘Yuzhnoye’ (in Dnepropetrovsk), where the SS-18 missiles were manufactured and 
the SS-24s were assembled, was located in Ukraine. Ukraine also maintained nuclear 
research centres in Kharkov, which had expertise in missile guidance, targeting and 
control.184
The most common opinion, which was generated in academic circles during early 
1990s indicated that although Ukraine “could in principle become a nuclear weapons 
state”, the costs of building a nuclear weapons establishment to maintain the weapons 
and create early warning as well as command and control facilities were prohibitive.185 
The main trouble for Ukraine would be dealing with the nuclear warheads. Ukraine never 
produced warheads and did not have production facilities, which would provide 
necessary technical maintenance. However, at the time it was acknowledged that Ukraine 
was dependent on Russia in terms of spare parts and expertise as much as Russia 
 
183 Cirincione et al., Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction, op. cit, p. 323 
184 Christoph Bluth, Anton Surikov, Igor Sutyagin, ‘Ukraine’s Security Dilemmas and Nuclear 
Weapons: A Recipe for Catastrophe?’, unpublished paper, Royal Institute of International 
Affairs 1994,  p. 2 
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depended on certain facilities located in Ukraine. There was a concern that Russia would 
feel inclined to assist Ukraine, at least, temporarily with maintaining the arsenal on its 
territory. Having said this, it could only be a possibility for a limited amount of time until 
Russia implements reductions in its arsenals by dismantling those missiles, which were 
manufactured in Ukraine. 
The whole issue with Ukrainian dependence on Russian expertise in maintaining 
the nuclear arsenal on its territory highlighted the controversy surrounding the ‘security’ 
value Ukraine placed on retaining nuclear weapons. Some political groups in Ukraine 
were voicing concern about possible “Russian aggression” and believed the country 
should retain the weapons to protect itself, from Russia, in the first place.186 Those 
counting on nuclear weapons as a deterrent against Moscow ignored the technical 
characteristics of missiles present on Ukrainian territory. It was not possible to fire those 
weapons against Russian targets because they were long-range inter-continental missiles. 
At the height of the concern about Ukraine’s moves indicating it would go nuclear, the 
reports were delivered claiming that Ukrainian researchers were working on reducing the 
range of the SS-24s by carrying out the so called “loop-manoeuvre” and on converting 
nuclear weapons into radiological (those works were assumed to have been carried out 
without Parliament approval).187  
Until the mid-1990s the status of control over the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian 
soil remained vague. Ukraine declared “administrative control” over the weapons. In 
early April 1992 President Kravchuk announced that all forces on Ukrainian territory 
were under the command of the Ukrainian military. That measure, however, did not 
mean that Ukrainian leadership had operational command and control, i.e. President 
Kravchuk did not have access to the codes needed to launch the weapons. 188
The very idea that one state should transfer its nuclear arsenal to another was not 
attractive to political elites in Ukraine. Nonetheless, it did not mean that official Kiev was 
against the idea of becoming a non-nuclear state. From the point of view of Ukrainians, 
nuclear disarmament had to be separated from the question of transferring weapons to 
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188 Wolf, Galdi, ‘Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: Location, Command, and 
Control’, op. cit, p. 6 
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Russia. One of the most common perceptions held at the top of Ukrainian political elites 
was that the weapons were present on its territory temporarily; however, until they were 
destroyed Ukraine was their owner. Ukrainian efforts to translate the presence of nuclear 
weapons from the arsenal of the former Soviet Union on its territory into tangible 
benefits in terms of military and economic security focused on compensation for the 
fissile material in the weapons and support for the costs of dismantlement (one of the 
arguments was that the Soviet nuclear complex, especially in its part in Ukraine was built 
with the Ukrainian human and material resources, and therefore, the state had to be 
compensated for this part) as well as a demand for some unspecified security 
guarantees.189 Nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine were a bargaining chip in Ukraine-
U.S. negotiations. The Ukrainian leadership was attempting to attract the Western 
attention to the economic and security problems faced by a new state.  
From the above, it appears that Ukraine did not have some sophisticated plan of 
persuading the West that it really wanted to keep the weapons and then reap off the 
benefits for abandoning this idea. The decision-making process in relation to the 
Ukrainian nuclear policy was more likely a reflection of conflicting views on what the 
country should do with the nuclear arsenal, and what was seen in the West as a ‘confused’ 
policy was not a unified state agenda, but rather the outcome of the lobbying of different 
political groups performed by President Kravchuk who was trying to accommodate 
varying political interests.  
In the end, it became evident that Ukraine could not delay its denuclearisation, 
and one of the most important reasons was its inability to guarantee safety of the nuclear 
weapons on its territory. When Ukraine assumed ‘administrative control’ over the ICBM 
bases, Russian support staff for the maintenance of the weapons was withdrawn. Soon 
reports were published about safety problems with nuclear warheads, and some warheads 
were quickly transported to Russia due to radiation leakages. The level of risk from 
warheads in Ukraine at the time remains under dispute, but the issue was used by Russia 
to put additional pressure on Ukraine to agree to the transfer of all warheads.190  
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In early 1994, Ukraine signed a Trilateral Agreement with the United States and 
Russia, which outlined the requirements for complete elimination of all nuclear weapons 
on its territory. The major provisions of the treaty stipulated: all nuclear warheads were to 
be transferred to Russia; Ukraine was to receive compensation in the form of nuclear fuel 
for civilian reactors and a share in the proceeds from the sale of fissile material recovered 
from the weapons; and Ukraine was given the standard assurances against nuclear attack 
as a non-weapon signatory of the NPT.191
The above discussion demonstrates that denuclearisation of Ukraine was not a 
smooth and easy process. Both the political ambitions from having significant nuclear 
arsenals left on its territory and inhibitions resulting from Ukraine’s perception of 
security threats (and as a result a view that nuclear weapons should be kept as a deterrent) 
were a serious factor in the strong opposition to disarmament within the Ukrainian 
political establishment.  
The negotiations on U.S. assistance for Ukraine’s disarmament to be channelled 
through the CTR Programme began in 1992. In October of 1993 Ukraine and the United 
States signed an umbrella agreement on eliminating strategic nuclear weapons and 
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Shortly after, five CTR 
implementing agreements were also signed.192 The significance of the CTR Programme 
for Ukraine’s denuclearisation is apparent: first of all, Ukraine would not be able to deal 
with the costly process of disarmament on its own; and secondly, Ukrainian leadership 
was adamant it had to receive some sort of compensation for the nuclear weapons it was 
giving up (that demand, to an extent, was justified, especially, in the light of the 
Chernobyl tragedy Ukraine had to endure as a result of nuclear weapons research and 
production being carried out on its territory). 
CTR funds may have not been the critical factor in Ukraine’s decision to disarm, 
but they played an important role in it. More importantly, CTR assistance ensured that no 
major accidents connected with safety and security had occurred while nuclear weapons 
were present on Ukrainian soil. 
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4.3.2. Assistance to FSU in Accelerating Strategic Arms Reductions to 
START Levels and Providing Safe and Secure Transportation and 
Storage for Weapons and Materials 
Elimination of arms 
The disarmament obligations stipulated by START involved substantial financial 
burdens that created difficulties for Russia due to its severe economic problems. The 
CTR Programme assists Russia in meeting its START obligations by helping to eliminate 
weapons and associated infrastructure. 
As of December 2003, the cumulative reductions funded by the CTR Programme 
include: 6252 warheads deactivated, 527 ICBMs destroyed, 455 ICBM silos eliminated, 8 
ICBM mobile launchers destroyed, 124 bombers eliminated, 668 nuclear air-to-surface 
missiles (ASMs) destroyed, 408 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers 
eliminated, 460 SLBMs eliminated, 27 nuclear ballistic submarines (SSBNs) destroyed, 
194 nuclear test tunnels/holes sealed.193 (see Table 4) 
Table 4 CTR Scorecard194
 2003 2007 2012 CTR 
Baseline 
Warheads Deactivated 6252 8564 9444 13300 
ICBMs Destroyed 527 821 1131 1473 
ICBM silos eliminated 455 485 485 831 
ICBM mobile launchers 
destroyed 
8 174 381 442 
Bombers eliminated 124 129 138 207 
Nuclear ASMs destroyed 668 708 708 708 
SLBM launchers eliminated 408 520 628 728 
SLBMs eliminated 460 629 712 936 
SSBNs destroyed 27 35 40 48 
Nuclear test tunnels/holes 
sealed 
194 194 194 194 
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Transportation 
The danger of diversion of nuclear weapons or materials is high during any stage 
of their handling, and that includes transportation. Each year there are numerous 
movements of weapons, warheads, and material between the operational sites, storage 
facilities, dismantlement facilities.   
CTR assistance in this area includes: the procurement of transportation services, 
provision of fissile material containers, super-containers for weapons, railcars, equipment 
to enhance ability of Russian Ministry of Defence (MOD) to respond to a nuclear 
weapons transportation accident, the enhancement of safety and security of non-heated 
cargo railcars. 
An Implementing Arrangement on nuclear weapons transportation was signed in 
November 1999, and by September 2002, 131 shipments of tactical and strategic nuclear 
weapons from operational sites to dismantlement facilities and consolidation sites were 
completed.195
Russia received 150 super-containers for transporting nuclear weapons to 
dismantlement sites. These containers provide protection from small arms, fire 
protection and physical protection during handling by precluding direct access to 
weapons196. The storage site at Mayak was provided with 1,000 transportation containers 
for fissile material extracted from dismantled weapons.197 In Soviet times, the weapons 
were transported by special railcars. Currently, the CTR Programme is assisting in 
modification of the old railcars by enhancing the safety and security of 100 non-heated 
cargo railcars, providing MOD with their maintenance and certification, extending the 
service life of 100 new heated cargo and 15 new guard railcars, while eliminating some 
215 old railcars.198
A Safety Enhancement Centre (SEC) for the MOD 12th Main Directorate was 
established in St. Petersburg in support of the transportation of nuclear weapons during 
 
195 The Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme, at http://www.dtra.mil/ctr_index.html 
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the consolidation and dismantlement process. The SEC is designed to provide safety 
analysis and certification of nuclear weapons handling and support equipment.199  
At five regional areas and St. Petersburg the CTR Programme has provided 
emergency support equipment, training and material necessary to respond to a nuclear 
accident/incident during transportation. Among equipment provided: five modules each 
including radiological situation evaluation equipment, emergency and rescue equipment, 
diagnostic systems, individual protective gear and portable power supplies.200 CTR has 
also supplied the Russian MOD with special Pomoshnik emergency response vehicles (by 
1st quarter of 2003 Russia received 445 vehicles), and 15 trucks/trailer systems to 
transport emergency response equipment modules were scheduled for delivery through 
FY2003. This equipment will enhance response in severe cold weather, nuclear weapon 
diagnostic, emergency access and data transfer and communications capability.201  
At Krasnoyarsk the CTR Programme provided equipment to support emergency 
response in the event of an accident involving transportation of missile or propellants.202
 
Fissile Material Disposition/Weapons and Material Storage 
One of the most important projects in this area is construction of a fissile 
material storage at the Mayak facility. The scope of the non-proliferation value of such 
facility is enormous. When operating in full force Mayak will be capable of storing 25,344 
containers of fissile material received from dismantled weapons – that amount equates to 
approximately 25,000 nuclear weapons.203
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By December 2003 a 25,000 container storage wing was completed and it is 
expected that the first 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium dismantled from warheads 
will soon be placed in the storage facility.204   
In 2000 and 2001 the CTR Programme had commissioned two facilities (Zvezda 
and Zvezdochka) after both of them were provided with Low Level Radioactive Waste 
(LLRW) volume reduction capabilities.205
At Votkinsk a low pressure, contained burn system to remove the solid 
propellant from Russian SS-24, SS-25, and SS-N-20 missile motors in a sound 
environmental manner was to be constructed, with initial start-up in 2004 and complete 
systematisation and facility certification in the end of 2006.206 However, the project 
stalled due to a conflict with the local Russian authorities, which refused to issue land 
permits for the construction of the facility due to environmental protection 
considerations. That unsuccessful example of CTR funds wasted on a project was widely 
publicised by critics of the Programme and used as an example of lack of cooperation on 
the part of Russia. 207
Another CTR-funded project aims at providing means for storage, transportation 
and reprocessing or placing into interim dry storage of Spent Naval Fuel (SNF) removed 
from eliminated SSBNs. A 40-ton SNF storage/transport cask was designed, tested and 
certified. Russian SevMash won a contract for serial production of casks, and Raytheon 
company got a task order to design a dry storage facility Mayak.   
 
4.3.3. Assistance to Russia in Providing Training in Areas of Nuclear 
Weapons and Material Control, Security Assessment, Personnel 
Reliability Control  
By 2000 the Security Assessment and Training Centre (SATC) was constructed in 
Sergiev Posad. At SATC the Russian Ministry of Defence together with the U.S. 
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Department of Defence are able to test, select, and integrate systems needed to upgrade 
physical security at nuclear storage sites in Russia. The Centre is also used for guard force 
training.208   
The CTR Programme is also providing Russian guard forces at sites throughout 
Russia with special training and equipment (small arms training stimulators, live-fire 
shooting ranges, and site communication equipment) in order to enhance the personnel’s 
ability to protect access to nuclear weapons.209
 Two projects assist in the area of personnel reliability and safety. The first provides 
testing devices for alcohol and drug screening of the personnel having direct access to 
nuclear weapons.  The other project has provided radiation dosimeter systems to ensure 
personnel safety210.  
 
4.4. The CTR Programme: the Key Players  
The CTR Programme is managed by the U.S. Department of Defence (DOD).  
Within the DOD, there are two offices responsible for the CTR Programme: CTR Policy 
Office and DTRA’s (Defence Threat Reduction Agency) the CTR Programme Office.  
CTR Policy Office has a decision-making authority, it develops the “vision” of the 
Programme, determines the priorities. DTRA’s CTR Office is responsible for the 
implementation of the Programme on the ground.   
Among the U.S. agencies involved in cooperative threat reduction (namely, 
Department of Energy, State Department, U.S. Enrichment Corporation, U.S. Industrial 
Coalition (USIC), which administer main CTR programmes studied in this research), 
DOD is certainly the most closed organisation with strict and conservative views on 
 
208 The Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme, at http://www.dtra.mil/ctr_index.html 
retrieved on 15.05.03 
209 ibid 
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sharing of information.211 On the Russian side, the main counterpart of CTR projects is 
the Ministry of Defence (MOD).   
 
4.5. The Evolution of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Process  
The following section provides an analysis of how the CTR Programme has 
evolved over the years and evaluates key developments in the perception of cooperative 
threat reduction in the U.S. and in Russia and introduces key individuals crucial to those 
developments. It demonstrates that DOD’s CTR Programme (with its original Nunn-
Lugar legislation) provided a unique foundation for an array of joint non-proliferation 
efforts now led by different agencies. The transfer of some programmes from one U.S. 
agency to another is traced. An evaluation of the political environment throughout the 
decade shows that some of the problems of implementation (which are discussed in the 
following section) resulted from the political problems in the U.S.-Russian relationship. 
 
4.5.1. Stage 1 (1990-1991) – The Vision  
The failed attempt to overthrow Soviet leader Gorbachev, concern about the 
disintegrating Soviet Union, and a realisation of the emergence of new nuclear 
proliferation threats created grounds for apprehension in certain circles of the U.S.  
Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar concluded that there were severe dangers with 
regard to Soviet nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise, which could leak out to 
nuclear threshold states, terrorist organisations etc. Their vision proved to be strategic in 
the long run.   
That was a period of the Programme’s struggle to exist. It was the time of the 
Bush Sr. Administration, the idea was very new and it did not have any real support in 
the government. The initiative to take action in the face of the emerging nuclear risks was 
taken in Congress. After some debate and a lot of effort on behalf of Senators Nunn and 
Lugar, as well as Harvard experts (the authors of Soviet Nuclear Fission212), the relevant 
 
211 DOD was the only agency, whose representatives were not available for interviews due to 
clearance regulations.  Communication with the corporate communications office of DOD 
was also unsuccessful.   
212 Campbell, Carter, Miller, and Zraket, eds., Soviet Nuclear Fission, op. cit.  
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legislation was passed by the U.S. Senate in November of 1991 (as was discussed earlier 
in this chapter).  
Less than two weeks after Nunn-Lugar law came into force President Gorbachev 
resigned, and the Soviet Union ceased to exist with the destiny of the vast Soviet nuclear 
arsenal becoming very unclear. The need of the former Soviet Union to get help with 
control over its nuclear weapons and materials was therefore rightly anticipated by the 
Senators Nunn and Lugar, as well as by other concerned experts. Persuading the 
American government to assist the Soviet Union (and later, FSU) in preventing the 
spread of nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise, as well as helping it in meeting 
START obligations was a politically wise exercise, and its importance cannot be 
overestimated. 
That first critical stage was successful in establishing the Programme due to the 
crucial role played by several key individuals. These include: Senators Sam Nunn and 
Richard Lugar, Ashton Carter (from Harvard University, co-author of Soviet Nuclear 
Fission and from 1993 Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Policy), William 
Perry (from Stanford University, later Deputy Secretary (1993-1994) and Secretary of 
Defence (1994-1997)), Les Aspin (member of Arms Houses Committee, later – Secretary 
of Defence (1993-1994)).   
The political debate preceding the establishment of the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Programme can be analysed at two levels: the level of bureaucratic politics and 
that of the post-Cold War international system. These two dimensions closely intertwine 
in the cooperation threat reduction process. At the bureaucratic politics level, there was 
internal resistance inside the Congress when the idea first resurfaced. When a small 
coalition of CTR proponents succeeded with securing Congressional support, the 
administration adopted a position of resistance towards the programme. To the 
administration, the CTR Programme was a Congressional initiative, which was based on a 
belief of U.S.-Russian relations not shared by the U.S. officials.213 The opponents both 
within Congress and the administration were not persuaded by the arguments of 
defending America’s own national security by preventing Russian loose nuclear weapons 
and materials falling into terrorist hands. There was a lack of trust towards the Russian 
government due to the Cold War legacy. CTR opponents were questioning the rationality 
behind assisting Russia with its nuclear complex problems. Many in the U.S. suspected 
 
213 Interview with the U.S. Congressional staffer, Washington D.C., March 2003 
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that by assisting Russia with dismantling of old obsolete weapons America would be 
saving Russia’s own resources for modernisation of its forces. 
 
4.5.2. Stage 2 (1992-1993) – Getting the Programme Off the Ground  
After Nunn-Lugar legislation was signed into law, the first important step was to 
persuade former Soviet states to agree to this unique kind of cooperation. By the end of 
1993 all four former Soviet republics which had nuclear weapons or materials on their 
territories had agreed to implement CTR (Nunn-Lugar) Programme. 
The very fact that such cooperation was offered by the American government 
and accepted by the former Soviet republics demonstrated a dramatically new era in U.S.-
Russian relations. At the same time, that initial stage of the programme was marked by a 
high level of distrust on both sides. There were opponents of cooperative threat 
reduction in the U.S., and in Russia many believed that offer of such assistance was a 
shield for American pursuing its interests of disarming the Russian state. Nonetheless, 
the political decision taken by the leadership of the U.S., Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine was in favour of the programme. 
On the U.S. side, the problem was with the source of funding. At the outset of 
the CTR Programme in 1991, Senators Nunn and Lugar had to “sneak it in” in the DOD 
budget for FY1992, and it was not a direct appropriation. The opponents of the 
programme considered that to be a “direct hit on operations and maintenance of 
Pentagon.”214  Organisational interests, determined as primary in organisational decision-
making by Bureaucratic Politics Model, have been critical for Pentagon’s initial 
unfavourable disposition towards the programme. 
 
4.5.3. Stage 3 (1994-1998) – The Evolution of the Original Nunn-Lugar 
Programme  
During the Clinton administration the CTR Programme enjoyed strong support 
within the White House. The key individuals supporting the programme’s 
implementation joined the Clinton government and were appointed to high positions.  
Ashton Carter was appointed as an Assistant Secretary of Defence for International 
 
214 Interview with the former senior Clinton Administration official, Washington D.C., March 
2003 
128 
 
                                                
Security Policy (1993-1996), Graham Allison received the position of an Assistant 
Secretary of Defence for Policy and Plans (1993-1994), William Perry became Deputy 
Secretary of Defence in 1993; Les Aspin assumed the position of Secretary of Defence in 
1993. When Les Aspin resigned in 1994 William Perry became the Secretary of Defence 
and stayed in that position until 1997. William Perry was praised for his important role in 
changing the attitude of Pentagon to CTR and his real support for the Programme. It is 
believed in Washington that William Perry changed some key attitudes in Pentagon and 
transformed the Programme on the Capitol Hill.215
Department of Energy also was led by the individuals, who realised the 
importance of moving cooperative threat reduction forward.  These were: Hazel O’Leary 
(Secretary of DOE from 1992), Kenneth Luongo (served as the Senior Advisor to the 
Secretary of Energy for Non-proliferation Policy and the Director of the Office of Arms 
Control and Non-proliferation), Leonard Spector (worked as an Assistant Deputy 
Administrator for Arms Control and Non-proliferation). At that period, Senator 
Domenici joined the efforts of Senator Nunn and Lugar to lobby for cooperative threat 
reduction on the Hill. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Clinton administration was giving the relationship 
with Russia a high priority in the U.S. foreign policy agenda (one of the examples was the 
fact that Strobe Talbott was brought into President’s office in the capacity of a special 
advisor on Russia and Eurasia and later became Deputy Secretary of State). More 
importantly, fundamental support for arms control and non-proliferation was at the core 
of Clinton’s policies. The composition of Clinton’s team in the Departments of Energy 
and Defence was evidence for that.   
The period of 1994-1997 was characterised by the expansion of the CTR 
Programme, its evolution into several major non-proliferation programmes, which were 
transferred to different U.S. agencies. Efforts on securing fissile material in FSU were 
formalised under the Material Protection, Control and Accounting Programme 
(MPC&A) and moved to the Department of Energy (DOE). In fiscal terms, it meant that 
a $50 million budget for MPC&A was transferred to DOE. 
 
215 Interview with the former senior Clinton Administration official, Washington D.C., March 
2003 
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In 1994 the State Department established an International Science and 
Technology Centre (ISTC) in Moscow aimed at providing civilian research opportunities 
for former Soviet WMD scientists. 
In 1993 Russia and the U.S. signed a Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) 
Agreement, designed to provide funds for purchasing Russian uranium from dismantled 
weapons in order to reduce the risk of its diversion. The HEU Deal was initially 
administered by the Department of Energy, but by 1998 the executive agent on the U.S. 
side – U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC) – was privatised and, technically, the Deal 
was out of DOE’s jurisdiction. 
The so-called “balkanisation” of the original the CTR Programme was in many 
ways a natural process of programme development and expansion of cooperation.  Many 
experts agree that bringing in different agencies with their specific expertise was 
important for providing for the effective implementation of projects. Another factor, 
which was equally important, bringing in new agencies, meant bringing in new budgets, 
and in this way, new resources for the programmes. 216 There were certain challenges to 
that too. The very first interagency meeting devoted to conducting non-proliferation 
assistance work had demonstrated that different agencies had different views. Another 
valid criticism was and remains: the presence of a lot of players in the cooperative threat 
reduction process sometimes results in duplication of effort, since different agencies do 
not always coordinate their activities well. Different activities to be implemented by 
different agencies also meant there were different Congressional concerns embedded in 
them. 
The intensification of U.S.-Russian cooperation in the nuclear-related area had, 
unfortunately, a limited negative effect on the CTR process. On the Russian side, Federal 
Security Bureau (FSB) became concerned with the increased number of American visits 
to the Russian nuclear sites; the same fact was a matter of concern to the U.S. State 
Department too. At one point, the State Department adopted a more restrictive attitude 
to the country clearance process [country clearance is a standard procedure for giving 
permission for officials, including national lab specialists, to travel to a foreign country]. 
According to Rozanne Olivier, Senior Policy Coordinator at the State Department’s 
Office of Proliferation Threat Reduction, there were large numbers of people travelling, 
 
216 Interviews with the individuals with a direct experience in establishment and implementation of 
the CTR-related programmes.  Washington D.C., March-April, 2003 
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and it became chaotic. As a result, the U.S. Embassy in Russia requested to give them 
more days in advance for coordinating visits of American delegations to Russia.  Olivier 
noted that it was an administrative measure217 and not a matter of politics. 
Until 1994-1995 U.S.-Russian relations were characterised as being in the stage of 
“euphoria” and “naivety”. There was a perception of common foreign policy aims. That 
state of affairs changed with the victory of Republicans in the U.S. Congress, and major 
problems in the foreign policy arena.   
The Republican revolution in the U.S. Congress in 1995 had an impact on the 
CTR Programme.  In 1995 and 1996 some Republican Congress members tried to attach 
several conditions to the appropriation of CTR funds. The proposed amendments 
included a requirement for a presidential certification that Russia was in compliance with 
all arms control treaties and was not pursuing biological weapons research. Those 
amendments sponsored by Congress Representatives Gerald Soloman and Robert 
Dornan failed to become law and did not influence the funding schedule.218
Important legislation sponsored by Senators Nunn, Lugar and Domenici was 
passed in 1996; it expanded the scope of non-proliferation programmes. With the funds 
allocated by Congress, new dimensions of cooperation became possible: the disposition 
of spent fuel from Russian nuclear submarines, the replacement of nuclear power plants 
that generated weapons-usable plutonium, and new programmes on combating threats 
from biological and chemical weapons. 219
Up until 1998 there was a steady evolution, expansion and growth of the 
cooperative threat reduction process. 220
 
 
217 Interview with Rozanne Olivier, Office of Proliferation Threat Reduction, U.S. State 
Department, Washington D.C., April 11, 2003 
218 ‘The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program’, 
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/shared/ctr/overview.htm
retrieved on 07.07.02 
219 Felton, ‘The Nunn-Lugar Vision: 1992-2002’, op. cit, p. 10 
220 Interview with Sandy Spector, Monterey Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Washington 
D.C., April 10, 2003 
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4.5.4. Stage 4 (1998-2001) - The Financial Crisis in Russia: A New Boost to 
the Programmes  
The financial crisis of 1998 brought a new dimension to the problem of nuclear 
proliferation in Russia. The country was experiencing a severe economic crisis, and the 
fears of nuclear leakage of any form became stronger again. The collapse of the Russian 
economy was a major factor that prompted the introduction of a new programme, called 
the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI). The proponents of NCI were rightly worried about 
the destiny of the nuclear scientists, who were not receiving salaries due to the economic 
collapse.  There was an understanding that in the aftermath of an economic collapse, the 
problem of a potential “brain drain” deserved a very close attention. The idea of the NCI 
Programme was to provide nuclear scientists (mostly living in ten so-called “nuclear 
cities”) with civilian jobs and help Russia downsize its nuclear complex (the history of 
NCI Programme is discussed in Chapter 7). 
A financial crisis in Russia had prompted an $800 million initiative from the U.S. 
government – the idea was to reinforce CTR projects experiencing implementation 
problems. All the agencies were requested to comment on what was important, and for 
what they needed extra financial resources.221 That period was characterised by a certain 
degree of harmony in the way the programmes were perceived within the U.S. 
Administration. There was a consensus regarding their importance. 
In January 1999, President Clinton proposed another major expansion of Nunn-
Lugar legislation, which he called the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative. President 
Clinton requested additional $1.8 billion for the programmes over the next five fiscal 
years, and also promised to push other countries to contribute. He succeeded in getting 
Congress to approve the increase, but did not persuade allies to support the 
programmes.222
In June 1999 the U.S. and Russia signed a protocol to continue the CTR 
Programme in Russia through June 2006.223   
 
221 Interview with Sandy Spector, Monterey Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Washington 
D.C., April 10, 2003 
222 Felton, ‘The Nunn-Lugar Vision: 1992-2002’, op. cit, p. 10 
223 ‘United States and Russia Extend Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement’, U.S. 
DOD News Release, June 24, 1999 at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1999/b06241999_bt307-99.html  
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4.5.5. Stage 5 (January 2001 – September 2001) – The Bush Administration  
The change of administration in the White House resulted in many key 
individuals crucial in taking non-proliferation programmes off the ground leaving the 
Government. Some new senior officials in the State Department, National Security 
Council (NSC), and Department of Defence (DOD) were not supportive of the 
programmes. 
There is a view shared by many in Washington D.C., that the initial months of 
new administration made many observers think the programmes were in trouble, and that 
they were not at all favoured in the White House.224 It seemed that the fundamental 
guiding principle of the Bush administration was: ‘Anything but Clinton’. The new Bush 
administration has revised U.S. non-proliferation policies, and although, rhetorically, 
support for processes such as CTR and arms reductions is expressed, the political 
environment of CTR programmes and arms reduction treaties has changed in a dramatic 
fashion.   
In the words of Congress Representative John M. Spratt Jr.:  
“Although the Bush Administration is officially supportive, its support is hardly 
zealous.  Its stated policies are correct but often not backed up by its budget 
policies, and the White House seems more inclined toward counter-proliferation 
than non-proliferation.”225
The programmes under immediate threat of their funding being cut were the 
programmes administered by the Department of Energy - Material Protection, Control 
and Accounting (MPC&A), the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI), and the Plutonium 
Disposition Programme.226 The new Bush Administration also requested a full review of 
all the non-proliferation assistance programmes soon after it came into office.  Some 
 
retrieved on 03.20.02  
224 Interviews with the U.S. former and current officials involved in the CTR process, Washington 
D.C., March-April, 2003  
225 John M. Spratt, ‘Stopping a Dangerous Drift in U.S. Arms Control Policy’ in Arms Control 
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experts in the U.S. believe it was a “non-strategic” review, and was implemented for 
internal political reasons.227   
Kenneth Luongo, who is currently a Director of the Russian-American Nuclear 
Security Advisory Council (RANSAC) and was formerly an official at the Department of 
Energy during Clinton administration at the time, commented on the review in the New 
York Times: 
“A prejudiced review that looks at what can be eliminated, and not what can 
be improved, is missing an enormous opportunity and is likely to further rile 
relations with Russia.”228
The review could not identify major faults with the programmes and found that 
“most of U.S. programmes to assist Russia in threat reduction and non-proliferation 
work well, are focused on priority tasks, and are well managed”.229
In April 2002 the Bush administration froze future work on securing warheads, 
the dismantlement of submarines and long-range missiles, and on creating new jobs for 
former Russian chemical and biological scientists. That move was connected with 
requirements imposed by Congress for the U.S. President to certify that Russia complies 
with the arms control agreements before funding for cooperative threat reduction can be 
approved by the Congress. According to U.S. officials, a decision to freeze funds for any 
new cooperative threat reduction work230 meant to send a warning ‘message’ to Russia on 
its alleged non-compliance with its arms control obligations in relation to chemical and 
biological weapons programmes.   
The funds were frozen for a year until President Bush signed special orders in 
January 2003 to release them. At the administration’s request Congress passed legislation 
in December 2002 that gave the U.S. President power to waive certification 
                                                 
227 Interview with the U.S. Congress staffer, Washington D.C., April 2003 
228 Vladislav Nikiforov, ‘U.S. Reviewing Aid for Nonproliferation Programs in Russia’, April 17, 
2001 at http://www.belona.no   retrieved on  28.02.02 
229 ‘Administration Review of Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance to the Russian 
Federation’, Fact Sheet, The White House, Office of Press Secretary (Crawford, Texas), 
December 27, 2001 
230 The certification requirement applied to programmes administered by the Department of 
Defence, State Department, but did not cover programmes administered by the Department 
of Energy 
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requirements.231 The decision to renew funding for CTR work was most likely motivated 
by the events of 9/11 and the greater awareness of the need to prevent terrorists from 
obtaining WMD and WMD materials. 
 
4.5.6. Stage 6 (September 11, 2001 – 2003) - The Post-9/11 Security 
Environment  
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York changed the 
international security environment: the threat of mass casualties became a reality.  
Terrorists used conventional means to cause severe damage and loss of life, and 
demonstrated the determination and ability to inflict severe destruction. A post 9/11 
international security system has to be defined by new factors, such as the possibility that 
terrorists might use WMD in any future attack. The scope of potential destruction and 
human tragedy, which can be brought upon the world by the use of nuclear or 
radioactive material in any sort of weapon of any level of sophistication by sub-state 
actors, is enormous. Russia remains to be one of the most attractive places for any 
terrorist organisation to try and get hold of nuclear material, expertise, or technology. 
Securing anything that can be of use and interest to terrorists at the source (at the 
facilities, sites, research institutes, reactors in Russia) is the wisest possible way to protect 
the world community from a possible attack with the use of nuclear weapons. 
In the immediate aftermath of the events of September 11, President Bush 
announced that the prevention of WMD use by terrorists now had the highest priority 
for the United States. There were some emergency measures taken, including an 
Emergency Supplemental Act appropriating additional funding in the amount of $260 
million.232  There was a renewed interest in the CTR programmes. 
However, there is a clear understanding in the policy-related circles of 
Washington D.C. that rhetoric often does not match the actual deeds in terms of 
bringing cooperative threat reduction process to a new level, which would fairly reflect a 
heightened danger of nuclear proliferation. An increasing number of experts believe that 
much more should be done, and done faster, in order to prevent a catastrophe. This 
 
231 Peter Eisler, ‘Bush Frees Cash to Secure Soviet Arms; U.S. Wants to Stop Foes from Getting 
Weapons’, USA Today, January 14, 2003, page A.01 
232 Interview with Elisabeth Turpen, Senior Associate, Henry Stimson Center, Washington D.C., 
April 1, 2003 
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criticism is justified to an extent, however, there are also some objective constraints – 
such as a lack of financial and human resources, a need to prioritise spending by the U.S. 
government, and limitations of the process of cooperative treat reduction, e.g. the 
problem of access to Russia’s most sensitive sites, bureaucratic hurdles and other 
factors). (This is discussed in more detail in the section on the problems of 
implementation). 
Overall, the current state of all the major non-proliferation assistance 
programmes is more or less stable. The programmes have passed through a worrying 
stage in the beginning of Bush Administration, but seem to enjoy support and 
appreciation within all the U.S. agencies involved in the implementation of programmes 
and the White House administration. There are problems of implementation determined 
by various factors, but U.S.-Russian cooperation is continuing. 
In May 2002 Senators Pete Domenici, Joe Biden, and Richard Lugar introduced a 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, and in June 2002 Senator Pete Domenici introduced a 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Initiative largely based on that Act. The legislative 
amendments introduced by Domenici’s Initiative authorised $100 million to renew and 
build on existing programmes and create new cooperative initiatives.233  
In June 2002 the G-8 leaders signed an agreement on a Global Partnership 
Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.  The G-8 countries 
agreed on providing $10 billion to Russia plus a U.S. contribution of another $10 billion 
over a 10 year period. This arrangement is informally known as the 10+10 over 10 
initiative. This development demonstrates a qualitatively new stage in the cooperative 
threat reduction process – from being mostly bilateral it changes to a multilateral exercise 
and Russia shifts from being just a recipient to an equal partner in this process with its 
announced commitment to provide $2 billion for the effort. 
An on-going CTR process will provide a benchmark for Global Partnership. In 
this respect, the analysis of achievements and problems of implementation can be 
important for the future cooperation within a multilateral framework.    
 
233 Chris Gallegos, ‘Senate Accepts Domenici Nuclear Non-proliferation Initiative’, New Mexico 
Institute of Mining and Technology, at 
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4.6. Problems of Implementation  
The analysis of the problems of implementation and the overall effectiveness of 
the CTR Programme supports the hypothesis of this thesis that the achievements and 
limitations of the cooperative threat reduction process reflect the nature of U.S.-Russian 
relations in the post-Cold War environment. These relations are seen as a “constrained 
partnership” – a dramatically new type of bilateral relations, which made possible such 
unique cooperation at first place, despite the persistence of a certain degree of suspicion, 
legacies of the Cold War, and bureaucratic hurdles. Problems of implementation result 
from a mixture of bureaucratic constraints exacerbated by political problems. It is often 
hard to distinguish between the bureaucratic and political factors, since they are closely 
interlinked in the case of the CTR process.  
An analysis of problems of implementation shows that some of them are directly 
determined by a still present lack of trust on both sides. At the same time, some of the 
limitations of cooperation can be explained on the basis of a Bureaucratic Politics Model 
to the process of threat reduction. In other words, bureaucracy and conflicting interests 
of organisations and individuals play a substantial role in some of the areas too. 
The major impediments on the way to the implementation of the CTR 
Programme are: problems with access to Russian nuclear sites, lack of trust and legacy of 
Cold War attitudes in implementing the Programme’s objectives, bureaucratic hurdles, 
the negative attitude of some individuals in key political positions, and some conditions 
attached to the cooperation by the U.S. Some of the problems of implementation 
discussed are endemic to the whole process of threat reduction, not only to the CTR 
Programme – this is evident from the case studies material provided in Chapters 5, 6, and 
7. 
Some typical problems of implementation have clearly defined bureaucratic 
characteristics, such as a lack of coordination, a clash of organisational interests, and 
there are some, which have mixed characteristics. For example, the problem of access to 
Russian facilities has to some extent mundane bureaucratic causes: lengthy procedures to 
obtain visas and permissions for access. The bureaucracies act on the basis of their own 
values and perception of their purpose (e.g. the Russian FSB as an organisation is meant 
to guard country’s security interests, which due to its culture, mind-sets and procedures 
results in its overhyped suspicion towards U.S. visitors). At the same time, concerns over 
access are further aggravated by political factors in the U.S.-Russian relationship, 
especially, by a residual lack of trust. The same explanation can be applied to 
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Congressional reluctance to provide unconditional assistance to Russia. Apart from the 
immediate interests of Congressmen to ensure that their work is first of all directly 
beneficial to their constituencies, they are also troubled by the lingering Cold War 
perceptions of Russia as a former enemy. 
The following description of problems of implementation shows that most of the 
problems of implementation result, to a different extent, from underlying bureaucratic 
and political factors, and some problems are purely political.  
 
4.6.1. The Lack of Interagency Cooperation, and the Clash of 
Organisational Interests and Internal Political Factors  
The bureaucratic factor and varying organisational interests play a substantial role 
in the U.S.-Russian cooperative threat reduction process.   
Authors of a report commissioned by Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) in March 
2003, summarise the problem of bureaucratic impediments in the following way: 
“…Bureaucracies around the world tend to follow their standard operating 
procedures, and to have difficulty moving quickly to pursue a new mission 
in a new way.  The incidents of threat reduction efforts being substantially 
delayed or bogged down by bureaucratic procedures, interagency infighting, 
and the like – both in Washington and in Moscow and other recipient 
capitals – are a legion.  When an expert on physical protection of nuclear 
facilities is spending his time doing the twelfth revision of a contract 
proposal requested by headquarters, he is not spending his time actually 
implementing security upgrades…”234
Bureaucratic impediments are present on two levels: within the countries, and 
between them. Some procedural requirements, which take too much time delay the 
implementation process. These include: the clearance process within the State 
Department for the American specialists and officials wishing to travel to Russia, a long 
process of granting access to Russian facilities by the Russian government, and a long 
waiting period for issuing visas for Russian experts wishing to travel to the U.S. 
No less important is the bureaucratic struggle between the organisations. In 
Russia MINATOM and Gosatomnadzor (GAN) had a controversial relationship, with its 
most antagonistic point in 1994 due to GAN having been appointed a controlling agency, 
 
234 Bunn, Wier, Holdren, ‘Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials, op. cit, p. 44 
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monitoring MINATOM. At the moment, there is still a limited on-going struggle 
between MINATOM and GAN. However, the role of GAN has diminished over time.  
Moreover, it is believed that these two organisations have now succeeded in finding a 
formula for interaction.235 The same was true for the Russian Ministry of Defence, when 
GAN for a short period of time, was the body overseeing the safety and security of 
MOD nuclear facilities. In 1995 President Yeltsin removed this function of GAN, largely 
in response to opposition from the military-industrial complex. 
The U.S. administration also has some issues within its establishment from time 
to time.  There are two offices within the U.S. State Department with overlapping 
responsibilities for matters relating to CTR. There is an office responsible for the NIS 
region as a whole, and there is another one dealing with the issues of non-proliferation. 
At the earlier stage of programme implementation, there was some tension between the 
NIS desk responsible for all the assistance going to former Soviet Union by and large and 
the Department of Energy. There was a lot of support for cooperative threat reduction 
within the both agencies, but there was friction over day-to-day issues.236
There is also a perception among some U.S. experts that the State Department 
sometimes gets concerned that the DOE plays too active a role. Some U.S. specialists 
express their dissatisfaction with the State Department’s practices of issuing visas to their 
Russian colleagues and getting permission for their own travel to Russia. They share this 
with their Russian colleagues in the informal conversations.237
It is believed in certain circles in the U.S., that DOE, in its turn, is concerned 
with the role of the national labs, which sometimes move forward in U.S.-Russian 
cooperation without paying attention to the constraints of policies in Washington. 
There is also a particular role of the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), 
which is designed to monitor how well the programmes work. Very often GAO 
produces critical reports on the implementation results of the major non-proliferation 
assistance programmes. DOD and DOE agree with some of the comments, and disagree 
with the others. 
 
235 Interview with Daniil Kobyakov, PIR-Centre, Moscow, May 2003 
236 Interview with the former U.S. senior DOE official, Washington D.C., April 2003 
237 Interviews in Moscow with the Russian experts involved in the programmes of cooperative 
threat reduction, Moscow, May-June 2003 
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Non-proliferation assistance programmes are sometimes kept hostage by the U.S. 
House of Representatives in an attempt to get certain concessions from the Senate.  
Traditionally, the Senate always has more a longer term view, while the House members 
are judging policies by their relevance to the immediate interests of constituencies they 
represent.238
There is a serious problem of lack of coordination between the implementing 
agencies both in Russia and the U.S. Former 12th GUMO chief General Maslin noted, 
that there are frequent bureaucratic struggles between different agencies in Russia, and 
“funds are received not by an agency, most critically in need, but by those, who can 
better than others elbow their way”.239 In the U.S. the problem of coordination of all the 
cooperative threat reduction assistance is acute. Two American agencies are involved in 
protecting nuclear warheads in Russia. These are Department of Defence (DOD) and 
Department of Energy (DOE).  DOD is focusing more on storage sites, while DOE has 
being assisting the Russian Navy and following the Navy’s request, focused on security 
upgrades at operational sites, where warheads are deployed with delivery vehicles. 
Although, coordination between these two agencies improved recently, DOD and DOE 
still face coordination issues according to the U.S. GAO. Some of their plans overlap and 
the same sites are included in each agency’s plan of security assistance. U.S. interagency 
guidelines were issued only in January 2003.240
One of the failures in the cooperative threat reduction process blamed on 
bureaucratic problems inside Russia and the U.S. relate to a case concerning a fuel 
conversion facility in Krasnoyarsk.  U.S. $100 million were used to construct a facility in 
Krasnoyarsk to convert rocket fuel to commercial use. When the construction was 
completed, it was found out that there was no fuel to convert at that facility since Russia 
had diverted it to its space programme.241
 
238 Interview with the U.S. senior policy expert, Washington D.C., April 2003  
239 Evgenii Maslin, ‘Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme and Russia’s National Security 
Interests’ (‘Programma sovmestnogo umensheniya urgozy i interesy  natscional’noi 
bezopasnosti Rossii’), in Safranchuk, ed.,  Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme, op. cit, 
p. 7 
240 GAO report “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to 
Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites’, March 2003, GAO-03-482, p. 41 
241 ‘Specialists Hit Efforts to Secure Russian Arms Threat is Greater than Iraq, They Say’, The 
Boston Globe, 05.03.03, A9  
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4.6.2. The Problem with Access  
The problem with access of American experts to some of Russia’s sites, where 
nuclear material and parts are located and where upgrades of security and safety are 
vitally needed, remains a major impediment to a smooth and swift implementation of 
projects. Both sides believe they have grounds for insisting on their way of doing the 
business. The U.S. side believes it has every right to monitor the implementation of the 
projects, which it funds. The Russian side sees American request to enter almost any site 
in Russia as an intrusion to an area of national security interests.   
The report of the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) (“Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to 
Improve Security at Russian Sites”) published in March 2003 stated as its key finding:  
“…The Department of Defense and Energy have made slow progress in 
helping improve the security of sites in Russia with weapons of mass 
destruction against the threat of theft or diversion because Russia is not 
providing needed access to many sites.  Unfortunately, there is little reason 
to believe this situation will change in the near future…”242
Experts from Moscow’s PIR-Centre note:  
“…overall, problem of access to the Russian weapons complex sites is one 
of the most ‘painful’ and hard to be solved problems in U.S.-Russian 
relations…It seems that in the near future it is not going to be possible to 
solve it…”243
 The first formal agreement on access was signed in 2001-2002.  The opinion on 
whether that agreement brought anything new varied. Some believe that it just formalised 
all the conditions and rules, which were operating from the very beginning. Another 
group of U.S. experts and project managers believe that it had a positive role, since all the 
conditions were codified and certain issues were solved (albeit not all).  Oleg Bukharin of 
Princeton University believes that: “it [the agreement] was certainly useful in a way – it 
 
242 ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. 
Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites’, GAO report, op. cit.  
243 ‘Sotrudnichestvo vo imya global’noi bezopasnosti’ (‘Cooperation for the Global Security’), 
Nauchnye Zapiski PIR-Centra, #1 (19), 2002, p. 198 
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helped to break the log-jam at many facilities […] it was certainly a positive 
development.”244
This agreement stipulates how many visits can take place; it sets the conditions 
on how the U.S. can operate and commits Russia to accepting some on-site visits. The 
two sides also agreed on a list of approved U.S. personnel, who can have a shorter 
waiting period of their application for access being reviewed (30 days). For the moment, 
the waiting period for a regular review for access is 45 days. 
A quite prolonged waiting period of gaining access to some of the “closed” cities 
and sites (which is not guaranteed) is often an impediment to project implementation.  
Getting access to “closed” cities, where most of the sensitive work is done, is especially 
hard. In these cities, not only sites are closed, but the whole cities – this creates 
complications on moving forward the projects connected with the commercialisation of 
former weapons facilities, since American businessmen and national lab experts have 
difficulties visiting the cities, where these facilities are located.  The sites, which are 
completely inaccessible to U.S. experts, are nuclear warhead construction sites. 
Senior White House member of the National Security Council (NSC) Susan 
Koch mentioned that over time major strides were made to overcome issues of access, 
and steadily the programmes were expanded, and the work was done where access was 
granted. She believes it is important to build true habits of cooperation with the U.S. side 
recognising Russian security concerns, and Russia having to understand concerns of the 
U.S.245   
Overall, U.S. officials and experts see access issue as a serious problem; however, 
some of them find Russia’s security concerns legitimate. Many on the Russian side 
appreciate the American interest in controlling results of their activities in Russia and 
becoming equal participants of the threat reduction process. However, there are limits to 
where Russians can open their doors – some of the sensitive sites cannot be visited due 
to laws on the protection of national security interests. Some on the U.S. side believe that 
limitations in granting access and using national security as an excuse are sometimes a 
 
244 Interview with Oleg Bukharin, (W. Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 
Princeton University), Washington D.C., April 01, 2003. 
245 Interview with Susan Koch (Director for Proliferation Strategy, National Security Council, The 
White House), Washington D.C., April 08, 2003 
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result of mentality peculiarities of Russian elites, who “not always perceive interests of 
donor-states in adequate manner…”246
An important factor for the Russian state is the lack of reciprocity. Even though 
the U.S. government is providing assistance to Russia, it cannot expect unlimited access 
to sites of high sensitivity, especially, when Russian specialists are not able to visit 
sensitive U.S. sites. It is notable that even some U.S. experts see the lack of reciprocity 
from the U.S. side as an impediment to a smoother programme implementation. It is 
believed that providing better transparency on a mutual basis will help ease the tension 
on access issues. 
Russian policy specialists from PIR-Centre believe that although it is hard to 
solve the problem of access as such in the near term, it is important to reduce the area of 
contradictions as much as possible – in other words, come up with a list of sites, which 
under all conditions will remain closed for foreign inspectors. At the same time, Russia 
should be granted reliable guarantees that the information received in the course of work 
at the opened sites will remain confidential, and a study should be undertaken on 
measures of indirect control of the use of equipment supplied by the United States to 
Russia.247
In this respect, there are ideas of trying to navigate between the U.S. need to 
verify how the money are spent, and how the work is done, and Russian national security 
obligations. There are suggestions from the U.S. side too to think of less intrusive 
projects less relying on access248, or bring in technologies to verify results of the U.S. 
funded upgrades without the physical presence of U.S. personnel at the site. 
From the above it is evident that the problem of access is not just a matter of 
bureaucratic obstacles. There are real limits of the extent to which Russia is prepared to 
share information about the details of its nuclear weapons programmes. Likewise the 
refusal by the United States to accept reciprocity of access is a result of the unwillingness 
to allow Russian specialists to gain further insights about U.S. nuclear weapons 
 
246 ‘Sotrudnichestvo vo imya global’noi bezopasnosti’ (‘Cooperation for the Global Security’), op. 
cit, p. 10 
247 ‘Sotrudnichestvo vo imya global’noi bezopasnosti’, (‘Cooperation for the Global Security’), op. 
cit, p. 198 
248 Interview with Raphael Della Ratta (Russian-American Nuclear Security Council (RANSAC)), 
Washington D.C., April 03, 2003 
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technology. These attitudes persist despite the fact that they create a serious constraint on 
the ability to achieve the central objectives of CTR, and point to the limits of the strategic 
partnership between the former adversaries. 
 
4.6.3. The Cold War Legacy and the Cultural Clash  
It seems there are two levels of operation in today’s U.S.-Russian relations. There 
is a level of countries’ political commitment, a general understanding of a need of a 
completely new type of interaction in the aftermath of the Cold War. At the same time, 
there is another implementation level: at this level various kinds of contradictions in 
bilateral relations clash. While the international system changed very rapidly, the 
bureaucratic systems of government and the mind-sets of people take time to adapt to 
this transformation.  
There are many factors, which indicate that a residual legacy of the Cold War still 
persists.  A lack of trust from both sides (Americans wanting to check closely on where 
Russians spend money and Russians suspecting Americans of trying to get their state 
secrets) is one example. There is still a certain level of hostility from the parts of U.S. and 
Russian establishment – against any U.S.-Russian cooperation in the security field.  Some 
members of the U.S. Congress are deeply opposed to the CTR Programme, because it 
constitutes assistance to a former enemy, whom they still do not trust. There is a 
widespread perception among some that Russia would use its own resources (saved 
because of U.S. assistance) on modernising its military capabilities. There are sections of 
Russian State Duma, especially, ultra-left wing, which do not trust American motives. 
Both American and Russian experts believe it will take generations to change 
some of the ways of Cold War thinking deeply embedded in both countries. It is notable 
that the legacy of the Cold War is more obvious on the level of large organisations – 
especially more conservative ones, like military complexes of the U.S. and Russia, which 
for a long time were on the forefront of the Cold War. 
There is also a problem of cultural differences.  Certain things, which are 
absolutely normal for one side, contradict the usual practices of the other. One example 
is that there is a high turnover of U.S. experts working on projects in Russia, and there 
were complaints from the Russian side that it hampers the project implementation. While 
in Russia successful performance of any enterprise depends a lot on the human factor, on 
personal relationships and trust built over time, in the U.S. frequent rotation of cadres is 
a regular thing. 
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4.6.4. The Conditions Attached to Cooperation  
Throughout the years, the CTR Programme was a hostage to conditions and 
political issues in U.S.-Russian relations.   
One of the conditions determining implementation, especially in the earlier years 
– was a “Buy-American” clause. The equipment and services required for implementing 
agreed projects under the CTR Programme had to be bought in the U.S. Investment in 
U.S. own economy while fulfilling a non-proliferation objective in the interest of the U.S. 
state was a good bargaining chip in the hands of the Programme’s supporters. It played a 
positive role in persuading U.S. Congress to agree to engage in CTR activities. 
However, there were some negative aspects to such a provision. Very often a 
Buy-American condition meant delays in project implementation, more money being 
spent than if the equipment had been procured locally. There is a consensus in the 
Russian political and expert circles that in many cases Russian equipment would be more 
suitable for Russian conditions.  No less important is the sustainability factor. When the 
CTR Programme, as well as the other programmes, reaches its end point, and the present 
equipment completes its operation cycle – it will be harder to change everything over to 
local equipment. There is also a question of whether Russia would have sufficient 
resources for that. Those in Russia, who were directly involved in the first years of the 
CTR Programme implementation note that the Programme was perceived quite 
negatively due to strict conditions attached to it. American-made equipment supplied by 
the CTR Programme could only be used for the purposes specified.   
An attempt to make CTR funding conditional on other political issues, such as 
compliance of Russia with the Chemical Weapons Convention, cessation of cooperation 
with Iran and some other is harmful for the implementation process, which goes against 
interests of both countries. U.S. President is required to certify that Russia complies with 
all the arms control agreements and other conditions.  Only recently Congress provided 
President with a 3-year waiver authority to grant CTR program contracts without 
certification. Attempts of the Programme’s supporters to receive a permanent 
presidential waiver have been unsuccessful so far. 
Evgenii Maslin, former chief of the 12th GUMO stated: 
“…it is worrisome that the Programme is annually tied up by Congressmen 
with political conditions, which have no direct connection with the CTR 
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Programme at all….Keeping such policy of artificial linkages does not fund 
understanding and results in disappointment…”249
U.S. senior policy experts see the preparedness of the State Department to put 
conditions on the Programme as a real step backwards.250
 
4.6.5. The Donor-Recipient Relationship  
When the idea of the CTR Programme was developed the former Soviet Union 
was in a deep economic crisis. There could be no other mechanism apart from the direct 
assistance from the U.S. side. Unfortunately, that created a donor-recipient relationship, 
which sometimes is not the best basis for genuine partnership and cooperation.   
First of all, there is a perception on the Russian side that the priorities of Russia 
in non-proliferation work are not taken into consideration because the U.S. side is the 
funding party. Priorities vary on the importance of certain projects (like, for example, 
which nuclear sites are in greater need of security upgrades, or which type of nerve agents 
should be  destroyed first in the chemical weapons destruction programme). There is a 
feeling in Russia that often they receive assistance, which is readily available in the U.S., 
but which does not match real Russian needs. 
Secondly, not engaging Russia as an equal partner in the CTR Programme, as well 
as all other major non-proliferation assistance programmes, has a negative effect on 
sustainability of the programmes. Excluding Russians from the management of the 
programmes, or not trying to consider the priorities of Russia in securing its nuclear 
arsenals and expertise lessens the support for the cooperative threat reduction on the 
Russian side. Russian Foreign Ministry representative noted that Russia has “a very 
limited influence on the processes [of fund allocation, choice of subcontractors]”, and 
that is “wrong”.251
 
249 Evgenii Maslin, ‘Programma sovmestnogo umensheniya ugrozy i interesy  natsional’noi 
bezopasnosti Rossii’ (‘Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme and Russia’s National 
Security Interests’), in Ivan Safranchuk, ed.,  Programma sovmestnogo umensheniya ugrozy: 
otsenka effektivnosti i perspektivy razvitiya (Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme: 
Assessment of Effectiveness and Prospects for Development), Moscow, 2000, p. 6 
250 Interview with the U.S. senior policy expert, Washington D.C., April 2003  
251 Valerii Semin, ‘Programma sovmestnogo umensheniya ugrozy imeet potentsial dal’neishego 
razvitiya’, (‘Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme Has Potential for Further 
146 
 
                                                                                                                                              
The recent Global Partnership, designed to unite resources of G-8 countries 
against spread of WMD, which engages Russia as a partner not a simple recipient is a 
positive and important development.    
 
4.7. The Overall Effectiveness  
The CTR Programme is to a large extent a unique phenomenon of a post-Cold 
War world environment aiming at joining the efforts of two former adversaries - Russia 
and the United States - to reduce, limit, and even eliminate, if ever possible, the dangers 
arising from the nuclear weapons. It is unique because the two countries are trying to 
deal with the dangers created by huge nuclear arsenals, which were a «birth product» of 
their own mutual mistrust, agony, and aggressiveness. It is an unprecedented attempt to 
deal with the whole range of complicated issues arising from the presence of nuclear 
weapons in the security environment. 
The mere existence of such kind of cooperation changes the character of U.S.-
Russian bilateral relations. The CTR Programme (based on the Nunn-Lugar legislation) 
has enormous value as a foundation for all the other non-proliferation assistance 
programmes. The umbrella CTR agreement was a starting point for developing and 
expanding cooperation between Russia and the U.S. in the area of threat reduction, and it 
provided the basis for making this assistance more specialised by involving other agencies 
rather than just DOD. 
The CTR Programme is an important tool of non-proliferation: it gives the U.S. a 
chance to participate in protecting nuclear expertise, weapons, and materials in Russia 
and in such way protect its own national security from a possible attack from a threshold 
state or terrorist organisation, and at the same time it helps Russia to meet its START-
related obligations, improve safety and security of its weapons and materials, which can 
be used within Russia by unauthorised groups. 
The CTR Programme enabled numerous contacts between the Russian and 
American military, nuclear physicists, officials, scientists and policy experts. It had the 
intangible result of building a working relationship in the area of nuclear safeguards, 
 
Development’”), in Safranchuk, ed.,  Programma sovmestnogo umensheniya ugrozy, op. cit, p. 
9 
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safety and security. This kind of cooperation is unprecedented for the former ideological 
enemies. 
Among concrete objectives achieved by the CTR Programme first and foremost 
is denuclearisation of three former Soviet Republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. 
The CTR Programme was not only one of the determining factors in the decision taken 
by three states to join NPT as non-nuclear states, but it certainly played a very important 
role in it. The CTR Programme has provided vital equipment and other resources for 
eliminating certain weapons, transporting the rest, and destroying the supporting 
infrastructure left on their territories. CTR projects dealing with fissile material 
disposition, weapons and material storage have also been important in reducing the 
threat of nuclear proliferation. 
However, there are limitations to the achievements of the CTR Programme.  The 
problems of implementation discussed above and limitations of U.S.-Russian relations 
are setting back a more effective and smooth cooperation in threat reduction.   
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Chapter 5 
Preventing the Proliferation of Fissile Material: the Material 
Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Programme 
5.1. Introduction  
Chapter Five and Chapter Six should be seen as two parts of one segment of 
this work, assessing threats from the proliferation of fissile material and CTR 
programmes, which have been designed to deal with these particular threats. Chapter 
Five evaluates the potential dangers of fissile material proliferation from the Russian 
Federation and other ex-Soviet Republics in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. An 
attempt is made to demonstrate the magnitude of the problem, assess the risks, and 
analyse programmes, which deal with the issues of fissile material non-proliferation. 
The main purpose of Chapters Five and Six is to provide an account of all the major 
activities undertaken by the U.S. and Russia to tackle the threat of nuclear material 
leakage from Russia and to point out the achievements and the deficiencies of those 
actions. This Chapter (Five) evaluates the achievements and failures of Material 
Protection and Accounting (MPC&A) - a major programme designed to confront 
nuclear material safety and security issues. Chapter Six is divided into two thematic sub-
chapters, which deal with the problems of weapon-grade Plutonium (Plutonium 
Disposition Programme) and Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) (HEU Deal) 
respectively.   
It is important to analyse the infrastructure of the production, storage and 
disposition of weapons-grade nuclear material in Russia. In this respect, key players 
involved at any of the above mentioned stages of handling the fissile material are 
presented. The final part of Chapter Six explores larger questions arising from the 
discussion of the role of fissile material in the future of non-proliferation and nuclear 
cooperation between the U.S. and Russia. It assesses the interconnectedness of the 
production volumes and disposition, as well as the problem of a growing stockpile of 
the fissile material due to Russia’s dismantlement obligations and needs.   
An assessment of the approximate volumes of the fissile material already 
produced and the surpluses added to it annually, as well as approximate rates for the 
disposition of this material help to evaluate the magnitude of material proliferation 
problem. The following two chapters demonstrate the immediate dangers arising from 
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the inadequate material storage, lack of comprehensive material accounting and 
protection systems, and how the general social, economic and political turbulence in 
Russia aggravate the existing problem. The aim is to show how the whole problem of 
fissile material relates to the future of Russia’s nuclear arsenal and the U.S.-Russian 
arms control treaties, and what the role of the cooperative threat reduction is in this 
process. MPC&A, Plutonium Disposition and the HEU Deal represent important 
components of the CTR process. An examination of problems of implementation they 
encountered, an analysis of why cooperation has been limited and, on the other hand, 
why it was possible at all – provides an insight of the nature of the U.S.-Russian 
strategic relations in the post-Cold War period. 
 
5.1.1. The Danger of Fissile Material Proliferation  
Fissile materials are composed of atoms that can be split by neutrons in a self-
sustaining chain-reaction to release enormous amounts of energy.252 Plutonium and 
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) are the materials that can be used to make nuclear 
warheads. All of the isotopes of Plutonium (most importantly Pu239, Pu240, Pu241, and 
Pu242) and two isotopes of uranium (U233 and U235) can sustain an explosively growing 
chain reaction.253
The proliferation of fissile material is considered to be a major threat to nuclear 
safety and stability in the world. While it is possible in principle for unauthorised parties 
to acquire control over nuclear weapons, their physical and electronic protection is such 
that this remains a remote contingency. It is widely believed that fissile material 
proliferation is a more significant threat to international security. In a situation when 
ready-made weapons are hard to get and fissile material, which can enable proliferators 
to build them, is not adequately protected, the chances of material falling into the 
wrong hands rise considerably. This is especially the case as persons with access to 
fissile material are often poorly paid and may see fissile material as an opportunity to 
improve their situation. 
                                                 
252 ‘Fissile Material Basics’, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, at 
http://www.ieer.org/fctsheet/fm_basic.htm  retrieved on 09.08.02 
253 Matthew Bunn, John P. Holdren, ‘Managing Military Uranium and Plutonium in the United 
States and the Former Soviet Union (excerpts)’, at http://www.ransac.org/new-web-
site/pub/reports/bunnholdren1.htm retrieved on 02.07.02 
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The lack of access to fissile material is the most important barrier that stops 
terrorists/rogue states from making a nuclear weapon. The scholars from Harvard 
University in their comprehensive report on nuclear proliferation risks ‘Controlling 
Nuclear Warheads and Materials’ give the following assessment:  
“If they [terrorists] got the materials, making a bomb is at least potentially 
within the capability of a large and well-organised terrorist group.  With 
enough HEU, terrorists could potentially make a simple “gun-type” bomb, 
little more than firing two pieces of HEU into each other to form a critical 
mass.”254
It is trickier to build a weapon using plutonium or with an amount of HEU too 
small for a gun-type weapon, because in this case the type of weapons will be 
‘implosive’ – which means, explosives have to be set off around the core with the fissile 
material in order to crush it into a smaller, denser configuration for the chain reaction 
to begin. Although, such a scenario is more challenging for terrorist organisations, it is 
not impossible.   
The authoritative report of Harvard’s Managing the Atom Project reiterates: 
“Detailed examinations by U.S. nuclear weapons experts have concluded 
again and again that with enough nuclear material in hand, it is possible that 
a sophisticated terrorist group could build at least a crude nuclear explosive 
– including, potentially, an implosion bomb, though that would be 
substantially more difficult for them than a gun-type bomb.”255
Up until now nuclear material rather than ready weapons has been a more 
appealing product on the illegal nuclear market. Technically, even in Russia nuclear 
weapons are relatively well secured, while the protection of nuclear material is doubtful. 
There are several reasons for serious concern about safety and security of the nuclear 
material in Russia. 
First of all, there is a large number of sites in Russia, where small or large 
amounts of dangerous materials are located. According to some estimates, Russia 
possesses some 130-200 tonnes of Plutonium256 and 800-1,200 tons of HEU.257  
                                                 
254 Bunn, Wier, Holdren, ‘Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials’, op. cit.,  p. 12 
255 ibid 
256 The figure of 200 tonnes is given in Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Richard A. 
Falkenrath, Steven E. Miller, eds., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose 
Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
London, England, 1996, p. 21; the figure of 115+/-20 tonnes was calculated by David 
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Another source reports the possession of approximately 650 metric tons of weapons-
usable fissile material in the countries of the former Soviet Union, not including the 
material currently in nuclear warheads.258  The amount required for a nuclear warhead 
ranges from 5 kilograms of plutonium to 15 kilograms of HEU.259 The immense 
amounts of fissile material in Russia can provide more than enough for terrorist groups 
if they decide to obtain it by using loopholes in Russian inadequate material safety and 
security. Second, the already extensive material stockpile keeps on growing due to 
dismantlement process (with material being extracted from weapons) and because of 
the continuing production of plutonium in Russia.  
There are several sources of fissile material in Russia. At several stages of 
making a nuclear warhead, its dismantlement and fissile material disposition the 
material can be at risk of diversion. The process of warhead production and 
dismantlement involves the following stages outlined in the next chapter. 
5.1.1.1. Process of Warhead Production and Weapon Dismantlement  
Chart 1 Process of Warhead Production  
 
Production of fissile 
material
Material component 
fabrication
Warhead production
Process of warhead production 
                                                                                                                                         
Albright. Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly 
Enriched Uranium 1992, SIPRI, Stockholm, 1992, p. 37 
257 Allison, Coté, Jr., Falkenrath, Miller, eds., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, op. cit., p. 21 
258 Nuclear Status Report, op. cit., p. 75 
259 ‘Fissile Material Basics’, op. cit. 
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First Stage – Production of Fissile Material: The initial stage of warhead 
production involves the production of fissile material. HEU is produced in uranium 
enrichment plants. Plutonium is produced at special plutonium production reactors and 
is later separated at a reprocessing facility. 
Second Stage – Material Component Fabrication: After the first stage of 
production is completed, the fissile material is transferred to a fissile material 
component fabrication facility, where it is moulded and shaped into required form. 
Third Stage – Warhead Production: At this final stage the components shaped 
and moulded are transferred to a warhead production facility, where they are mated 
with the other required components, such as high explosives and sophisticated triggers. 
 
Chart 2 represents the process of weapon dismantlement. 
Chart 2 Process of Weapon Dismantlement 
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First Stage – De-launching of the Weapon: First of all, the weapon is 
removed from its launcher (ICBM/SSBN/SLBM/Bomber) or from its storage 
position. After that the weapon is placed in a special shipping device and transported to 
MINATOM’s dismantlement installations.  
Second Stage – Warhead Decomposition: After the warhead was taken from 
the weapon, it is transferred to the weapons production facility (where it was built) to 
be taken apart.  As a result of this, a number of fissile material components are 
produced. 
Third Stage – Fissile Components Handling: The third stage is the most 
important from the point of proliferation risks and deserves a more detailed 
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consideration.  After the warhead has been taken apart, MINATOM is left in 
possession of the fissile material components. There are two possible ways of handling 
these components: either to stockpile them as they are, or to take them apart («below 
pit-level dismantlement»). In case of the latter, the components are taken back to the 
facility where they were fabricated. The components consist of bulk fissile material, 
which can either be disposed of or used in several ways.   
Plutonium can be used to fabricate new components for new weapons, or as 
fuel in special reactors. HEU can be used in a variety of different HEU fuel cycles, or 
as the raw material for new weapons production, or blended with natural uranium to 
produce LEU for conventional power-generating nuclear reactors. The methods of 
fissile material disposition are presented in Chart 3. 
Chart 3 Fissile Material Disposition 
      
 
    FISSILE MATERIAL 
     Taking components apart Stockpiling 
     Disposition       Usage 
Plutonium (Pu) HEU
Fuel cycle 
New components for new weapons
New weapons production 
Fuel in special reactors 
Production of LEU 
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5.2. Safety and Security of Fissile Material at Russian Facilities  
A multi-stage process of production and dismantlement of nuclear warheads 
(Charts 1, 2 and 3) demonstrates at how many points material is in danger of being 
diverted.  Moreover, the disposition of fissile material by any of the options presented 
in Chart 3 requires transportation of warheads and material between and within the 
nuclear facilities.  Transportation of material is considered to be one of the “weakest 
links” for material diversion.260    
The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) has the capability of 
both producing fissile materials and extracting them from the dismantled nuclear 
weapons. Other producers of fissile material are Russian nuclear power-generating 
reactors, which fall under control of MINATOM. Additional amounts of fissile 
material can be found at the research institutes and labs. Moreover, there are thousands 
nuclear weapons still residing at MOD sites with the material still trapped inside them, 
which potentially can be dismantled adding more volumes of fissile material. 
The degree of potential leakage varies depending on the nuclear material 
custodian.  It is widely believed that the safest stockpiles of nuclear weapons belong to 
the Ministry of Defence. The weakest in terms of safety and security arrangements are 
the stockpiles, which belong to research institutes and non-standard fuel cycle 
facilities.261  In most cases, the amount of fissile material stored and used at these 
facilities is considerably smaller than at all the other sites, however, even that small 
amount poses a significant risk if smuggled. 
The U.S. National Intelligence Council declared in its February 2002 report that 
security varies widely among the different types of Ministry of Atomic Energy 
(MINATOM) facilities and other Russian institutes: 
“Russian facilities housing weapons-usable nuclear material – uranium 
enriched to 20 percent or greater in uranium235 or uranium233 isotopes and 
any plutonium containing less than 80 percent of the isotope plutonium238 – 
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typically receive low funding, lack trained security personnel, and do not 
have sufficient equipment for securely storing such material.”262
 
5.2.1. Safety and Security of Fissile Material at the Ministry of Defence 
(MOD) Sites  
MOD nuclear weapon and material storage facilities are believed to be quite 
satisfactory in terms of nuclear safeguards. However, there is a growing concern about 
safety of nuclear weapons and material under custody of the Defence Ministry. There 
are several reasons for that.  First of all, in the aftermath of the Communist collapse 
Russia no longer has access to Eastern European and former Soviet facilities. Three 
non-Russian republics (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) made a decision to join the 
NPT as non-nuclear states, and as such had to eliminate all the nuclear stock and move 
it to Russia.  It is assumed that sometimes Russia is forced to use conventional weapons 
storage sites for keeping its nuclear weapons, which are not suitable for these purposes.   
Second, it is alarming that Russian military and security forces remain the 
principal source of arms becoming available to organised crime groups, participants in 
regional conflicts, and corrupt state officials engaged in the black, grey, and legal arms 
markets in their various dimensions.263 Finally, corruption is dangerous not only at the 
level of highly placed military officials, but also at the level of regular members of 
Russian military. They are facing dramatic economic hardships and are going through a 
time of political and social crisis; all these factors cause a deterioration of the morale in 
the Russian army and often are a pre-requisite for crime from within the military 
establishment. 
 
5.2.2. Safety and Security of Fissile Material at MINATOM’s Sites  
MINATOM stores weapons-usable nuclear materials in over 300 buildings at 
over 40 facilities across the country, according to an assessment by the U.S. National 
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156 
Intelligence Council.264 The safeguards applied to MINATOM’s facilities are less strict 
than the ones used by MOD. In the mid-90s, almost each and single site under the 
control of MINATOM had inadequate MPC&A, did not meet the strict nuclear safety 
and security regulations and as such represented a potentially great risk:   
“MINATOM appears to be somewhat less strict in managing nuclear 
stockpiles that its military counterpart [MOD], although this relative laxity 
applies more to nuclear materials outside the nuclear weapons complex – 
that is, nuclear materials under MINATOM control produced for and by 
nonweapons activities in the research, commercial power, and military 
sectors." 265
 One of the main vulnerabilities of MINATOM is its inability to deal with 
insider thefts. During the Soviet time all the nuclear custodians relied heavily on 
reliability of the members of its vast nuclear complex. The Soviet nuclear safety and 
security systems were designed to counter threats from outsiders, but safeguards 
systems were not developed to confront insider threats. 
It is considered that the stockpiles controlled by MINATOM represent a 
steadily growing risk due to the dismantlement process (fissile material extracted from 
dismantled weapons is transferred from the MOD to custody of MINATOM) and 
MINATOM’s lack of appropriate storage facilities. Even MINATOM officials 
themselves had to acknowledge that interim storage facilities for plutonium from 
dismantled weapons «are not very safe» and are not adequately guarded and there is a 
shortage of trained personnel and modern equipment, inadequate transport control 
procedures, and the lack of storage and processing facilities.266   
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5.2.3. Safety and Security of Fissile Material at the Research and Other 
Fuel Cycles   
It is acknowledged that research and other fuel cycles are the weakest category 
among all nuclear facilities in terms of vulnerabilities to nuclear theft and material 
misplacement. Different research installations, naval fuel cycles, and non-standard fuel 
cycles all have a certain amount of fissile material, and this material is stored under 
conditions that do not come close to meeting desired standards of nuclear custody. 267   
Oleg Bukharin of Princeton University confirmed that research reactors 
represent a “significant vulnerability”.268  As shown in Appendix 1, some of the sites do 
not even fall under custody of MINATOM – there are several under the jurisdiction of 
civilian ministries, which have no expertise in managing nuclear materials. According to 
U.S. specialists, small civilian research sites in Russia are the biggest threat.269 It is 
evident that the amount of fissile material in Russia is overwhelming, its security is less 
than adequate, and there are apparent reasons for concern of the world community and 
policy decision-makers. 
 
5.3. Types of Threats  
There are several types of threats for material smuggling that can be identified: 
the group insider threat, the outsider threat, and the high-level insider threat. 
5.3.1. The Group Insider Threat  
A group of insiders, who feel economically desperate, can pose the most serious 
threat.  Workers in the Russian nuclear complex found themselves in a quite desperate 
situation in the early 90s. Financial difficulties and, as a result, low morale became the 
worrisome characteristics of the formerly privileged social group. Through its own 
resources and with a significant help of cooperative threat reduction funds, Russia was 
able to improve the working and living conditions for nuclear scientists, who faced 
major economic challenges in the early 90s.  It should be noted that many in the West 
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praise former Soviet nuclear scientists for being highly professional and patriotic about 
security interests of their country, and remaining loyal to the state interests even in the 
conditions of severe hardship.   
However, the possibility that interested parties can exploit poor economic 
conditions in order to “buy in” knowledge of the desperate nuclear workers or use their 
access to fissile material in order to illegally obtain some of it - still remains (Chapter 7 
discusses challenges faced by the Russian nuclear complex workers and potential 
proliferation threats associated with economic hardships).  
5.3.2. Outsider Attack  
Some of the Russian facilities, especially, the smaller ones can be subjected to 
an outsider attack with the goal of obtaining fissile or radioactive material. Events such 
as the seizure of a theatre in the heart of Moscow in 2002 by Chechen fighters proved 
that Russian law enforcement forces are not prepared to prevent such attacks. 270
The level of protection varies from site to site. Sites under the authority of the 
Defence Ministry believed to have a better level of physical security that any other sites, 
where nuclear weapons and/or materials are stored. There is a debate in Russia on 
changing the way MINATOM sites are being protected.  At the moment, MINATOM 
sites are guarded by the forces of Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA). The 
Russian government suggested that MINATOM should find its own resources to 
protect its facilities.271  If MIA forces no longer guard MINATOM’s facilities, it will put 
additional pressure on MINATOM.   
In Russia there are many civilian research institutes, where some work was done 
involving dangerous material, but since such work stopped, nobody has comprehensive 
information on where such material is still left and in what condition.272 Such places are 
usually completely unprotected. 
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5.3.3. High-Level Insider Threat    
The possibility of highly placed insider being involved in a security breach is not 
formally discussed either in the U.S. or in Russia. Nevertheless, such a scenario came 
up in several informal conversations with the U.S. non-proliferation experts.273 It 
remains highly unlikely that high-level security personnel or facilities’ managers would 
voluntarily get involved in an illegal operation connected with fissile material. One of 
the reasons for that is the remaining high professionalism and patriotism of the nuclear 
complex workers in Russia and the severe legal punishment in case such a breach is 
discovered. However, there are plausible scenarios of such an eventuality. For example, 
if higher level insiders were subject to blackmail, and forced to ignore a security breach, 
the theft of nuclear material might occur. This threat is probably the most difficult to 
counter. 
 
5.4. Fissile Material Smuggling  
5.4.1. Smuggling Fissile Material: The Level of Risk 
The following section discusses how it can be possible for terrorists/nuclear 
black market dealers/and even for members of the Russian nuclear complex 
community (if they choose to do so) to acquire fissile material. Specialists confirm that 
some health or other risks associated with nuclear material smuggling are nothing more 
than myths.274 The following facts suggesting that smuggling is not that difficult and 
demonstrate why it is important to secure material at the source.   
First of all, the transportation of weapons and fissile material does not 
contribute a major challenge.  Many nuclear weapons are easily transported by ordinary 
means of transportation – cars, trucks, aircraft. It is even easier to transport fissile 
material (in amounts enough for a simple nuclear weapon) – it can be carried by any 
person without danger to his/her health. 
Secondly, handling of fissile material is not necessarily a hazardous activity.  
Plutonium and HEU can be carried out of Russia with little or no danger to the person 
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carrying them. Stealing the material is not a hazardous activity because, especially, 
uranium is not dangerous at all. Handling fissile material is more of a problem: 
plutonium processing does require special precautions and safety measures.275
Thirdly, the amount required for a nuclear device is quite small.  Both 
plutonium and HEU are very dense and compact; therefore, the volume associated 
with a large weight is very small (the size of a Coke can).  
Therefore, nuclear smuggling is not a difficult challenge for those who might 
choose to acquire nuclear material. 
 
5.4.2. Acknowledged Cases of Smuggling    
There are numerous reports of theft and the smuggling of nuclear materials 
from the territory of Russia and ex-Soviet Republics. Some of them failed to be 
officially proved, but there were some cases, which clearly demonstrated a growing 
number of attempts to smuggle fissile material. It has to be noted that those cases 
(where the theft/smuggling) was discovered may possibly represent the tip of an 
iceberg and are publicly known only because unsuccessful smugglers were caught by 
luck. It is only left to imagination how many attempts of the nuclear smuggling have 
been implemented successfully by the criminal elements, and how the nuclear dangers 
for the world community have increased. The material already smuggled from Russia 
may well be sitting in the hands of rogue states/organisations waiting to be used in 
illegally produced weapons. 
The U.S. National Intelligence Council assessed that ‘undetected smuggling has 
occurred’, although the extent or magnitude of undetected thefts is unknown.276 
According to David Kyd of the IAEA, there have been 175 known cases of attempts to 
smuggle nuclear material out of former Soviet Republics.277 A new database of lost, 
stolen and misplaced nuclear material (Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and 
Orphan Radiation Sources) compiled at Stanford University after September 11th has 
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revealed some serious facts. According to Lyudmila Zaitseva, a visiting fellow at 
Stanford University, over the past 10 years at least 88 pounds (40 kg) of weapons-
usable uranium and plutonium had been stolen from the facilities in the former Soviet 
Union. Most of this material was subsequently retrieved, but at least 4.4 pounds (2 kg) 
of HEU stolen from Georgia still remains missing.278  
One of the major problems of the post-Soviet period is the dramatic increase in 
state corruption, and the deterioration of the professional morale among the members 
of military and security forces. Vulnerability to insiders is the weakest spot of the 
Russian nuclear complex, while there is a growing demand for fissile material on the 
world black market, which according to the principles of business creates supply. The 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 and subsequent declarations from Osama Bin Laden that Al-
Qaida would not hesitate to use WMD aggravated concerns about unprotected material 
in the former Soviet Union.   
Table 5 demonstrates some acknowledged cases of nuclear smuggling, which 
originated from the territory of Russia and former Soviet Union. 
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Table 5 Some Cases of Nuclear Materials Smuggling from FSU279
December 
2001 
Russian police arrested seven men trying to sell more than one kilogram 
(2.2 pounds) of suspected weapons-grade uranium.  It was reported that 
the criminals were trying to sell the uranium for $30,000 to another gang.  It 
is thought that the capsule could have come from a nuclear research centre 
or a production plant.   
July 2001 In Georgia police arrested three men attempting to sell 1.7 kilograms (3.751lbs) of 
Uranium235 to buyers in Turkey. 
1999  CIA confirmed that the material seized by Bulgarian authorities was weapons-
usable.  The material - four grams of HEU - likely originated in Russia. 
1998 
 
Although not independently confirmed, reports of a theft from an unnamed 
enterprise in Chelyabinsk Oblast are of concern, believes CIA.  According to 
MINATOM’s Viktor Yerastov, the amount stolen was «quite sufficient material to 
produce an atomic bomb».   
1994 3.0 kilograms of 90% enriched weapons-grade uranium were stolen in Moscow. 
June 1994 
 
800 mg of HEU enriched to 87.7% (probably originating from Obninsk) was 
obtained from a Slovakian trader in Germany. 
August 
1994 
 
On August 10, 1994 German police at the Munich airport seized almost a pound 
of near-weapons-grade plutonium (87% Pu239).  The material was brought into 
Germany from Moscow. 
May 1994 
 
On May 24, 1994 German police found 5.6 grams of super-grade plutonium 
(99.78 percent Pu239) in the garage of Adolf Jäckle in Tengen, Germany.  It was 
believed that the material originated from Arzamas-16. 
July 1993 
 
1.8 kilograms of HEU enriched to 36% in the form of two fuel rods was stolen b
two naval servicemen at a naval base storage facility of the Northern Fleet 
Andreeva Guba, Murmansk region. 
Mid-1992 
 
During a three-and-a-half month period in mid-1992 an engineer Smirnov 
working for Luch Scientific Production Association (Podolsk) stole approximately 
3.7 pounds (or 1.5 kilograms) of HEU (90% enriched).   
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Apart from the cases involving fissile material, attention should be paid to other 
incidents, which did not involve neither Plutonium nor HEU, but where leakage 
occurred from a facility possessing large volumes of material. One of the examples was 
the case, when four tonnes of beryllium were taken from one of the institutes outside 
of Moscow.  The material was shipped to Yekaterinburg, then – Vilnius, where it was 
finally discovered.  It was reported that the head of the institute and security people 
were involved.  The institute in question stored tonnes of material.280  
This list is far from comprehensive and includes only some cases of the 
acknowledged incidents of nuclear material smuggling from the territory of the Russian 
Federation and former Soviet republics. Some of the cases were confirmed by the 
Russian authorities, in some the exact origin of the material remains in doubt, and how 
it found its way to the market. The important questions are: how difficult is it to 
illegally obtain nuclear material from Russian facilities, how real is the demand, who are 
the potential buyers, and what is the real scope of the problem.  
There are no doubts about the dangers of illegal nuclear material proliferation.  
The Russian government, in the first place, as well as the world community, have to be 
extremely vigilant about potential threats of nuclear smuggling. It is apparent that the 
problem of safeguarding nuclear material in Russia is dramatic. Neither authorities, nor 
observers can deny the fact that it is possible to obtain nuclear material from the 
Russian territory if such an intention exists. 
 
5.4.3. Potential Smugglers and Buyers of Fissile Material  
The high number of cases (both confirmed and unconfirmed) demonstrates 
that demand exists for smuggled nuclear material. At the same time, some of the cases 
can not provide a straightforward answer to the main question: who are the buyers and 
whether there is a relevant (not exaggerated) view on the number and determination of 
potential smugglers and buyers. The case of material seizure in Munich airport is one of 
the best examples of controversy surrounding this problem. 
It is believed that the operation carried out by the German authorities in 
Munich airport in 1994, which resulted in the seizure of more than 0.5 kg of MOX 
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(containing 363 g of plutonium close to weapons-grade material), was especially set up.  
It was revealed that it had been a ‘sting operation’ by the German Intelligence 
Service.281 In that case, it is highly likely that the ‘supply’ was artificially created by the 
‘demand’ of the intelligence services. This incident does not provide any evidence as to 
whether a market exists. Nonetheless, the majority of cases involving nuclear smuggling 
were not set up and provide evidence of existing demand for smuggled nuclear 
material. The case also suggests that the demand for material can be met at ‘black’ 
nuclear market. 
Who are the real potential buyers of smuggled material? The first most 
common and logical assumption is: they are the threshold countries, in other words, the 
states, which are one step away from creating their own nuclear warhead and this 
remaining step to be taken is to obtain necessary material. The countries, like Iraq 
(before the recent war) or Iran, for example, might want to use this opportunity and 
become buyers of smuggled nuclear material. However, it should be noted that 
threshold states willing to become nuclear would prefer to manufacture material 
themselves rather than rely on the occasional supply from the illegal nuclear market. 
Having said this, an incentive for threshold states is present and cannot be ruled out. A 
purchase of already produced fissile material can considerably reduce the timeframe for 
an acquisition of a nuclear weapon. 
Another group of potential buyers is – sub-state, terrorist organisations.  In the 
aftermath of September the 11th events in the U.S., the danger of Al-Qaida and other 
well-established terrorist organisations trying to obtain Russian fissile material in order 
to produce nuclear weapons is more significant than ever. Already existing stockpiles 
are probably the only source for terrorists to obtain fissile material. The production of 
fissile material is an extremely sophisticated process, which requires a complex 
infrastructure and state support. Currently, no terrorist organisation is believed to be 
capable of producing nuclear material. At the same time, it could possible for 
organisations like Al-Qaida to produce a nuclear weapon (or at a minimum a 
radiological weapon) if they acquire the necessary amount of material. Therefore, an 
incentive for this group to illegally obtain it from nuclear states is high and poses a 
serious security risk to the world community. 
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There have been acknowledged attempts of Al-Qaida members to acquire 
nuclear material from the former Soviet Union and other countries. In 1993 an Al-
Qaida operative was instructed to attempt a purchase of HEU in Sudan, in 1998 the 
senior Al-Qaida deputy Mamdouh Mahmud Salim was arrested in Germany and 
charged with an attempt to obtain HEU in mid-1990s, and there were credible but 
unconfirmed reports of Al-Qaida attempts to purchase nuclear materials in Kazakhstan 
and Ukraine.282
Although, there is no established functioning black market for fissile material, 
there are all the prerogatives for having one. There are those, who are willing to buy 
such material, and there are those, who might be capable of getting and willing to sell it.  
If buyers manage to link to sellers there could be a significant leakage of nuclear and 
radioactive material from unsecured sites. With the danger of fissile material smuggling 
being so apparent, the U.S.-Russian cooperative threat reduction involving MPC&A 
Programme to improve material safety and security is extremely important.   
 
5.5. Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) 
Programme  
5.5.1. Background of the Problem  
The shortest path for terrorists or rogue states to acquire nuclear capability is to 
get hold of nuclear material. Russia possesses 800-1,200 tonnes of HEU and about 130-
200 tonnes of Plutonium283, which is dispersed all over the country at the numerous 
military and civilian sites without adequate safeguards.   According to 2001 estimates of 
the U.S. Defence Department, 603 metric tons of HEU and Plutonium out of this 
amount are at risk of nuclear theft.  This material can be used directly in a nuclear 
                                                 
282 Mclound and Osbourne ‘WMD and Usama Bin Laden’, Benjamin Weiser ‘U.S. Says Bin 
Laden Aide Tried to Get Nuclear Weapons’, New York Times, 26.09.1998, Marie Colvin 
‘Holy Warrior with U.S. in His Sights’, Times (London), 16.08.1998 – all cited in Bunn, 
Wier, Holdren, ‘Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials’, op. cit., pp. 14-15 
283 Refer to sources listed in footnotes 257 and 258 
166 
weapon without further enrichment or reprocessing.  This amount is enough to 
produce almost 40,000 nuclear warheads.284
In the current circumstances, Material Protection Control and Accounting 
Programme (MPC&A) in Russia is without exaggeration the most vital prerequisite for 
a safer world. A comprehensive MPC&A system is the most basic requirement for any 
nuclear state, which recognises its responsibility in the face of its own population and 
the world community. 
At the moment, in Russia and the other former Soviet republics (which still 
have nuclear material left on their territory from Soviet times) MPC&A is far from 
adequate.  The unsatisfactory conditions, in which material is stored, makes one wonder 
how until now there has been no major disaster connected with the misuse of this 
material. There is a documented evidence of some fissile material storage sites left 
unguarded and unprotected for various reasons - lack of resources, severe socio-
economic crisis in Russia, and a crisis of morale in the Russian military. At one of the 
facilities visited by U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) officials, an entrance 
gate to a building containing nuclear material was left open and unattended by 
guards.285
The problem of accounting is a serious challenge for the Russian nuclear 
complex.  If there is no systemic comprehensive account of material there is no chance 
of identifying its loss. If it is known that misplacing poorly protected material will not 
raise any suspicion, there is a great possibility someone will attempt to use this 
loophole. There can be no margin for inaccurate accountancy. The failure to account 
properly for even 1 per cent of material can be dangerous. A simple example: if at a site 
with 100 metric tons a 1 per cent margin for miscalculation is allowed, it means a metric 
ton of dangerous material can be unaccounted for and not identified as stolen. Taking 
into consideration, that only a few kilograms of weapons-grade material are needed for 
a simple nuclear device, even an insignificant miscalculation can lead to rather serious 
consequences. 
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Unfortunately, the Soviet system has created some paradoxical methods of 
accounting. Due to an obsession with over-production, it became a common practice 
to manipulate numbers, even of fissile material. The nuclear facilities would produce 
extra plutonium without it been registered in case of a short fall in production in the 
following years.286
The U.S. National Research Council (NRC) has specified the following: 
«…The Soviets maintained primitive accounting systems for direct-use 
material at each facility, relying primarily on handwritten documentation and 
only occasionally on computer-based records.  The documentation was not 
always complete or easily retrievable […] there were significant errors in the 
records (e.g., in one case, supplies of HEU were recorded as low-enriched 
uranium)…» 287
Such a peculiar accounting system left a problematic heritage in terms of non-
proliferation. First, it is a reason for the present lack of an MPC&A culture in Russia (it 
is only recently that Russian authorities gradually started to appreciate importance of 
the comprehensive MPC&A system). Secondly, the accumulation of materials for 
future accounting purposes creates additional risk of diversion of nuclear material by 
insiders, who are aware both of certain amounts of unaccounted material and the 
possibility of misplacing it gradually in small amounts without being caught. 
It should be noted that during the Soviet times, accounting for the nuclear 
material was not a priority for the state, because the nature of the state itself made theft 
from inside very unlikely. Due to the isolation of the Soviet state, highly secretive 
military nature of activities connected with nuclear weapons production, tight state 
control and reliance on the personal responsibility of nuclear custodians, and a lack of 
outside demand for nuclear material – the insider threat was not an issue during the 
Soviet period.   
In the case of modern Russia, both types of threats - from outsiders and 
insiders - cannot be neglected. Therefore, the whole philosophy of how to make 
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nuclear materials safe needs to change. Providing for a high level of MPC&A would be 
a good starting point. 
 
5.5.2. Three Components of MPC&A   
The purpose of the U.S.-funded MPC&A Programme is to rapidly reduce the 
threat posed by unsecured Russian nuclear weapons-usable material. The MPC&A 
Programme provides Russian nuclear facilities with modern safeguards, material 
accounting and physical protection systems; training for nuclear personnel in proper 
MPC&A techniques; assistance in developing a comprehensive and enduring regulatory 
basis for nuclear material security in Russia; and assistance in improving the physical 
protection of nuclear weapons-usable materials in transit.288
MPC&A consists of three main components: 289
1. The Physical Protection System includes such elements as fences, multiple 
barriers to entry, limited access points, alarms, motion detectors, metal doors, and 
video surveillance. Physical Protection Systems should enable the detection of any 
unauthorised penetration of barriers and portals, thereby triggering an immediate 
response, including the use of force if necessary. The system should delay intruders 
long enough to allow an effective response.290 
 
2. Material Control Systems include such elements as seals attached to nuclear 
containers that indicate tampering or theft, identification codes that make it 
possible to verify readily the location and condition of material, badges for 
personnel, portal monitors and other devices to control egress from storage sites, 
authorised flow paths, storage locations, secure containers for material. Material 
Control Systems should prevent unauthorised movement of materials and allow 
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for prompt detection of the theft or diversion of material.291 
 
3. Material Accounting Systems include inventory systems and computerised 
databases that allow sites to keep track of the amount and type of nuclear material 
in specific buildings. Material Accounting Systems should ensure that all material 
is accounted for, enable the measurement of losses, and provide information for 
follow-up investigations of irregularities.292 
 
5.6. Origins of MPC&A Programme – the Evolution of Decision-
Making  
The MPC&A Programme has been modified over time. Looking at different 
stages of its evolution and the role of different agencies in its implementation fits well 
into the bureaucratic politics decision-making model chosen as a theoretical framework 
for this study. The role of key political actors has been crucial in how the programme 
developed.  Other important factors include political, social and economic conditions, 
in which MPC&A Programme has to operate in Russia. Lack of funds in Russia, 
secretiveness with regard to facilities, which need security upgrades, an underdeveloped 
MPC&A culture and inadequate personnel training, as well as bureaucratic hurdles 
contribute to problems of implementation. 
 
5.6.1. The Government-to-Government Programme  
The first effort to assist the former Soviet Union in improving material 
protection, control and accounting began in 1992 in the form of a Government-to-
Government Programme. The Government-to-Government Programme was part of 
Department of Defence (DOD) CTR Programme.293 The Programme’s initial legal 
status was based on the ‘Agreement Between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation Concerning Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and 
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Destruction of Weapons and Prevention of Weapons Proliferation’ signed in June, 
1992 – the CTR “umbrella” agreement. 
That initial period of negotiations on MPC&A was a difficult time – the Russian 
authorities were suspicious of U.S motives and refused to allow intrusive inspections at 
their sites. The first bilateral agreement on the development of national systems for 
physical protection, control and accounting of civilian nuclear materials was reached in 
September 1993 but the cooperation was limited to low-enriched uranium (LEU) 
only.294
The authors of the report ‘Foreign Programs Reducing Russia’s WMD Threats: 
Appraisals and Outlook’295 believe that there were three main reasons for the slow pace 
of the Government-to-Government programme: the difficulty to reach an agreement 
on access to facilities with ‘direct-use’ material; MINATOM’s reluctance to 
acknowledge GAN’s role in supervising nuclear safety at its facilities; and a requirement 
imposed by the U.S. Congress to buy only American equipment and expertise. 296
Russian authorities were adamantly opposed to the idea of allowing American 
specialists access to highly sensitive sites. The facilities, where most of fissile material is 
located, are the most sensitive sites in the Russian nuclear complex. Allowing U.S. 
experts to the ‘heart’ of the Russian nuclear establishment was seen as a serious breach 
of the national security interests of the Russian state. Russian legislation did not provide 
a clearly defined status for GAN, and MINATOM was opposed to being ‘regulated’.  
The provision imposed on Russians to buy only American equipment and other goods 
was an impractical and disappointing requirement. Very often it would have been easier 
and beneficial for the programme to use Russian-made equipment, thus, reducing the 
cost, the time for delivery, and avoiding problems connected with unsuitability of 
American goods for Russian conditions.  
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Although, the initial period of the MPC&A Programme (at its Government-to-
Government) was rather complicated, it laid the groundwork for the unprecedented 
process of cooperative efforts in making Russian fissile material more secure.   
 
5.6.2. The Lab-to-Lab Programme   
The year of 1994 was a turning point for the MPC&A Programme. That year 
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) launched a separate parallel programme called 
Laboratory-to-Laboratory. The main idea was to introduce cooperation between the 
U.S. and Russian nuclear scientists, on a more informal, less politicised level. It was one 
of the best solutions to the problems encountered by the initial DOD’s Government-
to-Government Programme. At the time, when bureaucrats had difficulty to overcome 
the legacies of the Cold War and make the extra effort required to restructure the 
mechanisms of how their government organisations worked, scientists and production 
workers were more open to cooperation. 
The success of the lab-to-lab programme can be explained by the theories of 
influence of transnational movements, which assign an important role to the epistemic 
communities in developing international cooperation.297
Even during the height of the Cold War, the nuclear scientists were not as 
hostile to each other as the systems they were representing. There are some good 
examples taken from anthropological studies of American nuclear labs and Soviet 
scientists’ autobiographies, which demonstrate this.298 The American and Russian 
scientists have always been interested in each other’s  work and after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union were prepared to work on projects of mutual interest Several years before 
the Lab-to-Lab Programme was officially established by DOE, scientists had already 
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established strong informal ties.  They began to discuss joint work on projects such as 
pulsed power, hot magnetised plasmas, and soft X-rays.299
The two main nuclear laboratories: U.S. Los Alamos National Laboratory 
(LANL) and the Russian major nuclear lab in Sarov (Arzamas-16) - developed 
extremely productive ties and in this way put a firm ground for a more structured 
cooperation proposed by the Lab-to-Lab Programme. The initial steps of the Lab-to-
Lab Programme included a demonstration of MPC&A technologies in Sarov and 
implementation of pilot projects for MPC&A upgrades at Sarov, the Kurchatov 
Institute, and the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE).300 Among 
participants of the Lab-to-Lab Programme were the All-Russian Scientific Research 
Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF), the All-Russian Scientific Research 
Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF), Siberian Chemical Combine (SCC), the 
Bochvar All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Inorganic Materials (VNIINM), 
the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Automation, and the ELERON 
company.301
The lab-to-lab initiative played a crucial role in the process of trust-building 
between Russia and the United States. As a result, the Russian authorities began to 
allow access to some of the facilities with HEU and Plutonium. In 1994 the first 
reciprocal visits to plutonium storage facilities were exchanged, and the first contracts 
for rapid MPC&A upgrades were issued.302 The Lab-to-Lab Programme has been 
praised for its effectiveness. Several factors determined its success: the time frame; the 
elimination of suspicion; the bottom-up approach in moving forward cooperation; and 
the reduction of the “brain-drain” threat. 
The process of the implementation of projects was simplified because there was 
no need to negotiate and sign state-level agreements. Laboratories on both sides could 
arrange direct straightforward contracts, which were not subject to congressional 
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approval and restrictions. The American and Russian scientists involved in the Lab-to-
Lab initiative established personal ties and built trust throughout the years of scientific 
cooperation. The fact that they shared a common understanding of what was important 
and necessary, what needed to be done at first place, and the ways of how to do it had a 
positive effect on bringing two sides closer. 
Once the nuclear scientists on both sides defined the priorities in cooperative 
threat reduction initiatives, they could influence the officials, state agencies and 
government in their countries from ‘bottom-up’. In the case of the Russian 
bureaucracy, especially, an understanding of nuclear safety and security needs and an 
appreciation of cooperation with the U.S. demonstrated by Russian scientists played a 
major role in moving forward decision-making at state level. U.S. observers 
acknowledged that Russian scientists simply ‘know better’ how to deal with the 
mechanisms of the Russian bureaucracy, and therefore, can prove to be an important 
tool in influencing the government.303 Involvement of Russian scientists in the lab-to-
lab initiative projects also contributed to lessening of the ‘brain drain’ problem (the 
problem of ‘brain-drain’ is further discussed in Chapter 7). 
The main shortcoming of the lab-to-lab programme was that it was only limited 
to the U.S. and Russia,304 and did not include other former Soviet republics, which 
could have benefited from such cooperation. Until 1996 the MPC&A initiative was 
implemented on two levels: the government-to-government programme (under 
auspices of the DOD) and the lab-to-lab programme (under the auspices of the DOE). 
The lab-to-lab programme in its early years escaped bureaucratic problems, 
while the process was much more ponderous in the government-to-government 
programme.305 However, in terms of programme goals there was a little difference 
between the two programmes. 
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5.6.3. Consolidation and Expansion of MPC&A-related Activities  
In 1996 Department of Energy received funding responsibilities for all MPC&A 
activities.  In this way, MPC&A efforts of the DOD and the DOE (the Government-
to-Government and Lab-to-Lab Programmes) were managed as separate programmes, 
although the funding was coming from one source – the Department of Defence. The 
two programmes were coordinated by the laboratory experts brought to DOE 
headquarters under the supervision of the Director of the Office of Arms Control and 
Non-proliferation.306
The period of 1995-1996 was a time of rapid expansion of MPC&A activities: 
the number of sites, where MPC&A upgrades were implemented grew dramatically. 
However, there was a setback to that process of acceleration - by late 1995 the Russian 
FSB became concerned with the number of American visits to the nuclear sites in 
Russia, which resulted in the imposition of more formal controls over the U.S.-
sponsored MPC&A activities.307 By 1995-1996 labs lost decision-making authority.  In 
February 1997 DOE consolidated its Government-to-Government and Lab-to-Lab 
Programmes into the Material, Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) 
Programme. The MPC&A Programme is now under the auspices of DOE’s National 
Nuclear Security Agency.308  From the Russian side the main partners are the Ministry 
of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) and Gosatomnadzor (GAN).  Additionally, U.S. DOE 
signed agreements on cooperation with the Russian Navy and several Nuclear Centres. 
There are varying opinions on the reasons behind the consolidation of the two 
programmes, and on its effect on the MPC&A work in Russia. Some believe that it was 
necessary to consolidate management, and the process of work remained the same.309 
At the same time, another group of experts saw a negative trend in consolidation, 
which, in their opinion, resulted in diminishing role of the lab-to-lab cooperation.   
 
                                                 
306 Bukharin, Bunn, Luongo, ‘Renewing the Partnership’, op. cit., p. 46 
307 ibid 
308 NTI, ‘Russia: DOE MPC&A Program’, 
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/doe/mpca.htm retrieved on 12.04.02 
309 Interview with the U.S. senior national lab official, Washington D.C., April 2, 2003 
175 
Bukharin et al. note:  
“The lab experts who had led both parts of the effort were forced out, 
management was taken over by federal officials, and the role of both the 
U.S. and Russian experts in general was substantially de-emphasized.”310
Although current MPC&A managers give credit to the Lab-to-Lab efforts in 
preparing the ground for negotiations that were difficult for the governments, they 
would not want MPC&A activities to be shifted to labs again. They consider that if 
there is government support for certain projects, it is better to build on the agreement 
already achieved by the governments, and that the “labs not necessarily reflect bigger 
strategy views of the government”.311 The fact that the labs do not reflect the larger 
strategy and policy of the government might be exactly why the lab-to-lab initiative was 
successful in avoiding politically-induced impediments experienced by all the other 
CTR projects. The lab representatives operate from the basis of the interests of their 
respective labs (i.e. interest in joint scientific, non-proliferation projects; funding 
appropriated to labs for these projects).   
Due to the rapid expansion of the programme some new ways of implementing 
the programme’s activities were introduced: an improved computer-based financial and 
status monitoring of all projects was instituted, and the new guidelines on the standards 
for the upgrades were defined.312   
In March 1999 the MPC&A Programme was expanded (as a part of the 
Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative) to include some new projects: The Material 
Conversion and Consolidation Programme (MCC) and The Site Operations and 
Sustainability Programme. The MCC Programme is designed to reduce the number of 
sites, buildings, and former Soviet republics, where fissile material is located (it is 
planned that by 2010 weapons grade nuclear material will be moved from 50 buildings 
located at 5 facilities).313 Currently, there is an MCC pilot programme at the facilities of 
Luch (near Moscow) and at the Scientific Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (NIIAR) 
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(in Dmitrovgrad). The projects involve blending down 24 tons of HEU to LEU at 
these sites, which can no longer be used in production of weapons.314 The focus of the 
MCC Programme is less on the quantity of materials, but on the number of sites.315   
Currently, the MCC Programme has stalled due to a number of reasons. MINATOM is 
not prepared to provide a list of sites, from which material can be removed, until a 
separate agreement is in place on material consolidation activities. Another reason is the 
unwillingness of the managers of the facilities to give up material stored at their sites. 
They see the presence of nuclear material as a guarantee that U.S. funding will be 
allocated to their facilities for MPC&A upgrades.316
The Site Operations and Sustainability Programme is designed to provide the 
basis for the long-term sustainability of MPC&A activities.317 This programme involves 
establishing training facilities in Russia and developing regulatory standards for 
MPC&A. Every team at each site focuses on ensuring that the results of their work will 
be sustained over time, and the policy objective is to lessen Russia’s reliance on U.S. 
funding.  
In the spring of 1999 responsibility for the non-Russian NIS was transferred 
from the MPC&A Programme to DOE’s Office of International Safeguards, leaving 
MPC&A concentrate solely on Russia.318 In October 1999 Russia and the U.S. signed a 
government-to-government agreement that extended U.S.-Russian MPC&A 
cooperation, established a Joint Coordinating Committee, and authorised the 
development of alternative measures to resolve issues of access to Russian facilities.319   
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5.7. MPC&A Programme Implementation 
The Figure 2 presents the MPC&A budget during the period of 1993-2004. 
Figure 2 MPC&A Budget (1993-2004)320
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There are 59 major nuclear sites in Russia, 31 of which are nuclear 
production/reprocessing facilities and nuclear research centres, and 27 are naval bases 
and shipyards. The analysis of the upgrades already implemented or planned can help to 
evaluate the pace of the DOE-funded MPC&A assistance to Russian nuclear facilities. 
The analysis is based on the information provided in Appendix 2. The most recent 
comprehensive data available in the open sources is of 2001.321 Out of 31 nuclear 
facilities in Russia: MPC&A upgrades were completed at 13; work began but was not 
completed at 12; work has not begun or was suspended at five of them; and one facility 
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was determined to be in no need of MPC&A upgrades. 
The situation with the MPC&A upgrades at the naval facilities is different from 
the other nuclear facilities. The amounts of fissile material kept at the naval sites are 
smaller, and the type of their storage (nuclear fuel is confined inside a submarine 
reactor) poses a lesser proliferation risk. Out of 27 naval sites in Russia – nine do not 
require MPC&A assistance because the nuclear fuel in a submarine reactor is 
considered to be safe once the reactor is operational.  It is not clear whether three other 
sites do not have MPC&A upgrades for the same reason. Nine naval sites have 
undergone MPC&A upgrades and the work at those sites has not been completed.   At 
two sites the work is believed to have started but it is not known whether it has been 
completed or not according to the latest available data published in 2001. At the 
remaining nine sites – DOE is considering implementing MPC&A upgrades and is 
negotiating it with either Russia’s MINATOM or GAN.  At one of the sites (Olenya 
Naval Base) the MPC&A upgrades were completed at the PM-12 fuel-transfer ship, 
which also operates at Nerpa Shipyard. 
MPC&A achievements at Navy facilities are an illustration of a very successful 
cooperation.  Ninety-five percent of the Russian sites suggested by Navy as requiring 
assistance have had MPC&A upgrades.    
5.8. Analysis of Each Component of MPC&A Upgrades  
The information available on MPC&A upgrades in Appendix 2 demonstrates 
some general trends on how the programme works and what are the most common 
measures to improve material protection control and accounting systems in Russia. It is 
apparent that the MPC&A programme had to prioritise its activities. First, the upgrades 
had to be implemented at those buildings at numerous Russian sites, where the 
potential proliferation risk was the greatest and to which U.S. experts could have been 
granted access. Among such buildings were reactor, critical assembly and storage 
facilities, where the amount of fissile material was the largest. 
MPC&A upgrades implemented at the Russian nuclear facilities can be generally 
summarised in accordance with the three defined levels: physical protection, material 
control system, and material accounting system. 
Improving physical protection is the first priority of MPC&A improvements at 
any of the Russian sites. Although, historically, physical protection from outsider 
threats was highly advanced, nowadays it needs enhancement. Adam Bernstein believes, 
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the necessary physical infrastructure in Russia (guard forces, secure perimeters) is either 
already in place or could easily be put into place given the necessary financial 
resources.322 Among the upgrades often implemented are the following measures: 
installation of hardened doors, metal detectors, video surveillance, alarm systems and a 
physical protection control centre; area wide physical protection upgrades include 
vehicle and pedestrian portal monitors and metal detectors at key points of the 
facilities. 
It is hard to evaluate the overall progress of physical protection upgrades at the 
Russian facilities due to the different level of the work done at the different sites. It is 
believed that the physical protection of nuclear material is extremely good at some of 
the facilities, while some others raise concern in terms of proliferation risk: 
“…Whether due to Russian efforts and the influx of U.S. and other foreign 
assistance, Russian physical protection has become a mixed bag of old and 
new practices and attitudes, and of outdated and up-to-date equipment, 
both at relatively stable and economically strapped facilities…”323
The upgrades of the material control system have become an important part of 
limiting the risk of the external and internal thefts. Material control system 
improvements implemented by the MPC&A programme in Russia include the 
following measures: installation of access controls, implementation of a computerised 
badging system, construction of a centralised MPC&A control station, development of 
a tamper-indicating device programme, bar codes, provision of special nuclear-material 
portal and hand-held monitors, the use of electronic scales, tags and seals, equipment 
for nuclear material management. 
The lack of adequate material accounting in Russia is one of the main 
deficiencies of its MPC&A system. As was discussed earlier, the lack of accurate 
accounting of fissile material can lead to its gradual leakage without being noticed by 
the controlling authorities. Therefore, the improvement of the material accounting 
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system is another important task of MPC&A programme in Russia. The main measures 
to improve the material accounting system include the following: measured physical 
inventory of nuclear materials, computerised material accounting systems, the use of 
methods for automated material accounting. 
Due to the absence of a sound material accounting culture in Russia, the 
process of completing an inventory of nuclear material will take a long time. First of all, 
it is a pain-staking process of re-measuring all the existing material given the inaccurate 
accounts left from the Soviet times. Secondly, an even harder task is to introduce a 
whole ‘culture’ of material accounting – to make sure the Russian nuclear custodians 
are aware of the vital importance of accurate inventories. 
 
5.9. The Key Players 
As with all the other major CTR programmes, certain key players had an 
important role in shaping the implementation of the programme. Throughout the 
development of the MPC&A Programme, responsibility for its implementation shifted 
between different U.S. agencies. The transfer of programme authority from a military 
organisation (U.S. Department of Defence) to a civilian agency (U.S. Department of 
Energy) has eased some of the tension in carrying out the projects. 
Initially, funding for MPC&A projects was coming from the Department of 
Defence budget, as a part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme. Even 
when the funding was coming from DOD’s budget, the actual implementation was 
undertaken by DOE experts.  From 1994, when DOE launched its separate Lab-to-Lab 
Programme, U.S. national labs came to the forefront of the MPC&A activities in 
Russia.  The role of the labs was decisive in moving forward the programme, especially 
since initial government-to-government programme stalled due to bureaucratic 
obstacles. Since 1996 DOE has become the main player on the U.S. side in the 
implementation of the MPC&A Programme, when it received the funding authority. By 
1995-1996 the role of the labs started diminishing, and by 1997 – when the 
government-to-government and lab-to-lab programmes were consolidated – the role of 
the labs was formally reduced.  At the moment, MPC&A Programme is managed by 
DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).  
On the Russian side, U.S. DOE has two main partners: the Ministry of Atomic 
Energy (MINATOM) and GAN. Cooperation with MINATOM includes implementing 
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MPC&A upgrades at MINATOM’s sites. GAN has a different role as a controlling 
agency. DOE provides GAN with necessary equipment and training to carry out 
MPC&A-related inspections of nuclear facilities. 
 
5.10. Problems of Implementation  
5.10.1. The Problem with Access  
The MPC&A Programme is a peculiar mixture of unique achievements in the 
U.S.-Russian cooperative threat reduction and serious problems resulting from 
limitations in the bilateral relations. The MPC&A programme can be characterised as 
the most intrusive of all non-proliferation initiatives ever agreed on between the two 
countries. The achievement of its objectives requires intrusion into the most sensitive 
areas of Russia’s nuclear complex – to the actual production, development and testing 
sites of the country. In order to ensure an adequate evaluation of the upgrades required 
at each site, to make sure they are put in and sustained correctly, the implementation 
team needs access to these facilities. 
It is generally understood among MPC&A managers that Russian security 
services closely monitor activities connected with the programme implementation. 
However, DOE officials refer to the progress, which has been made over time, 
especially, with the Russian Ministry of Defence in receiving access to the Russian sites. 
It is believed that DOE’s status as a civilian organisation plays a positive role in 
overcoming issues of access.324   
The events of 9/11 drew a lot of attention to the safety of nuclear material in 
Russia.  Some U.S. programme managers believe that the momentum should be used to 
resolve the access issue. In 2001 an agreement on access was signed, which formalised 
the already existing procedures. The agreement stipulates a 45-day waiting period 
before permission for access can be granted. It establishes a list of approved U.S. 
personnel, who are subject to a shorter waiting period of 30 days. However, according 
to U.S. programme managers, that agreement did not resolve the problem. Four 
Russian warhead production/dismantlement facilities under MINATOM’s jurisdiction 
are on the list of the facilities, to which American specialists will likely never get access. 
However, two of them were supposed to be closed altogether in 2003, according to 
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MINATOM’s Deputy Minister Lev Ryabev.325
The lack of reciprocity with regard to access has a negative effect on the 
implementation of the MPC&A Programme – as in the case of all the other CTR 
programmes, which require unprecedented cooperation from the Russian security 
services and nuclear facilities, while similar facilities in the U.S. remain closed to 
Russian experts. The Russian side does not feel encouraged to provide better access to 
its nuclear sites for MPC&A upgrades, since the U.S. is reluctant to open its own 
facilities to Russians, even in order to demonstrate how MPC&A standards should be 
maintained. Even some American officials and experts acknowledge the need of 
reciprocity in this case.326
 
5.10.2. Historical Legacy – Russia’s Suspicion and Bureaucratic 
Bottlenecks 
Decades of hostility between America and the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War left a legacy of suspicion and lack of trust. The nuclear establishments of the two 
countries were geared up to work against each other and more than four decades years 
of antagonism resulted in some major trends in the organisational culture. The 
theoretical Model of Organisation Culture (briefly presented in Chapter 1 and further 
discussed in Chapter 3) demonstrates the importance of the organisational interests and 
values of the main participants in the state decision-making process. During the Cold 
War period the military and nuclear industries were developing and thriving on the 
necessity to override the opposite side in terms of quantity and quality of the nuclear 
weapons. The end of the Cold War changed the foundation of the international security 
system and the necessity to perfect nuclear capabilities no longer exists; however, this 
new reality is still not fully apprehended by some of those closely involved in the 
nuclear industry. 
Russia feels it is still necessary to guard the secrets of the nuclear industry and 
has a need to secure the weapons and materials. Russia is under pressure to strike the 
right balance between useful cooperation and the protection of the country’s most 
sensitive information. 
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Some aspects of the MPC&A work are complicated by the bureaucratic 
procedures on the Russian side, like, for example, travelling to Russia. Currently, before 
any American expert can travel to Russia he has to overcome some obstacles. In order 
to receive permission for such a trip an application to the Russia’s Federal Security 
Service (FSB) should be made. An application for proposed travel should be made 6 
weeks before the trip for it to be reviewed by the FSB327, and there is no guarantee 
access will be granted. 
 
5.10.3. Lack of Mutual Transparency and the U.S. Bureaucracy 
Both the suspicion and the bureaucratic bottlenecks are not limited to Russia.  
There is a general lack of mutual transparency of the nuclear inventories, the work done 
at the nuclear facilities and other aspects of the nuclear establishments. Suspicion 
towards the U.S. presence at the Russian nuclear sites results from a lack of reciprocity 
on the American side and the overall lack of transparency in the nuclear field. Many 
Russian experts believe they have grounds to oppose the American presence at some of 
the most sensitive nuclear facilities due to interests of national security. 
There are several bureaucratic problems on the American side.  Both the 
Department of Energy and the State Department considerably delay the trips of U.S. 
experts to the Russian facilities. The U.S. DOE has an almost equally complicated 
process of allowing its own experts to receive permission to travel to Russia as does the 
Russian FSB. After the scandal with the Chinese espionage the DOE imposed rigorous 
restrictions on contact with foreigners from the so called «sensitive countries» – Russia 
was included in that list. As for the State Department, it has the power to approve 
«country clearances», which it regularly delays for various reasons.328 (Refer to the role 
of the State Department discussed in Chapter 3) 
It is not surprising that with the bureaucratic obstacles coming from both sides, 
the progress of the programme becomes dependent on the organisational behaviour of 
certain state agencies. The situation when each state agency involved in the process, is 
trying to guard its interests (as well as the interests of its country, as they believe) serves 
a good practical example for the theory represented by the Organisation Process Model 
(Chapters 1 & 3). 
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Several measures can be taken in order to resolve or lessen the problems of 
access, secrecy and travel.  First of all, the Russian experts should be allowed adequate 
level of access to the U.S. facilities.  Allowing Russian specialists to see similar facilities 
in the U.S. as those they work for in Russia can serve several useful purposes. It can be 
a good way for Russian nuclear custodians to learn advanced MPC&A techniques from 
their colleagues’ experience. Moreover, a policy of openness from the American side 
can be a confidence-building exercise and can dramatically improve the spirit of 
partnership between two countries. For the Russian authorities, it is important to 
remember that the U.S. Government is assisting Russia with securing its weapons and 
materials (even though the U.S. Government does it for its own national security 
reasons). It is also vital for the success of the programme, for the organisations 
involved to work as a team, not as single representatives of the state. The bureaucratic 
hurdles obstructing several aspects of the implementation track, including the access to 
the facilities and problem of travelling for the American experts to Russia, should be 
eliminated (in an ideal scenario) or at least lessened. 
 
5.10.4. MPC&A is Hostage to Problems in U.S.-Russian Relations  
The U.S.-sponsored non-proliferation assistance programmes in Russia are 
hostage to a whole spectrum of other issues in the bilateral relations. Problems in the 
implementation of MPC&A Programme and CTR-related projects are determined by 
the existing disagreements on issues of foreign policy in Russia and the United States. 
Russia’s nuclear sales to Iran, the Chechen war, and the war in Kosovo all 
contributed to the MPC&A Programme being undermined, either in terms of delay in 
its implementation or projects being scrapped all together. It was not the case that 
particular events had specific implications for a particular project; rather, changes in the 
climate of U.S.-Russian relations had an indirect effect on cooperation in unrelated 
areas such as MPC&A. In this way, the interdependence of the various developments in 
the bilateral relations plays an important role in determining the fate of the 
programme.329  
 
                                                 
329 An opinion expressed by several U.S. non-proliferation experts, interviews, Washington 
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5.10.5. The ‘Buy-American’ Clause  
The Buy-American clause was always a serious obstacle to the implementation 
of the non-proliferation projects in Russia. In its early years, MPC&A Programme was 
affected by this condition attached more than any projects.  The initial Government-to-
Government part of the MPC&A Programme was funded by the Department of 
Defence, therefore, it was covered by original CTR “umbrella” legislation requiring the 
use of American contractors and equipment whenever possible. 
The constraints imposed by this requirement to buy American goods and 
expertise had a negative effect on the programme. First of all, it gave Russian 
authorities a wrong idea of the reasons behind U.S. willingness to assist with the nuclear 
security upgrades at its facilities. The Russian side was questioning whether it was the 
readiness to share the burden of dealing with a critical situation or a means of boosting 
the U.S. economy. 
The second reason behind the discontent of the Russian authorities and nuclear 
custodians with the idea of a Buy-American clause was its impracticality. The 
implementation of a number of projects was delayed because of the waiting period for 
when the equipment would arrive from the United States. Moreover, in some cases it 
was better to use locally produced equipment due to easier maintenance and suitability 
for the needs of the Russian nuclear facilities. Last, but not the least, the cost of the 
equipment purchased and shipped from America added up to the expenses of the 
programme’s budget; that meant that the money, which could be spent on further 
nuclear upgrades were not spent in a most rational way. Overall, it was noted that Buy-
American policy ‘drastically diminished the motivation of the economically stressed 
nuclear sites to cooperate with the Program’.330 Since the programme was moved from 
the Department of Defence to the Department of Energy, there no “Buy-American” 
clause has been attached. The DOE was not obliged to follow conditions outlined in 
the original CTR legislation, and could work out its own terms with the Russian 
MINATOM, GAN and Navy.   
The MPC&A Programme is a positive example of the U.S. government proving 
to be more flexible with the terms of providing assistance. Currently, most of the 
equipment going for MPC&A upgrades is produced and bought in Russia. Exceptions 
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include pieces of equipment, which Russia simply does not produce, such as CCTVs. 
There was an understanding that since the sites, where MPC&A upgrades are required, 
are so sensitive, the programme should rely more on Russian equipment provided it has 
some advantages in terms of price, operation and other aspects.331 The change in 
practice of implementing MPC&A projects was a very positive development. 
 
5.10.6. Management Problems and the Lack of Russian Participation  
There are two major problems in how MPC&A is currently managed. First of 
all, a constant shuffling of the U.S. experts working at the Russian sites undermined the 
possibility of fruitful cooperation based on the long-term commitment of American 
experts and their Russian colleagues. It was reported that the frequent change of the 
U.S. team leaders at the nuclear sites was a source of annoyance for the Russians. This 
can be an issue of cultural differences, since it is a regular practice for U.S. officials to 
be transferred from one position to another more or less frequently, while Russians 
find it hard to adjust to it. 
Bukharin et al. note that: 
«…Each site was constantly having to accommodate itself to new team 
leaders with new approaches...»332
Russian policy experts from Moscow’s PIR Centre characterise this problem in 
the following way: 
“…It [frequent change of American personnel] has a negative impact on 
the competence and level of personal responsibility of employees 
responsible for that or another area of work.  Moreover, it is exactly the 
frequent personnel changes that are quoted by many Russian programme 
participants as the main reason for unsolved problem of access – since they 
hamper establishing trusting working relations between the partners.  
Russian working groups at nuclear sites do not change for several years, 
while changes in the American teams happen several times a year…”333
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Another shortcoming in the Programme’s management was the limited (almost 
non-existent) participation of the Russian scientists after Lab-to-Lab and Government-
to-Government programmes were merged. An important precondition for any 
successful project is a spirit of partnership between its participants. In case of the 
MPC&A programme, this spirit was almost lost, when the Russian specialists found 
themselves practically excluded from the programme’s management process.   
It is apparent that a lack of attention to and respect for the opinions of the 
Russian specialists is not only undermining the idea of cooperative threat reduction, but 
also wastes a unique chance of influencing the policies of the Russian government from 
the bottom-up. It is apparent that the Russian scientists motivated to advance co-
operative threat reduction programmes would be more successful in overcoming the 
hurdles of the Russian bureaucracy rather than anyone from the outside. Therefore, it is 
vitally important for the American authorities to implement the MPC&A Programme in 
full partnership with their Russian colleagues.  It has to be noted that there was 
progress in addressing these issues recently; however, they are still not resolved. 
 
5.10.7. The Economic Crisis in Russia/The Crisis of Military Morale  
The early 1990s in Russia are associated with severe disruption of the socio-
economic system. The living and working conditions have deteriorated dramatically 
prior and after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Moreover, the economic crisis of 
August 1998 severely damaged an already weak economy. In such conditions, the 
Russian state alone is not capable of making any considerable changes in the 
enhancement of the safety and security of its nuclear materials. A strong foreign 
participation in the form of an existing MPC&A Programme is a vital tool in making 
Russian fissile material safer. 
Having said this, it should be noted that the Russian government is upgrading 
security systems at its nuclear installations, although this work is considerably 
constrained by a lack of financial resources. The Federal Special Programme ‘Nuclear 
and Radiation Safety of Russia for 2000-2006’ incorporates a programme on the 
‘Creation of the State System for Control and Accounting of Nuclear Materials and the 
State System for Control and Accounting of Radioactive Substances and Waste’.  
However, the funding approved by the Russian Government for the implementation of 
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this programme334 is only about 70 million rubles for 7 years - approximately 30 times 
less than actually needed.335 These numbers demonstrate the critical economic 
condition, in which the Russian authorities are trying to maintain their nuclear complex 
safe and secure.  The lack of financial resources has a direct detrimental effect on the 
morale of the military and contributes to the problem of the safety and security of 
nuclear material at Russian facilities. Military personnel and workers in the nuclear 
complex live in a constant state of anxiety about their financial survival, which is bound 
to affect the way in which they regard and carry out their day-to-day duty in a job that 
does not pay them enough to live. (Chapter 7 discusses this problem in detail) 
 
5.10.8. The Lack of an MPC&A Culture  
As was discussed in the introduction to this chapter, due to legacies of the 
Soviet times the institutional culture and the working practices in the nuclear facilities in 
modern Russia are not appropriate to the establishment and maintenance of an 
adequate MPC&A system. There have been numerous incidents when the equipment 
supplied to Russian facilities as part of MPC&A assistance was used inappropriately.  
The reason for this is a lack of experience in operating modern equipment, and an 
immature “safety culture” among workers dealing with the nuclear materials. Very often 
employees at nuclear facilities do not wish or are not trained to follow the necessary 
procedures, and pay not enough attention to the safety of nuclear material.336
Even more worrying is the fact that the managers of nuclear facilities managers 
do not see establishing adequate MPC&A systems as a priority. On most occasions they 
are not prepared to invest the resources of their own facility on upgrading MPC&A. 
This factor raises a serious question about the sustainability of what has been done with 
the help of U.S. assistance. There is also a lack of legal norms and rules for MPC&A 
procedures in Russia.   
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5.11. The Overall Effectiveness of the MPC&A Programme  
MPC&A upgrades can be divided into two phases: “quick fixes” (‘rapid’ 
upgrades) and comprehensive upgrades. At the inception of the programme, the threat 
was immediate and extensive. It was important to try and secure as many facilities as 
possible in the shortest possible time. At many sites, the focus was on “quick fixes”, on 
providing basic safety and security measures to secure fissile material. The next level is 
to provide comprehensive security upgrades, which result in  much more sophisticated 
protection of nuclear material. 
Initially, the MPC&A Programme identified 252 buildings at 40 sites in Russia 
that required MPC&A upgrades: by the end of FY2002 (8 years since the Programme’s 
inception), 37% of nuclear material in Russia have had ‘rapid’ upgrades, and only half 
of that number – have had ‘comprehensive’ upgrades.337
The effectiveness of the implementation of the programme varied during its 
course and was different in different areas. Thus, for example, MPC&A upgrades at 
Russian Navy sites were swift and comprehensive (about 95% Navy facilities have had 
MPC&A upgrades). Cooperation between the U.S. MPC&A managers and Russian 
Navy officials was more productive than with some other Russian agencies. The U.S. 
side was more apprehensive of the needs of the Russian Navy, and therefore, there 
were fewer controversies on the type of upgrades.338
Apart from solving the technical and logistical issues of the programme’s 
implementation, it is vital to define the overall objective of the MPC&A. The obvious 
goal is to secure nuclear material and provide better control and accounting for it. 
However, there is a larger question of what is the final goal of the MPC&A Programme 
in Russia and how the effectiveness of the programme can be evaluated. 
It is impossible to achieve a total security of the nuclear material in Russia, but 
it is possible to have a certain state of security – when it is difficult to illegally obtain 
any fissile material and when any loss will be immediately detected. In this respect, 
achieving this highest possible state of security in the shortest amount of time is 
imperative. No matter how many sites have been upgraded in terms of MPC&A, if 
there is still at least one site that lacks adequate control and protection the objective of 
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the entire programme, i.e. the prevention of unauthorised access to weapons-grade 
nuclear materials, is at risk. It was discussed in this chapter how little fissile material is 
needed to construct a nuclear warhead. For example, just 10 kg of unprotected material 
falling into the wrong hands can be disastrous. One way of improving the efficiency of 
the programme in terms of the time it takes to upgrade individual sites is to increase the 
funding available for the implementation of the projects. 
Like any other important non-proliferation initiative, the MPC&A Programme 
would only benefit if the funding allocated for its implementation was to be increased. 
The MPC&A Programme was praised for its achievements and the work already done, 
however, there is a lot which remains to be implemented. It is important to remember 
that this Programme deals with today’s nuclear threats and anything not done today 
might turn into a nuclear disaster tomorrow. The authors of the CSIS Report 
‘Managing the Global Nuclear Materials Threat’339 see the allocation of increased 
funding for the cooperative MPC&A Programme as a means to consolidate vulnerable 
nuclear material stockpiles at fewer locations and to improve the sustainability of 
security and accounting upgrades, without reducing the pace of installing security and 
accounting upgrades and providing training that was achieved in the previous years. 
The amount proposed to be added to the annual MPC&A budget is approximately $20 
million - $165 million per year.340  
The authors of another influential policy report341 also single out the MPC&A 
programme (among few others) as a programme, which ought to receive additional 
funding. They note that this programme is well established and has embarked on new 
tasks (material consolidation work with the Russian Navy and MINATOM), and as 
such «is in a good position to receive additional funding commensurate with its 
expanding scope).342  
However, in the course of interviews conducted for this research it became 
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apparent that MPC&A managers are more worried about getting more money than they 
can spend than current level of funding, according to DOE sources. According to one 
of the DOE’s officials, the MPC&A Programme receives budget it needs, while having 
money appropriated but not spent would mean more criticism from the outside.343 It 
seems that solving the problems of implementation, which limit the scope of 
cooperation, is an answer. If an agreement can be reached on a larger number of sites 
to be upgraded and the U.S. government allocates more human resources to the 
implementation of MPC&A Programme, spending larger amounts of money would not 
be problematic. 
 
5.12. Conclusion 
Apart from some purely logistical issues surrounding a swift and efficient 
implementation of the MPC&A projects in Russia, there are larger, more complicated 
questions. For example, what are the standards the MPC&A Programme is trying to 
achieve? At the moment, the DOE-sponsored MPC&A Programme is bringing 
Russia’s MPC&A systems closer to what is present practice in America. There are some 
disagreements between the Russian and the American specialists on what the system 
should be like. According to American experts, Russian specialists are more concerned 
with the outside/perimeter threats, while the U.S. sees insider threats as equally 
important. American MPC&A managers say they design a security system best suited 
for each individual site they go to. Although, they not always agree with the Russians, 
the work remains a collaborative process. Ultimately, the design is produced by 
MINATOM, and the DOE specialists make changes through a negotiating process, 
which became easier over time.344
There are some technical peculiarities in the processes involving fissile material. 
The isotopic composition of the material can change and the mass is not conserved in 
nuclear process. This means net losses of the material are anticipated and this factor 
plays a role in how the material is accounted. In order to eliminate the inconsistencies 
in the balance sheet that arise as a result, managers might be tempted to conceal them 
by not registering the exact correct amount of the material used in the nuclear process 
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(a practice followed in Soviet times). This creates additional complications in having 
“absolute” volumes of the material.345  
More importantly, the MPC&A Programme represents a completely different 
kind of an international agreement. By its nature, the main indication of its success is 
the technical viability, the safety and security of all nuclear sites and facilities in Russia. 
The MPC&A Programme will become irrelevant if these goals are no longer considered 
the ultimate aim. In this respect, this Programme as well as other CTR projects 
represents a new, ‘absolutist’ form in arms control. 
During the Cold War, arms control had political objectives in addition to the 
‘technical’ objectives that were as, if not more important. The ‘technical’ objective of an 
arms control might be to limit the acquisition of certain types of weapons, exclude the 
development of certain types of weapon technologies or even reduce military arsenals. 
The political objectives usually were a reduction in tension and the establishment of 
apolitical dialogue. Often the political objectives were achieved even when strictly 
speaking the technical objectives were not. Non-proliferation differs from other kinds 
of strategic arsenal agreements in so far that the ‘technical objectives’ are of paramount 
significance, and the whole objective of non-proliferation fails unless they are achieved 
in full. The same applies to MPC&A, which is one aspect of non-proliferation. Thus, 
securing fissile material at every but one site can be considered meaningless. Only when 
all material is secured and as sustained as such one can consider MPC&A’s goal to be 
achieved. The MPC&A objectives also put under the question how further 
dismantlement of nuclear weapons relates to the overall sense of nuclear security, since 
material extracted from the weapons is a more serious proliferation threat than the 
weapons themselves. It is a technically demanding process to retrieve the material from 
the warhead. Therefore, fissile material is relatively safer when trapped inside the 
weapons. These factors call for looking at broader implications of denuclearisation 
process on cooperative threat reduction. In other words, decisions taken on how many 
weapons to keep and how many to dismantle will influence the scope of what MPC&A 
Programme should achieve.  In this case again, there is an obvious link between 
questions of a strategic nature (i.e. how many weapons to keep and how many to 
dismantle) and the scope of the MPC&A Programme, the goals it should try to achieve. 
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The MPC&A Programme is part of a larger cooperative threat reduction 
process, the role of which should be re-defined in the wake of international terrorism 
since 9/11. Since the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in America the threat of 
international terrorism seeking means of mass destruction is no longer perceived to be 
hypothetical. Before there was the perception of an elusive nuclear threat of rogue 
states or terrorist organisations seeking to acquire nuclear material or weapons, plenty 
of which was unprotected in Russia. Now the nuclear material is still largely unsafe in 
Russia and international terrorism has demonstrated its determination to cause 
casualties on a large scale.   
The post-9/11 international security environment should have given a new 
perspective to the U.S. government on the importance of the non-proliferation, in 
Russia, in first place – a country with the largest numbers of unsecured nuclear material. 
In reality, the Bush administration seems to be distracted by political actions in other 
parts of the world.  
The importance of the MPC&A Programme for cooperative threat reduction is 
two-fold.  It is one of the most ‘progressive’ areas of cooperation. The implementation 
of MPC&A upgrades requires intrusion into the most sensitive nuclear sites in Russia 
and thus gradually extends the boundaries of what is possible in cooperative threat 
reduction. At the same time, the MPC&A Programme is the quintessence of limitations 
in U.S.-Russian cooperation, it brings out various constraints in bilateral partnership. 
Cooperation in the MPC&A framework became possible because the danger of nuclear 
material proliferation in the disintegrating Soviet Union was unprecedented. The 
political leadership in the U.S. and Russia realised the scope for potential disasters 
stemming from the fact that Russia was not able to provide safety and security for its 
nuclear material. 
An analysis of the problems of implementation of MPC&A projects leads to 
the following conclusions. Given the severity of the risks of the diversion of nuclear 
material and the objectives of the programme that was created to address this threat, its 
practical implementation conflicts with the stated goals and the urgency of the 
problems.  A ‘rational actor’ model is therefore not adequate to explain how MPC&A 
was handled. In line with the original hypothesis, the Bureaucratic Politics Model is 
appropriate to explain the problems of the programme’s implementation the central 
objectives of which have so far only been partially achieved.  
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The political actors in both countries vary in degree of their support to 
cooperative threat reduction process. The organisational culture is one of the major 
factors determining the role the political actors play. Security and military 
establishments both in the U.S. and Russia are holding the most traditional views on 
international security and have been the slowest in accepting new reality of the post-
Cold war security environment. 
Nuclear scientists have been the most liberal group in terms of their views and 
ability to work together and have been instrumental in moving the MPC&A 
Programme forward (Lab-to-Lab Programme), where governments could not succeed. 
The successful example of the involvement nuclear scientists’ involvement in the 
cooperative threat reduction process deserves special attention and should be seen as 
one of the ways to by-pass bureaucratic and political constraints. 
The legislative branches – the U.S. Congress and Russian State Duma – 
sometimes hold MPC&A Programme, as well as other CTR programmes, hostage to 
unrelated problems in U.S.-Russian relations. At the same time, both Congress and 
Duma provided crucial support when it was vital for the take-off of the Programme, i.e. 
they authorised establishment of the most intrusive cooperative threat reduction 
programme. 
The organisational culture of key political actors reflects the conditions in which 
they operate. The sensitivity and secrecy of nuclear facilities and decades of U.S.-Soviet 
antagonism contribute to the problem of access and other limitations in cooperation. 
U.S.-Russian cooperation in the area of nuclear safeguards is a completely new 
phenomenon, and both parties are still in the process of adjusting to it. 
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Chapter 6 
Preventing the Proliferation of Fissile Material: Plutonium 
Disposition Programme and Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) 
Agreement 
 
While material protection, control, and accounting is essential to safeguard 
nuclear materials and prevent their proliferation, the risk will be much reduced if 
weapons grade nuclear material can be disposed of. This chapter discusses technical 
aspects of the disposition of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium. It 
discusses the U.S.-Russian Programmes dealing with each material separately - the 
Plutonium Disposition Programme and the HEU Purchase Agreement (HEU Deal). 
Both of these programmes are an important part of the cooperative threat reduction 
process, and there is a need for their consistent and efficient implementation.   
The examination of Plutonium Disposition Programme and HEU Purchase 
Agreement contributes to the explanation of why CTR programmes have succeeded in 
some areas, while failing in others. The Bureaucratic Politics Model is used to evaluate 
how individual and organisational interests have shaped the implementation track of 
these two programmes. Apart from factors of a bureaucratic nature, programmes, 
which deal with disposition of fissile material, are complicated by technical issues, the 
sensitivity of the sites of where the projects have to be implemented, and by the overall 
state of U.S.-Russian relations. 
6.1. Plutonium  
6.1.1. Background of the Problem  
A nuclear weapon typically requires 3-5 kilograms of plutonium.346 The amount 
of weapons-usable plutonium stockpiled in Russia is not publicly known, estimates vary 
between 130 and 200 tonnes347, and according to the former President Yeltsin Russia 
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had 50 metric tonnes of excess Plutonium (not required for security needs) as of the 
year 1997.348  
According to some estimates, Russia produces 1.5 tonnes of weapons-grade 
plutonium annually, and separates one additional ton of reactor-grade plutonium per 
year.349 Weapons-grade plutonium is enriched so that it contains more than 90% Pu239, 
reactor-grade plutonium contains only 60-70% Pu239. Even reactor-grade plutonium can 
be used to produce nuclear weapons.350 The U.S. has produced 111 metric tonnes of 
plutonium, and in 1995 President Clinton announced over 50 metric tonnes to be 
excess of the U.S. national security needs.351   
Plutonium along with HEU is one of the main components of the fissile 
material used in nuclear weapons. There are technical problems with the disposition of 
plutonium; it is much harder to get rid off plutonium than of HEU. Plutonium can be 
blended with U238 to make fuel usable in ordinary power reactors, but this process is 
extremely costly, and the final product (Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel) is not economically 
competitive with Low Enriched Uranium (LEU). Another problem is that it is easier to 
recover weapon-usable material from MOX than HEU from LEU. The recovery 
process only requires chemical separation techniques.352 Therefore, the disposition of 
weapons-usable plutonium is a more challenging task than the disposition of HEU.  
In order to evaluate the nature of the problem, we should look at the possible 
ways to utilise/dispose plutonium used in weapons. Both the U.S. and Russia see 
transforming weapons-usable plutonium into a form that meets the spent-fuel standard as 
a goal of plutonium disposition. In this form, plutonium is still recoverable for the use 
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in nuclear weapons, but it is no easier to utilise than civilian plutonium produced by 
nuclear power reactors.353   
 
6.1.2. Two Approaches to Plutonium Disposition  
There are two approaches to re-using Plutonium and reducing its weapons-
usability to the spent-fuel standard: by converting it into MOX fuel and with the help 
of an immobilisation technique.   
The MOX/current reactor approach354: using plutonium in mixed oxide 
(MOX) fuel for burning once-through in currently operating nuclear power reactors. 
The prerequisites for the MOX approach are: the presence of facilities for fabricating 
plutonium oxide in MOX fuel and reactors capable of safely handling MOX fuel. 355
Vitrification-with-wastes approach (Immobilisation or ‘Can-in-
canister’)356: vitrifying the Plutonium together with fission products in glass logs of 
the type planned for use in immobilising high-level radioactive wastes from the 
defence production complex. 
 There was an important difference of view on the viability of these two 
methods between the Russian and American governments. While the U.S. initially 
considered both methods of Plutonium disposition equally acceptable, the Russian 
leadership viewed the immobilisation option as undesirable from the very beginning. 
Russia believes plutonium is an important nuclear energy product and can be used in 
power reactors.   
In recent years, the position of the U.S. on plutonium has changed. If 
previously the U.S. government was the main opponent of the MOX option, it now has 
changed its policy and declared that it is not going to use immobilisation. In March 
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2001 a discussion started in the U.S. circles on the grounds that the U.S. has to do 
something because Russia would only use the MOX option.357
Both methods met a certain degree of scepticism from their opponents. 
 
6.1.2.1. Criticism of the MOX Option 
Specialists point out several reasons why the MOX option is dangerous and 
undesirable. Among them: the MOX option does not eliminate entirely the danger of 
re-using plutonium in weapons; it is an expensive, economically not viable way of 
disposition,  using MOX fuel in reactors can be dangerous, Russia does not have the 
facilities to implement the MOX disposition of plutonium, and finally, producing MOX 
fuel can increase proliferation risks. Each of the above arguments against MOX option 
is discussed below: 
1) The MOX option does not eliminate entirely the danger of re-using 
plutonium in weapons 
 In ideal conditions, the amount of plutonium in MOX fuel after irradiation is 
only 30 per cent less than before the «burning up» of weapons grade plutonium in 
reactors, however, in practice, this amount will be even greater. It is believed that in real 
terms, «a light-water reactor (LWR) loaded with a conventional one-third core of MOX 
fuel would discharge only about one per cent less plutonium than was contained in the 
MOX fuel originally loaded. The remaining 99 per cent will remain weapons usable».358    
However, some experts dismiss such statements as least credible among all the 
criticisms of MOX option. For example, Oleg Bukharin of Princeton University 
believes that nobody “in his right mind” would try to extract plutonium from MOX to 
re-use it in weapons,359 which is a difficult, costly and dangerous process.   
2) MOX option is expensive and economically not viable 
A joint U.S.-Russian government study concluded that a MOX-fuel plutonium 
disposition option will cost Russia up to $2.5 billion.360 In current economic conditions 
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Russian government in no scenario would be able to implement such a resource-
demanding task without external help. 
3) Using MOX fuel in power reactors is dangerous  
One of the main concerns for specialists is the safety risks associated with using 
MOX fuel instead of LEU (low-enriched uranium) in nuclear reactors. There are 
technical reasons for these concerns and broadly they can be divided into 2 categories:  
1.  The probabilities of certain severe accidents may increase when MOX is 
used. 
2.  The consequences of a severe accident will be greater if MOX fuel is 
used.361   
4) Russia does not have facilities to implement the MOX disposition of 
Plutonium 
Apart from financial constraints, Russia does not possess the technical 
capabilities to use the MOX option. Russia’s MOX-fuel fabrication planned to begin in 
2007 could not start without the export of the Hanau MOX plant equipment from 
Germany – the facility was suspended due to opposition from the environmental 
movements.362 However, the German government is not prepared to support the 
export of the Hanau MOX plant equipment to Russia.363  
The idea was that Germany would give the plant to Russia or sell it for a 
nominal price. The problem was that the company (Siemens) wanted to recoup some of 
the cost of the facility.  It is also believed that the German government did not want 
MOX option to be used elsewhere outside of Germany. Exporting the Hanau MOX 
plant to Russia looked like an opportunity, but it does not look like an option now. The 
assumption is that Russia is going to use French technology (Demox) – the same 
technology U.S. is planning to use for fabricating MOX.364
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5) MOX fuel can increase proliferation risks 
The G-8 nations believe that if Russia chooses to go for a MOX-fuel 
fabrication option, it can further increase proliferation risks.365 First of all, the chemical 
composition of MOX fuel (a relatively high amount of plutonium not weapons-grade, 
but still usable in weapons) makes it possible for both Russia and/or third parties to 
reverse the process and turn the fuel into dangerous fissile material again.  More 
importantly, Russia reserved the right to use the MOX-fuel fabrication plant to 
manufacture civil MOX fuel after the disposition programme is completed. MOX 
fabrication will encourage MINATOM to get into commercial sphere, which will 
increase material proliferation risks.366 At the same time ‘considering the huge 
quantities of separated plutonium that exist already and the diminishing opportunities 
on the fuel market, any motivation for additional reprocessing is highly unlikely’.367  
Second, the process of fuel-fabrication can present a proliferation danger in 
itself due to the difficulties of safeguarding it effectively and unavoidable long-distance 
transportation.   
From the aforementioned, it is evident that the MOX-option for plutonium 
disposition is probably not the best option. According to the Nuclear Control Institute, 
the U.S. Department of Energy persistently understated the dangers of the MOX 
option when talking about its plans to use the new Savannah river site in South 
Carolina for MOX production. Initially, DOE denied the existence of a risk to the 
public in running plutonium MOX fuel, but now it ‘reluctantly acknowledges’ that up 
to 15 per cent more people would die of cancer in case of a severe accident with MOX 
fuel compared to conventional uranium fuel.368 The figures will be even worse for 
Russia because its reactors are even less safe. 
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Nevertheless, the Russian leadership has its own reasons to favour the 
fabrication of MOX fuel from plutonium used in weapons rather than immobilising it 
completely. Russia considers plutonium to be a very important source of energy and 
cannot easily agree to get rid off the material it considers to have considerable 
economic value. It is evident, however, that Russia has neither the financial, nor 
technical capabilities to pursue the MOX approach of plutonium disposition. Having 
said that, the MOX option remains the only potentially viable option. Interviews 
conducted with Russian policy experts and physicists demonstrated that is the only 
option considered by Russia for plutonium disposition.369
 
6.1.2.2. Criticism of the Vitrification (Immobilisation) Option 
Immobilisation also has some technical disadvantages: the initial proposal to 
dilute plutonium in highly radioactive glass raised doubts - specialists believe that the 
criticality problem cannot be solved without extreme costs. 370  Another method of ‘can-
in-canister’ in technical terms also fails to be perfect371 - it is not clear whether 
plutonium after this method immobilisation will meet the spent-fuel standard required by 
the U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition Agreement.  
Vitrification is clearly a cheaper option to dispose of plutonium, and from the 
proliferation point of view, it appears less dangerous. Nonetheless, the political 
considerations of the Russian government to use material and not destroy it make the 
vitrification option an extremely unlikely alternative to MOX option. Vitrification 
technology is immature, and has not been done on a large scale.372 Therefore, the 
‘immobilisation’ approach is not an ideal way to dispose plutonium, and will not be 
used by Russia. The fundamental problem of the disposition of weapons-grade 
plutonium is that the available options do not fully meet the goals of safe and secure 
disposition. It is a relative choice between two options, neither of which is ideal. 
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6.1.3. Facilities Involved in Plutonium Production and Disposition  
There are three main reactors involved in production of weapons-grade 
plutonium in Russia: two of them are located in Tomsk-7 (Seversk), and one – in 
Krasnoyarsk-26 (Zheleznogorsk). They are reactors ADE-4, ADE-5 and ADE-2.  
Table 6 Plutonium Reactors in Russia373  
 
ADE-2 (Krasnoyarsk-26) began operating in 1964, began supplying the underground 
facility and closed city with electricity and steam heat in 1965, and is still operating as a dual-
purpose reactor. ADE-2 is the main source of heat-supply to the city of Zheleznogorsk 
ADE-4 (Tomsk-7) began operating in 1965 and is still operating. 
ADE-5 (Tomsk-7) began operating in 1968 and is still operating. 
ADE-4 and ADE-5 provide 30-35% of the heating of Tomsk, and 50% of the 
heating of Seversk 
 
These reactors also supply heat and electricity for the near-by cities – this 
creates complications for shutting them down. Initially, all three reactors were to be 
shut down in 2000.  That was agreed by Al Gore and Viktor Chernomyrdin in June 
1994.  In 1997 the deadlines were postponed. According to the Agreement signed by 
Russia and the U.S. in 1997, the breeding of surplus plutonium at these reactors was 
supposed to be terminated in 2002 (for ADE-4 and ADE-5 in Seversk) and 2003 (for 
ADE-2 in Zheleznogorsk).  
The deadlines for the shut-down were extended again in 2001. In August 2001 
the Russian government approved a draft protocol submitted by MINATOM to 
modify the U.S.-Russian agreement from September 1997 on cooperation on 
plutonium breeder reactors. The bottom line of the new protocol is that it prolongs the 
active period of these three reactors. According to the protocol, ADE-4 and ADE-5 
will continue working until December 31st, 2005 and ADE-2 until December 31st, 
2006.374 However, pending budget allocations from the U.S. government, two reactors 
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in Seversk (ADE-4 and ADE-5) will be shut down by 2008, and reactor ADE-2 in 
Zheleznogorsk – by 2011.375 In March 2003 U.S. and Russia signed a modified 
agreement under which the three plutonium reactors are to be replaced with fossil 
energy plants.376 The following is the list of Russian facilities involved in plutonium and 
MOX-related production processes. 
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Table 7 Facilities Involved in Plutonium and MOX-related Production 
Bochvar All-Russian Scientific Research Institute (Moscow)  is involved in the 
development of MOX-fuel fabrication technology377 and the production of 
experimental MOX fuel and fuel rods378
Mayak Production Association (Ozersk, formerly Chelyabinsk – 65) used to 
produce plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.  Recently it launched a pilot 
production of MOX fuel pellets379
Mining and Chemical Combine (MCC) (Zheleznogorsk, formerly Krasnoyarsk-26) 
has one operational plutonium production reactor, two nonoperational plutonium 
production reactors, which were shut down in 1992, and a plutonium oxide storage 
facility380
Scientific Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (NIIAR) (Dimitrovgrad, 
Ulyanovsk Region) is conducting research on the conversion of excess weapons-
grade plutonium into MOX fuel, and has MOX fuel-fabrication and experimental 
reprocessing facilities381
Siberian Chemical Combine (SCC) used to produce plutonium for use in nuclear 
weapons, has two operational plutonium production reactors, three non-operational 
plutonium production reactors (shut down between 1990 and 1992), and 
plutonium-pit fabrication facilities382   
 
6.1.4. Plutonium Disposition Agreement  
In July 1998 the U.S. and Russia had signed a Scientific and Technical 
Cooperation Agreement383 to conduct tests and demonstrations of proposed plutonium 
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disposition technologies.384 The Plutonium Disposition Agreement is one of the main 
U.S.-Russian regulating mechanisms to dispose of both countries’ excess plutonium.  
The Plutonium Disposition Agreement was signed in September 2000. 385 It stipulates 
the intention of each country to dispose off 34 metric tonnes of weapons-grade 
plutonium.  The initially planned amount of 50 metric tonnes each for disposition was 
reduced due to Russia’s insistence on the fact that 16 metric tonnes declared by the U.S. 
are not weapons-grade and cannot be re-used in weapons anyway. According to the 
Agreement, the U.S. and Russia are required to put in operation industrial-scale 
facilities no later than December 2007 and dispose two metric tonnes a year. 386  
The Agreement also provides for monitoring and inspection throughout the 
disposition process, and allows for equivalent IAEA verification measures in lieu of 
bilateral monitoring activities, as may be agreed by the U.S. and Russia.387 According to 
terms of the Agreement, the U.S. side was to fabricate and irradiate 25.6 metric tonnes 
of weapons-grade plutonium into mixed-dioxide (MOX) fuel and immobilise 8.4 metric 
tonnes in ceramic forms and later dispose of them in canisters containing vitrified high-
level radioactive wastes. This was supposed to be processed at the Defence Waste 
Processing Facility at the Savannah River Site.388    
Although, the U.S. expressed its commitment to pursue a ‘dual-track’ policy of 
disposition and specified its intention to immobilise 8.4 metric tonnes of plutonium in 
ceramic forms, the plans of the American government have changed. In March 2001 
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the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) ordered to immediately suspend 
all immobilisation activities. NNSA has also ordered the dismantlement of an almost 
completed Plutonium Ceramification Test Facility at Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, which was designated for processing weapons-grade plutonium into 
ceramic pucks. 389 Although, the official reasoning behind that decision was said to be 
prompted by financial/budget considerations, and was meant to be temporary, it could 
have far-reaching consequences for the future of the Plutonium Disposition 
Agreement, in particular, and for the whole immobilisation technology, in general.  
Russia, in its part, accepted an obligation to dispose of the same amount of 
weapons-grade plutonium (34 metric tonnes), but by using only the MOX option. It is 
worth noting that the Russian government was ready to immobilise one metric tonne of 
plutonium contained in a low-assay sludge, but the U.S. insisted that only high-assay 
materials are covered by the Agreement. Some analysts believe that ‘it was a tactical 
mistake, because a Russian commitment to pursue immobilisation technology and build 
an immobilisation plant would itself have been a far more important achievement than 
a specific commitment to immobilise high-assay material’.390
It is apparent that this is a long-term operation requiring serious financial 
resources. According to some preliminary estimates, the amount of money required for 
Russia’s disposition programme is $1.7 - 1.9 billion over twenty or more years.391 
According to other sources (DOE’s Task Force), that amount is even higher - 
approximately $2.1 billion for the disposition of the initial 34 metric tonnes of Russia’s 
excess plutonium.392  
In this light, the Russian government is in a difficult situation of finding the 
resources for its disposition programme. The situation is further complicated by the 
criticism surrounding the MOX option of plutonium disposition.  Generally, the MOX 
option is not welcomed by the international community, which means foreign 
                                                 
389 Lyman, ‘The Future of Immobilization Under the U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition 
Agreement’, op. cit.  
390 ibid 
391 Disposition of United States and Russian Federation Weapons-Grade Plutonium, White 
House Factsheet, op. cit 
392 Draft of A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with 
Russia, op. cit,  p. 28 
207 
governments would not be willing to provide financial assistance for building MOX 
fabrication facilities in Russia. The U.S. government is providing some assistance; 
however, the supporters of financial aid for Russia’s disposition efforts are confronted 
with the criticism that U.S. funds are helping Russia to create a fuel-cycle. 
The lack of financial resources for the construction of MOX facilities is the 
major problem of the implementation of the agreement. Experts say that Russians 
understand it quite well, and they are not going to start the physical construction of 
facilities until there is a firm commitment to provide funding.393   
One of the possible scenarios of resolving the plutonium disposition problem 
for Russia would be to produce MOX fuel and to sell it to Western Europe. That could 
provide significant revenue and provide funding for the operation of the MOX facility. 
Eventually, Russia would be taking that fuel back, because they produced it.  Such a 
scheme can provide a very strong incentive for reactor operatives. However, that 
option is also subject to many problems of implementation, including finding initial 
funding for fuel fabrication.394
Another problem will arise from the complications resulting from the U.S. 
decision to suspend its immobilisation programme. If the U.S. government does not re-
instate its obligation to immobilise more than 8 metric tonnes of weapons-grade of 
plutonium, it will mean that either the U.S. will have to agree to use the MOX option 
for the disposition of the total of 34 metric tonnes (the same as Russia), which is highly 
unlikely, or all the volumes and conditions of disposition will have to be re-negotiated, 
which will result in a considerable delay of the implementation of the agreement.. 
Safeguarding and verification 
The opponents of the agreement also point out the unresolved issues of liability 
and monitoring arrangements for processing and using plutonium as fuel in Russian 
nuclear reactors (when Russia will use the MOX option). The U.S. Nuclear Control 
Institute called the agreement ‘premature’ and warned about the danger of plutonium 
disposition not proceeding in either of the countries due to the problems, which will 
arise due to unresolved issues of liability in case of a MOX-fuel accident, safeguarding 
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and monitoring of disposition, and financial assistance arrangements.395 The warning 
proved to be justified when the technical agreement on plutonium disposition was 
allowed to expire in July 2003 and was not extended due to disagreements over the 
language relating to liability. 
The U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition Agreement, which is the main legally 
binding international document - is criticised for the ‘failure to resolve important 
problems of liability and monitoring arrangements for processing and using this 
plutonium as fuel in Russian reactors’.396   
It is believed that the Agreement does not resolve questions related to liability 
in case of a MOX-fuel accident, safeguarding and monitoring of disposition, and 
financial assistance arrangements.397 The technical agreement on plutonium disposition 
signed in 1998 included liability provisions, which were at the time seen as adequate to 
the scale of cooperation on research and development outlined by the Agreement (a 
formal Plutonium Disposition Agreement was signed in 2000). The liability clause did 
not include provisions of immunity to the U.S. and its contractors in case there was an 
accident, and it was intentional. Legislation freeing U.S. and its contractors from any 
responsibility has been embedded into original Department of Defence CTR 
“umbrella” agreement. The original CTR agreement was signed in the early 1990s in a 
general mood euphoria in U.S.-Russian relations and with a lot of concessions from the 
Russian side.   
Both U.S. Department of Energy and Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy were 
willing to extend the Agreement without imposing changing liability conditions, but the 
State Department insisted that the Plutonium Disposition Technical Agreement would 
not be extended until Russians agree to the same liability language as was used in the 
original CTR legislation.398 The cooperation continues on the contracts, which were 
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signed prior to Technical Agreement’s expiration. However, the liability issue will have 
to be resolved in order to begin construction of the plutonium disposition facilities.   
Matt Bunn from Harvard’s Managing the Atom Project believes: 
“Neither bilateral U.S.-Russian nor multilateral talks have made much 
headway in devising an approach to liability that is acceptable to the Russian 
government, the U.S. State Department, contractors that might participate 
in the project […], and other countries that may contribute.  It has become 
clear that Russia is absolutely unwilling to again agree to language that 
would leave the Russian government liable for intentional sabotage by U.S. 
contractors, while the U.S. is unwilling to accept liability language that left 
the determination of what was intentional sabotage solely up to Russian 
courts…”399
The dilemma of plutonium disposition 
The conceptual controversy surrounding the whole issue of plutonium 
disposition concentrates on the following: What is the non-proliferation value of 
disposition if the production of plutonium continues?  
In August 2001, the Russian government announced its decision to prolong a 
lifespan of its three nuclear plutonium breeder reactors in order to solve heating 
problems of several towns. Although, the civilian plutonium produced for energy 
purposes is not as dangerous as weapons-grade, the fact that stockpiles are not reducing 
but growing is more than worrying. As of late 2003, Russian plutonium reactors were to 
continue working until 2011. 
Another issue in the dilemma of plutonium disposition is the interdependence 
of arms reduction treaties and disposition. The decision by the U.S. and Russia to 
reduce nuclear weapons to much lower levels is a welcome move. However, the rapid 
dismantlement of more and more weapons puts additional pressure on the disposition 
activities. As was noted before, the disposition process is no less expensive and 
complex as the production itself. It can even be argued that the material secluded inside 
the weapons is not as dangerous as when it has to be extracted and stored until it can 
be disposed of. In this light, the U.S. and Russia are in a double trap: they have to 
dismantle their weapons fulfilling their denuclearisation pledges and at the same time 
they have to face an ever growing problem of how to dispose of material from the 
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weapons dismantled. Overall, Plutonium Disposition Agreement in its current form 
does not have very enthusiastic support among non-proliferation experts.   
Kenneth Luongo from RANSAC believes: 
“…Plutonium disposition is taking too long, it’s too expensive, and we 
don’t have enough money for that, the time frame is enormous for a small 
amount of plutonium.”400   
Alexander Pikayev of the Carnegie Endowment noted that the “political value 
of this Agreement is not high […] the price of it is too expensive…”401 The small 
amounts of plutonium to be disposed of defined by the Agreement raise scepticism as 
well402 – 34 tonnes constitute only about 15% of all Russian plutonium stocks. Taking 
into consideration that Russia is still producing plutonium, the volume of the material 
to be disposed of as a percentage of the entire stock will be even smaller. 
6.2. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) 
6.2.1. Background of the Problem 
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is one of the two (along with plutonium) 
main materials used for nuclear weapons. About 15-20 kilograms of HEU are sufficient 
to make a nuclear warhead without plutonium.403 At the moment 51 facilities in Russia 
possess small and large amounts of HEU (see Appendix 1 for a full list of facilities 
storing HEU). The production of HEU in the former Soviet Union ceased in 1989.404  
The estimates of the amount of HEU accumulated by the Russian nuclear complex 
vary from 800 to 1200 tonnes: by DOE’s estimates, Russia has more than 1,000 metric 
tonnes of HEU405; according to some other estimates, it is about 1,200 metric tonnes. 406 
                                                 
400 Telephone interview with Kenneth Luongo, RANSAC, Washington D.C., 08.04.03 
401 Interview with Alexander Pikayev, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Moscow, 26.05.03 
402 Interview with Thomas Cochran, NRDC, Washington D.C., 03.04.03 
403 ‘Fissile Material Basics’, op. cit. 
404 Albright, Berkhout, and Walker, World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 
1992, op. cit., p. 53 
405 Draft of A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with 
Russia, op. cit., p. 14 
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It is believed that 45 tonnes of HEU are added annually to the stockpile due to the 
dismantlement process.   
HEU is very inert and has a very low radioactive signature, which makes it hard 
to detect.  Specialists acknowledge that ‘outside a few feet, even the most sophisticated 
passive radiation detectors would fail to detect HEU’.407 There are some alternative 
approaches available to detect unshielded HEU involving bombarding it with an active 
radiation source in order to induce fission and in this way detect neutron emissions. 
However, this approach is not considered to be safe and, therefore, is not practical. As 
a heavy metal, HEU can be detected by X-rays but taking into consideration the 
amount of metal objects going through X-ray detectors (in the airports, for example), it 
is very unlikely that HEU would be detected if smuggled. The fact that HEU is hard to 
detect, if smuggled, makes the problem of its safe and timely disposition a very 
important one. As well as plutonium, HEU can be an attractive product for rogue 
states or international terrorists. The best solution to reduce the threat of nuclear 
smuggling is to provide all the necessary safety and security measures for the material 
stockpile and to make HEU unattractive for the terrorists by downblending it to forms 
not usable in weapons.  
First of all, it is important to explain the process by which HEU can become 
less dangerous in terms of nuclear proliferation. An evaluation of the technical process 
of HEU downblending demonstrates the possibilities and limitations for the U.S. - 
Russian HEU Deal.408
6.2.2. The HEU Downblending Process  
Table 8 presents an HEU downblending process which consists of the 
following stages: weapons dismantlement, material extraction and transportation, 
production of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU).409
                                                                                                                                         
406 Protecting Nuclear Weapons Material in Russia, Office of International Affairs, National 
Research Council, National Academy Press, Washington, D. C., 1999, p. 7 
407 Allison, Coté, Jr., Falkenrath, Miller, eds., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, op. cit., p. 67 
408 The HEU Purchase Agreement (The HEU Deal) – an agreement stipulating purchase of 
Russian uranium by the U.S. is discussed in detail in the following sub-section 
409 This table is generated from the description provided in Nuclear Status Report, op. cit., p. 
64 
212 
Table 8  HEU Downblending Process 
 
1. Weapons Dismantlement 
- At this stage weapons are dismantled at four of Russia’s warhead production 
facilities at Lesnoy (Sverdlovsk-45), Trehgornyy (Zlatoust-26), Avangard in Sarov 
(Arzamas-16), and Zarechnyy (Penza-19) 
 
2. Material Extraction and Transportation  
- After the weapons have been dismantled, the fissile material extracted, in this case, 
uranium, is shipped to the Siberian Chemical Combine (Seversk) and the Mayak 
Production Association (Ozersk).  At these facilities HEU is ground into metal chips, 
converted to oxide, and chemically treated to remove impurities 
 
3. Production of LEU (Low Enriched Uranium) 
- Purified uranium is first combined with fluorine to produce Uranium Hexafluoride 
(UF6) at the Krasnoyarsk Electrochemical Plant (Zelenogorsk) and then it is blended 
with uranium enriched to only 1.5% U235 to produce LEU (this process takes place at 
Seversk, Zelenogorsk facilities and at the Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant 
(UEIP) in Novouralsk). 
 
Ideally, the process of HEU downblending in Russia should be stimulated by 
the U.S.-Russian ‘HEU Deal’.  The conditions of this agreement envisage the purchase 
by the United States of HEU from dismantled Russian warheads. However, in reality, 
the implementation of this agreement is flawed due to a number of reasons and the 
process of HEU downblending was not going according to plan in Russia. In order to 
analyse the reasons for such setbacks, this chapter presents an overview of the 
agreement, its terms, key players and key events surrounding this Deal.  
 
6.2.3. HEU Purchase Agreement (HEU Deal)  
6.2.3.1. Overview 
One of the major initiatives to prevent the proliferation of fissile material is the 
U.S.-Russian ‘HEU Deal’ (HEU Purchase Agreement). The terms of this bilateral 
agreement create a ground for ensuring that HEU from dismantled Russian nuclear 
weapons is only used for peaceful purposes. According to the outline of the agreement, 
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the U.S. government will purchase 500 metric tonnes of HEU extracted from 
dismantled warheads over a period of 20 years.410
The HEU Deal can theoretically be one of the most successful non-
proliferation projects, given both the incentive it creates for Russia to dismantle its 
warheads and the fact that extracted fissile material is transferred to safer locations in 
the U.S. Moreover, LEU - downblended from HEU - has a real economic value, and as 
such, is a valuable market product. In perfect circumstances, such a deal would mean 
that Russia is motivated to follow its arms reductions obligations, the U.S. market 
receives a valuable energy product, and the threat of nuclear material proliferation is 
considerably reduced. However, in reality, the HEU Deal turned out to be a promising 
project with a disappointing implementation track.   
In order to comprehend the nature of the problems encountered by the HEU 
Deal, the following section introduces the main conditions of the deal, the interests of 
key players involved in the process, and provides an account of political and economic 
events, which played a crucial role in it. 
 
6.2.3.2. Origins, Terms, and Current Status of the HEU Deal 
The HEU Agreement was signed on February 18th, 1993 in Washington D.C. 
The commercial implementing contract was signed by the executive agents in January, 
1994 in Moscow. Under the HEU Deal, the U.S. is purchasing approximately 500 
metric tonnes of HEU removed from Russia’s dismantled nuclear warheads with an 
average assay of 90% or greater of the uranium isotope 235 (U235). The material is 
converted to LEU411 before shipment to the U.S., where it is then used in the civilian 
power reactors.  The total value of the programme was estimated as $12 billion.412
                                                 
410 Text of Russian-U.S. HEU Agreement, NTI, 
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/heudeal/heufull/htm  retrieved on 
07.07.02 
411 LEU is uranium enriched to less than 20% in the isotope 235 
412 USEC, at http://www.usec.com/v2001_02/HTML/Megatonnes_FAQ.asp retrieved on 
13.06.02, Text of Russian-U.S. HEU Agreement, op. cit, and  Testimony of Leonard S. 
Spector Before the Subcommittee on International Security, Nonproliferation, and Federal 
Services, U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, November 2001, at 
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/latest.htm retrieved on 30.11.02 
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As of September 2003, 193 metric tonnes of weapons grade HEU was 
converted to 5,705 metric tonnes of LEU power plant fuel. This means that nuclear 
material equivalent to the fissile material required for 7,733 nuclear warheads has been 
eliminated.413
Several important events and policy decisions preceded the signing of the 
agreement and unfolded during its evolution. It is important to evaluate the political 
and economic environment surrounding the origins of the agreement in order to 
understand its initial goals, framework of implementation and serious limitations 
encountered along the way. 
The most comprehensive account of the HEU Deal complexities available in 
existing literature was presented by Richard A. Falkenrath.414 The end of the Cold War 
saw unprecedented reductions in the nuclear forces in the United States and the former 
Soviet Union, thereby reducing the nuclear dangers. However, at the same time new 
concerns have arisen from the fact that more and more fissile material was extracted 
from the dismantled weapons. The world community has faced a new set of nuclear 
threats: a stockpile of the dangerous material accumulated in the former Soviet Union 
kept on growing, while the conditions of transportation and storage kept on 
deteriorating. 
In this set of circumstances, the idea proposed by Thomas Neff (from the 
Massachusetts Institute for Technology (MIT)) to buy part of this material from the ex-
Soviet Union was reasonable and timely. Neff proposed for the U.S. to buy excess 
HEU from the Soviet dismantled weapons. Not long after the idea started circulating, 
the Soviet government made the same proposition. Soon after that the Soviet Union 
collapsed - that event only added reasons for the U.S. government to support the idea 
of buying excess HEU from a country, where the nuclear custodial system was 
deteriorating.  
The other two major developments, which were taking place approximately at 
the same time, played their role in HEU Deal as well, but in a completely different way.  
The dramatic rise in the U.S. imports of Soviet uranium (1988-1991), which caused a 
                                                 
413 USEC, at http://www.usec.com/v2001_02/HTML/megatonnes_fact.asp retrieved on 
12.05.03 
414 Richard A. Falkenrath, ‘The HEU Deal’, Appendix C in Allison, Coté, Jr., Falkenrath, 
Miller, eds., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, op. cit., p. 229 
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fall in global uranium prices and provoked an anti-dumping campaign against any 
uranium imports, and the privatisation of the sole HEU Deal executive agent on 
American side - USEC - both had a negative effect on the terms and conditions of the 
agreement, and also on the way it was destined to be implemented.   
After announcing several preliminary findings of «material injury» occurred as a 
result of the alleged Soviet uranium dumping, on May 29, 1992, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce put an immediate levy of 115.82 per cent duty on uranium imports from the 
former Soviet Union.  In exchange for the duty to be lifted Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine had to agree to sign the so-called «suspension 
agreements», which set a quota for uranium imports that was linked to the price of 
uranium.  In other words, as the price rose above $13 per pound, each republic would 
have a progressively larger import quota. The market price at that time was $10 per 
pound and was not expected to rise, which meant that no import from FSU was 
allowed unless it would go above $13.415
The Suspension Agreements played an important role for the HEU Deal due to 
two major factors explained by Falkenrath: 
1.  The Department of Commerce decided to include HEU in the scope of 
the Suspension Agreement with Russia, so that the same quota limitations applied.  
This decision was actively opposed by the Russian side, because the purpose of the 
export of HEU was not commercial, but rather the prevention of proliferation. As a 
result, Russian HEU or blended-down HEU from Russian dismantled weapons was 
excluded from the quota. 
2.  The Suspension Agreements complicated the HEU Deal in another way 
too: the Suspension Agreement with Russia limits its exports of uranium to the U.S. As 
a result it had to be stipulated that USEC can buy only SWU (single working units) in 
LEU and natural uranium part (feed) had to be returned to Russia.416 That constraint 
put into jeopardy the whole HEU Deal: Russia could not sell the returned uranium 
(feed) due to import quotas. That problem was later resolved by the U.S. Congress 
agreeing to pay for the feed component for the years 1997 and 1998, and in 1999 three 
                                                 
415 Falkenrath, ‘The HEU Deal’, op. cit., p. 253 
416 The price for the LEU comprises of two parts: for the SWU (single working units – 
measurement for work required to enrich it) and natural uranium components (feed) 
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companies - Cogema, Nukem, and Cameco - received an option to buy 72% of the 
Russian feed.417 
Another key event, which influenced in a significant way how the HEU Deal 
developed, was the privatisation of the U.S. sole executive agent for HEU Deal - 
USEC.  By making USEC a purely commercial company, the U.S. Government limited 
its own leverage in the HEU Deal and made the agreement a ‘business’ deal rather than 
an important cooperative threat reduction initiative. 
6.2.3.3. The Key Players 
The role of the key players involved in the implementation of any policy is 
important, in the case of the HEU Deal, it especially applies to the U.S. side. The two 
executive agents appointed by their governments to implement the HEU Purchase 
Agreement are Tenex - Russia’s foreign trade company for nuclear services and USEC 
Inc. - the U.S. Enrichment Corporation. The role of Tenex - a MINATOM business 
subsidiary - is straightforward in this agreement – Tenex oversees deliveries of LEU to 
the U.S. However, the participation of USEC as the sole US executive agent in the 
HEU Deal has important implications for the agreement’s implementation. 
Tenex carries out the export of goods and services produced by enterprises of 
MINATOM. It is a 100% MINATOM-owned enterprise, and in this way its status is 
different from USEC, which now represents a completely separate and independent 
entity from the U.S. government.  
At the time when the agreement was signed by Russia and the United States, 
the HEU Deal was overseen by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). In mid-1992 a 
decision was taken to privatise DOE’s civilian enrichment enterprise and create a U.S. 
Enrichment Corporation (USEC).  USEC inherited two civilian enrichment plants (in 
Portsmouth and Paducah) and in July 1998 became a private corporation.   
At the moment USEC is no longer a U.S. government corporation, nor is it 
chartered by the government. The U.S. government holds no financial shares in the 
company.418 Monitoring USEC’s progress in the implementation of the HEU Deal is a 
                                                 
417 Nikhil Anand and Mary Byrd Davis, Report on the U.S. Enrichment Corporation 
Privatization and the Russian HEU Agreement, at 
http://www.earthisland.org/yggdrasil/usec.htm retrieved on 28.06.02 
418 USEC, at http://www.usec.com/v2001_02/HTML/Megatonnes_FAQ.asp retrieved on 
04.05.02 
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responsibility of an Enrichment Oversight Committee under the authority of the 
National Security Council (NSC). However, according to the report of the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) of December 30, 2001, the named Committee has been 
«largely passive».419
Giving an entirely commercial entity such as a privately-owned USEC 
responsibility for the implementation of a non-proliferation initiative was bound to 
create complications.  It was not an accident that a commercial company became an 
executive agent for the HEU Deal though. The privatisation of USEC was discussed 
well before the initial Deal was signed. The idea was to put the HEU Purchase Deal on 
a sound commercial basis in order to ensure its implementation by both sides.  
However, the experience has proved that a business framework for what was supposed 
to be a non-proliferation initiative was not exactly suitable. It became apparent that 
USEC’s commercial interests and U.S. Government’s political objectives of reducing 
the threat of nuclear proliferation were at conflict.420   
                                                 
419 ‘U.S. GAO Report: Government Oversight of HEU Deal Lacking’, press release, 
December 30, 2001 
420 The sub-section 6.2.4.1 discusses in detail the problems of implementation deriving from 
the fact that it is not in USEC’s interests to implement the HEU Deal on other than the 
profit-oriented conditions 
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6.2.3.4. Facilities  
The facilities involved in the implementation of the HEU Deal are presented in 
Table 9. 
Table 9 Facilities Involved in Implementation of the HEU Deal421
Russian facilities involved in blending down HEU into LEU: 
Electrochemical Plant (Zelenogorsk) 
Mayak Production Association (Ozersk) 
Siberian Chemical Enterprise (Seversk) 
Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant (UEIP) (Novosibirsk) 
U.S. Facility receiving LEU from Russia: 
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant  
U.S. Facilities converting Russian LEU into commercial power reactor fuel: 
Westinghouse Nuclear Fuel, Columbia, SC 
Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas, Wilmington, WC 
Framatome Cogema, Lynchburg, VA 
ABB Combustion Engineering, Hematite, MO 
Siemens Power Corporation, Richland, WA 
 
6.2.4. Problems of Implementation 
6.2.4.1. USEC and the HEU Deal: the Clash of Interests  
The technicalities in the process of Russian HEU downblending and conditions 
of the U.S. uranium market play an important role in how USEC wants to see the HEU 
Deal being carried out. One underlying controversy in the whole HEU Purchase 
Agreement is: it is not profitable for USEC to buy an agreed amount of Russian HEU 
with all its components unless the price paid to Russia is well below the market price 
for uranium. USEC insists it faces an estimated $200 million in losses from 
                                                 
421 USEC, at http://www.usec.com/v2001_02/HTML/megatonnes_stepbystep.asp  retrieved 
on 16.04.02 
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implementing the contract.422 As a sole executive agent of HEU Deal on the U.S. side 
and as a privately-run company responsible for maintaining a profitable business, 
USEC is understandably trying to protect its legitimate commercial interests.  
The way USEC has being implementing the agreement was in conflict with the 
initial goals of the U.S. government, which saw the HEU Purchase Agreement as an 
important non-proliferation enterprise. The purchase of 500 metric tonnes of HEU is 
meant to create an important incentive for the Russian government to dismantle its 
nuclear weapons and at the same time to bring vitally needed hard currency into the 
Russian nuclear complex. The money received by Russia for the HEU sent to the 
United States is supposed to be spent on the improvement of safety and security at the 
Russian nuclear installations. In other words, the smoother the Deal can be 
implemented, the higher the chances are for the important non-proliferation initiative 
to be successful. 
An analysis of the U.S. uranium market shows why having a private monopoly 
company managing a state-level non-proliferation programme means putting limitations 
on its implementation. Currently, there seems to be no realistic alternative to the 
current arrangement of how HEU Deal is implemented, and in recent years USEC 
managed to strike a balancing act with Russia on the conditions of the Deal. However, 
USEC’s controversial role in the HEU Deal was a source of serious disagreements 
between the U.S. and Russia. 
 
6.2.4.2. The U.S. Uranium Market, USEC and Russian LEU 
The HEU Purchase Agreement in schematic terms works in the following way: 
HEU extracted from dismantled weapons is ground into metal chips, converted to 
oxide, and chemically treated to remove impurities; then purified uranium is first 
combined with fluorine to produce hexafluoride (UF6) and then it is blended with 
uranium enriched to only 1.5% U235 to produce LEU; LEU is shipped to St. Petersburg 
port to be transported to the U.S., where USEC fabricates it into fuel assemblies; after 
that USEC sells LEU components to utilities and utilities burn LEU fuel in their 
reactors, producing energy and spent fuel.  
                                                 
422 USEC, http://www.usec.com/v2001_02/HTML/Megatonnes_FAQ.asp retrieved on 
04.05.02 
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Russian SWUs versus USEC’s production 
The price for the Russian LEU bought by USEC is determined by two 
components: the natural uranium and the work required to enrich it measured in 
separative work units (SWU).423 This two-part price composition is important in two 
ways: 
1.  USEC does not pay Russia for the natural uranium component (feed), it 
pays only for the SWU component. The amount of natural uranium that would have 
been needed to produce a received quantity of low-enriched uranium is then supposed 
to be returned to Russia (according to the Suspension Agreement).424 Due to 
Suspension Agreement, Russian natural uranium component cannot be sold directly on 
U.S. market, therefore, Russia was (initially) not compensated for the full value of its 
blended-down HEU.425   
Until February 2002, the arrangement was that USEC was supposed to send an 
amount of natural feed equivalent to the feed component in Russian HEU received by 
the U.S. Given that Tenex could not sell the feed on the world market at the appropriate 
price, HEU supplies from Russia were suspended three times. U.S. DOE intervened 
and saved the deal by buying out the feed. 
The new pricing agreement reached in February 2002 solved this problem (details 
of the new pricing arrangement reached are discussed later in this chapter). 
  
2.  By buying Russian SWU as a component of LEU, USEC would go against its 
own commercial interests.  Until 2001 USEC had two gaseous diffusion plants - in 
Portsmouth, Ohio and in Paducah, Kentucky. The annual production of those two 
plants together could be 19.3 million SWU. However, due to the oversupply of the 
world SWU market, the plants have been producing only 13 million SWU per year.426 In 
2001 USEC closed down the plant in Portsmouth. Being one of the few SWU 
                                                 
423 Thomas L. Neff, ‘Decision Time for the HEU Deal: U.S. Security vs. Private Interests’, 
Arms Control Today, June 2001 
424 ibid 
425 Falkenrath, ‘The HEU Deal’, op. cit., p. 269 
426 Falkenrath, ‘The HEU Deal’, op. cit., p. 278 
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producers in the world USEC is trying to underpay Russia for SWU from Russian LEU 
to compensate for higher costs of production of its own SWU - USEC’s costs of SWU 
production have risen because the production cost had to be spread over smaller 
amount of produced volume.  That factor also drove USEC to use some trade action 
manipulations to secure its high profits. 
USEC - a monopoly  
As was mentioned earlier, by being a private company with no obligation to 
fulfil the government’s policy objectives, USEC is not trying to aim for a ‘budget-
neutral’ HEU Deal as was assumed by the U.S. government, but rather to secure high 
profits from this deal.   
Thomas Neff of MIT outlines two actions the company has taken to better its 
financial situation, and which demonstrate that USEC as a private company is often in 
conflict with the policy objectives of the HEU Deal: USEC is seeking to get a 
monopoly power over the U.S. nuclear fuel supply and it is trying to establish even 
lower prices for Russian LEU. 427 In 2000 USEC filed a trade action against two 
European companies - Urenco and Eurodif - the only competitors to USEC on the 
American uranium market. Specialists correctly predicted an outcome favourable to 
USEC (because U.S. Department of Commerce usually takes decisions favourable to 
American producers). As a result, duties were imposed on both European companies.   
USEC itself does not consider itself a monopolist. USEC’s representative 
Charles Ulish believes the idea of USEC being a monopolist on the American U.S. 
market is created by its competitors. According to Ulish, USEC has 60% of the market, 
and only has a monopoly over Russian HEU.428   
In November 2001, the U.S. government authorised USEC to conclude 
negotiations on contract terms with the Russian executive agent Tenex for the calendar 
year 2002 and beyond.429 Media reports indicated that USEC was trying to lower the 
                                                 
427 Neff, ‘Decision Time for the HEU Deal’ op. cit. 
428 Telephone interview with Charles Yulish, USEC, 02.04.03 
429 USEC Press-Release, Statement by USEC Inc. ‘Status of the Russian HEU Purchase 
Contract - Terms Reached for Future Implementation of the Megatonnes to Megawatts 
Program’, February 26, 2002 at 
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current price by 15 per cent.430 The initial reaction of MINATOM was negative and it 
was reported that MINATOM officials were not offering to reduce the price of 
uranium that it supplied to the U.S. under the HEU Purchase Agreement. However, it 
was announced later that Russia agreed to sign the new contract and the shipments 
were resumed in March 2002.   
The amendment was signed by USEC and Tenex in February 2002 in Moscow. 
In June 2002 the two governments approved implementation of the contract 
amendment for the remaining 12 years of the programme. The new pricing terms went 
into effect in January 2003.431  The new price conditions state the price would fluctuate 
with the markets annually and would be based on a three-year average.432 The danger of 
this lies in the possibility of undermining Russia’s willingness to participate in the 
programme. USEC as a sole agent of HEU Deal can dictate unfairly low prices to 
Russia. Russia although unwillingly accepting unfavourable terms, might lose the 
incentive to continue with the HEU Deal, or domestic support for this deal in Russia 
could be severely undermined. 
It should be said, that for the moment, Russia is satisfied with the current 
conditions.  Russian MINATOM Deputy Minister Vinogradov believes that both sides 
have made ‘reciprocal concessions’ and the new arrangement meets interests of both – 
the U.S. and Russia. In his words, U.S. power generation cannot operate without 
Russian uranium, and Russia will receive a steady inflow of funds for up until 2013 and 
has secured a presence on American uranium market (albeit more political rather than 
market-based).433 The market uranium prices are currently (as of 2003) quite high, and 
the HEU Deal secures a relatively high inflow of hard currency. However, this market 
price-based approach can prove to be unstable considering possible fluctuations on the 
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world uranium market. Experts from the Russian policy think-tanks believe that the 
price USEC pays Russia is miniscule, but that the deal is still welcomed since it secures 
vitally needed revenue. 434  
 
6.2.5. Verification: the HEU Transparency Implementation Programme  
Verification is an important part of any international arms control/non-
proliferation enterprise.  In case of the HEU Deal, both sides agreed on establishing a 
so called HEU Transparency Implementation Programme. The initial Protocol on 
HEU Transparency Arrangements was signed by U.S. Vice-President Gore and Russian 
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin on March 18, 1994 in Washington.  On June 30, 1995 
U.S. Energy Secretary O’Leary and Russian MINATOM Minister Mikhailov signed a 
Join Statement on Transparency Arrangements in Moscow. Initially, MINATOM 
resisted the Transparency Agreement, but the economic incentives played their role.  
U.S. proposed an advance of $100 million in exchange for expediting transparency 
measures.435
The programme seeks to ensure the following requirements are met: HEU is 
extracted from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons, this same HEU is converted to 
LEU, and the LEU shipped to the United States is fabricated into fuel for commercial 
nuclear reactors.436 Among the tools used by American monitoring specialists are 
physical observations, measurements, accountability documents, monitoring 
information. Technical experts (monitors) conduct regular visits to all the four Russian 
uranium processing plants: the Siberian Chemical Enterprise, the ElectroChemical 
Plant, the Mayak Production Association, and the Ural Electrochemical Integrated 
Plant (UEIP). The first three facilities are visited six times a year by teams composed of 
5 to 10 scientists.437 At the fourth facility (UEIP) DOE established a Transparency 
Monitoring Office with a permanent presence of monitoring staff. The office specialists 
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are provided with daily access to monitor the material and certain process activities 
related to the conversion process.438  
The technical application used to determine HEU assay in Russian containers is 
the Portable Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) Instrumentation. The Blend Down 
Monitoring System (BDMS) is used to confirm the traceability, flow and enrichment 
assay of HEU being blended into LEU.439 Continuous enrichment monitoring 
equipment involves a radiation detector on the pipe, where HEU is downblended. 
There is a continuous monitoring of the enrichment process:  the specialists monitor 
the HEU stream, the blend stocks stream, and the product stream. 
Such continuous enrichment monitoring system is highly praised by experts, 
and as such represents one of the examples of non-intrusive verification mechanisms.   
Oleg Bukharin from Princeton University commented on the enrichment 
monitoring:  
“…It works very well, it’s a very unique kind of element of this [HEU 
Transparency] Agreement, it is much more advanced if you compare it to 
other transparency initiatives […] and it is routinely implemented on the 
operational level…”440   
 
6.2.6. The Overall Effectiveness of the HEU Deal  
The HEU Deal passed through several stages of evolution, and for the 
moment, has reached a working arrangement more or less satisfactory for Russia and 
the U.S.  Privatisation of USEC in the earlier years of HEU Deal, brought a completely 
new complexity: the deal had to be justifiable on economic grounds. Although, the 
choice of USEC as an implementing agent for the Agreement does not have 
unanimous support, it seems like the only realistic option. USEC has all the relevant 
expertise, and there are no other entities to be considered as better agents for the Deal. 
MINATOM and USEC managed to agree on a market-based approach of 
establishing a price for Russian uranium. Current conditions more or less satisfy Russia, 
                                                 
438 Environmental Assessment Division at http://www.ead.anl.gov/project/ retrieved on 
23.07.03
439 Chart ‘Highly Enriched Uranium Transparency Implementation Program’, op. cit. 
440 Telephone interview with Oleg Bukharin, Princeton University, Washington D.C., 01.04.03 
225 
although the arrangement is not particularly stable. If market prices fall considerably, 
Russia will be less happy to go on with the deal. It is apparent that an interim 
compromise was found, but it is widely believed in Russia and the U.S., that this 
compromise is rather weak. 
6.2.7. Conclusion 
The problem of fissile material disposition is linked to its production. While 
Russia stopped production of HEU in 1989, it continues to generate plutonium and 
will continue to do so until, at least, 2011 (see the section on problems associated with 
shut-down of plutonium reactors)  Another aspect of the disposition problem is the 
dismantlement of existing weapons, which generates additional volumes of loose 
material. These two aspects of fissile material disposition relate to two separate sets of 
issues: the question of safety and security, and strategic issues (such as the question on 
whether to maintain fissile material, whether to produce new material for new weapons, 
etc.) 
The issue of safety and security of fissile material discussed in detail in Chapters 
5 & 6 generates questions on strategic issues connected with the larger process of 
determining a role for nuclear weapons in the post-Cold war international security 
system and of restructuring of U.S.-Russian relations. While it is perceived by the U.S. 
and Russia that maintaining substantial levels of nuclear weapons is necessary, demands 
for fissile material production and/or use of existing stockpiles to build new weapons 
will remain.   
There was a trend pointing at cessation of new weapons production during 
early 1990s but with the change of power in the U.S. this process has been in reverse. 
There was a sharp transition from Clinton to Bush administration. Clinton 
administration officials were trying to be as absolutist as they could and saw taking 
nuclear weapons out of international politics as a part of a larger process of 
restructuring U.S.-Russian relations. The Bush administration re-emphasised the role of 
nuclear weapons and demonstrated a general disbelief in arms control. The differences 
in attitude to arms control and denuclearisation of Clinton and Bush administrations 
had a direct impact on the process of cooperative threat reduction. (see the discussion 
in Chapter 2) 
The problem of the safe storage and disposition of fissile material will remain at 
the forefront of non-proliferation agenda since it is unlikely that the volume of fissile 
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stockpile will diminish dramatically (in the light of the current state of the U.S.-Russian 
strategic relations). 
On the programme level, Plutonium Disposition Programme and HEU 
Purchase Agreement have been an important tool of the cooperative threat reduction 
process. They encountered problems of implementation, which are endemic to all the 
CTR programmes. 
The Plutonium Disposition programme suffers from two fundamental 
problems. One is that there is no technically flawless method of disposition that fully 
meets the proliferation concerns. The other, even more important issue is that Russia 
still continues to produce plutonium, and while this continues, the question of 
disposition appears to be moot. There are also bureaucratic obstacles, such as the lack 
of funds and the lack of agreement over liability of contractors. 
The case with expiration of the Technical Agreement for Plutonium 
Disposition proves that Bureaucratic Politics Model is relevant when used to explain 
the cooperative threat reduction process. As was discussed in this chapter, the 
Technical Agreement for Plutonium Disposition was not extended because U.S. State 
Department insisted on changing the liability provisions for the U.S. contractors. The 
U.S. Department of Energy, which implements the project, and Russian MINATOM 
were ready to extend the agreement, but the State Department was not ready for 
compromise. The fact that two U.S. agencies – the Department of Energy and the State 
Department – have varying views on the programme implementation – results from 
their organisational interests. The Department of Energy is willing to continue the 
implementation of the programme, which it considers important, for which it has 
expertise, and for which it received additional funding from the federal budget. The 
State Department is more concerned with the principles and procedures that govern 
U.S.-Russian relations, rather than the objectives of CTR in themselves. 
The experience of the HEU Deal constitutes another example of how the 
interests of the key player – USEC - (in this case, of a commercial entity with a political 
role) determined the way the programme developed. USEC’s commercial interests have 
interfered with the implementation of the HEU Deal. Although, after years of 
disagreements on pricing arrangements, the compromise has been reached, there is no 
guarantee that it will be stable. 
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Chapter 7 
The ‘Brain-Drain’ Threat: the Human Factor in Downsizing of 
Russia’s Nuclear Complex 
7.1. Introduction  
The collapse of the Soviet Union prompted the severe deterioration of its nuclear 
complex. The poor economic and socio-political conditions resulted in a crisis inside the 
former Soviet nuclear complex. The potential «brain-drain» of former and present nuclear 
scientists, who can be tempted to work abroad, raised serious concerns. Moreover, the 
deterioration of morale among the nuclear complex employees could result in undermining 
of safety and security of nuclear weapons and materials. Desperate nuclear workers and 
those involved in maintaining nuclear safety and security, who are not paid for months can 
not be expected to carry out their duties as normal. 
This chapter addresses the problem of the human factor – as one of the components 
of the proliferation challenges of the post-Soviet period. The political and economic 
turmoil in the disintegrating Soviet Union created two major nuclear proliferation threats, 
associated with the ‘human factor’. Firstly, many weapon scientists lost their jobs, and 
secondly, those left faced grim working and living conditions. These developments had 
potentially dangerous consequences; experts with critical knowledge of weapons could have 
been tempted to sell their expertise to rogue states or feel discouraged and deceived by the 
system and compromise on keeping nuclear weapons and materials secure. Therefore, the 
‘human’ dimension of proliferation risks in Russia is significant. The following chapter, 
first, introduces the phenomenon of “closed” cities in Russia – where most of the nuclear 
scientists and engineers live. The specific lifestyle typical for these cities during the Soviet 
time (the inhabitants enjoyed better welfare than any other Soviet citizens) made the 
financial and economic problems of early 1990s an even greater challenge for the nuclear 
complex employees. 
In this respect, it is important to assess achievements and failures of the programme, 
which was specifically designed to address the problems of Russia’s “closed” nuclear cities. 
The Nuclear Cities (NCI) programme provides interesting insights into the priorities of 
U.S. in non-proliferation assistance to Russia. The experience of the last few years shows 
that NCI does not have great support on Capitol Hill because of the specific goals of the 
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programme, which do not yield immediate results and do not in any obvious way reflect 
the interests of American tax payers. Another programme, which deals with the human 
aspect of nuclear threats, is the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP). Similar to 
NCI, its focus is on the nuclear scientists, and the goal is to prevent a possible “brain-
drain” from Russia by funding commercially viable projects. IPP has been looked on more 
favourably in the United States since cooperation between American and Russian scientists 
brings mutually beneficial commercial profits, while fulfilling an important non-
proliferation task. 
An establishment of the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) was 
another attempt to prevent the “brain-drain” from the former Soviet Union. Unlike NCI 
and IPP, ISTC is a multilateral effort. ISTC provides former Soviet nuclear scientists with 
civilian research opportunities. Initially, ISTC experienced problems, but at the moment, it 
receives good feedback from the experts. Nonetheless, ISTC methods of work are 
undergoing major changes, which reflect the changing U.S. policy to non-proliferation 
assistance to Russia. The focus is shifting towards encouraging self-sustainability of Russian 
nuclear institutes.    
The evaluation of the problems of implementation and of overall effectiveness of the 
programmes dealing with the human factor in Russian nuclear complex provides some 
interesting conclusions about the U.S.-Russian cooperative threat reduction. The problem 
of downsizing of the Russian nuclear complex is interlinked with the problem of decisions 
to be taken by the Russian government on what its nuclear forces should be like. The size 
and composition of Russian nuclear forces will determine the size of the complex necessary 
to maintain them and a number of personnel required for the nuclear complex. 
 
7.2. ‘Closed’ Cities 
In Russia there are ten cities, known as ‘closed’ nuclear cities.  The total population 
of these cities is more than 756,000 people. The majority of them are nuclear scientists 
engaged in the development, testing and production of nuclear weapons and materials. In 
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total, the Russian nuclear weapon complex has some 17 industrial enterprises and scientific 
research institutes, the majority of which are situated in these 10 cities.441 (Table 10) 
Table 10 “Closed” Cities in Russia442
Name (Former Name)/Activities Nuclear Facilities Population 
SAROV (Arzamas-16) 
Weapons R&D 
Warhead Assembly/Dismantlement 
Research Reactors 
All-Russian Scientific and Research 
Institute of Experimental Physics 
(VNIIEF) 
Avangard Electromechanical Plant  
83,000 
SHEZHINSK (Chelyabinsk-70) 
Warhead Design 
Prototype Warhead Fabrication 
Research Reactors 
All-Russian Scientific and Research 
Institute of Technical Physics 
(VNIITF) 
48,000 
TREKHGORNY (Zlatoust-36) 
Final Warhead Assembly and 
Dismantlement 
Instrument-Making Plant 33,000 
LESNOY (Sverdlovsk-45) 
Final Warhead Assembly and 
Dismantlement 
Elektrokhimpribor Combine 58,000 
ZARECHNYI (Penza-19) 
Component Fabrication 
Warhead Assembly and Disassembly 
START Production Association 
(PO START) 
64,000 
ZELENOGORSK (Krasnoyarsk-45) 
Uranium Enrichment 
LEU Production 
Electrochemical Plant (EkhZ) 67,000 
OZERSK (Chelyabinsk-65) 
Plutonium and Tritium Production 
Reactors, Reprocessing 
MOX Fuel Production 
Warhead Component Production 
MAYAK Production Association 
(PO MAYAK) 
88,000 
NOVOURALSK (Sverdlovsk-44) 
Former HEU for Weapons Production 
Site 
LEU Production 
Urals Electrochemical Combine 
(UEKhK) 
96,000 
ZHEZNOGORSK (Krasnoyarsk-26) 
Plutonium Production Reactor 
Spent Fuel Reprocessing 
Mining and Chemical Combine 
(GKhK) 
100,000 
SEVERSK (Tomsk-7) 
Plutonium Production 
Uranium Enrichment, Reprocessing 
Dismantled Weapons Storage 
Siberian Chemical Combine 
(SKhK) 
119,000 
 
The idea of ‘closed’ cities appeared in the 1940-50s, when the Soviet government 
started creating them far away from the major cities in the isolated, remote areas. Ten 
                                                 
441 Lev Ryabev, ‘The Role of the NCI in Meeting Russia’s Nuclear Complex Challenges’, paper 
delivered at the 7th Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, January 11-12, 1999 
442 Spector Leonard, Webb Gregory, McDonough Mark, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide, 
Maps and Charts: 1998, The Brookings Institution, 1998, pp. 45-47 
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nuclear cities out of 42 closed cities in Russia have the legal status of Closed 
Administrative-Territorial Formations (ZATO). Each closed nuclear city was known by its 
secret name composed of its postcode and the name of the nearest big town and was not 
marked on the map. It was not until the early 1990s that the outside world and Russian 
population learnt the exact location of those cities, where ideas related to nuclear weapons 
were born, implemented and tested. However, even nowadays the nuclear cities and 
surrounding areas are protected by double fences and the perimeters are patrolled by armed 
guards of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Access is restricted and controlled by the FSB. 443  
Those cities had literally a life of their own - the state provided for the population 
of the ‘nuclear’ cities to be fully supplied with all the commodities (supply was significantly 
better than in any other parts of the Soviet Union). Nuclear scientists, the majority of 
whom lived in those ‘closed’ cities, enjoyed a number of privileges, including paid 
vacations, heavily subsidised apartments, access to special stores, free medical care and a 
dacha (summer retreat house).444 Soviet nuclear scientists and their families occupied an 
elite position in the society. However, there were restrictions on their movement (outside 
the ‘closed’ cities) due to the nature of their work. The phenomenon of ‘closed’ cities better 
than anything else demonstrates how the Soviet nuclear complex was operating 
independently from the rest of the country. It was a ‘state-inside-a-state’.  
The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the deterioration of 
economic situation in Russia caused major problems for the nuclear complex. The ‘closed 
cities’ were especially affected. From being well-provided, exclusive parts of the country 
they turned into cities struggling for the survival of their inhabitants – skilled nuclear 
scientists and engineers. 
The country’s military men, as well as the scientists, faced severe economic 
setbacks.  The Strategic Rocket Forces and the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of 
Defence (GUMO) suffered from wage arrears as well as shortages of food and housing 
allowances. In 1997, the 12th GUMO closed a nuclear weapons storage site due to hunger 
                                                 
443 Matthew Bunn, Oleg Bukharin, Jill Cetina, Kenneth Luongo, Frank von Hippel, ‘Retooling 
Russia’s Nuclear Cities’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, September/October 1998, Vol. 54, #. 5 
444 Michael Dobbs, ‘Collapse of Soviet Union Proved Boom to Iranian Missile Program’, The 
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strikes by the workers; in 1998, families of several nuclear units protested over wage and 
benefit arrears.445
The majority of specialists living in the ‘closed’ cities have a relatively low salary – it 
is not lower than the average state-funded salary in other cities, but dramatically lower in 
value terms in comparison with the levels before the Soviet collapse.   
Valentin Tikhonov in his comprehensive sociological survey of migration and other 
related problems in the ‘closed’ cities gives the following numbers: 
«The level and structure of pay (in US dollars) received today is practically the 
same as in 1992, although the cost of living has risen considerably since then. 
About 60 per cent of surveyed specialists receive monthly pay equivalent to less 
than US$50, and only 3 per cent receive US$100 to US$125».446
It is even more worrying that more than half of the specialists employed by the 
Russian nuclear complex do not treat their regular pay as being sufficient for their needs, 
and therefore look for other sources of income. It was found that 60% of specialists 
supplement their salaries by outside work. Around 90% of respondents of Tikhonov’s 
survey confessed that their financial situation has deteriorated, and 80% of surveyed 
experts expressed their will to work in the military industry of a foreign country.447   
 Bunn et. al in ‘Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials’ cite two reports: 1) in 
October 2000 Russia’s Security Council reported that Taliban envoys attempted to recruit 
at least one Russian nuclear expert.  While that particular expert did not agree to work for 
the Taliban, three of his colleagues had left his institute to live abroad and Russian officials 
do not know where they are. 2) In 1998 an employee of a nuclear weapons laboratory in 
the ‘closed’ city of Sarov attempted to sell documents on advanced conventional weapons 
to the Taliban and Iraq. The FSB official reported that there were other similar cases of 
attempted spying and that it was a consequence of the ‘very difficult financial position’ of 
workers at defence enterprises.448
                                                 
445 ‘Russia’s Nuclear Risks’, Carnegie Issue Brief, Vol. V – No. 2 February 28, 2002 
446 Valentin Tikhonov Russia’s Nuclear and Missile Complex: The Human Factor in Proliferation, 
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The statistics presented by Tikhonov in his survey of nuclear workers reiterates the 
danger posed by the conditions, which are compelling the nuclear specialists to look for 
other jobs. However, it should be noted that until now there have been no proven cases of 
former Soviet scientists in possession of top secret information working for any of the 
rogue states. The «brain drain», caused by worsening economic conditions in the nuclear 
sector, is, nonetheless, a potential security threat. As of 1999, those 10 cities had 18,000 
unemployed who were not even registered.449  
The mid-90s was the lowest point for the “closed” cities.  The federal budget was 
failing to pay its nuclear complex workers on time, and the pessimism of Director of 
Avangard plant in Sarov (the leading plant of nuclear industry) could well have been 
spoken out by any of the workers of all of the “closed” cities: 
“In the first nine months of this year [1995] the federal debt to the plant totalled 
12.5 billion rubles.  Furthermore, the federal budget still had a debt of R5.3 
billion left over from 1993.  And there is no hope now that we will get this 
money, although leaders at every level have promised to help.  It would be rash 
to rely on the federal budget alone.”450
At that time, the workers of “closed” cities set up the Association for Assistance to 
Citizens of Closed Administrative Territorial Formations of the Russian Federation 
Ministry of Atomic Energy. They decided to focus more on conversion projects and 
organised an exhibition called “Festival of Russia’s Closed Cities”. In some ways that 
exhibition highlighted the problems with the attempt of “closed” cities to fight for their 
own survival.  For many years the workers were isolated from the rest of the country, from 
the rules of market economy. It remains difficult to find conversion projects that would 
suit the profile of the former weapons facilities. 
The desperate situation characteristic of Russian nuclear complex in mid-1990s 
culminated in personal tragedies. One of such examples was the suicide committed by the 
Director of former Chelyabinsk-70 Vladimir Nechai in 1996 (Chelyabinsk-70 is one of 
Russia’s two nuclear design centres). Nechai’s suicide note reportedly said that he could no 
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longer bear the fact that his life-long work was falling apart and his workers were not paid 
for months and months.451   
In the early spring of 1998 regional legislators from Chelyabinsk oblast (where 
several nuclear facilities are situated) appealed to the State Duma to consider the dire 
situation in the Russian nuclear complex.  Some defence-related facilities appealed directly 
to President Yeltsin pointing out the arrears of wages.452
The financial crisis of August 1998 in Russia aggravated the abysmal situation in the 
Russian nuclear complex. It served as a wake-up call for the U.S. government, which 
realised the necessity to assist Russian nuclear personnel for the sake of its own national 
security interests. The threat of the ‘brain-drain’ and the potential consequences of 
deteriorating conditions of Russia’s nuclear custodians prompted proponents of the CTR 
process in the U.S. to develop a new programme, which could address their growing 
concerns.  The financial crisis of 1998 served as an impetus for the U.S. to establish the 
Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI). 
The problem of ‘closed’ cities highlights the necessity to define Russia’s new 
security philosophy. The research and military complex concentrated in the ‘closed’ cities 
was developed in the time of the Cold War with the sole purpose to match the nuclear 
capabilities of the adversary state, and if it was possible, to surpass them. In the changing 
security environment there is less need for intensive large-scale nuclear research and 
production becomes less and less relevant. Consequently the future existence of those cities 
is in doubt. Unfortunately, downsizing the Russian nuclear complex is a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand, the reduction in activity related to the development and 
production of nuclear weapons is in line with the new international security environment. 
It is desirable both in terms of Russia’s relations with the United States and as a general 
contribution to a reduced role of nuclear weapons in international politics and non-
proliferation. On the other hand, a decrease in the levels of nuclear research and 
production leaves thousands of specialists with unique knowledge of nuclear production 
without a job. In such a way, it increases the possibilities of a misuse of nuclear knowledge. 
The economic hardships can be an incentive for the Russian weapon specialists to sell their 
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skills to foreign countries, including rogue states. This also applies to materials to which 
they still have access.  
It is projected that MINATOM will reduce defence employment in the Russian 
nuclear complex from approximately 75,000 to 40,000 by 2005, and most of these 
reductions will take place in the closed nuclear cities.453 According to some estimates, about 
20-25,000 people working in weapon/material production and warhead R&D will be laid 
off in the next 10 years.454 This number refers to second-tier workers (those who might not 
have critical knowledge like weapon scientists but who have practical knowledge of certain 
stages of weapon production). Adding first-tier WMD workers, who eventually will lose 
their jobs due to downsizing, will produce an even higher overall number.  The Russian 
Government is on the track of downsizing its nuclear complex, which is far too large for 
Russia’s requirements in the post-Cold war security environment. Several conversion 
projects have been implemented, including the following: the uranium-enrichment plants 
have been converted from producing HEU for weapons to producing LEU for nuclear 
power plant fuel;  ten of thirteen plutonium-production reactors have been shut down; the 
annual production of  nuclear weapons has declined by a factor of 10 or more; production 
of new weapons has ended at two out of four warhead assembly/disassembly  facilities (the 
Avangard plant in Sarov and PO Start in Zarechny); manufacturing of fissile weapons 
components has ended at one of two sites (Seversk); at some facilities weapon activities 
were consolidated at a smaller number of shops.455
However, by not taking good care of its nuclear scientists and not being able to 
provide opportunities for their work, Russia can seriously undermine both its domestic 
atomic energy security and international security regime.  The Russian government is facing 
a major dilemma of how to deal with the problem of human factor in the process of 
restructuring the country’s nuclear complex. The problem is that Russia lacks the financial 
resources to deal with this problem adequately. The assistance provided by cooperative 
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threat reduction programmes is of great importance in dealing with problems of re-
employment and conversion in Russian nuclear sector. 
7.3. Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) 
The Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) was launched by the U.S. Department of 
Energy in 1998 with the goal to reduce the proliferation risks created by the poor economic 
conditions in the ‘closed’ cities.  By promoting the development of private industry in these 
cities, NCI seeks to prevent a ‘brain drain’ of Russian nuclear experts to nuclear threshold 
countries. 
There are two major objectives set by the NCI Programme: helping Russia 
downsize its nuclear complex and creating civilian jobs for scientists, engineers, and 
technicians. NCI also tries to assist in community and infrastructure development in 
nuclear cities and works to engage U.S. and international agencies and organisations in 
projects in nuclear cities. NCI is a relatively new programme in the range of non-
proliferation assistance programmes carried out with the help of the U.S funds. Unlike the 
older programmes of IPP and ISTC, which focus on scientists still engaged in the Russian 
nuclear complex, NCI focuses on providing assistance to scientists as they lose their jobs in 
the nuclear labs, institutes, and facilities.456   
The original concept of NCI was born in September 1997 following a proposal 
from the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC). DOE adopted 
RANSAC’s proposal, and shortly afterwards MINATOM and DOE began talks on the 
matter of establishing a cooperative programme in order to help Russian nuclear cities. In 
March 1998 both agencies have expressed their support for the plan and on July 24, 1998 
they issued a Joint Statement on U.S.-Russian Cooperation to Implement the Nuclear 
Cities Initiative.  In September 1998 President Clinton and President Yeltsin approved the 
basic concept of NCI during the summit in Moscow. Finally, on September 22, 1998 
Secretary of Energy Richardson and head of MINATOM Adamov signed an Agreement 
on the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI). Agreement designated Russian MINATOM and U.S 
DOE as executive agents, and established a U.S.-Russian Steering Committee.   
The following principal areas for the cooperation were defined: sharing experience 
in diversification of production; facilitating the selection of promising projects for 
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production diversification and creating the conditions that will enable them to be 
implemented; developing entrepreneurial skills in employees displaced from enterprises of 
the nuclear complex, training them in how to write a business plan, and facilitating the 
development of such plans; facilitating the creation of the conditions necessary for 
attracting investment in the «nuclear cities» for purposes of implementing the projects 
within the framework of the agreement; facilitating the search of investors for production 
diversification projects, market analysis, and the marketing of products and services 
produced as a result of the implementation of those projects; facilitating access to existing 
investment mechanisms for the funding of projects under the agreement.457
It was decided that pilot projects would be undertaken in three cities: Sarov, 
Snezhinsk, and Zheleznogorsk. As of the end of 2003, NCI continues to operate only in 
these three cities, while the remaining seven continue to struggle on their own with 
unemployment and other challenges of an economic and social nature. 
Sarov is the birthplace of the Soviet atomic bomb, and it became a “closed” city in 
1946.  It is located in the Nizhny Novgorod Oblast (about 255 miles southeast of Moscow 
and 90 miles south of the city of Nizhny Novgorod). Sarov is home to one of the main 
nuclear research institutes – the All Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental 
Physics (VNIIEF). The most important facility situated in Sarov is the Avangard 
Electromechanical Plant. 
Snezhinsk is home to one of Russia’s largest nuclear research centres, its formal 
name is the Russian Federal Nuclear Centre. Snezhinsk also has a Technical Institute of 
Physics (VNIIETF), one of the country’s two principal warhead design centres. About 
80% of the adult population is employed by either the Nuclear Centre or the Institute of 
Physics. The existence of the institute and the city was not made public until 1992.458
Zheleznogorsk is one of the largest “closed” cities in Russia with a population of 
100,000 people. It is situated in Central Siberia. The main facility in Zheleznogorsk is the 
Mining and Chemical Combine (MCC or GKhK in Russian abbreviation) with a workforce 
of 8,300 employees. It took years to carve MCC into a mountain so deep that it was 
thought that plutonium production could continue even after a nuclear strike. The 
                                                 
457 Full text of the ‘Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Russian Federation on the Nuclear Cities Initiative’, Article 3 
458 Sandia National Laboratory, at http://www.sandia.gov/ASCI/russia/snezhinsk.html retrieved 
on 26.01.04 
236 
plutonium reactor in Zheleznogorsk provides heat and light for the city, and this is one of 
the reasons for the delays in shutting down the reactor. It is now planned that it will be 
shut down in 2008. For the moment, there is enough plutonium production for 100 
nuclear warheads annually.459 MCC currently has 9,500 workers, and 6,000 of them will be 
displaced. This creates a necessity for serious NCI involvement in helping Russian 
government to deal with the downsizing. 
7.3.1. The Key Players  
The Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC) was the 
originator of the NCI concept. The idea was then taken to Department of Energy (DOE), 
where with the instrumental support of Rose Gottemoeller (then Assistant Secretary of 
Energy) it was developed further and introduced to the Congress. 
The practice demonstrated that Congress was not ready to cope with the sudden 
appearance of another non-proliferation assistance programme. The specific nature of the 
programme, which was designed to deal with the social and economic problems in the 
Russian nuclear complex met with a cool reception Congress as it was not a disarmament 
measure, but rather could serve to keep the Russian nuclear complex running. The 
supporters of NCI among Representatives of Congress include Ellen Tauscher (D-CA), 
Senator Pete Domenici; however, there are many others, who do not see NCI as an 
important non-proliferation tool.   
The programme is managed by the DOE’s National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA). In Russia NCI works with the city administrations and heads of 
facilities and institutes located in the three “closed” cities of Sarov, Snezhinsk, and 
Zheleznogorsk.  Successes of NCI often depend on the personalities involved – i.e. on how 
politically powerful the heads of the facilities are (what is their leverage in persuading FSB 
in necessity of cooperation), and how city administrators perceive the programme.    
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7.3.2. Problems of Implementation and the Overall Effectiveness  
«Closed» cities are very different from ordinary towns in Russia. At the moment, 
the specific nature of the nuclear cities creates certain complications and, to a limited 
extent, advantages for the operation of the NCI. There are some economic and socio-
political privileges in the nuclear cities. These include a more highly developed social 
infrastructure (healthcare, education, commodities), which to some extent has been 
preserved, and a lower rate of crime.   
Moreover, there was a temporary tax exemption for all ten nuclear cities. An 
amendment to Article 5 of the Law on ZATO of November 1996 established a special tax 
protection regime – allowing the closed cities to use taxes collected for their own budget. 
The deficit of the budget was to be covered by direct state subsidies. Moreover, the 
amended law allowed closed cities to establish tax-free zones, in other words, the 
companies registered within the city could do so on a tax-free basis.460 In a 1998 
Amendment to the Law On Closed Territorial Administrative Entities the Russian government 
allowed nuclear cities to keep tax revenues instead of turning them over to the federal 
government.461 All those innovations were meant to increase investment attractiveness of 
the «closed» cities and help them maintain economic stability. 
However, the new tax regime provided a loop-hole for companies, which registered 
for the tax exemption but did not contribute to the cities’ development. As a result, the 
federal budget incurred losses and ruled to tighten the rules for tax exemption. From April 
1999 the administration of the closed city can provide tax breaks only to companies who 
meet the following criteria: 90 per cent of permanent assets and 70 percent of their 
employees are located within the closed cities.462   
7.3.2.1 The Economic and Financial Situation in Russia  
The undeveloped economic and financial systems and corruption have a direct 
negative impact on what can be achieved by NCI projects.  “Oligarchs” – a small group of 
influential extremely rich people in Russia – damage the state economy. Oligarchs and the 
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integrated business groups they control - always have their own banks, thereby weakening 
the state financial system. Russian people do not trust banking systems, and there is no 
culture of savings in the post-Soviet period – that factor also has an impact on the state of 
financial institutions. The Soviet legacy of the central economy and concentration of 
resources in certain industries (like the defence military complex) continues to affect the 
Russian economy, although a process of moving towards a Western-type of economic and 
financial system is underway. Since the financial crisis of August 1998, Russian economy 
has been gradually improving, however, the main economic indicators still fluctuate (Table 
11).   
Table 11 Selected Macroeconomic Indicators in Russia (1991-2001)463  
Year 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 
GDP 
growth (%) 
-5.0 -14.5 -8.7 -12.6 -4.1 -3.4 0.9 -4.9 5.4 9.0 5.0 
GNP   
($ billion) 
569 469 412 343 333 348 383 331 256 246 253 
 
Until the economy is stable, it will be hard to attract foreign private investment. A 
still ‘wild’ Russian market economy coupled with the problem of getting access to ‘closed’ 
cities leaves not much for providing incentives for foreign investors. Another problem is 
that Russian private business has not participated in investing into ‘closed’ cities. Russian 
oligarchs prefer to keep their assets outside Russia in foreign banks. As in the case of 
Western investors, Russian businessmen have little incentive to channel resources into the 
deteriorating nuclear complex. Private investment is crucial for Russia’s nuclear complex 
and ‘closed’ cities, in particular. There is a very limited state support due to a lack of 
government funds, at the same time, the commercialisation and conversion of former 
weapon facilities is crucial for the cities’ survival.   
 
7.3.2.2 The Problem with Access  
There is a whole list of factors contributing to the problems of implementation of 
the NCI Programme. First and most important is the secrecy still surrounding nuclear cities 
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in Russia, which results in a serious problem of access. Most of the closed nuclear cities are 
located far away from any regional centres or big cities and have several levels of physical 
protection. The cities are surrounded by double fences, and the perimeter around them is 
guarded by the troops of Ministry of Internal Affairs.  
Bukharin provides the following description:  
“Inside the restricted area is a town for the facility work force, large wooded 
areas, and several isolated technical areas that house primary research and 
production facilities, testing areas, and a support infrastructure.  Technical areas 
within the restricted area are surrounded by their own double or triple fences 
patrolled by armed guards.”464
Although access control to the nuclear cities was slightly eased in 1950s, it still 
remains extremely tight, especially for foreign nationals. The residents of the closed nuclear 
cities can now travel in and out of the city provided they carry a special pass. The strict 
access regime for foreigners poses one of the main obstacles for the implementation of the 
NCI and some other U.S.-funded non-proliferation programmes. The American side has 
complained about the long process of obtaining permission to visit cities participating in 
the programme and has drawn up a long list on instances when access was denied 
altogether. During the period from spring 1999 till February 2001 there were 25 instances 
of denied access.465 DOE officials have noted that some requests were denied more than 
once, while a significant number of requests were approved at a later date. It is a rule that 
the application for entering a «closed» city should be filed 45 days before expected travel. 
One of the specific requirements applied to foreigners visiting «closed» cities is that they 
must be escorted at all times, with a few exceptions in some cities where foreigners are 
allowed to move on their own within a limited area in the city’s centre.466
It is apparent that the problem with access is hampering the implementation of the 
NCI and other projects in the «closed» cities. A complicated process of obtaining 
permission to visit the cities also has a negative psychological effect on American 
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participants of the programme. Although, the Agreement on NCI states «timely access for 
those involved in coordinating and implementing to nuclear cities and sites where activities 
related are performed»467 as a means to the effective implementation of the programme, an 
access issue still remains a stumbling rock in the NCI process. 
However, these restrictions of access to nuclear cities are not entirely irrelevant to 
guarding Russia’s national security. The example of America itself shows that it is a normal 
code of practice to try and limit the number of those allowed to sensitive sites in the 
country. Nevertheless, a balanced policy should be established in order to boost the 
implementation of NCI and other projects in Russia’s nuclear cities. Both Russia and the 
United States are trying to resolve the access issue. On 27 September 1999, the U.S. and 
Russia signed a memorandum of understanding under the auspices of the NCI to work to 
improve U.S. access to Russia’s closed cities.468  In September 2001 Russia and the U.S. 
signed an agreement on access for NCI projects. The agreement gave some political 
leverage to the Russian nuclear site managers, but it did not resolve the issues of access in a 
significant way. 
To the credit of NCI managers, they find ways to by-pass strict access rules: one of 
the good examples of how a compromise can be found is the idea of establishing NCI-
funded civilian production facilities just outside of the “fence” – for example at the 
Avangard facility in Sarov, some of its buildings are located outside of the “city” area. In 
this way, inhabitants of “closed” cities do not have to move out of Sarov and do not need 
to commute to a far-away regional centre to work.  
 
7.3.2.3 The Allocation of Funds and Their Effectiveness 
According to the stated aims of the NCI programme, its primary goal is to assist 
Russia in its struggle with dealing with the human aspect of nuclear complex downsizing.  
In ideal terms, this determination to help should first of all be reflected in straightforward 
numbers: the amount of funds allocated to be spent in Russia itself and the number of 
civilian jobs created with the direct assistance of NCI. These two indicators demonstrate 
the real-life effectiveness of the NCI programme. 
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The percentage of funds allocated to Russia is very low in comparison with the 
amount of money spent in the U.S. Overall, 70% of all NCI programme expenditure (up 
until December 2000) was incurred in America: 67% by national laboratories and 3% - by 
DOE headquarters. The remaining 30% was spent in Russia.469 DOE officials admit their 
concern regarding the amount of money spent by the U.S. national laboratories, but note 
the importance of their involvement at the initial stage of the programme. It is believed 
that these costs will be reduced over time as businesses invest their own capital in the 
nuclear cities.470 Russian authorities have criticised the amount of NCI funds spent in 
Russia.471   
Another major task taken on by NCI is the creation of civilian jobs for Russian 
nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians. The severity of the job problem varies from 
city to city. There are nuclear cities (Novouralsk, Zelenogorsk, Ozersk), which are doing 
better than others, often thanks to joint projects, such as the implementation of the HEU 
Agreement. According to MINATOM officials, 1,500 jobs have to be created annually in 
the nuclear cities. In 1999 MINATOM itself undertook a $50 million job creation effort, 
using the funds obtained from the revenues Russia received from the U.S.-Russian HEU 
Agreement.472 NCI has helped to employ 400 people as of April 2003.473 It is obvious that 
the progress made by the programme has not been entirely satisfying. Such an 
unsatisfactory performance can be a result of several factors – both within the 
programme’s management itself and external circumstances. The GAO Report on DOE’s 
assistance to nuclear cities474 criticised the NCI programme on several counts. It should be 
stressed that those directly involved in the implementation of NCI projects perform an 
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extremely important and difficult task, and some of the programme’s shortcomings should 
be rectified at a higher level of decision-making. The GAO report identified three major 
flaws in DOE’s implementation of NCI in Russia: the DOE’s lack of standardised 
reporting procedures, which affected its ability to monitor NCI’s expenditures; DOE’s 
limited oversight over laboratories’ expenditures; DOE’s failure to develop a cost estimate 
or time frame for the programme’s future scope and direction.475   
In January 2001 the DOE issued new guidance for the NCI programme with more 
detail on the project selection and approval process. The GAO obviously would welcome 
this new development; however, it might be controversial from the non-proliferation point 
of view. Prior to the adoption of new guidelines in January 2001, the projects implemented 
under NCI did not require partners in industry or demonstrate their commercial viability.  
This might mean that from then on some projects would be stopped at initial stage only 
because they would be considered not viable commercially.   
Such guidelines could contradict the main goal of NCI to prevent a «brain-drain» 
and help laid-off nuclear scientists by engaging them in non-weapons projects. While a 
certain project can be considered commercially unprofitable, it can be vitally important in 
helping Russia to deal with the problems of downsizing its nuclear complex. One should 
think in larger terms when considering this; especially knowing that another DOE’s 
programme – Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) – is aiming to develop 
commercially beneficial projects in the nuclear cities. 
7.3.2.4 Limited Amounts of Funds Allocated to NCI and Duplication of Efforts  
The objectives of NCI are similar to the ones of the two other U.S.-funded 
programmes working to provide possibilities for the Russian nuclear scientists. These are: 
the Initiative for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) and the International Science and 
Technology Centre (ISTC). It is often the case that there is a lack of coordination between 
the programmes, resulting in duplication of effort and a fight for the funds available in the 
federal budget. The non-proliferation assistance programmes are usually criticised for their 
low effectiveness caused by a lack of coordination between the implementing agencies and 
different programmes.   
The U.S. Senator Pete Domenici who plays an important role in promoting co-
operative efforts dealing with nuclear proliferation, has stated:  
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“Each program has reasonable goals, but they aren’t integrated into one 
coherent thrust led by a focused and committed Administration.  In some 
cases, programs share similar goals.”476
Throughout the years, NCI has been allocated funds much lower than the amounts 
requested.  In 1999 NCI received $15 million; in 2000 $30 million was requested, only $7.5 
million was appropriated; in 2001 $27.5 million was requested, and only $26.6 million 
appropriated. The process requesting and allocation of funds in 2002 demonstrated a 
reduced commitment to non-proliferation assistance programmes by new U.S. 
administration. DOE has submitted an initial request for $30 million (made under the 
Clinton administration). With the new administration in the White House, the DOE has 
revised its request to $6.6 million.  The House of Representatives increased NCI funding to 
$10 million. The Senate increased NCI funding to $21.2 million. The final allocation was 
confirmed by the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act for FY2002, which 
provided $41 million for NCI and IPP combined.477 Figure 3 presents the historical budget 
for NCI since 1999.  
Figure 3 NCI Budget (1999-2003)478
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7.3.2.5 The Attitude of Congress Towards NCI  
For several reasons the way U.S. Congress perceives NCI is not favourable.  Such 
attitude of the American legislators can be blamed on problems both within the Congress 
itself, and within the programme management.  There is an underlying conflict between the 
NCI objectives and Congress values and interests. 
Representative Ellen Tauscher (D-CA) of the U.S. Congress noted: 
“There are still some in Congress who have not awoken to the reality of this 
new nuclear threat and see no reason to adjust Cold War policies.  Some of my 
colleagues don’t like the idea that the Cold War is over.  They were very 
comfortable with the idea that we hated the Russians and that they were bad – 
you’ve got to have an enemy out there.  How do you build up a strong defense 
if you don’t have an enemy out there?  As a result, funding for the NCI and 
other programs such as Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention is in doubt.”479
First of all, NCI tries to address a very complicated set of issues, which include 
problems of social, political, and economic nature experienced by the Russian nuclear 
complex. The idea that U.S. money is spent on improving economic conditions of foreign 
scientists does not find appreciation it deserves in the U.S. Congress. Although, it is 
obviously in the long-term interest of the U.S. to keep Russian scientists in their home 
country, it is hard to explain it to some the critics of the programme. There can be no 
immediate results for a programme like NCI, and therefore, it is very hard to demonstrate 
the achievements reached. Because of that, NCI programme managers did not succeed in 
“selling” their programme on the Capitol Hill. 
Another factor, which contributed to the limited support NCI has secured was the 
way it was introduced. NCI was an emergency initiative, designed as a response to a 
financial crisis in Russia in August of 1998. At this time, the potential “brain-drain” of the 
Russian nuclear workers, as well as all the potential proliferation threats connected with the 
economic crisis inside the nuclear complex – became even more critical. Therefore, the 
NCI ideologists presented the Programme to Congress without much political 
groundwork. It was an unexpected initiative, for which Congressmen were required to 
allocate money at short notice – and that did not add to the support on the Hill. The 
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mismanagement of the NCI Programme for the first few years also contributed a lot to the 
negative attitude from Congress.  
In September 2003 the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) Agreement expired, and it was 
not renewed due to unresolved issues of liability (the same as in the case of the Plutonium 
Disposition Agreement). Although, the U.S. implementing agent – DOE – declared that it 
is ready to continue with the cooperation on projects that are already under way, the failure 
to renew the agreement means that no new projects can be started. 
7.4 Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) 
Another programme administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA) of the Department of Energy (DOE) is known as the Initiatives for Proliferation 
Prevention (IPP). The goal of IPP is to identify and develop sustainable, non-weapons-
related work for scientists, engineers, and technicians in order to prevent a «brain-drain».  
The U.S. Industry Coalition, Inc. (USIC) is facilitating cooperation between the 
representatives of U.S. companies, national labs and NIS institutes.  USIC represents 160 
American companies, most of which have partners in NIS. Unlike NCI, which is doing 
similar work, IPP is looking for projects with commercial potential and its work is not 
limited to the closed cities. 
The IPP programme - formerly known as the Industrial Partnering Programme - was 
established in 1994 following «The Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related 
Programmes Appropriations Act, 1994», which made available funds for cooperative 
programme between the DOE’s labs and former Soviet nuclear institutions.480 The 
programme carries out work in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, with the bulk of 
it done in Russia (about 80 per cent of projects). 
There are three main players implementing the IPP programme on the American 
side:  DOE, USIC, and U.S. labs. On the Russian side, there is no government agency 
playing an implementing role. USIC and U.S. labs work directly with Russian partners. 
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7.4.1 How the IPP Operates  
The programme operates in the following way:  
Stage 1 -  Establishing contacts, defining potential projects 
The U.S. companies approach DOE, USIC, or a national lab with a certain proposal.  
Sometimes, NIS institutes seek Western partners themselves. A draft proposal initiated by 
either a U.S. lab or company should be certified by the lab, and the technology has to be 
validated.  USIC participates in a company/lab review process. 
The Inter-Laboratory Board (ILAB), which consists of representatives of 10 U.S. 
DOE labs and the Kansas City Plant, makes contact with NIS institutes in order to locate 
potential projects which will engage former Soviet nuclear experts and are potentially 
commercially viable. The proposed projects are reviewed by ILAB for compliance with the 
dual-use and export control requirements.  
Stage 2 - Initial evaluation of capabilities and technologies 
ILAB implements initial evaluations of capabilities and technologies of the particular 
institution.   
Stage 3 - Evaluation of commercial viability of projects 
USIC evaluates the commercial viability of proposed projects. USIC promotes those 
projects that have the potential to be cost-effective to implement, that are attractive to 
investors, and would be commercially viable.481
Stage 4 - Final decision on projects to be implemented 
DOE headquarters has the right of final decision on all projects. If the project is 
selected, the U.S. government pays for existing R&D of the Russian lab or institute. Prior 
to granting an approval, the DOE evaluates proposals in terms of policy analysis, and does 
a check on dual-use. 
Stage 5 - Development of project conditions 
In the course of approximately 3 months – a statement of work is developed. It is 
called a Cooperation Research and Development Agreement (CRADA).482 Formally, the 
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U.S. company would have the exclusive right over the final product; at the same time, the 
company works out the ‘real’ terms with the Russian institution. 
Stage 6 - Project implementation 
At the final stage, the work starts at the Russian facility or institute, and its progress is 
tracked by U.S. experts. 
The IPP projects are classified into three different categories: Thrust 1, Thrust 2, 
Thrust 3. Thrust 1 projects are funded by DOE and involve the identification of 
commercially feasible technologies. Thrust 2 category deals with projects, for which a U.S. 
industry partner is found who agrees to share with DOE the costs associated with the 
development of potential technologies. Thrust 3 projects are expected to become self-
sustained business ventures, and there should be no involvement of the U.S. government. 
 
7.4.2 Problems of Implementation and the Overall Effectiveness  
As of spring 2003, there were 120 IPP projects, with 108 out of this number moving 
towards Thrust II.483 As of March 2003, 130 projects in total were completed, 13 have 
made to Thrust III, and another 20 projects are expected to reach Thrust III in one or two 
years.484 In FY2002 IPP spent $18 million, and USIC contributed $25 million. Overall, the 
companies raised more than $80 million as of 2003. The budget of IPP is presented in 
Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 IPP Budget (1994-2003)485
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The IPP programme faces some problems similar to the ones experienced by the 
other non-proliferation programmes in Russia.  At the same time, there are specific aspects 
of the programme, which are seen as potentially harmful to the U.S. interests.   
There are two main issues of concern for some U.S. observers: first, the fact that 
U.S. funds are used to subsidise former Soviet nuclear scientists, who are still involved in 
weapons production, and second, the possible damage to U.S. national security due to 
Russian access to some dual-use technologies shared in some IPP projects. 
A GAO report of February 1999 examining the IPP progress486 considered those 
two issues to be of significance for U.S. interests. The report found that some scientists 
working on a part-time basis on IPP projects were still engaged in nuclear research 
activities. It implied that IPP was subsidising nuclear weapons development in Russia.    
In response to criticism, DOE has stated: 
«…the fundamental goal of the IPP Program is to keep weapons specialists 
working in their home countries - in the face of grim domestic employment 
prospects - rather than selling their services to foreign states or organizations of 
proliferation concern...These scientists, and those who have been dismissed, are 
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the proper targets of the IPP Program, because these are the individuals who 
are most likely to be tempted to sell their services abroad...»487
Another concern of the GAO is that «information learned during the course of the 
project could unintentionally provide useful defense-related benefits to Russian and other 
NIS scientists».488 DOE has noted that the projects with potential dual-use implications 
brought to attention by GAO date from the earlier period and, «at worst, might have 
provided only incidental military benefits to Russia - and not to its weapon of mass 
destruction or missile programs».489 DOE officials reiterated their commitment not to 
support dual-use technologies. 
These particular issues of concern expressed by the GAO are important for this 
study because any programmes, which are seen as harmful to the interests of the U.S. will 
have difficulties obtaining the necessary funding. It should be stressed that the IPP is not 
regarded as working against American interests overall, but some of its aspects were seen 
by the GAO as potentially being against U.S. interests. The importance of effectively 
responding to such criticism is hard to overestimate.  DOE has been instrumental in doing 
it so far. 
Problems of another kind are associated with the implementation process as such.  
The GAO has identified several shortcomings of the IPP implementation in Russia. The 
following aspects have received the major criticism: Russia receives a smaller fraction of the 
total IPP funding (approximately 30-40%); there is no clear data on how much reaches the 
Russian scientists (due to deductions of taxes, overhead charges, institutional charges, etc.); 
the targets of the IPP are unclear (the GAO considers IPP might be not targeting the 
prime institutions and personnel in Russia); the long-term goal of the IPP is far from being 
achieved (only few projects have reached Thrust 3 stage).490
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250 
7.4.2.1. Funds Received by Russia  
Until recently, IPP was criticised for inadequate amounts of IPP funds being spent 
in Russia (approximately 30-40%). The overall allocation of IPP funds throughout the years 
has demonstrated that the larger part of the resources are spent in the U.S. with the U.S. 
national labs being the main recipients of the programme’s money. The funds are spent for 
scientific research related to IPP projects, developing or monitoring the projects, and other 
various kinds of administrative charges. Although largely justified these expenses create a 
dubious situation: a programme devoted to assist Russian nuclear workers is paying their 
American colleagues. The uneven distribution of funds might appear to be due to different 
levels of pay in the U.S. and Russia. In monetary terms, the work of 30-40 Russian 
scientists is equivalent to the pay of one American scientist. According to the President of 
USIC, Victor Alessi, that particular problem was dealt with through legislation, and now 
65% of IPP funds should go to ex-Soviet scientists.491
 
7.4.2.2. The Uncertainty of Data Relating to Funds Received by Russia and on the 
Participants of the Projects  
The major deficiency of the information available on the allocation of funds in 
Russia is the lack of clear data on several aspects: how much money Russia receives from 
the U.S., how much the Russian institutions are spending out of this amount on taxes, 
overheads and other charges, and what portion of these funds in the end reaches the 
scientists, who are the target of the whole programme. 
It can be argued that the following factors contribute to the existing problem.  
First, the IPP management lacks clear records itself on the amount of funds going to 
Russia. On some occasions the GAO determined that the DOE’s information was 
inaccurate and laboratory officials did not know how much went to the institute.492  
Secondly, the American side has most probably failed to lay down strict requirements for 
the Russian side to provide clear information on the distribution of funds allocated. 
Thirdly, the Russian institutions spend a certain amount of money on general expenses, 
such as paying off taxes and overhead charges, and therefore, only the remainder of these 
funds can be allocated to the scientists themselves. More importantly, the projects’ 
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participants are often not identified by the IPP management. The GAO believes it is 
important to have background information on the institutions and scientists participating in 
the IPP programme in order to make sure the most important of them are covered by the 
programme. GAO rightly believes those scientists with the most important direct WMD 
knowledge should be targeted first. 
DOE has special guidelines outlining the necessity of obtaining information on the 
background and experience by DOE labs’ investigators. However, some of them believe 
that doing this in Russia would be «too intrusive», would have a negative impact on the 
relationships between the U.S. labs and Russian institutes and is not necessarily relevant to 
the implementation of the projects.    
7.5 The International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC)  
7.5.1 Background  
The International Science and Technology Centre was a multilateral effort of the 
European Union (EU), Russia, the United States and Japan when it was established in 
1992. Those countries agreed that it was necessary to provide employment opportunities to 
former Soviet nuclear scientists. Two centres were set up - one in Moscow, another in Kiev 
(Ukraine).  Later on ISTC was joined by Norway and South Korea, and by Armenia, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as recipient countries. More recently, ISTC 
was joined by Tajikistan. 
The Agreement establishing the ISTC stated two main objectives:493  
(1) to give weapons scientists and engineers, particularly those who possess 
knowledge and skills related to weapons of mass destruction or missile delivery systems, 
in the Russian Federation and, if interested, in other states of the NIS and Georgia, 
opportunities to redirect their talents to peaceful activities; 
(2) to contribute thereby through its projects and activities to the solution of 
national or international technical problems, and to the wider goals of reinforcing the 
transition to market-based economies responsive to civil needs, of supporting basic and 
applied research and technology development, inter alia, in the fields of environmental 
protection, energy production, and nuclear safety, and of promoting the further 
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integration of scientists of the states of the NIS and Georgia into the international 
scientific community. 
The ISTC was always viewed as a short-term, temporary solution until the 
economies of Russia and NIS would be able to support these scientists in non-weapons 
work. However, the realities of the former Soviet Union turned it into a more long-term 
programme. It is only recently that ISTC vision managers started looking for options to 
reduce government funding in areas, where there is no proliferation risk. 
The U.S. government is now looking for an “exit” strategy, which would stimulate 
moving former Soviet scientists and the institutions they represent towards sustainability. It 
is believed, that the ISTC will continue for another 10 years. Qualitative changes in the 
programme strategy demonstrate some important shifts in U.S. priorities. It is apparent that 
with the new strategy U.S. is trying to encourage ex-Soviet institutions to be more 
competitive and rely less on external help.   
7.5.2 How the ISTC Operates  
The ISTC operates through two major programmes: the Partner Programme and 
the Science Project Programme. The Science Project Programme solicits project proposals 
from the institutes throughout the NIS and provides funding and logistic support to 
project teams, which in turn develop and implement the project with the assistance of 
foreign collaborating organisations.494 In other words, the Science Programme is funded by 
the government entities represented on the Board of Directors. Projects going through the 
Partner Programme are supposed to be funded by the private sector, but in real terms, 
many government entities act as partners. 
Through its Partner Programme the ISTC is playing the role of a broker by 
establishing links between the partners (companies, scientific institutions, and government 
and non-government organisations) interested in collaboration and NIS institutions. Any 
partner who is willing to engage a NIS institution in a research project benefits by doing it 
through the ISTC in a number of ways. The most important of them is the facilitated 
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process of cooperation, involving tax-free direct payments to NIS project teams and duty-
free import of project equipment.495
The Governing Board meets twice a year (in the spring and winter) to allocate 
funding, and there is a special allocation of funding in July. The purpose of the meetings is 
to announce which projects will be funded. 
7.5.3 Problems of Implementation and the Overall Effectiveness  
The main problems in the implementation of ISTC projects were identified as 
follows: funding is insufficient (Figure 5 outlines the ISTC funding); the multilateral 
framework of ISTC programme can sometimes cause delay in its operation; the ISTC 
agreement is still not ratified by the Russian State Duma, which means the programme has 
an uncertain legal status. 
Figure 5 ISTC Budget (1992-2003)496
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The lack of funding available for ISTC projects is the largest impediment to having 
more weapons scientists doing civilian research and thereby reducing the risk of 
proliferation. The number of projects proposals submitted to the ISTC amounted to 3,600 
(as of March 2003), and only half of them were actually funded.497   
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The ISTC is a multinational effort, and the multilateral work has both advantages 
and disadvantages. With regard to every decision the Board of Governors has to reach a 
consensus. In the case of the EU, the approval of all 15 states has to be received before 
funding for a certain project can be approved at all. The process of formal approvals from 
all the parties to ISTC does cause some delay. 
The fact that the ISTC agreement has not been ratified is a very good example of 
the limitations of U.S.-Russian relations, and the bureaucratic shortcomings of the 
cooperative threat reduction process. Initially, the ISTC agreement was not submitted for 
the Duma’s consideration because the situation in the Russian parliament was not 
considered ‘favourable’ for that. The reason for such a precaution was the dominance of 
‘right’ wing in the State Duma in 1999. The composition of the Duma has changed since 
then and the communists forces, which were the main obstacle to putting a document 
forward for ratification, are in the minority. Nonetheless, no state agency considered the 
issue of the ISTC agreement to be a priority, and it still remains not ratified.    
Currently, ISTC is considered to be one of the more successful cooperative threat 
reduction programmes. Both Russian and American scientists are enthusiastic about the 
opportunities created by the ISTC to work collaboratively. For Russian scientists, it 
represents a chance to work on most new projects, and the American scientists appreciate 
the advanced level of Russia’s fundamental sciences – all these factors contribute to fruitful 
cooperation.   
As of the end of October 2002, the United States made the largest funding 
contribution to ISTC Projects (35% of the total funding). The European Union has 
contributed 26.3%, Japan - 12.2%, Korea - 0.4%, Norway - 0.4%, and 25.7% was received 
by ISTC from the various Partners. 
As of March 2003, the ISTC in Moscow had 150 permanent staff. Most of them 
were Russians nominated by MINATOM. The number of scientists engaged numbered 
over 51,000, the majority being weapons scientists. The total funding provided to ISTC in 
Moscow up to 2003 amounted to $519 million.498 A smaller science centre in Kiev founded 
by the U.S., Ukraine, Sweden, and Canada had 60 permanent staff as of March 2003. The 
total number of weapons scientists involved in the work of Kiev’s ISTC was 8,000  people, 
and the funding up to 2003 amounted to $68 million.499 The main areas of scientific and 
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technological cooperation include biotechnology and life sciences (largest share of funding 
allocated, 23%), environment, physics (including fission reactors, non-nuclear energy and 
materials).500 During 1994-2002 the ISTC Programme funded 1,700 projects for the total 
amount of $490,743,687 (total numbers for all NIS countries, although the bulk of it was 
spent in Russia).501
A Qualitative change in the approach of ISTC 
Starting from 2003, ISTC vision managers started redesigning the approach to how 
the programme operates in Russia and other NIS countries. The qualitative shift in how 
ISTC operates demonstrates some major changes in U.S. policy towards non-proliferation 
assistance in Russia. 
The reorganisation within the ISTC Programme brought one fundamental novelty.  
From 2003 senior ISTC managers are no longer involved in improving the proposals.  
When ISTC receives a proposal from a NIS institution, it carries out an initial proposal 
screening to identify whether it is coherent.  If the quality of proposal submitted to ISTC is 
satisfactory, ISTC registers it and submits for review by the funding parties.  
The new approach demonstrates that the ISTC programme is now focusing on 
developing the self-sustainability factor among NIS institutions. Previously the idea was to 
spend as many grants as possible – it reflected an attempt to mitigate a critical situation in 
the first years after Soviet collapse. Now the policy has shifted towards bringing the former 
Soviet institutions to a level of self-sufficiency. The ISTC is attempting to stimulate 
development of business and marketing skills among institutions of the WMD complex. 
The ISTC is clearly looking for an “exit” strategy. Programme managers expect to 
stay in Russia and NIS for another 10 years, however, in order to achieve their goal of 
phasing out Western assistance they need to ensure sustainability of the work carried out. 
7.6. Conclusion  
The collapse of the Soviet Union created a whole set of challenges for international 
security. These included the potential “brain-drain” of former Soviet scientists, the 
deterioration of nuclear safety and security due to dramatic economic hardships 
experienced by Russia’s ‘nuclear’ cities, which remain to be very serious issues. 
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The CTR programmes designed to confront the potential “brain drain” and to 
improve economic and social conditions in the ‘closed’ cities had an ambitious non-
proliferation agenda. In a way, the three directions taken by the different programmes – 
NCI, IPP, and ISTC – complement each other and should together form a strong defence 
against the proliferation risks associated with the socio-economic conditions inside the 
nuclear complex. Although, it is hard to evaluate numerical value of what programmes 
have achieved, it is evident that they have played a highly positive role in the threat 
reduction process. At the same time, the potential of these programmes has not been 
realised, and the failure of the Russian and American governments to do so results from 
problems endemic to the overall CTR process. 
An examination of the NCI Programme and its achievements and failures leads to 
the following conclusions. The underlying concept of the NCI, which aims to assist former 
weapons scientists, does not always find appreciation among the U.S. legislators. Although, 
approved by Congress in 1998 in the aftermath of the financial crisis in Russia, NCI has 
never been popular on Capitol Hill. For the majority of the U.S. legislative branch it 
remains a question of how NCI relates to U.S. national interests. The non-proliferation 
value of the programme aiming at providing jobs for nuclear scientists, who, otherwise, 
might sell their expertise to rogue states, is self-evident. However, there are those in the 
U.S. policy-making circles, who see NCI as humanitarian aid to Russia. The fact that 
‘humanitarian aid to Russia’ is seen as an unfavourable act by some groups in the U.S. 
indicates some of the problems in U.S.-Russian relations. 
The specific conditions in Russia’s ‘closed’ cities, resulting from the secrecy 
surrounding them, are another major factor to why the programme has faced various 
obstacles. A lack of trust, as evident from the problem of access, is harmful to the CTR 
process. The FSB’s concerns over the protection of Russia’s national security interests have 
resulted in a limited and complicated access of foreign experts to nuclear cities. Apart from 
the programme managers, it is the private investors, who are discouraged from visiting 
these cities and exploring business opportunities. In this respect, the problem of access to 
‘closed’ cities has two major detrimental effects: 1) the implementation of the programmes 
is delayed and complicated; 2) it makes it difficult to attract private foreign investment 
vitally needed by nuclear cities. 
The IPP Programme has a more favourable position on Capitol Hill, since IPP 
projects can be commercially beneficial for the U.S. labs and the overall economy. The 
programme has been criticised for managerial oversights in the past and for the fact that an 
insignificant number of projects have reached self-sustainability. The implementation 
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framework of IPP projects also raised concerns about the possible damage to U.S. national 
security as a result of sharing technology and expertise with Russian nuclear experts. It is 
evident that both sides have concerns of each other’s motives on almost every single CTR 
programme.   
Another concern was triggered by the fact that the IPP is designed to provide 
additional work opportunities for the weapons scientists still working for the Russian 
nuclear complex. It reduces the incentive for Russian scientists to sell their expertise 
abroad, but at the same time by subsidising current nuclear complex workers it keeps the 
industry afloat.  This is seen as unfavourable for U.S. interests by some policy-makers. U.S. 
concerns of such nature are another evidence of lack of trust present in the U.S.-Russian 
relationship in the post-Cold War security environment.   
Currently, the ISTC Programme is the least controversial programme among all 
CTR activities. The ISTC experience is another example of how direct cooperation 
between scientists is less prone to political and bureaucratic setbacks.  It also helped that 
ISTC kept a relatively low profile during the years. The main problem with ISTC is that it 
does not receive enough funding and human resources to fund all project proposals. 
The ISTC programme is a multilateral effort of several countries, and because of 
that it is less dependent on bilateral relations between the U.S. and Russia.   
Overall, programmes designed to deal with the ‘human factor’ in the disintegrating 
Russian nuclear complex, had ambitious goals at their start. They were a timely reaction to 
potential proliferation threats created by dramatic political, economic and social problems 
in Russia. It is evident that bureaucratic impediments, Russia’s unstable economy, the 
secrecy surrounding Russian nuclear cities, insufficient funding, and mutual sense of 
suspicion on the both sides have considerably reduced the potential of these programmes. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
8.1. The CTR Process: a Laboratory Study of U.S.-Russian Strategic 
Relations  
The goal of this thesis was to use cooperative threat reduction programmes as a 
case study of U.S.-Russian relations in the post-Cold war environment.   
The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of a seemingly stable and 
balanced world system of international relations. The period of the «Cold War» or, as some 
IR theorists called it, the «Long Peace»502, had ended, and the states were faced with a 
dramatically new distribution of power in the world.  
The end of the Cold War marked a decisive shift in the international system, and 
the United States and Russia as the successors to the Cold War superpowers sought to 
reconstruct their security relationship on a completely new foundation. While the end of 
the Cold War suggested the end of the strategic nuclear confrontation and the removal of 
the threat of a global war of total destruction, at the same time new and unprecedented 
dangers emerged, as the tight control that the Soviet Union had exercised over its vast 
nuclear arsenal slipped due to the break-up of the state and the changing social and 
economic conditions.  
The United States had a very limited opportunity to influence the nuclear dangers, 
which appeared after the break-up of the USSR. Diplomatic persuasion, sophisticated 
nuclear strategies or binding bilateral arms control agreements were not enough anymore. 
The American government could not count on its vast experience of dealing with the 
Soviet leadership. The situation had changed dramatically, and the ex-Soviet leaderships 
were confronted with nuclear dangers that were hard to estimate and they did not know 
how to control. In the early 1990s the West was concerned about the possible misuse of 
nuclear weapons by the governments of the former Soviet republics, whose character was 
largely unknown, as well as the potential loss of physical control over weapons and nuclear 
materials. There was a lot of speculation about the increased danger of possible nuclear 
attacks either against the U.S. itself, or the use of weapons in the course of conflicts on the 
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post-Soviet territory. The experience of the last decade has confirmed that the main source 
of danger was and remains not from the official leaders of the ex-Soviet republics, but the 
potential illegal use of nuclear weapons, technology, materials, and expertise by either the 
criminal elements inside the former Soviet Union or by the third parties (e.g. threshold 
countries, terrorists).  
The tragic events of September 11, 2001, have created an even greater need for a 
timely and effective constraint of the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Non-
proliferation assistance to Russia must inevitably be an important part of any effective new 
non-proliferation policy of the U.S. government. It is extremely important for the 
governments of both the U.S. and Russia to acknowledge the fact that they share a 
common interest in jointly confronting the same dangers and threats. This is an obvious 
fact, but, in reality, it is still a controversial process for both countries - to act genuinely as 
partners is still a challenge. It is natural that Russia and the U.S. feel the pressure of more 
than four decades of mutual antagonism. It is a challenge for them to leave behind the 
ways and methods of dealing with each other and the sceptical attitudes that prevailed in 
the past, in a short period of time.  
In this respect, CTR is a truly remarkable process, which can be treated as an 
indicator of the changing nature of strategic relations between Russia and the States. The 
CTR process vividly represents a larger picture of the complexities of transformation the 
nature of their relations, especially in terms of the security aspects. The adaptation to the 
new international security environment, combined with the complex internal changes in the 
former Soviet space, will take much longer than a decade. Moreover, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and disappearance of one of the two superpowers are not the only 
developments on the international scene.  
The prospect of a major war has receded, and inter-superpower antagonism is no 
longer a determining factor in the system of international relations.503 Neither U.S., nor 
Russia views the other as a political enemy. However, the sophisticated state mechanisms 
(e.g. military-industrial complexes) still present in both countries were created to serve the 
perceived strategic requirements during the Cold War. The military thinking has not 
properly adapted to the new political realities. To implement a major transformation inside 
the internal organisations and institutions is simple in principle, but difficult in practice. 
The two erstwhile superpowers found themselves in the situation where the international 
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system and their security relations had changed so completely in a very short period of time 
that long-established requirements for international security that had dominated the 
security and military establishments of both countries for decades had suddenly become 
obsolete. The political leaders sought to move quickly to adapt their  relations to the new 
realities, but given the rapidity of the changes and the uncertainty of the nature of the 
evolving international system and the future requirements for the security of either country, 
the national security establishments of both countries were slow in absorbing the ‘new 
thinking’. 
The CTR process, in essence, belongs to ‘new thinking’ in trying to promote the 
transition to a new state of relations. There were two principal reasons for the CTR process 
to be established, at first place: a desire to move to a new international order, where the 
role of nuclear weapons would be considerably reduced (ideas of cooperative 
denuclearisation advocated by Ashton Carter – Chapter 2) and a fear of an inadvertent 
nuclear war due to the abundance of nuclear weapons both in the United States and Russia 
(due to technical dangers described in Chapter 2). The CTR process is more than a simple 
technical process dealing with safety and security of nuclear weapons; it was meant to lay 
the foundation for a new type of relationship between the United States and Russia, which 
would reflect a new international system without the Cold War.  
The ideas of cooperative denuclearisation were not accepted, and the reason for a 
lack of understanding of the changing world system may be explained by the still on-going 
process of transition. The old world order has undergone considerable transformation, but 
the new order has not been fully re-established, although the international system has 
settled into some interim equilibrium state.   
8.2. The CTR Process in the Context of an Emerging New World 
Order  
The reasons why this study was worth undertaking are two-fold. It provides a new 
contribution to the existing literature on the subject of the threat reduction by presenting 
an explanatory model of all the major CTR programmes and analysing problems of 
implementation, which hamper the process. The U.S.-Russian CTR process is gradually 
growing into a larger process: in June 2002 the G-8 leaders launched a Global Partnership 
Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, which would deal with 
proliferation threats on a global scale and will not be limited to Russia only. The original 
CTR legislation, which formed a basis for the U.S. non-proliferation assistance, will soon 
be extended to cover regions outside of the former Soviet Union. That means that that the 
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CTR framework designed for Russia will be applied to other countries. Therefore, now is 
the right moment to understand what was right and wrong about the CTR mechanism 
before it is used in other parts of the world. 
More importantly this study demonstrates that the processes happening in the 
international security system below the surface and which might not be so obvious at a 
glance can be absolutely important for the future of the international system. The CTR 
process is worth understanding because it represents a mechanism, which can be used to 
build a new international system, where the role of the nuclear weapons becomes more and 
more obsolete.504 Looking at why the CTR programmes went a long way, but were not 
used to their full potential, helps to understand at what stage the transition to this new 
international system is located.   
There is an obvious fundamental constraint on how countries re-orient their 
security policies after the Cold War. After the initial ambitious agenda of dramatically 
changing the relations between the former superpowers, which would have meant a 
consequent change in the way the international system operated, it became obvious that the 
countries were not ready to proceed with such radical developments. There was 
unwillingness on behalf of the political elites to adjust fully to the new political reality, and 
that is evident from the empirical data and analysis presented throughout this work. 
The example of the CTR process tells us how the societies deal with the risks, 
which are uncertain (as is the threat of nuclear proliferation), and when actions which are 
required to meet these risks involve high political stakes. That example showed that the 
societies are able to deal with this kind of risks, but the level of commitment present is not 
enough for the kind of potential dangers these risks entail. The reasons why there was not 
enough commitment and why the initial CTR agenda was only partially fulfilled are to a 
large extent the consequence of the internal political and bureaucratic problems in the 
United States and Russia, and the inability of political establishments to adapt to the new 
emerging world order.   
The institutions, especially military and national security establishments, cannot 
conceive of the new international system, which requires an approach different to that of 
during the Cold War. The CTR process can be understood as part of an effort to eliminate 
these last vestiges of an anarchic system – the heritage of the inter-state conflict agenda of 
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the Cold War era. In a way, CTR can be used as a tool of dealing with this heritage and also 
as a mechanism to move the countries beyond transition towards the new international 
order.   
The CTR framework has the potential to go beyond the technical goals of securing 
nuclear weapons and materials. It contains the seeds of a comprehensive approach towards 
safeguarding stockpiles of nuclear materials, the disposal of weapons-grade HEU and 
plutonium, the cessation of future production of such materials and the reduction of 
stockpiles of nuclear warheads to minimal levels. In other words, the full implementation 
of the concepts underlying CTR would lead to cooperative denuclearisation – a  process, 
which would reflect the emerging new world order, an international system, which moves 
towards normalisation of inter-state relations. Given the importance of the CTR process in 
shaping the new international system we should look at what lessons the decade of its 
existence can offer and why the United States and Russia have failed so far to realise it to a  
full degree.   
8.3. Testing the Research Arguments  
It was assumed that some major problems of implementation of CTR programmes 
lie in bureaucratic politics – i.e. the reluctance of organisations to engage in sensitive 
cooperation due to organisational values and interests. It was also assumed that the 
problems on the bureaucratic level are linked to larger political problems in U.S.-Russian 
strategic relations. The initial conceptual framework for assessing the political climate of 
the U.S.-Russian strategic relations with focus on the role of nuclear weapons proposed 
four possible scenarios as the envisaged final outcome of CTR (as presented in Table 1 in 
Chapter 1): Scenario 1 - complete disarmament (no nuclear arsenals retained by the U.S. 
and Russia); Scenario 2 - cooperative denuclearisation (very low level of nuclear arsenals 
not on alert); Scenario 3 – strategic arms reductions (reduction within the START 
framework); Scenario 4 – strategic confrontation (retention of large nuclear arsenals).  
The political decision-makers in the United States and Russia have not been very 
explicit about how they envision their strategic nuclear relations in the future. One of the 
tasks of this thesis was to identify the scenario with which the objectives that the U.S. and 
Russia pursue in the bilateral strategic relations is most compatible and how the CTR 
process fits into existing relations. Currently, the force postures and the state of alert do 
not reflect the likely military contingencies which the United States and Russia are facing. 
The current military contingencies involve conflicts with small states, sub-state or ethnic 
conflicts, or international terrorism and insurgencies. The military instruments required 
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involve rapidly deployable forces with non-strategic weapons. However, two countries still 
adhere to strategic nuclear postures, which although at lower levels still resemble those of 
the Cold War period. Therefore, we can suggest the existence of a “Strategic Paradox”505 – 
the nuclear postures and doctrines of the United States and Russia do not reflect political 
conditions or the requirements of national security. The objectives that the two countries 
seek to achieve with the CTR process fall somewhere in between Scenarios 2 & 3 and can 
be a part of strategic arms reductions or cooperative denuclearisation, since so far the two 
states have not moved towards the full-fledged cooperative denuclearisation.   
The analysis presented in Chapter 2 on the state of the U.S. and Russian nuclear 
postures has identified the following: the composition and state of alert (‘hair-trigger’) of 
Russian and the U.S. nuclear forces still represents Cold War perceptions of threats; both 
Russia and the U.S. plan their forces balancing against the other side as though the 
possibility of an all-out nuclear war is still present; even the most recent arms reduction 
agreement (i.e. Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT)) does not change 
fundamentally the nuclear postures of two countries; current nuclear postures contribute to 
the dangers of an accidental nuclear war (due to the significant numbers present, their state 
of alert, presence of vulnerable components, such as land-based ICBMs and other 
factors).506 In the early 1990s (Chapter 2) the Harvard scholars envisaged large reductions 
in nuclear weapons as part of a programme of rendering nuclear weapons more secure, on 
the premise that fewer nuclear weapons and a reduction in the number of storage sites 
would be an essential part of an effort to provide for the safety and security of nuclear 
warheads.507 This idea did not in the end play a major part in either CTR or arms control.   
The presence of significant numbers of nuclear weapons in the U.S and Russia has 
been a stumbling block in the further development of global non-proliferation regimes, 
notably the NPT which involves a commitment by the nuclear powers to disarm. If the 
major nuclear custodians (the United States and Russia) were to demonstrate an 
understanding of the dangers associated with the presence of such vast nuclear arsenals and 
engage in cooperative denuclearisation it would strengthen the ‘nuclear taboo’ and 
contribute to constraining proliferation.   
                                                 
505 First introduced by Bluth, Nuclear Challenge, op. cit. 
506 Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, op. cit. 
507 Campbell, Carter, Miller, and Zraket, eds., Soviet Nuclear Fission, op. cit.  
264 
The technical expertise presented in the existing literature508 shows that despite the 
rhetoric of de-targeting and de-alerting, Russian and American nuclear forces still are 
practically on ‘hair-trigger’ alert and can be re-programmed to target the opposite side in a 
matter of seconds. 
The evaluation of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and Russian Military Doctrine 
(Chapter 2) has demonstrated that since 1999 there has been a shift in the policies of the 
two countries towards assigning nuclear weapons an important role in their strategies. 
Nuclear weapons are once again seen as a major tool of deterrence and de-escalation of 
conflicts. The important shift, which has been identified in Russian and American nuclear 
policies, is that the use of nuclear weapons is not ruled out in non-nuclear conflicts. The 
U.S. Nuclear Posture Review of 2001 presents a lowered nuclear threshold – it blurs the 
distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons. The Russian Military Doctrine of 
2000 and a recent policy document of the Ministry of Defence (2002) show that the 
Russian government would consider the use of its nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 
states under circumstances, which can be perceived as threatening to Russia’s national 
security. The reasons of this shift in the strategic policies of the United States and Russia 
are quite different. In the United States, this shift can be explained by the ‘realist’ strategic 
outlook of an administration that seeks to transcend restrictions on the freedom of action 
of the United States imposed by international regimes and conventions. It is paradoxical 
that this shift of attitudes should occur at the time when for all practical purposes the 
United States has become a superpower on the basis of its conventional military capabilities 
alone and has no practical requirement for the use of nuclear weapons either as a deterrent 
or as military instrument.  
Russia, on the other hand, is in the precise opposite situations. Its conventional 
forces have deteriorated to the point that they may not be adequate to prosecute a large-
scale high intensity military engagement. It is this weakness that creates the requirement of 
nuclear weapons as an ‘existential deterrent’. However, official Russian pronouncements 
about the ‘lowering of the nuclear threshold’ also seem to have no relevance to the military 
threats and contingencies that Russia faces. Nuclear weapons have no role in ethnic 
conflicts, crisis management or peace-keeping. For Russia, nuclear weapons provide a 
political leverage as it is the only country, which is hypothetically able to destroy the United 
States. 
                                                 
508 Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, op. cit. 
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Despite the new security environment, which does not call for retaining significant 
numbers of nuclear arsenals, the United States and Russia accord nuclear weapons a central 
place in their strategic policies. The nuclear planning in the U.S. and Russia reveals that 
nuclear forces, their composition and posture are still determined by considerations of 
deterrence of the opposite side. 
The most recent arms reduction treaty – SORT (signed in Moscow in 2002) – failed 
to introduce any substantial changes to the nuclear postures of the two countries. 
Although, positive nonetheless as a declaration of the intent of the U.S. and Russia to 
continue with strategic arms reductions, its value for arms reduction is limited due to 
several factors. Although, the number of strategic weapons will be reduced, the 
composition of the nuclear forces on both sides will remain the same: it is still a triad (air-, 
land-, sea-based missiles). The real number of warheads, which will remain after the Treaty 
is implemented (1,700-2,200 on each side), is higher than what is proclaimed because the 
U.S. has a capability of uploading warheads back on the delivery vehicles, and can decide to 
do so should  relations with Russia deteriorate. Therefore, even after the implementation of 
announced reductions, the U.S. will have a potential capacity of approximately 5,000 
warheads.509 The Treaty lacks explicit verification and transparency mechanisms and 
reflects the intensified trend of unilateralism favoured by President Bush - the U.S. side 
originally was not interested in signing any binding agreement on arms reductions and 
expressed the view that each side should unilaterally determine reduction levels for its 
forces. 
The existing nuclear postures contribute to instability in several ways.  First of all, 
the presence of large nuclear arsenals, a substantial part of which is on ‘hair-trigger’ alert 
for launch-on-warning, raises the danger of an accidental nuclear launch. It is especially 
dangerous due to deteriorating early warning systems in Russia. There is a possibility of 
false warning due to failure in the system.  The presence of land-based missiles (ICBMs), 
which are vulnerable to a first strike, has a further destabilising effect. The knowledge that 
a substantial part of forces will not survive the first attack might influence the decision-
makers to treat the false warning as a real one, since risks can not be taken. In this respect, 
ideas of cooperative denuclearisation proposed by members of the Clinton Administration 
could have reduced these particular dangers (Chapter 2). 
                                                 
509 Sokov, “START III”: An End or Beginning of Negotiations’, op. cit. 
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Secondly, the presence of significant numbers of nuclear weapons and materials 
increases the danger of their illegal use. The possibility of diversion is greater when the 
numbers are higher. 
Thirdly, on a psychological level, the presence of thousands of nuclear weapons at a 
high state of alert cannot possibly contribute positively to the process of building a true 
partnership between the U.S. and Russia.   
There was a possibility for the U.S. and Russia to engage in cooperative 
denuclearisation, however, that political ‘window of opportunity’ was not used. Both the 
political environment of general euphoria in the bilateral relations in the early to mid-1990s 
and the political will of proponents of cooperative denuclearisation provided a unique set 
of conditions to achieve more ambitious goals in U.S.-Russian post-Cold War nuclear 
relations. Several individuals who were instrumental in developing ideas of cooperative 
denuclearisation and cooperative threat reduction before joining the government were 
brought into the Department of Defence during the Clinton administration. The ideas of 
Ashton Carter and other supporters of dramatic changes in nuclear postures of the two 
countries were never fully implemented.  Carter was proposing the elimination of land-
based missiles, since they represented the destabilising part of the nuclear triad due to their 
vulnerability to a first strike. He also promoted de-alerting nuclear forces and attempted to 
sell the idea of complete U.S. engagement in cooperative denuclearisation with Russia. 
Carter’s ideas were met with stern opposition from the side of the military, supported by 
certain members of Congress. 
The proposals for nuclear reductions beyond START were opposed by both states, 
and such opposition was especially apparent from the side of state organisations with 
traditionally more conservative political views (military establishments).   
The new Bush administration has revised U.S. foreign policy, and although, 
rhetorically, support for processes such as CTR and arms reductions is expressed, the 
political environment for CTR programmes and arms reduction treaties has changed in a 
dramatic fashion. The Bush administration has abandoned most of the components 
integral to Clinton’s strategic policies, such as the fundamental commitment to non-
proliferation regimes, building down nuclear arsenals through strategic arms control, the 
strategic relationship with Russia, the preservation of the ABM Treaty, the ratification of 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the strengthening of the nuclear taboo. 
The changes in U.S. strategic policies and aversion to multilateral security 
cooperation (that includes the relationship with Russia) had a direct impact on the 
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implementation of the CTR programmes. All programmes had gone through a critical 
review process, which failed to identify any major faults with how the programmes operate.  
Since the Bush Administration came into power, the budget for CTR efforts has constantly 
been at risk of being reduced. The events of 9/11 should have provoked a reemphasis on 
cooperative threat reduction due to increased concerns over possible use of WMD by some 
terrorist groups. The terrorists have demonstrated a determination to impose significant 
human and material destruction, but it did not prompt any substantial changes in how the 
CTR programmes are perceived by the U.S. leadership. 
 
8.3.1. The Findings on the Problems of Implementation  
It was important to identify the problems on the implementation level that were 
hampering the CTR process. If the CTR process can be treated as central to the U.S.-
Russian strategic relations and as a potential mechanism for moving towards a new 
emerging international system, it is worth understanding the constraints that prevent it 
from moving beyond the current limitations. The fact that the CTR process exists is an 
important determinant of the U.S.-Russian strategic relations in the post-Cold war period.  
However, the process was hampered by various problems of implementation.   
The research carried out has identified the following problems of implementation 
endemic to most of the CTR programmes. Among some typical problems are conflicting 
organisational interests and values at different levels of implementation, bureaucratic  
procedures, which cause delay in the implementation of projects, lack of coordination 
between the agencies, lack of trust resulting in problems with access, and differing 
perspectives of Russia and the U.S. regarding the importance of specific projects.    
The empirical evidence gathered on major CTR programmes suggests that the 
underlying reasons for problems in implementation can be traced to factors of a 
bureaucratic and political nature. This result confirmed the initial assumption about the 
nature of the problems (Chapter 1). However, the study has also found that not all 
problems can be attributed to the inability of bureaucracies and political systems to adapt 
to a changing international environment: there is also a set of other conditions, which 
complicated the implementation of the non-proliferation projects in Russia (i.e. technical 
problems of fissile material disposition, conceptual issues related to material disposition 
(production vs. disposition), economic conditions and the investment climate in Russia 
(which prevents private investment in Russian ‘closed’ cities)).    
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The chosen research design, which employed the Bureaucratic Politics Model as an 
analytical tool to analyse the CTR process and developed a conceptual framework of four 
scenarios of the U.S.-Russian strategic relations turned out to be appropriate. The nature of 
some typical problems of implementation could be explained on the grounds of the 
Bureaucratic Politics Theory. The conceptual framework of different scenarios of the U.S.-
Russian strategic relations provided a useful structure for testing empirical data on nuclear 
policies to define the state of the current relationship. Nonetheless, both the Bureaucratic 
Politics Model and the conceptual framework of U.S.-Russian relations did not yield all the 
explanations to the issues uncovered by the research. The study has shown that additional 
theories and analytical models would have to be employed to understand the nature of the 
CTR process. One of the examples was the evidence suggesting that the non-government 
participants in the CTR process behave differently to the state agencies, and their 
behaviour does not fall into patterns described by the Bureaucratic Politics Model. The 
Theory of Transnational Movements, which is not central to this particular work, can 
probably contribute to the understanding of the success of the non-state actors in the CTR 
process. The evidence suggests that the scientific communities play a positive role in the 
restructuring of U.S.-Russian relations and this insight should be employed for further 
studies on how this positive role can be utilised.    
The analysis of some typical problems of implementation on the bureaucratic level 
has shown that they partly represent the unresolved issues in U.S.-Russian relations, the 
failure of formerly antagonistic powers to fully adjust to a new security environment. In a 
way, the slow adjustment of organisational behaviour to ‘new’ thinking necessary for the 
implementation of CTR projects reflected the still confused state of U.S.-Russian strategic 
relationship. An evaluation of major problems in the implementation of CTR programmes 
has provided evidence that the legacy of Cold War thinking is still strong in the mind-set 
and procedural operations of the state organisations. 
The majority of bureaucratic problems hampering the smooth implementation of 
threat reduction programmes result from a lack of trust and of a solid foundation for a 
genuine partnership. Problems with access (at the level of security services), delays in 
issuing visas (at the level foreign office establishments), scepticism of the other side’s 
motives and actions hampering the implementation of projects due to unrelated problems 
in bilateral relations (at the level of legislative branches) – demonstrate that the CTR 
process is closely linked with the political environment in which it operates.   
Although the U.S. and Russia have re-evaluated their relationship after the end of 
the Cold War, their policies on the strategic level still fail to reflect the new security 
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environment they found themselves in. In this respect, the analysis of the role of nuclear 
weapons has been important since nuclear weapons have always been one of the major 
determinants of their bilateral relations. The composition and numbers of weapons are 
balanced against each other, and not any other countries. Although, U.S. and Russia have 
been engaged in arms reductions, the reductions have not altered dramatically the postures, 
i.e. the triad (air-, land-, sea-based) and destruction capabilities have not been changed 
dramatically. To an extent, the failure to adopt a radical restructuring of strategic postures 
and implement CTR to its full potential reflects the incomplete reintegration of Russia into 
the international community and the partial transition of Russia from a former adversary to 
a strategic partner. 
The question of the role of nuclear weapons is important because it defines the 
constraints under which the CTR must operate. Depending on how central nuclear 
weapons are to Russian and U.S. security needs (as perceived by countries’ governments), 
the CTR process will either be expanded and will dominate the relationship based on 
cooperative denuclearisation or it will be constrained to a limited reduction of weapons. If 
nuclear weapons continue to play a dominant role in the strategic relations between the two 
countries and are perceived as a force of deterrence this will limit the scope of the 
cooperative threat reduction process: the limits will be determined by Russia’s 
unwillingness to expand cooperation and allow access to its nuclear complex and by 
altering the end goals for CTR (i.e. complete denuclearisation will not be the goal). There 
will be larger psychological implications on CTR if the posture of nuclear forces remains 
the same: the sincerity of the partnership will be questioned and such doubts on both sides 
will continue to overshadow organisational perceptions on bilateral cooperation in the 
nuclear field.  Therefore, CTR will continue to be a limited process unless the role of 
nuclear weapons is re-considered on both sides.  
The technical issues with fissile material disposition are also closely linked with the 
plans on how the two countries view the future of nuclear weapons. The question is 
whether they will proceed with the development and construction of new nuclear weapons, 
for which fissile material is required (then the value of MPC&A Programme will have to be 
re-considered) or they will commit to banning the production of new weapons, and in this 
case, the MPC&A Programme will have an end point by which all stockpile in Russia is 
secured and no new material is produced. 
One of the major problems for all CTR programmes is the problem of access. The 
issue of access of U.S. experts and officials to sensitive Russian facilities has been identified 
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as a serious limitation of the CTR process.510 Practically all programmes designed to 
improve nuclear safety and security and prevent a “brain-drain” from the Russian nuclear 
complex require a certain degree of access to ‘closed’ cities or facilities storing nuclear 
weapons or/and materials. The data available in the existing literature and interviews with 
the U.S. and Russian officials has shown that the governments of Russia and the U.S. have 
different views on the issue of access. The U.S. has pushed for unprecedented access to 
Russian facilities, since relevant verification and transparency measures otherwise cannot be 
carried out. The Russian government is adamant in not allowing U.S. personnel access to 
certain facilities, which are considered to be highly sensitive. 
The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has found in March 2003 that ‘the 
Departments of Defense and Energy have made slow progress in helping to improve the 
security of sites in Russia with weapons of mass destruction against the theft or threat of 
diversion because Russia is not providing needed access to many sites.”511 The GAO 
report concluded that the situation was unlikely to change in the future. 
Russian officials have made clear that access to certain sites would never be granted 
to U.S. personnel. By March 2003 the U.S. Department of Energy – working mostly on 
MPC&A projects – had not been able to access 74 per cent of the buildings in Russia’s 
nuclear complex, and the agreement on access signed in 2001 between the DOE and 
Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) has failed to make a substantial 
difference.512 The U.S. Department of Defence was granted very limited access by the 
Russian Ministry of Defence. A new agreement between the two military establishments 
was signed in February 2003; however, further delays were anticipated by U.S. experts 
given previous experience.513
The problem with access has underlying political motivations. The reluctance of 
Russians to grant unlimited access to nuclear sites results from a lack of reciprocity from 
the U.S. side and mutual lack of trust. Both the U.S. and Russia still perceive nuclear 
                                                 
510 Discussion in on problems of implementation in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 
511 ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. 
Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites’, GAO report, GAO-03-482, March 2003 
512 ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. 
Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites’, GAO report, op. cit., p. 7 
513 ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. 
Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites’, op. cit., p. 8 
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weapons industry as highly sensitive, and there are reservations on both sides to fully 
reverse the Cold War practices of guarding nuclear secrets. 
The organisational culture and traditional values held by agencies involved in the 
CTR programmes plays a substantial role in aggravating the issue of access. Military, 
security and weapon-building establishments are generally less flexible in changing their 
routine procedures.  As far as these are precisely the type of state agencies involved in the 
CTR process, it is hard to anticipate more rapid progress. When access is not denied 
altogether by the Russian side, a different set of bureaucratic complications come into play, 
and they are prompted by both sides. The Russian FSB and U.S. State Department have 
elaborate time-consuming procedures of granting access and issuing visas respectively.  The 
common procedure of reviewing applications for access to a Russian facility takes 45 days 
(in some cases the period is reduced to 30 days). The State Department has been criticised 
for bureaucratising procedures for giving permission to U.S. personnel to travel to Russia 
and has been taking time to scrutinise visa applications from the Russian experts travelling 
to the U.S. for CTR-related visits and training. 
The bureaucratic setbacks are prompted by lack of inter-agency coordination inside 
the countries and between the two sides. The problem of inter-agency rivalry is common 
for Russia in terms of struggle for CTR funding. The U.S. participating agencies have been 
criticised for a lack of coordination of their CTR efforts in Russia. 
The example of the Lab-to-Lab Programme (which was a part of MPC&A 
Programme) provided evidence that with a reduced involvement of state organisations, 
more progress can sometimes be made (Chapter 5). During its existence, the Lab-to-Lab 
initiative was able to move beyond the bureaucratic bottlenecks on the government level 
and had provided the foundation for cooperation in the most sensitive area of securing 
fissile material in Russia. The Lab-to-Lab initiative was one of the important examples of 
how nuclear scientists, engineers and other experts ‘on the ground’ relate to each other at 
the level of experts and are less prone to be slowed by bureaucratic mechanisms of state 
organisations. 
Some of the conditions attached to cooperation have dramatically delayed the 
implementation of major CTR projects. One of the most inconvenient conditions attached 
to projects falling under the CTR umbrella agreement (the original legislation establishing 
the CTR Programme) is the requirement to buy only American equipment and expertise. 
The “Buy-American” clause applies to the DOD-administered CTR Programme and 
constrained the MPC&A Programme for several years until it was moved from the auspices 
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of the Defence Department to the Department of Energy. The persistence of the U.S. 
Congress requiring the use of U.S. goods and expertise only has left an unfavourable 
impression on the Russian participants of the programmes affected by the ‘Buy-American’ 
clause. It was both impractical and controversial in terms of the message sent to Russia. 
Another condition stipulating that the U.S. equipment provided to Russia for 
dismantlement purposes cannot be used for any other purposes (e.g. defence conversion) 
had also a negative impact on how the CTR process was perceived by people implementing 
the projects ‘on the ground’. The movement of equipment, such as excavators and cranes, 
was monitored by the U.S. side and their use for other than strictly limited purposes was 
not welcomed. 
There is an important ‘cultural’ aspect to problems in the U.S.-Russian cooperative 
threat reduction process. The ‘Western’ ways of doing business are not necessarily adopted 
well by Russians. One of the examples is the dissatisfaction of Russian side with the fact 
that the U.S. personnel working on programme implementation in Russia has been rotated 
frequently. While a normal practice for the U.S. government employees, it is seen by 
Russians as harmful to the building of trust and a stable relationship between teams of the 
two countries. 
This research suggests that the separation of bureaucratic and political factors 
influencing CTR implementation is not clear-cut. It can be argued that the problems on the 
organisational level are heavily influenced by the political environment, and it is difficult to 
differentiate between purely bureaucratic constraints and the impact of the political 
limitations of the U.S.-Russian relationship. However, it is possible to identify the primary 
and the secondary factors in the problems of CTR: the political environment of the U.S.-
Russian strategic relations seems to be the primary factor, while bureaucratic politics is 
more of a secondary factor, since it is influenced by the political conditions. It should be 
noted that even if there were no political constraints, there would still be problems 
connected with the bureaucratic ‘pushing and pulling’ of different organisations involved in 
a complex decision-making and implementation process – such as CTR. However, in the 
case of the CTR process, political constraints aggravate even further the already existing 
bureaucratic conditions for slow implementation of the programmes. In other words, if the 
U.S. and Russia would adapt their strategic relations more closely to the conditions of the 
contemporary security environment, in which they are no longer enemies, it would have a 
direct positive impact on the bureaucratic environment for implementation of CTR 
programmes. [For example, the process of issuing visas (in both countries) and access 
permits (by Russian security services) is already a bureaucratised process, but due to a 
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degree of suspicion towards cooperation in CTR area, that process is subjected to even 
further delays].  
Although, problems of a bureaucratic and political nature were identified as major 
factors in the slow pace of CTR programmes, some other problems of a technical and 
conceptual nature became evident as a result of this research. This observation especially 
applies to programmes dealing with the disposition of fissile material. These programmes 
are hindered by the lack of technically flawless methods of disposition, and their value is 
questioned by the continuing production of fissile material.   
The disposition of plutonium is complicated by the absence of an ideal method of 
disposition. The two possible options - immobilisation and converting plutonium into 
MOX fuel – have limitations from either economic, technical or proliferation points of 
view. The immobilisation option has never been done on a large scale and is considered to 
be a technically ‘immature’ method of plutonium disposition. There are doubts on whether 
the final product would meet the spent-fuel standard required by the U.S.-Russian Plutonium 
Disposition Agreement. In any case, the Russian government made it clear that it is not 
considering immobilising its plutonium as an option to dispose of the material it considers 
of economical value. 
The MOX option, which is currently more favoured by both – the U.S. and Russia 
– is even more criticised for its limitations. Among them:  the MOX option does not 
eliminate entirely the danger of re-using plutonium in weapons; it is an expensive, 
economically not viable way of disposition, using MOX fuel in reactors can be dangerous, 
Russia does not have facilities to implement MOX disposition of plutonium, and finally, 
producing MOX fuel can increase proliferation risks. 
There is also the issue of on-going plutonium production in Russia. The remaining 
three plutonium reactors in Russia were not shut down as was scheduled due to the fact 
they provide heat and electricity to the near-by town. Their operation is, therefore, critical 
for a significant number of residential and industrial facilities. In March 2003 U.S. and 
Russia signed a modified agreement under which the three plutonium reactors are to be 
replaced with fossil energy plants.514 Noting previous agreements on reactor shut-down, 
which were not carried out due to lack of financial resources, leave room for doubt 
whether the work of the three plutonium reactors would be suspended in the near future. 
                                                 
514 ‘Plutonium Production Reactor Shutdown’ at 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/ending/plutonium.asp#_ftn2   retrieved on 22.11.03 
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The HEU Purchase Agreement, which provides a framework for the U.S. purchase 
of Russia’s HEU converted into LEU, is also hindered by factors beyond the bureaucratic 
or political sphere. Apart from the organisational interests of USEC – a private company 
aiming to have commercial profit from the deal, the state of the world uranium market has 
important consequences for the viability of the deal. The current agreement between 
USEC and the Russian government has set a price for Russian LEU, which would fluctuate 
in accordance with the world prices for uranium. Such arrangement can potentially cause 
problems should the prices drop dramatically. In this respect, putting a non-proliferation 
project on a purely commercial basis cannot be seen as an ideal solution. 
The issue of the disposition of fissile material in CTR has important wider 
implications for the end point of the CTR process, which are discussed later in this chapter. 
 
8.3.2 Going against the Odds: Accounting for the Establishment of the CTR 
Process 
At the core of this research is the question: How can we explain the establishment 
and the outcomes of the CTR process? The identification of conditions which resulted in 
its creation, the factors that mitigated against CTR and constrained the process, and those 
that made it possible to overcome those obstacles, at least to an extent, can provide a 
glimpse of the core of the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship in the post-Cold War. This 
relationship can be characterised as ‘constrained’ partnership, an ambiguous relationship 
which has seen unprecedented cooperation with the some of the features of the Cold War 
thinking and policy-making still lingering. 
The process of cooperative threat reduction emerged through the implementation 
of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Act, a unique U.S.-Russian effort to deal with 
the unprecedented nuclear dangers. The imminent collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
complete uncertainty about what would happen to nuclear weapons and material in the 
disintegrating country motivated an attempt to design methods of dealing with the nuclear 
dangers and threats whose full extent could not be estimated on either side. There was a 
mutual realisation in Russia and the U.S. that the dramatic political, social, and economic 
changes resulting from the dissolution of Soviet Union might prompt an unauthorised 
use/launch of nuclear weapons, leakage of nuclear materials and expertise to rogue states, 
smuggling of weapons and materials and attempt to use them by sub-state actors. 
Nevertheless, Cooperative Threat Reduction was a process that was so contrary to 
the political culture of national security establishments and hence faced so many 
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fundamental obstacles that it requires an explanation of how it could ever come in to 
existence at all. 
First of all, it was not at all clear that the nuclear dangers and threats in the 
disintegrating Soviet Union outlined by the Harvard study in Soviet Fission515 and taken on 
as reasons for establishing the CTR Programme by Senators Nunn and Lugar constituted a 
real and present danger to the United States. There was no evidence of an imminent loss of 
control nuclear weapons or materials. Neither the imminence nor the magnitude of the risk 
was certain. Governments have difficulties in prioritising resources to deal with threats that 
are unquantifiable, and that may or may not be real. The situation has changed after the 
terrorist attacks in September 2001, however, even in the new circumstances it is easier to 
justify funds for military action in Taleban-ruled Afghanistan, which was harbouring Al-
Qaida, since it can produce immediate obvious results rather than persuade the U.S. 
Congress to spend money on securing Russian weapons and materials, which can possibly, 
but not necessarily be acquired by Al-Qaida. It was even harder to defend ‘soft’ 
programmes, such as providing jobs for former Soviet scientists, since again, the threat of 
‘brain-drain’ represented an uncertain, unquantifiable risk, and it was problematic to 
demonstrate a direct relation between the money spent on grants provided to nuclear 
scientists and the reduction of threat of the U.S. being attacked by weapons, which could 
have been possibly designed with the help of Russian expertise. 
Secondly, CTR programmes required collaboration on matters, which were deemed 
to constitute the most sensitive security secrets. All CTR-related programmes require to a 
different extent access to Russia’s sensitive nuclear sites.  For example, Material Protection, 
Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Programme is the most intrusive programme of all, 
since it requires to facilities storing fissile material (information on composition of fissile 
material is the most classified information in the nuclear weapons field). Nuclear Cities 
Initiative (NCI) requires frequent travel of the U.S. officials and other experts to the 
‘closed’ cities, which historically were protected from any presence of outsiders, let alone 
foreigners. An implementation of all CTR programmes was complicated by a necessity to 
receive access to Russia’s nuclear facilities. The fact that nuclear weapons remain central to 
Russian and American strategic planning is another factor of the remaining secrecy 
surrounding nuclear weapons complex. 
                                                 
515 Campbell, Carter, Steven, and Zraket, eds., Soviet Nuclear Fission, op. cit. 
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Thirdly, initially there was a strong opposition within the U.S. to providing 
assistance to Russia. The founding Nunn-Lugar legislation (which provided the basis for 
the CTR Programme) was initially rejected. The most common concern voiced by some 
representatives of the Pentagon and the U.S. legislative branch was that by assisting Russia 
to deal with its dismantlement and nuclear safety and security needs, the U.S. would be 
freeing Russia’s own resources for its strategic modernisation. Strategic modernisation was 
not a hypothetical issue, because START II required Russia to replace most of its existing 
ICBM force with new single-warhead missiles. This kind of concern was not eradicated 
with the adoption of the CTR Programme. The possibility that the U.S. might be 
‘subsidising’ the Russian military complex remains an issue for critics of the CTR process, 
who question the wisdom of providing non-proliferation assistance. Some programmes, 
such as the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) designed to provide additional incomes for 
Russian scientists, are criticised because they allegedly keep the Russian nuclear complex 
‘afloat’ by sustaining expertise, which can be used against U.S. interests should the 
international situation change. 
Fourthly, the opposition within certain circles of the Russian political elite was no 
less strong. For reasons of the culture of secrecy outlined earlier, CTR was a hard ‘sell’ in 
Russia too. The fierce debates in Russian parliament preceded ratification of the CTR 
‘umbrella’ agreement. The concern was that the U.S. might ‘steal’ Russian secrets or take 
control over Russia’s strategic arsenal. 
Last but certainly not the least, as this study has revealed, bureaucratic politics 
strongly influenced the CTR process.  The organisational culture and values held by 
individual bureaucrats impacted on the way the CTR process developed. On the negative 
side, it was a frequent occurrence that problems were encountered on the organisational 
level because the state establishments were not adapted to the pressing needs of the new 
security threats stemming from Russia’s inability to secure its weapons and materials. Large 
organisations generally do not deal well with innovative practices, and CTR was certainly 
one. The uncertainties of the general direction of U.S.-Russian relations, especially with 
regards to the strategic relationship, further complicated the implementation on the 
bureaucratic level as unambiguous political leadership was often absent.  
Given the many political and other constraints that mitigated against a programme 
such as CTR, it is remarkable that it was nevertheless established, and Russia and the U.S. 
found a way to engage in an unprecedented cooperative security endeavour. We can adduce 
the following factors that help to explain the phenomenon of CTR:  
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First of all, although there was some debate about the urgency and the scope of the 
threat, the threat was perceived to be real by key actors in the U.S. political elite. If it was 
uncertain that sub-state actors or rogue states would take advantage of Russia’s nuclear 
weapons and materials, it was understood that if they decided to do so, they would have all 
conditions to succeed. Although, the perception was that the weapons were relatively well 
protected in Russia (for the time being), there was a great concern over the nuclear material 
since there were reasons to believe that nuclear materials were at risk. More importantly, 
the West was highly concerned about nuclear warheads left in non-Russian republics. The 
political environment in the former Soviet Union (including the Russian Federation) was 
highly unstable. Given the uncertainty with regard to the character of the governments in 
the newly independent states and issues of safety and security it was agreed that 
denuclearisation of three former Soviet states (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) was a 
priority, and CTR funds played a critical role in this process. 
Secondly, the role of key individuals (as suggested by Graham Allison in his 
Bureaucratic Politics Model) was important. There was a fortuitous combination of 
scholars from Harvard University who were the first to undertake a fundamental study on 
arising nuclear threats in the disintegrating Soviet Union (Soviet Nuclear Fission) and Senators 
Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar who had the political vision and will to found the Nunn-
Lugar (CTR) Programme, which initiated the process of the cooperative threat reduction.  
Even more important was the fact that the same scholars who were instrumental in 
developing ideas of cooperative denuclearisation and cooperative threat reduction (Ashton 
Carter, Graham Allison and others) were brought into the U.S. Government during the 
Clinton administration.   Their values and perceptions were a decisive factor in shaping the 
CTR process. 
Thirdly, President Yeltsin was attempting to forge a strategic relationship with the 
U.S. and transform the Russian nuclear arsenal in line with the limited financial resources 
of the Russian Federation and the perceived need to eliminate the dependence on missile 
factories outside Russia. The CTR programme fitted well into this framework, especially as 
part of the programme would assist with the costs of dismantling strategic nuclear vehicles. 
There was a more general interest on the Russian side in the financial benefits to be 
brought by the CTR projects.  The Russian economy of the early and mid-1990s was going 
through a dramatic period of turbulence, and any external funding was seen vital. 
To summarise: The research has established quite clearly that there were two 
distinct sets of driving forces that account for the CTR process. One was the deep-seated 
concern of key figures for the nuclear risks that resulted from the end of Communist rule 
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and the break-up of the Soviet Union. This concern evolved into a larger agenda for 
cooperation in stemming the risks of proliferation world wide. The other was the 
endeavour to construct a post-Cold War international system that was based on different 
principles, a New World Order. The U.S.-Russian relationship was to play a central role in 
this envisaged transformation of the international system by removing any vestiges of the 
bipolar Cold War structure. These two sets of policy objectives were given sufficient 
political momentum by key figures in the political elite, including the presidents of Russia 
and the United States, to overcome the systemic obstacles to an innovative programme like 
CTR. 
 
8.3.3 Assessing the Achievements of CTR: Implications for Arms Control 
and International Security  
The most tangible achievement of the CTR Programme was the denuclearisation of 
three non-Russian republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. At the moment of the 
Soviet collapse, four republics including Russia, had strategic nuclear weapons stationed on 
their territories, which meant an appearance of four potential nuclear powers on the former 
Soviet space (instead of one). The denuclearisation path chosen in the end by all three non-
Russian republics was not entirely the result of the availability of funds for denuclearisation 
from the CTR Programme. However, the CTR Programme played a substantial if not 
critical role in the decision made by the governments of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine 
to transfer all nuclear weapons from their territory to Russia. The two most successful 
projects under the initial CTR legislation were assistance for the dismantlement of START-
accountable weapon systems and the enhancement of the security of transportation for 
nuclear weapons and materials. The denuclearisation of non-Russian republics and helping 
Russia to meet its obligations under START were extremely important for the arms control 
process. 
By far the greatest proliferation risk emanated from the storage of nuclear 
materials. The enhancement of safety and security of fissile material was therefore a critical 
part of the cooperative threat reduction process. The Material Protection, Control and 
Accounting (MPC&A) Programme has reduced the amount of unprotected nuclear 
material, that is at risk of diversion. By the end of FY2002 the MPC&A programme had 
implemented ‘rapid’ upgrades of 37% of vulnerable nuclear material in Russia and half of 
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that number – have had ‘comprehensive’ upgrades.516 Most sites with nuclear material 
under the authority of the Russian Navy (95% of them) have had MPC&A upgrades. In 
addition to MPC&A, CTR has secured nuclear material through disposition. As of 
September 2003, the HEU Purchase Agreement succeeded in converting 193 metric tons 
of bomb grade HEU to 5,705 metric tons of LEU power plant fuel, which means that 
weapons grade material equivalent to 7,733 nuclear warheads was eliminated.517 As far as 
plutonium is concerned, Russia cannot provide for its disposition without external help.  
Although, the overall effectiveness of the Plutonium Disposition Programme is debated 
and practical results are yet to be achieved (no plutonium has been disposed of with the 
help of U.S. funds), the programme highlighted the problems associated with plutonium 
disposition in Russian and provided a framework for addressing them. 
The achievements of CTR in the area of fissile material will have a direct impact on 
the future of arms control. The CTR programmes have come as far as having an agreement 
that no new fissile material should be produced (the Plutonium Reactor Shut-Down 
Agreement), and that the extracted material cannot be re-used in weapons. The only next 
step to take would be an agreement on what to do with the fissile material already 
stockpiled. If the United States and Russia would agree that the material already produced 
cannot be used in weapons, it would practically mean the end of the nuclear programmes 
and would commit Russia and the United States to a path leading to the gradual elimination 
of nuclear arsenals. The role of CTR programmes in paving the way for a potential 
denuclearisation of two countries is enormous. It is true that although in the 
Clinton/Yeltsin period much progress was made in this direction through CTR and various 
international non-proliferation regimes, the two countries shied away from the last step of 
committing themselves to the end of fissile missile production. Under the Bush 
administration any progress in this direction has been suspended and in fact reversed as 
some of the links in the chain of the nuclear warhead production process that had been cut 
have now been reinstated. But there remains the opportunity that this process toward 
denuclearisation will be resumed in future through an invigorated, multilateral process of 
Cooperative Threat Reduction. 
The potential proliferation risk associated with the potential “brain-drain” was 
recognised, and programmes dealing with the human factor in the downsizing of Russian 
                                                 
516 ‘Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials’, op. cit., p. 78 
517 USEC, at http://www.usec.com/v2001_02/HTML/megatonnes_fact.asp retrieved on 
12.05.03 
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nuclear complex can claim a certain degree of success in confronting this threat (Chapter 
7). 
The progress of CTR reveals that the United States and Russia were able to 
overcome bureaucratic and political obstacles, albeit with mixed degree of success and 
there was political will on both sides to implement an unprecedented type of cooperation. 
It also shows that the type of security threats that the states face in the aftermath of the 
Cold War requires cooperation between the states to confront them. The problems of 
implementation they encountered has demonstrated that the CTR process can be seen as 
being ahead of its time – it relies on trust and requires a depth of partnership in sensitive 
areas, which are not yet typical for the current U.S.-Russian strategic relations. The CTR 
process has also confirmed that Russia’s transition to being an equal partner representing 
common values and goals in the international security system would take a longer time than 
initially anticipated.  
The current research suggests that some important problems in the implementation 
of CTR programmes are of a bureaucratic nature. However, bureaucratic factors are 
aggravated by the political factors stemming from the fact at the national security policies 
of the U.S. and Russia are still in part based on concepts and strategies adopted during the 
Cold War period. This is particularly relevant with regard to the role assigned to nuclear 
arsenals by both countries. 
In this respect, it would be interesting to look at the question of what the role of 
nuclear weapons should be in the post-Cold War security system.  At the conceptual level, it 
is evident that nuclear weapons should be gradually taken out of the U.S.-Russian 
relationship, that their role should be reduced to reflect changes in the security 
environment, i.e. lack of a mutual threat, and the changing nature of conflicts, which do 
not require large arsenals of nuclear weapons either as means of deterrence, or as war-
fighting weapons. However, the question is how that new role can be defined in practical 
terms? What should be the posture, size, and state of alert of nuclear weapons in order to 
meet new security needs? If complete denuclearisation seems unrealistic for the next few 
decades due to the existence of other nuclear powers and rogue states aspiring to acquire 
nuclear capabilities, what kind of forces are needed to deter existing threats and how can 
the U.S. and Russia achieve more appropriate force postures?   
As long as confusion in the strategic objectives of the U.S. and Russia persists, the 
end point of the CTR process remains unknown because the final point of arms control 
and strategic reductions is uncertain. 
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As a result of the study of the CTR process and of the larger issues in which it is 
embedded (such as the role of nuclear weapons), the following tentative suggestions can be 
made: a change of policy on the part the United States (which may follow a change in 
leadership) can bring back some of the ideas of cooperative denuclearisation of the early 
1990s onto the international agenda. A decade of CTR removed certain barriers in the 
U.S.-Russian strategic relations. If the political leadership in the United States and Russia 
adapts more fully to the emerging international system and shows its willingness to act 
upon new security realities without holding on to the ‘old thinking’, it would give a 
tremendous boost to the transition towards a new world order. The CTR process should 
be used as part of an effective mechanism of such transition. 
 Appendix 1 – Amount of Fissile Material at Russian Sites/Facilities1
Name of Site/Facility Supervising Agency Amount of Separated 
Plutonium 
Amount of weapons-
usable Uranium (HEU) 
RUSSIAN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY NUCLEAR FACILITIES 
All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of 
Experimental Physics (VNIIEF) 
MINATOM More than 1,000 kg  More than 1,000 kg 
All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of 
Technical Physics (VNIITF) 
MINATOM More than 1,000 kg More than 1,000 kg 
Avangard Electromechanical Plant (AMZ) MINATOM More than 1,000 kg More than 1,000 kg 
Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant MINATOM no More than 1,000 kg  
                                                 
1 Source: Nuclear Status Report, op. cit 
Bochvar All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of 
Inorganic Materials (VNIINM) 
MINATOM  Less than 1,000 kg Less than 1,000 kg 
Electrochemical Plant MINATOM no More than 1,000 kg 
Elektrokhimpribor Combine MINATOM More than 1,000 kg More than 1,000 kg 
Elektrostal Machine Building Plant (MSZ) MINATOM no More than 1,000 kg 
Institute of Medical and Biological Problems (IMBP) Ministry of Health no Less than 100 kg 
Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) MINATOM More than 1,000 kg More than 1,000 kg 
Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics MINATOM no Less than 1,000 kg  
Instrument Making Plant MINATOM More than 1,000 kg More than 1,000 kg 
Joint Institute of Nuclear Research (JINR) Independent 
Government Institute 
Less than 10 kg Less than 100 kg 
Karpov Scientific Research Institute of Physical 
Chemistry 
Ministry of Economics no Less than 100 kg 
Khlopin Radium Institute, St. Petersburg Branch MINATOM Less than 5 kg Less than 5 kg 
Khlopin Radium Institute, Gatchina Branch MINATOM Gram quantities are kept in hot 
cells at this site 
Gram quantities are kept in 
hot cells at this site 
Kurchatov Institute, Russian Research Centre Independent 
Government Institute 
Less than 1 kg may be on site More than 1,000 kg 
Luch Scientific Production Association (NPO 
LUCH) 
MINATOM no More than 1,000 kg 
Mayak Production Association MINATOM More than 1,000 kg More than 1,000 kg 
Mining and Chemical Combine (MCC) MINATOM More than 1,000 kg More than 1,000 kg 
Moscow Engineering and Physics Institute 
(MEPHI) 
Ministry of Education Small amount for research Less than 100 kg 
Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant (NCCP) MINATOM no More than 1,000 kg 
Petersburg Institute of Nuclear Physics Russian Academy of 
Sciences 
no More than 100 kg 
Scientific Research Institute of Atomic Reactors 
(NIIAR) 
MINATOM At least 100 kg More than 1,000 kg 
Scientific Research Institute for Instruments MINATOM no More than 1,000 kg 
Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power 
Technology (NIKIET), Moscow Branch 
MINATOM no Less than 10 kg 
Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power 
Technology (NIKIET), Yekaterinburg Branch 
MINATOM no More than 100 kg 
Siberian Chemical Combine (SCC) MINATOM More than 1,000 kg More than 1,000 kg 
START Production Association MINATOM More than 1,000 kg More than 1,000 kg 
Tomsk Polytechnical University Ministry of Education no Less than 100 kg 
Urals Electrochemical Integrated Plant (UEIP) MINATOM no More than 1,000 kg 
RUSSIAN NAVAL FACILITIES, NORTHERN FLEET 
Ara Bay Naval Base (Ara Guba) MOD no An unknown amount of 
HEU is located in fuel on 
active duty and 
decommissioned submarines 
Atomflot Ministry of 
Transportation 
no More than 500 kg of HEU is 
located on the service ship 
Immandra and in the reactors 
of active icebreakers 
Gadzhiyevo Naval Base  MOD no An unknown amount of 
HEU is located in fuel on 
active-duty submarines, on 
decommissioned submarines, 
and in spent fuel 
Gremikha Naval Base MOD no An unknown amount of 
HEU is located in low-
irradiated and spent fuel on 
decommissioned submarines 
and on site in spent-fuel 
assemblies 
Nerpa Shipyard Russian Shipbuilding 
Agency 
no Approximately 1,000 kg of 
HEU is located on the PM-
12 fuel-transfer ship 
Northern Machine Building Enterprise Russian Shipbuilding 
Agency 
no More than 1,000 kg of spent 
fuel is located on site and the 
PM-63 service ship 
Olenya Naval Base (Olenya Guba) MOD no More than 1,000 kg of HEU is
located in active duty
submarines and in fresh and
spent fuel on the PM-12
service ship 
Pala Bay Submarine Repair Facility (Pala Guba) MOD no An unknown amount of 
HEU is located on board 
docked submarines 
Severomorsk Naval Base MOD no More than 1,000 kg of fresh 
and spent fuel is located at 
Site 49; and fresh fuel on 
board battle cruisers 
Sevmorput Naval Shipyard No. 35 MOD no Am unknown amount of 
HEU is in low-irradiated and 
spent fuel on 
decommissioned submarines 
Shkval Naval Yard No. 10 MOD no An unknown amount of 
HEU is in low-irradiated and 
spent fuel in 
decommissioned submarines 
Zapadnaya Litsa Naval Base MOD no An unknown amount of 
HEU is located on active 
duty submarines and in spent 
fuel 
Zvezdochka State Machine Building Enterprise Russian Shipbuilding 
Agency 
no An unknown amount of 
HEU is located in low-
irradiated and spent fuel on 
decommissioned submarines 
and on the two service ships 
RUSSIAN NAVAL FACILITIES, PACIFIC FLEET 
Amurskiy Zavod  Russian Shipbuilding 
Agency 
no An unknown amount of 
HEU is located in fuel in the 
reactor of the partially 
completed submarine 
Cape Sysoeva MOD no An unknown amount of 
HEU is located on site in 
spent fuel 
Chazma Ship Repair Facility MOD no More than 2,000 kg of fresh 
and spent fuel is located at 
Site 34, on board the PM-74 
service ship, and in low-
irradiated and spent fuel in 
decommissioned submarines 
Gornyak Shipyard MOD no More than 1,000 kg of HEU 
is located in fresh and spent 
fuel on the PM-74 and 
possibly on the 
decommissioned PM-32 
service ship 
Pavlovsk Bay MOD no An unknown amount of 
HEU is located in fuel on the 
active-duty submarine and 
nuclear-powered ships, as 
well as in low-irradiated and 
spent fuel in 
decommissioned submarines 
Razboynik Bay MOD no  An unknown amount of 
HEU is located in low-
irradiated and spent fuel in 
decommissioned submarines 
Rybachiy Nuclear Submarine Base MOD no There is an unknown amount 
of HEU located in fuel on 
active-duty and 
decommissioned submarines 
Zavety Ilyicha MOD no An unknown amount of 
HEU is located on low-
irradiated and spent fuel in 
decommissioned submarines 
Zvezda Far Eastern Shipyard Russian Shipbuilding 
Agency 
no An unknown amount of 
HEU is located in spent fuel 
on decommissioned 
submarines 
OTHER RUSSIAN NAVAL FACILITIES 
Admiralteyskiye Verfi Shipyard Russian Shipbuilding 
Agency 
no Possibly in fresh fuel and in 
critical assembly 
Baltic Shipyard Russian Shipbuilding 
Agency 
no An unknown amount of 
HEU is stored at this site in 
fresh fuel 
Central Physical-Technical Institute (TsFTI) MOD, 12th Directorate no At least 5-10 kg of fresh fuel, 
approximately 90% 
enrichment 
Experimental Machine Building Design Bureau MINATOM no There is an unknown amount 
of HEU at a military-
controlled location on site 
Krylov Central Scientific Research Institute Ministry of Economics no Less than 100 kg of HEU 
 
Appendix 2     MPC&A Upgrades at Russian Facilities2  
 
Name of the site/facility Time framework MPC&A Status 
All-Russian Scientific Research Institute (VNIIEF) 
http://www.vnieief.ru/english  
Work begun: 1994 
Not yet completed 
x Initial cooperation was limited to a few sites within the 
VNIIEF complex.   
x In 1997 cooperation expanded to all sites that process or store 
HEU or plutonium 
x 1998 – upgrades completed at the Pulse Research Reactor 
facility3 
All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of 
Technical Physics (VNIITF) 
http://www.vniith.ru  
Work begun: 1995 
Not yet completed 
x Cooperative MPC&A work with DOE at the pulse research 
reactor (PRR) facility.  Upgrades included the installation of 
hardened doors, metal detectors, video surveillance, alarm 
systems and a physical protection control centre. A new system 
at PRR commissioned in May 1998 
x Areawide MPC&A improvements: vehicle and pedestrian 
portal monitors and metal detectors were installed at key 
points throughout VNIITF 
x installation of access controls, implementation of a 
computerised badging system, construction of a centralised 
MPC&A control station, development of a tamper-indicating 
                                                 
2 The following table is generated from the Nuclear Status Report, op. cit.  The data is based on the most recent information in open sources (2001) 
3 See Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 26, DOE-MINATOM Nuclear Security Arrangements, http://www.acronym.org.uk/26doe.htm  
device programme 
x VNIITF is completing a measured physical inventory of all its 
nuclear materials, plans to develop a complex-wide 
computerised material control and accounting system. 
x In July 2000 - physical inventories were under way in two of 
the building of PRR facility and the same procedure was 
planned for several other sites 
x Consideration to construct a new fissile-material storage 
building to consolidate material from three sites 
x 1999 - access problems slowed the work 
Avangard Electromechanical Plant (AEP) Work not yet begun x work scheduled for 1998 but access to sites was denied 
although some portal monitors and other equipment was sent 
x 1999 - DOE’s policy not to continue any work until access 
issue is resolved 
Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant 
http://insp.pnl.gov/?profilebeloyarsk.be  
Work began in 1996 
Work completed in 1998 
x physical protection upgrades: central alarm station; 
improvement of fresh- and spent-fuel vault areas (access, video 
surveillance, electronic sensors); hardening of the vehicle and 
personnel portals; provision of a guard communication system 
x provision of equipment for nuclear-material measurement; 
provision of a underwater video camera and recorder for 
verification of spent-fuel serial numbers; and a computer 
network for material accounting 
x VNIITF is working with Beloyarsk NPP on the development 
and implementation of a computerised accounting system 
Bochvar All-Russian Scientific Research Institute 
of Inorganic Materials (VNIINM) 
Work began in 1995 
Not yet completed 
x 1994 - GAN ordered to shut down certain activities for 6 
months owing to lax measures for protecting plutonium 
x improvement of VNIIM’s current methods for measuring bulk 
nuclear  materials 
x VNIIM is working with DOE to develop a general MC&A 
plan for the entire institute (including a computerised 
accounting system) 
x DOE and Germany provided physical protection assistance 
Electrochemical Plant 
http://www.ecp.ru  
Work began in July 1996  
Not yet completed 
x upgrades focused on the HEU storage facility, the intermediate 
storage and fluoridation facility, the uranium downblending 
area, and the facility perimeter 
x The plant upgraded access controls around the facility and 
DOE provided video surveillance equipment, metal and 
nuclear material detectors, and X-ray machines 
x structural hardening and the installation of alarms and sensors 
x upgrades to the Central Alarm station; communications 
equipment provided to the guard force 
x scales for material measurement, bar codes, tamper-indicating 
devices, hardware and software for a computerised material 
accounting system  
Electrokhimpribor Combine Work has not begun x work scheduled for 1998 but access to sites was denied 
although some portal monitors and other equipment was sent 
x 1999 - DOE’s policy not to continue any work until access 
issue is resolved 
Elektrostal Machine Building Plant (MSZ) Work began in 1994 
Work suspended 
x 1994 - this facility was a ‘test’ facility for MPC&A programme 
x 2 specific sites within the LEU line were chosen for full 
upgrades.  Attention on fast-breeder fuel production line 
situated in the same building as the LEU production line.  
Assistance included: enclosing and separating the fast-breeder 
line within the building, adding access controls, an enhanced 
alarm system, portal monitors, sensors and perimeter fencing 
x LEU line: installation of hardware and software for 
computerised material accounting and the delivery of 
equipment for nuclear material measurements 
x 1997 - a new MPC&A system commissioned at building 247 
x After a few years the full fast-breeder fuel-fabrication line (uses 
HEU of 26% enrichment) was to the DOE MPC&A.  
September 1999 - all work was ended by DOE due to access 
problem 
Institute of Medical and Biological Problems no plans for MPC&A upgrades  
Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) 
http://www.rssi.ru/IPPE  
Work began in September 1994 
Not yet completed 
x IPPE one of the first to participate in MPC&A programme 
x 1994 – first basic agreement between IPPE and LANL4 
x 1995 - work began at the fast critical assembly facility  
x 1996 - work extended to the fuel-fabrication laboratory and the 
old central storage facility. 
x Upgrades at all three facilities include: physical protection, 
improved access control, video surveillance of nuclear 
materials, implementation of nuclear material measurement 
techniques, use of methods for automated material accounting, 
development of local networks for computerised material 
accounting, and the development of procedures for taking 
physical inventories.  Many of these upgrades will be extended 
to the entire IPPE site 
x 1996 - IPPE decided to create a «nuclear island» consisting of 
the fast critical assembly (BFS) facility and a new central 
storage facility. One physical protection will be developed for 
the «nuclear island», which will house 80-85% of the IPPE’s 
weapons-grade nuclear materials 
x 1995 - The RMTC was established by the Russian government 
                                                 
4 See http://www.rssi.ru/IPPE/MPCA/prot.html  
to teach basics of MPC&A   
Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics 
http://www.heron.itep.ru  
Work began in 1996 and 
completed in 1998 
x provision of instruments for nuclear material measurements 
and software for computerised material accounting 
x physical protection includes: establishment of a central alarm 
station in the area where fissile material is located, access 
control, intrusion detection, video assessment, delay elements, 
and a guard communication system 
Instrument Making Plant 
http://www.npz.sol.ru  
Work has not begun x work scheduled for 1998 but access to sites was denied 
although some portal monitors and other equipment was sent 
x 1999 - DOE’s policy not to continue any work until access 
issue is resolved 
Joint Institute of Nuclear Research (JINR) 
http://www.jinr.ru  
Work began in May 1996 and 
was completed in February  
x improved access controls, intrusion sensors, a hardened fresh-
fuel vault, personnel portals, upgrades to the central alarm 
station, upgraded inventory-taking procedures, and a 
computerised material accounting system 
x DOE follow-up team has visited the site as part of DOE 
sustainability programme 
Karpov Scientific Research Institute of Physical 
Chemistry (Obninsk Branch) 
http://www.nifhi.ru/institut.html  
Work began in February 1996 
and was completed in February 
1998 
x physical protection upgrade includes access controls, alarms, 
sensors, and physical barriers 
x other upgrades: tags, seals, and computers for computerised 
material accounting 
x DOE follow-up team has visited the site as part of DOE 
sustainability programme 
Khlopin Radium Institute, St. Petersburg Branch 
http://www.atom.nw.ru/RIE/INDEX.HTM
Work began in 1996 and was 
completed in May 1998 
x hardened storage vault and improved access control at the 
central storage facility, computerised material accountancy 
system 
Khlopin Radium Institute, Gatchina Branch Work began in May 1996 and x improved access control at the main entrance to this facility  
http://www.atom.nw.ru/RIE/INDEX.HTM was completed in May 1998 
Kurchatov Institute, Russian Research Centre Work began in 1994  
Not yet completed 
x 1994 - assistance began as a part of lab-to-lab programme 
focusing on Building 116 where substantial amount of HEU 
are located - completed in 1995 
x November 1996 - upgraded security at central storage facility 
x 1997-1998 - Building 106, where several research reactors and 
critical assemblies are located, and Building 135, where three 
critical assemblies are located 
x physical protection include: access control systems, physical 
barriers, and alarms and sensors 
x computerised MC&A system called KI-MACS, which includes 
bar coding, tamper-indicating devices, and electronic scales (5 
buildings equipped) 
x February 2002 – U.S. Congressmen visited the facility to 
examine the physical protection of the building 1355 
Luch Scientific Production Association (NPO 
Luch)  
http://www.fas.org/spp/civil/russia/luch.htm  
Work began in 1996 
Not yet completed 
x mid-1998 - Luch consolidated HEU from 28 separate locations 
to four sites (with DOE’s MPC&A assistance) 
x central storage facility (CSF) - highest priority 
x building modifications, improved access controls, and the 
installation of alarms, sensors, video surveillance, and metal 
and radiation detectors 
x tamper-indicating devices, bar codes 
x U.S. equipment for nuclear-material measurement 
x computerised database for the location and identification of 
                                                 
5 See http://www.kiae.ru/eng/new/usa-2of.htm  
nuclear items 
x upgrades at the three HEU processing buildings 
x May 1999 - MCC Programme’s pilot project at Luch 
x November 1999 - DOE’s MCC Programme and Luch signed 
an agreement to continue consolidation work  
Mayak Production Association Work began in June 1996 
Not yet completed 
x two Mayak plants were allowed for MPC&A upgrades: RT-1 
spent-fuel facility and Plant 1, where the HEU oxidation and 
purification facilities are located 
x RT1: repairs to and installation of metal and nuclear-material 
detectors, upgrades to the central alarm station, upgrades to 
the interim and long-term plutonium dioxide vault and storage 
areas, and the provision of a physical inventory laboratory to 
help update inventory records of plutonium dioxide. 
Improvement of nuclear material measurements, the accuracy 
and timeliness of nuclear material accounting, and the 
computerisation of data gathering.  Under way: a computerised 
nuclear-material accounting network; upgrades to the existing 
badging and access control systems are being negotiated 
x Plant 1: 1999 - Mayak submitted reports on the current status 
of Plant 1.  May 1999 - a joint U.S. - Mayak team toured the 
plant.  MINATOM has not approved yet (2000) 
Mining and Chemical Combine (MCC) 
http://www.nuclearno.com/text.asp?312  
Work began in January 1996 
Not yet completed 
x Initial focus on the plutonium oxide storage facility (POSF).  
Upgrades include: increased access control, material 
surveillance equipment, sensors, and tamper-indicating devices 
x a new computerised material accountancy system  
x equipment for nuclear-material measurement and for taking 
physical inventories 
x future projects: the reactor complex, and the new plutonium 
oxide storage areas 
x 1999 – a Gkhk’s Plan6:  
1. a facility description and the division of GKhK into MBAs 
(Material Balance Areas) 
2. creating an MPC&A staff and management organisational 
structure 
3. descriptions of the accounting and inventory systems at 
GKhK 
4. the creation of an in-house accounting programme to confirm 
and verify fissile material quantities 
5. a material control system 
Moscow Engineering and Physics Institute 
(MEPHI) 
http://www.mephi.ru  
Work began in 1996 and was 
completed in June 1998 
 
x upgrades implemented at the research reactor building, the 
nuclear training facility, and the nuclear material storage centre.  
Upgrades include: building and minor perimeter modifications, 
access control, internal and external video systems, and 
sensors, improvements to guard posts 
x MC&A upgrades: computerised material accounting and the 
provision of instruments for improved nuclear material 
measurements 
x DOE follow-up team has visited the site as a part of the DOE 
sustainability programme  
Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant (NCCP) 
http://www.nccp.ru  
Work began in January 1996 and 
was completed in November 
2000 
x highest priority given to the central storage facility, where 
HEU was consolidated from four buildings to only one. 
x A storage building annex was constructed, several measures 
put into place: structural modifications to the building, the 
installation of sensors, cameras, and radiation detectors, and 
improved access controls. 
                                                 
6 See Russia:Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26), http://www.nto.org/db/misprofs/russia/fissmat/pukras26/kras26.htm  
x automated accounting system and nuclear material 
measurements 
x a new central alarm station is being built 
x upgrades are planned for the HEU processing facilities (to be 
completed by the end of FY2003) 
Petersburg Institute of Nuclear Physics Work began in 1996 and was 
completed in May 1998 
x video-monitored, double-fenced perimeter with a vehicle 
portal and crash barrier 
x a new entry control station on the perimeter includes video 
surveillance, a pedestrian portal monitor, metal and radiation 
detectors, and a badging system 
x physical protection upgrades to the VVR-M reactor building: 
building modifications, video monitors, sensors, access 
control, and a hardened HEU vault (fresh fuel for all reactors 
and critical assemblies is stored at the VVR-M facility) 
x new computerised MC&A system is working in «real time». 
The system tracks the movement of nuclear materials and 
assists with computerised nuclear material inventory  
Scientific Research Institute of Atomic Reactors 
(NIIAR) 
Work began in February 1996  
Not yet completed 
x Initial focus on the central storage facility (CSF), the MOX fuel 
facility, and the BOR-60 fast-reactor facility (these buildings 
handle the largest amounts of HEU and plutonium) 
x December 1996 - Building 106, which houses two of seven 
reactors, was added to the DOE Programme 
x July 1997 - NIIAR agreed to include all remaining buildings 
with appreciable amounts of HEU and plutonium in the 
programme 
x December 1998 - significant upgrades at CSF were completed.  
They incluge: modifications to the interior and exterior of the 
building, the installation of alarms, and the installation of 
several MC&A technologies, including bar coding, electronic 
scales, tamper-indicating devices, and computerised accounting 
x specific improvements at the MOX fuel facility and Building 
106: relocation and enhancement of the central alarm station, 
the installation of vehicle portals, the use of hand-held 
radiation monitors, and the use of various nuclear-material 
measurement equipment 
x development of a sitewide MC&A system 
x November 1999 - DOE MCC Programme signed an 
agreement with NIIAR to consolidate app. 250 kg of HEU 
and downblend it to LEU (by the end of October 2000) 
Scientific Research Institute for Instruments Work began in July 1997 
Not yet completed 
x July 1997 - site added to DOE list 
x October 1997 - work began; slow progress 
x 1999 - as part of MCC programme a significant amount of 
HEU was moved from the Institute to NPO Luch for storage 
Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power 
Technology (NIKIET), Moscow Branch 
Work began in February 1996 
and was completed in 1998 
x physical protection upgrades at a new fresh-duel vault at 
NIKIET headquarters: fresh fuel was moved from its previous 
storage place at Bauman University to the new vault, facility 
hardening, access control, video monitors, sensors, improved 
guard communications, alarms, and a central alarm station 
x minimal physical protection upgrades at the critical assemble 
facility at Bauman University 
x MC&A upgrades: tamper-indicating devices and a basic 
computerised material accounting system 
Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power 
Technology (NIKIET), Yekaterinburg Branch 
Work began in May 1996 and 
was completed in May 1998 
x improved protection at the fresh- and spent-fuel vault, 
equipment for nuclear-material measurement, tamper-
indicating devices, and hardware and software for 
computerised nuclear material accounting 
Siberian Chemical Combine (SCC) Work began in 1995 x installation of more than 27 pedestrian portal monitors and 
metal detectors at principal access control points within the 
Not yet completed SCC 
x by mid-2000 - total of 17 vehicle and 31 pedestrian portal 
monitors delivered and installed 
x sitewide communications computer network to link access 
control at al SCC facilities, an upgraded radio communications 
system, and delivery of a transport truck with a fissile-material 
vault for transporting fissile materials between facilities within 
the SCC 
x the reactor plant - the highest priority. Upgrades: upgrades to 
the 4.5-km perimeter and to the interior of the plant (variety of 
alarms and sensors).  The access control system to be 
completed in 2000 
x ISTC grant to develop a plan for a new MC&A system at the 
reprocessing plant. Project completed in 1997.  The developed 
plan includes the provision of bar codes and other equipment 
for nuclear-material measurement and inventory and 
equipment for computerised nuclear-material accounting. 
Physical protection upgrades have also been made to the 
reprocessing plant 
START Production Association Work has not begun x work scheduled for 1998 but access to sites was denied 
although some portal monitors and other equipment was sent 
x 1999 - DOE’s policy not to continue any work until access 
issue is resolved 
Tomsk Polytechnical University Work began in April 1996 and 
was completed in July 1998 
x physical protection upgrades to the reactor building, where 
both the reactor and the fresh-fuel storage vault are 
located: bricking up windows, replacing doors, hardening 
the roof, and the installation of an electronic access control 
system, a central alarm station, video cameras, and sensors. 
x MC&A upgrades: the provision of a tamper-indicating device 
system, a non-destructive assay system, a special nuclear-
material portal monitor, and hand-held monitors 
Urals Electrochemical Integrated Plant (UEIP) Work began in January 1996  
Not yet completed 
x January 1996 - site added to the DOE MPC&A list 
x September 1997 - work began 
x enhanced radio communications; video surveillance along the 
perimeter of the site and at buildings that store or process 
HEU; an access control system with portal monitors, metal 
detectors, and X-ray machines; equipment for nuclear material 
measurement; and hardware for computerised accounting 
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